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**CHINESE TRANSLATION OF THE WEST:
A HISTORY FOR A GLOBAL ERA**

by

Yangsheng Guo




**A thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy**

Department of Secondary Education

Edmonton, Alberta

Fall 2002



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FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled *Chinese Translation of the West: A History for a Global Era* submitted by Yangsheng Guo in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

DEDICATION

For **Jian**

Whose love and support have been the rock
upon which this work has been built...

ABSTRACT

Modern Chinese history can be described as an ongoing process of translating the West to re-define Chinese identity in relation to the West in colonial and postcolonial contexts. This massive translation effort points to some major intercultural challenges for the present age of globalization.

The thesis explores various dimensions of translation through hermeneutically reconstructing the Chinese experience of translating the West. It attempts to bring some new, Chinese perspectives to translation studies per se, and on that basis, to suggest some curricular implications of translation as a form of curriculum and curriculum itself as a form of translation.

An interpretive history of Chinese translation of the West was built by examining various historical details from different theoretical perspectives. This history displays the many dimensions of translation, perhaps especially the destructive patterns of a uniquely occidentalist translation of the West as Other, as well as linguistic and cultural difficulties that have been working at the heart of China-West engagement.

To gain some insights into where the ongoing work of translation is moving, three contemporary texts were selected, read and interpreted. These texts show that Chinese translation is still lost in a contradictory tension between a desire for wholesale Westernization and a kind of one-turn negation, or simple rejection of the West.

To find a way out of the impasse between Sinocentrism and Eurocentrism, a hermeneutic effort was made to identify the various roles of translation and translator, as seen in the Chinese experience. The idea of translation as a form of dreaming and

translator as a person in exile was put forward, suggesting both hopes and possibilities for translation as a third space for intercultural mediation. This new form of understanding translation and translator was then re-translated and applied briefly to the context of curriculum inquiry. This may hold promise for developing an international discourse of curriculum, involving intercultural reconciliation, peace and harmony in a globalizing world.

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Chinese Translation of the West: A History for a Global Era

I. Introduction and Overview

1. Introductory Statement

The importance of translation can hardly be over-emphasized. Translation has been, historically, a major agent in bringing the world to where it is today. At no time in history has the world of different linguistic, cultural, religious and social systems been so deeply inter-connected and inter-dependent. This inter-relatedness is well described by the term *global era*.

This global era is not simply one of multi-lingual, multi-national or multi-cultural harmony but an entanglement of various oppositional forces fighting against one another. At least two major forces are discernible. One is global economic integration as an essentially West-centred imaginary of globalization that sees no limits or boundaries. The other is represented by the non-West's cultural, social and other forms of resistance designed to protect personal, communal and national identities. The potential destructiveness of the two opposing forces, identified as a "clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1996), has started to manifest itself in the manner of post-"9.11" worldwide tensions. This rather gloomy global reality is calling for a more profound understanding of the deeper inter-related and shared truth of humanity.

Yet, no matter how radically different the two visions are, some form of translation of each for the other seems necessary for any shared future. The age of globalization, whether as an *imaginary* or as *facticity* (Smith, 2000), is inexorably an age of translation.

What is ironic is that on the one hand, translation has often been regarded as an effective, and at times singular basis for intercultural understanding. On the other hand, intercultural understanding itself as a product of millennia of inter-civilizational translation is precisely what is lacking in this globalizing age. This situation raises the question of what translation can be understood to be, both ideally and realistically.

Indeed the root and cause of current international and intercultural discord between the West and non-West may be found in the tension between the possibilities and limits of translation.

Against this background, the present study attempts to interpretively reconstruct the Chinese experience of translating the West. Although as an ancient civilization, China boasts thousands of years of translation, Chinese translation of the West emerged as late as the end of the 16th century as a response to the West's global mission of colonization. It has been an open and ongoing process of China's various forms of interfacing and engagement with the West as the Other. An examination of this experience, from particularly linguistic, literary, intellectual and cultural perspectives, may demonstrate why and how China has come to be what it is today. It may reveal some of the inner tensions in the relationship between China and the West.

In a broader sense, since the Chinese experience is in many ways parallel to those of other non-West nations, such a study might show some deep-rooted tensions at the bottom of the current postmodern, postcolonial and globalizing world.

While the main part of the study is building a dynamic "text" of Chinese experience of translating the West, it is at the same time a hermeneutic interpretation of the text being built. In the process, the thesis focuses on the following (among other) issues:

- 1) What is translation as seen in the Chinese historical context?
- 2) What does it mean to translate the West within the Chinese context in terms of language, cultural tradition, personal and national identity? A subset of this question might be how translation of the West has been changing China.
- 3) How have Eurocentrism and the Celestial Empire mentality been played out against each other and what hidden forces can be identified from the "text" of Chinese translation?
- 4) Insofar as Chinese translation of the West is a product of Western colonization, what can such a text tell us of our shared postcolonial reality?
- 5) From an educational viewpoint, what does this dynamic and changing text tell us about curriculum studies in a global era? Put generally, what new dimensions of translation can be found that may be meaningful to our living creatively with

Others in a global era?

The final and ultimate purpose of the thesis is to show that the West and the non-West have moved, through centuries of mutual translation, to a point where each can make sense of their own identity only through directly or indirectly translating the other. In a sense, translation characterizes the way of life in a global era. In this sense, each and every one of us is a translator of others and an interpreter of translations. It is therefore of great significance to understand the nature, ways, forms and faces of translation. Many challenges and dangers confronting the contemporary world may find their roots in Orientalist and Occidentalist ways of translation. To understand these ways of translation is to understand what is problematic with current ways of life being lived by the West and the non-West. This process of understanding is itself a quest for the identity of translation as an academic discipline. In brief, the thesis is a humble effort, from one Chinese experience, to recover the lost space of translation as a genuine and creative intercultural space for a more meaningfully shared future. It intends to provide, through detailed studies, an interpretive text for any potential Western reader to retranslate the Chinese experience into his or her understanding of what it means to live in an age of East-West interconnection and interdependence.

2. Summary of Chapters

The present study is structured in a way that may point to the scope and breadth of Chinese experience of translating the West, an experience that is massive and complex. It may be necessary here to provide a road map for the study itself. This map is expected to illustrate how the following chapters are inter-connected and inter-related to the central theme of hermeneutically re-visiting and re-living this part of Chinese history. It is an account of ongoing, personal as well as collective experiences in a sense relived as a proffered contribution to a globalizing era.

Chapter II. Journey into the Study First and foremost, this study is a personal journey into my own experience as a translator and translation educator, one who seems to translate to live and live to translate in between cultures. It begins with a reflection on how and why I decided to take up this task. As a Chinese learning to speak and translate

the language of English in China, I came to North America with romantic fantasies about the West and a clear-cut mission of learning from the West for the rejuvenation of my homeland China. My first encounters in day-to-day life in North America, however, not only shattered my 'West-dream' to pieces; they shook the foundations of many of my unquestioned beliefs, faith and confidence in who I was and what I was doing. Those experiences ran much deeper than what studies on Culture Shock - which I had read extensively - could theorize. I was facing an untranslatable crisis of identity as a Chinese living in the West, as a Chinese translator-educator of the West, and as a human being caught in the web of globalization processes.

The crisis drove me to re-examine particularly the theories, techniques and pedagogical methods I had learned and practiced in my learning, teaching and translating English. I sensed that the best way to overcome my identity crisis of a non-verbal and non-textual nature would be to understand why I had never been able to textually translate the English word *identity* into proper Chinese.

The sections that follow then attempt to historically, theoretically and disciplinarily *locate* the present study by examining various literatures on translation studies. They are intended to set up the stage for the drama of Chinese translation of the West.

Chapter III. Textual and Cultural Translation The Chinese experience of translating the West is indeed dramatic, which can be seen from various aspects in Chinese translations. First of all, this dramatic quality comes from linguistic differences between the pictography- and ideography-based Chinese and alphabet-based English or other European languages. The Chinese character and the English word do not share phonetic or written affinities or similarities. Second, if a language is a system of cultural encoding, the character-based Chinese vocabulary and grammar well reflect the extent to which the dominant Chinese Confucian tradition differs from the West's Christian civilization.

Third, at both linguistic and cultural levels, translation is conditioned by different stages of civilizational development (pre-modern, modern and postmodern; or oral/aural, chirographic, typographic and telematic) (Lowe, 1982), each of which has its own system

of civilizational vocabulary and grammar. These stages of development, greatly affecting individual and collective conscious and unconscious, set limits to the translatability of texts from the source into the target cultures. Fourth, Chinese translation of the West is not a spontaneous intercultural act. From the very beginning, it has been characterized by various political, social, ideological and other motives and objectives. Through this open discussion of textual and cultural translation at an experiential level, this chapter tries to lay the foundation and raise the curtain for the dramatic story of translating the West to be possibly played out on various fronts, including linguistics, literature, philosophy, religion, morality, politics and so on.

Chapter IV. Historical Experience: Translation of Buddhism Prior to its first encounter with the West, China had enjoyed a long history of translating neighbouring cultures, particularly Buddhism. An examination of those historical experiences is not only necessary as a background to the subsequent translation of the West; it is important to interpreting the experience of translating the West in the following ways. In the first place, that period of translation was part of what had made China before its encounter with the West. On the one hand, translation had enriched Chinese culture in terms of language, literature, philosophy, moral values, and self-image. On the other hand, and perversely, it had strengthened China's Sinocentrism or Middle Kingdom mentality, which subsequently stood in the way of translating the more heterogeneous civilization of the West.

Second, while that period of translation established some theories and techniques of translation, it failed to develop a system of translatology that might explore intercultural dimensions of translation. For almost two thousand years, Chinese translation, confined to Buddhist textual renditions, had been unable to open itself to more secular responsibilities. In comparison with European experience of translation, it actually assisted in preventing China from advancing to a more modern society like Europe. As a result, internally, China remained culturally dormant within a vicious cyclicity of feudal dynastic changes. Externally, as a rival cultural Other to Europe, China lost the opportunity to creatively engage the West precisely when Europe was setting out on its march of global colonization.

Third, for all its shortcomings, Buddhist translation forms a sharp contrast to the later translation of the West. It speaks more about the positive and constructive side of translation as a peaceful, natural and spontaneous cultural choice, exchange and enrichment - enriching and therefore transforming a people without threatening its national identity. It stands as a counterpoint to the destructive nature of the oncoming Western orientalist translation of China, and Chinese occidental translation of the West. This chapter, then, is intended to illustrate China-West cultural and civilizational divides through revisiting Chinese translation before China-West encounter.

Chapter V. Translation of the West The unification of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism failed to culturally, intellectually or psychologically prepare China for its encounter with the West toward the end of the 16th century. The Middle Kingdom rejected all of the vanguards of Western colonial forces - Jesuits, pirates, sailors and adventurers - as 'barbarians.' It had no interest whatsoever in learning the language of the West.

With the efforts of missionaries such as Matteo Ricci, Western texts began to appear in Chinese at the turn of the 17th century. The collaboration between the Jesuits who were major scholars, and their Chinese converts who were mainstream Confucian scholars, could be regarded as the first meeting of minds between the two great civilizations. An examination of textual translations coming out of this meeting shows, first of all, how deep and wide the linguistic and cultural divides were for translating the Western logocentric Word into the sinocentric Character. It shows how a theology-based, trade- and industry-oriented culture could hardly be translated into the Chinese common sense-guided and agriculture-based culture. More importantly, it shows that the translations, being mostly Western translation of the West into Chinese, were not fruits of open intercultural engagement. Instead, they were expressions of different closed visions of divinity and humanity. Furthermore, it shows how translation, at this very early stage of China-West encounter, was manipulated and used for different purposes.

Unlike Buddhist translations, which had been peacefully, slowly and steadily assimilated into mainstream Chinese culture through linguistic, philosophical and social institutionalization, the missionary-convert translations were limited within an elite group

of Chinese. Ironically, even within the small circle at the imperial court, those translations stirred up waves of intellectual, religious and political power struggle. This points to new dimensions of translation as self-identification, social acceptance and cultural Otherness that defies easy mediation. It contains the roots of manipulation and appropriation of translation.

Chapter VI. Translation, Colonization and Anti-Colonization The failure of missionary-convert translations of the period from early 17th to mid-19th century was a miniature of China's overall failure in its intercultural engagement with the West. For nearly two hundred and fifty years, while Western works in theology, science, technology and philosophy were translated into Chinese, Chinese knowledge and understanding of the West was minimal.

During this time, Europe was translating China in its logocentric and imperialistic way through various means. As a result, like other non-West nations in the world, China was no longer that great civilization that it was in the eyes of the Enlightenment philosophers. Instead, it was being de-centred and dehumanized from the West-centred map of the world, as another atheistic, backward, underdeveloped and subhuman Other to be conquered and colonized. The Opium War beginning from 1840s started the long process of China being marginalized and dumbled-down in the new world order of the West's design.

On the other hand, the Celestial Empire-minded China was not seeing itself in that way. Instead, it was viewing the militarily and economically triumphant West as a morally and culturally inferior barbarian. With no way to translate the new capitalist language of the West, or to communicate the Chinese vision of human life with this arrogant and non-dialogical West, China started on its long march towards translating the barbarians in order to control them. Chinese translation moved radically towards its utilitarian, anti-colonial objective in the name of Yangwu Movement. For nearly half a century, it fell into the absurd logic of "Chinese body versus Western function," by which was meant Western science and technology should be used to serve the Chinese soul. Inevitably, this Occidentalist way of translation went against the nature of translation as primarily intercultural understanding and mediation. The massive textual translations of

particularly Western military science and technology pushed China further away from gaining a fair understanding of the 'truth' of the West.

Chapter VII. Self-Colonization The inevitable failure of the Yangwu translation movement, marked by China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, drove China to look further for *China's own truth* from the *West* through more radical kinds of translation. A ray of hope for a sounder translation came with overseas and returned students represented by Yan Fu. Although those students had been sent to the West as tools of colonization for the Euro-American imperial powers, and as anti-colonization agents for the Chinese government, they became the first bi-cultured translators of the West. In particular, Yan Fu opened up the tradition of Chinese translation of the West in the true, intercultural sense of the word translation that we might use today. Instead of becoming either a colonizing or an anti-colonial tool, Yan, standing in between the two cultures, was translating to find the more shared truth of modernity that was drawing all the nations, peoples, cultures and traditions into its sphere of influence. Together with Lin Shu and others, Yan brought China and the West to a platform of intercivilizational dialogue through translating some of the most influential Euro-American texts that were shaping the world of modernity in many different ways.

An examination of Yan's and Lin's textual translations, however, reveals that cultural and civilizational divides and incommensurabilities were still there in between the lines. In particular, Classical Chinese, with its pre-modern vocabulary and grammar, and its way of speech contextualized within the Confucian-Taoist-Buddhist framework, could hardly serve to translate the modernizing, industrializing and capitalizing language of the West. Similarly, traditional Chinese literary forms, methods and expressions could hardly transform the literary soul of the West into something comprehensible or sympathetic to the Chinese reader. Although Yan and Lin contributed a great deal to the possible gradual transformation of Chinese language and literature into something more compatible with its Western counterpart, the intensification of Euro-American colonization broke the hope for any peaceful transformation of China.

Chapter VIII. May 4th Revolution Chinese translation at the turn of the 20th

century represented by Yan Fu aroused national hope and desire for change through ways that seemed more rational than those adopted by the Yangwu Movement. However, the brutal forms of Western oppression and exploitation, culminating in the violent suppression of the Boxers' Movement by the Eight-Power Allied Forces, drove China to a corner where no rational forms of translating the multi-faced West seemed possible. Chinese translation turned radically to the more urgent task of revolutionizing and fighting for national survival - ironically through translating various Western anti-slavery, anti-colonial, proletarian and revolutionary literatures. Through translating Western political theories, Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his comrades overthrew the Qing Dynasty, bringing an end to the feudal system that had lasted over two thousand years.

The May 4th Movement, ignited by Euro-American powers' attempts to further carve China into dismembered 'spheres of influence,' was the beginning of a century of radical and revolutionary translation. Within a short period of time, in the light of the translated West, the cultural foundation of Confucianism was destroyed as the evil root of China's plight and woes. Classical Chinese, the medium and carrier of traditional culture, was rejected as useless, replaced by the vernacular, whose vocabulary and grammar were largely from half-mediated, half-manipulated and half-appropriated translations, especially Japanese translations, of the West. Classical literary forms were abruptly revolutionized by copying Western forms of fiction, drama, poetry and prose. From clothing, hair style, social etiquette, to love, marriage and education systems, many Chinese were imitating and practicing what they knew of the West through translations.

One of the most striking features of the May 4th Movement was translating and practicing Western political theories, including constitutional monarchism, democratic republicanism, socialism and communism. Different factions, groups and parties backed by different colonial powers carried out their translated political visions at the cost of millions and millions of lives. Another feature was using the more academic field of translatology as a war zone for political, social, intellectual and ideological fights. In a sense, modern Chinese translatology was born out of those fights. In brief, the May 4th translation movement demonstrated dimensions of translation that were largely invisible in histories of translation in other countries.

Chapter IX. De-colonization: Translation under the Proletarian Dictatorship

The Chinese Communist Party, born out of the May 4th translation movement, finally saved China from Western colonial hands. The New China as a political entity, however, was doubly cursed. Externally, it had to face the various forms of blockade that the West exerted against it. Internally, it had to face the tragic reality of cultural destruction resulting from the violent and revolutionary May 4th movement. Although a translated Marxism (especially the Soviet Union's version) was adopted in place of Confucianism, the new socialist or communist system could not be established simply through a political declaration. The New China had to re-translate into a new, sustainable culture the ruins of Confucianism and the broken memory of a colonizing West that had ironically become part of its legacy. Under the then international and domestic political climate, however, what could be built was largely a more destructive political culture of Communist control.

Inevitably Chinese translation under Mao's leadership served as a tool for de-colonization through language and ideological unification. On the one hand, the rate of textual translation by far exceeded that in the old China. On the other hand, what part of the West was to be translated and how to translate it depended on what particular objectives Mao's regime had in mind. Consequently, Marxist and Leninist translations dominated. In literature, for example, translations of the Soviet Union's proletarian literature and art took the major share.

In comparison, the literary West that was presented to Chinese readers was mostly 19th century critical realism. Although Fu Lei's translation of Balzac's *Human Comedy* might, for example, represent the Chinese efforts along the road opened by Yan Fu in terms of language, literature and culture, his own personal tragedy pointed to where Chinese translation would scale in Mao's China. Political manipulation of translating the West was best seen in the case of *Cankao xiaoxi* supervised by Mao himself. All this led China further away from understanding its roots in the now broken and rejected Confucianism in relation to the New China. Similarly lost was an understanding of what the West - against which China was trying to define itself through translation or absence of translation - was in relation to China. It could be regarded as part of the cause for the unprecedented cultural catastrophe of the Great Cultural Revolution (1966-76).

Chapter X. Contemporary Translation: A Chinese Form of Globalization

The death of Mao in 1976 marked another turning point in the Chinese history of translation. With Deng's open-door policy, China began its new long march towards translating the West for surviving the new world order which was largely of American design. However, ignorance about the post-WWII West has deepened the linguistic, social and cultural divides in translation, and lack of understanding of the Euro-American version of globalization as postcolonial and neo-colonial vision raises the question of to where this translation is leading China. On the one hand, the massive, ongoing translation of the West is displaying a kaleidoscopic pattern in scope and breadth in various forms. Its impact has been deep and broad. The waves of social, political, intellectual, economic and psychological unrest and turmoil were well represented by the Tian'anmen Incident. Today China looks more and more Westernized.

On the other hand, some of the essential questions and problems since the missionary-convert translation remain un-addressed, including language, culture and the intentionality of translation. In general, Chinese translation is still trapped in its occidentalist, utilitarian, Darwinian, political and now economistic mentality. It is still vacillating between wholesale Westernization and anti-Westernization. Over four hundred years ago, as a world power, the Sinocentric China could not, or did not care to, understand the language of, and therefore lost its opportunity to dialogue with the Eurocentric West. Now when the world is moving to an age of globalization, the postcolonial situation of Chinese language, culture and mentality makes it very difficult for China to carry on meaningful dialogues with the latter regarding a shared future. This is best seen in the three contemporary texts which I discuss in this chapter - *China Can Say No*, *Shanghai Babe* and Interviews with Chinese translators. These point to the bleak reality of massive translation with little intercultural value. However, while such translation practices may lead to an end of translation in its traditional sense, they may be calling for a newer understanding of translation in a global era. At the moment, a key problem is that translation is an occupation limited to professional translators. A better solution is to broaden out the scope of 'who' translates, to internationalize the translation community. In the thesis, this new awareness of translation leads to a hermeneutic

reinterpretation of the Chinese experience of translating the West, directed to a renewal of understanding what it means to translate and to be a translator.

Chapter XI. A Hermeneutics of Translation in a Global Era This chapter focuses on what the whole process of examining the vast Chinese experience of translating the West points to. First of all, in terms of language and culture, translation must be understood as a hermeneutic act. Translation of even one word involves understanding the whole linguistic and cultural contexts in which the word appears. However, the ambiguous, flexible, porous and slippery nature of language as a cultural and historical product of a nation's experience adds to the difficulty of this hermeneutic task. Different linguistic and cultural systems erect limits and boundaries between the source and target languages and cultures, as Chinese experience shows. These are some of the issues this chapter tries to address.

The various faces and dimensions of translation and translator lead to the understanding of translation as a form of dreaming and translator as a person in exile. And as the Chinese experience shows, the 'truth' of the West as Other, or of China as Self, has never been fully achieved through any form of translation. Instead, the West in translation or translation of the West has remained a dream.

The new form of understanding translation and translator is of curricular significance in a global era. In the last chapter of the thesis, I will suggest some curriculum implications of translation and translation education. To understand who I am in relation to the Other in a global era of inter-facing and inter-dependence, the West and the non-West may have to see how both have come to this situation by each examining their own history of translating the Other. A new understanding of how the notion of Self has been formed through orientalist and occidentalist ways of translating the Other may hold the promise of coming to terms with *being* in a global era, when *to live* is *to translate*.

3. Sources

As can be seen in the above summary, the present study, as a kind of 'hermeneutic history,' has been conducted in its particular way. It tries to create a space or location of

its own, where 'history' and 'interpretation' depend upon each other for self-expression. In other words, the present study is neither history nor interpretation, but both history and interpretation. It is a kind of history of translation, but a history contextualized within an interpretive framework that draws on various traditions of theory. It is an intercultural interpretation, but an interpretation situated within actual, living and ongoing Chinese historical experiences full of verbal, non-verbal and (inter)cultural tensions.

In between history and interpretation, and from the text of my own physical and spiritual being in China and the West, the thesis attempts to bring the dramatic, ongoing and open story of personal and national translation of the West to 'life' as it has been and is lived. It is a reflection on, and in itself, a journey into what it means to define the Self through translating the Other for a better, shared future. This may be what H-G.

Gadamer's "effective historical consciousness" refers to.

This location or positioning of the thesis comes partly out of the postcolonial academic situation in which using the dominant language of English to interpret the marginalized experience of Chinese translation means one has to interpret the experience by creating it. There is not much intertextuality in English to work from or with. While studies on translating Others abound in English, little can be heard that tells the other side of the story. For me, personally, bringing Chinese experience through translation to the table of deliberations on translation as intercultural dialogue is one of the key interests and concerns of this thesis. In a sense, in this historical study of Chinese translation of the West, I am writing primarily as a translator, both personally, as well as a translator of sources for this work.

In this case, the thesis has to draw heavily from Chinese sources for constructing the history. I have resorted to the over one hundred Chinese books and journals in translation studies my wife and I brought from China, and numerous books in Chinese or English that are related to or can inform translation studies of the West. Meanwhile I have turned to the Internet for sources in both English and Chinese. What is noteworthy here is that as a feature of this global era, the Internet itself is already a phenomenon of interconnection and free sharing of information. I can type in some key words in Chinese, such as *fanyi* (translation), *fanyishi* (history of translation), *fanyi yanju* (translation studies/research), *fanyixue* (translatology). Thousands of relevant websites and listservers

would be listed on the computer screen. I can scroll down and choose to enter those authoritative webpages I know from the names of publishers, scholars or translators. Unlike on-line English sources, numerous Chinese translation studies (on-line editions of formal books, journals, newspapers, etc.) can be accessed in their entirety for free on the Internet. There are many Chinese websites or online forums that are devoted to translation studies. However, sources that are used in the thesis are strictly limited to electronic versions of writings officially published by such authoritative institutions as Guangming Daily Press in Beijing and Wenhui Daily Press in Shanghai. These works have been listed as on-line sources.

4. On the Use of the Word "Translation"

As can be seen from above, within the discursive context of the thesis, the key word *translation* is understood in many different ways. It is often used in its broadest sense possible. Basically the word is used to mean a piece of writing or speech that has been translated from a different language, and the act of translating of speech or writing from one language into another (Collins, 1992). Sometimes it is used in the senses summarized in the *Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary of Current English*:

- 1) give the meaning of (something said or written) in another language; interpret;
- 2) show, make clear, the meaning of (either in words or by artistic performance);
render;
- 3) clarify (somebody's behaviour, etc.);
- 4) transform or realize;
- 5) remove to a different place or position;
- 6) take to heaven without death (in its figurative rather than religious sense).

To 'translate' the above definitions more specifically, the denotation and connotation of *translation* in this thesis have been sometimes extended and slightly modified. At times it is used to mean the actual process of textual translation that involves the original text, translator, interpretation and rendering of the original, and acceptance in the target culture. It is sometimes used to refer to the act of translation as the enactment of human vision, dream or desire, or as a political, intellectual, cultural and

social force. It is also used to refer to that part of translation which works as an agent for colonization, anti-colonization, self-colonization and de-colonization.

Sometimes, the reader may find that the word has been endowed with some kind of personal agency. This personification comes from two perspectives. The first is that while translation is a human action, the result or consequence of this action translates back as an uncontrollable "it," which works according to its own logic on the target culture. The second is that translation as a proper noun refers to the generalized community of translators who operate in different ways at different times in Chinese history. For instance, the missionary-convert translation, Yangwu translation, overseas and returned students' translation, May 4th translation - all these refer to groups of people who launched different translation movements to achieve their own intellectual and cultural ends. No matter in what sense *translation* is used, it always refers to an intercultural activity which is linguistically and culturally conditioned but holds promise of new possibilities for human exchange.

II. Journey into the Study

1. Personal Experiences

a. From China to Canada: Dream vs. reality

The idea for the present study flashed in my mind in 1997 shortly after I came from the most heavily populated part of China to one of the least populated parts of Canada. Sitting on the open terrace of the main building at the University of Lethbridge, with Wing-Tsit Chan's *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (1973) in one hand and a cigarette in the other, I looked into the valley below, to downtown Lethbridge on the other side of the river, and far into the distance, to a vast, flat, hill-less land. Like the green, sunny and lively summer that was giving way to the gray, leafless and chilly fall, my heart and mind were turning blank, speechless and cold.

I had come to North America as a visiting scholar on a hard-won Chinese government scholarship, part of a program aiming to modernize China. Like other visiting scholars from China, I was supposed to "learn the most advanced science, technology and theory from the West" to contribute to our national rejuvenation. In my specific situation, it was intended for me to update and further my modernist, postmodern and China-West comparative studies. In China, "the West" has been an ambiguous and changing term, currently referring mainly to the "advanced" countries, including Western Europe, North America and Japan. It has come to mean a free but globally unified "Other," within which there is not much difference and against which China is trying to define itself.

After much thought, I had chosen to come to Canada, since in Chinese Canada is called, together with the U.S., *meizhou* - the land/continent of beauty. Although I could not perceive much difference between the two countries, the fact that Canada had been successively rated the best country by the United Nations did help in my choice-making. Also I had learned that the United States is a cultural melting-pot, in which people of different colours and cultural backgrounds are seasoned, heated, boiled, stewed and remolded according to the governing principles of the American Dream. In contrast, Canada is a cultural garden, pruned by the national policy of multiculturalism, where one flower buds, grows and blooms not necessarily at the cost of another. Deep in my mind,

Canada meant the better part of the free, borderless America. Within my fantasy structure of the time, *Canada* was America.

What thrill and joy I had experienced when I had at last received my passport, visa and air tickets! America, *meizhou*, the homeland of Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Emerson, Thoreau, Whitman, Edison, Hollywood, Broadway, Dr. Norman Bethune, Martin Luther King, Bill Gates, Internet - everything that was associated with glamour, power, strength, creativity, freedom and democracy. America, the pinnacle of human development. America, the vigorous unity among diversity. America, a kind of language I had literally learned to speak, interpret and translate since I was twelve years old. The coming journey to North America would mean the fulfillment of myths and dreams that had constituted my sixteen years of academic, professional and intellectual activities.

For a time in my excitement, the other side of the "beauty" that I had been systematically taught - the ugliness of killing off the indigenous peoples, black slavery, consumerism, global hegemony, containment of China, etc. - seemed to have been suppressed into oblivion. As I was packing, I was filled with fancies, fantasies, imaginations, ambitions and a sense of mission for my nation. When I bid farewell to my wife and two-year-old daughter at the Beijing International Airport, I did not shed a drop of tears. As the plane took off, I looked out of the window. Intense feelings and emotions of patriotism and even heroism surged in me. I found myself solemnly promising that by making this journey into experiencing the other side of the myths and dreams, I would come back genuinely bi-cultured, and "do my bit to help build our motherland" with whatever I could bring from the West.

But now, however, sitting on the banks of the Old Man River in Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada, I felt my curiosities, romantic imaginations and excitement were disappearing. I had descended to the reality of a dull and wretched daily life of reading, auditing some courses, cooking, washing, grocery shopping, suffering the inconvenience of being unable to drive, saving every penny for any emergency, loneliness, lack of human contact, and all the yearnings and anxieties associated with leaving one's family behind on the other side of the Pacific. As a spoiled husband, I did not know how to cook. My stomach would reject anything Western, even milk. Every day, I had the same kind of food that was neither tasty nor nutritious. My body was going from thin to skinny. The

scholarship, barely covering my minimum living expenses, was sent to me on a monthly basis. Since Canada was in the middle of a postal strike, my long overdue cheques were still somewhere on the way from Vancouver to Lethbridge, and I had to borrow money - a shame and disgrace in China - to survive.

Things were so different from what I had imagined of the North America (re)presented by Hollywood and the media. Gazing blankly at the vast openness looking back at me, I felt I could see everything at one glance but could actually see nothing. Except for some impersonal cars moving along the highways, there was virtually no trace of human beings to be seen. The endless, well-preserved land spread out in its natural colours and shapes, yet something gave me the feeling that it was not natural. It was arranged and controlled by some invisible human force. What I could hear was the roaring wind, which seemed to come from nowhere but would not stop for even one second twenty-four hours a day! How I wished I could hear the river down there - the flowing life of nature - as I used to back in my homeland. How I wish I could hold on to something, something that could tell me where I was.

A strong sense of displacement and disorientation haunted me. I was lost - lost not just in a vast land of "limitless freedom and opportunity," but also lost in the disjunction between my fanciful image of North America and the real world of day-to-day life in the actual North America. I was lost between a sense of "somebody-ness" back in my homeland and "nobody-ness" here in the free world, with no helpful meaning that I could "translate" from my new daily life in Canada.

Like a fish out of water, I was imprisoned, both spiritually and physically, within my own inability to cope with the new cultural and physical environment. My range of mobility in Lethbridge was limited. It was confined to the basement of my landlord (What a derogatory word to a mainland Chinese!) and the one grocery store within ten-minute's walking distance. Any other stores were almost one hour's walk to the other side of the river valley, which I had been told was full of rattle snakes. The University was located also within a ten-minute walk. I could take a bus to the downtown area, but I was so tight financially that I could hardly afford a monthly bus pass. And, really, what was the point of going to town since I was empty-handed?

I wanted to go home - to be free!

To be more exact, I was disappointed - disappointed at a dream being shattered to pieces. Is this America? I asked myself. Ever since my university days, for both my specialty and profession, America served as an intangible but ever-present background against which I struggled emotionally, intellectually and academically. On the one hand, like other young people of my generation, I grew up to be strongly aware of modern Chinese history, a history of humiliation, disgrace and dehumanization under Western colonialism and imperialism. We were told that this history, including particularly the Chinese Communist Revolution, was a history of national struggle for survival. The great project of the Four Modernizations underway was to re-establish the honour, dignity, glory and integrity of the Chinese nation. On the other hand, since the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's open-door policy, Western pictures of contemporary China were pouring in. We were shown the "true" colours of our own life under a "dictatorial, totalitarian and authoritarian regime." Meanwhile, literature, art, movies, etc. posed a dramatically different image of a wealthy, happy, merry, free and democratic West. In particular, America was presented as a land next to paradise on earth. For a time, we were led to believe "The American moon is rounder than China's (moon)."

Under this cultural, political, intellectual and social climate, I laboured and toiled hard on my field of studies. I read America; I visualized America; I taught America; I translated America - in the hope of pressing on to the real truth of America. An imagined America became part of me. Or I tried to reach the other side of myself through interpreting America. The more I translated America, however, the less I felt I knew America. I dreamed of going to the America in my heart, to realistically breathe her air, smell her smell, taste her taste, feel her heartbeat, and walk her soil - to gain more authority over my teaching and translating of America.

Now that I am right here, with my feet planted on the real North American ground, with all the surreal and misty veils lifted, I can hardly connect the two Americas. A sharp pain came from my fingers. The last cigarette I had brought from China had burned to its end.

I lifted my eyes to the open nothingness: There was the Lethbridge railway bridge, said to be the longest of its kind in the world, arching expressionlessly, a dark line on a

lifeless landscape. At that moment, it was to me merely a giant iron structure, yet I wondered what the valley was like before European exploration and exploitation.

Somewhere in my memory, a deep, ancient voice came from the *Analects of Confucius*: "*Zi zai chuan shang, yue: Shizhe ru si fu! Bu she zhou ye.*" I began to ponder over this famous saying. What did Confucius actually mean by that? I was surprised to realize I had never really given any thought to it although, like many Chinese of my generation, I had the words at my fingertips and had been content to take the line at its face value. The saying had been passed on to us as a piece of advice, to seize the hour and seize the day, since time and tide wait for no man. I flipped open Chan's English translation of the paragraph, which reads:

9: 16. Confucius, standing by a stream, said, "It passes on like this, never ceasing day or night!" (Chan, 1973, p. 36)

The translation did not particularly impress me. There could be other, better and more accurate ways to render it into English. But the comment below the translation aroused my interest:

What was Confucius thinking about? Was he thinking of the unceasing operation of the universe (Chu Hsi and Ch'eng I)? Was he lamenting over the fact that the past cannot be recovered (Hsing Ping)? Was he comparing the untiring effort of a superior man's moral cultivation (Liu Pao-nan)? Was he praising water because its springs continuously gush out (Mencius and Tung Chung-shu)? Was he praising water because it has the qualities of virtue, righteousness, courage and so forth (Hsun Tzu, 298-238 B. C.)? One thing is fairly sure: water to him meant something quite different from what it meant to Indian and Western philosophers, and to some extent to Lao Tzu (p. 36).

So generation after generation of Chinese philosophers had different interpretations of that simple line. But what was the very original, un-interpreted and un-translated meaning of the saying? What was the name of the stream or river by which Confucius was standing? In what ways did Confucius understand water differently from Indian and Western philosophers?

I sank back into the chair upset and helpless, in the way someone exiled or imprisoned might try desperately to cling to a question or puzzle for some meaning in

life, yet without any answer. I had no books in Chinese to turn to for any clue. I had no one who understood enough classical and modern Chinese to ask for some kind of response. The so-called advanced technology of Internet would not help much. You could surf freely in English. But there was no way for me to search in Chinese. It appeared to me I was cut off both spiritually and physically from the world: spiritually from the Confucian river, one of the sources of the Chinese civilization, and physically from the Old Man river down below, a voice that was telling a different (or maybe similar) history I could not hear.

My mind returned to the reality I was facing but could not interpret. Why should I be here? I questioned myself. To have access to more English books to read? Many English texts are available from various sources back in China. To experience foreign and exotic life here? A life could hardly be called a life if there was little or no human contact or interaction. Some of my days had passed without me speaking even one word to anyone.

b. Question of identity in translation

Where am I? Who am I? Such questions had been haunting me for days. The English word "identity" began to loom large on my horizon of confusion. A month or so before I came to Canada, I had read David Geoffrey Smith's paper "Identity, Self, and Other in the Conduct of Pedagogical Action: An East/West Inquiry" (Smith, 1996). I had been fascinated with the paper, to the extent that I decided to translate it into Chinese. But the very thematic word "identity" had stood in my way and brought my work to a halt. How should it be translated into Chinese? In China, the general equivalent for "identity," *shenfen*, is seldom used except when you fill in official forms. If you ask any Chinese about his/her identity, s/he would answer you without thinking: I'm a student/teacher/worker/cadre... I started to realize in different contexts the simple word "identity" can have over ten equivalents in Chinese, including status, capacity, dignity, identification, individuality, absolute sameness, personality, special property, body, oneself, thing-in-itself, and equality of two algebraic expressions for all values of quantities. Each of these equivalent words in Chinese can translate "identity" but none is exactly equivalent. There is no way to fill the language gap.

Why is this the case? What does it tell us of different histories and linguistic systems as cultural codes encoded in our different historical frameworks of human experience?

It was a frustrating but enlightening moment. Perhaps "identity" was the best place to start. Why had I never been bothered by "identity" in my homeland? Was there such a thing as "identity?" If yes, what was it? Why is the English "identity" so difficult to identify in Chinese? Why does the Chinese language "lack" such a well established and defined Euro-American concept? The absence of this more abstract and all-inclusive idea of identity in Chinese perhaps means that to the Chinese there is no abstract identity, "the flower above all flowers" in the French Symbolist terms, except in specific relationships. Then why do the Chinese understand it that way?

Strangely, those and many other questions created a calm and quiet space for my impetuous mind. I was drawn back to my lonely, challenging but nonetheless soul-satisfying career as a translator, teacher of translation, English language and literature. That evening, when I returned to my basement apartment, I took out the suitcase of questions, notes, plans and drafts of translation that had been lying in a corner in my bedroom. I unlocked the suitcase. The sight of my deserted past brought me fits of excitement. It seemed to me I was a child long lost and finally found. I burst into tears. When the tide of entangled emotions calmed down, I felt relieved and peaceful. I picked out Smith's paper together with my unfinished translation full of un-translated and un-translatable "identities." Wasn't my purpose for coming to North America to understand and translate what appeared to be untranslatable within the Chinese cultural context of vocabulary and grammar!

I was driven to look at my own broken, lost or non-existent identity - my own experiences as a translator and educator from a new perspective. Suddenly, it dawned upon me that what I had done so far was perhaps part of a long quest for identity that had not been understood in terms of, or for lack of, "identity." I sensed that my journey to North America might be part of a larger, global phenomenon that was yet to be named. Maybe for someone like me from an ancient and homogeneous cultural tradition, it was only when s/he was physically placed in a foreign land where s/he was the "Other" of what was going on around that "identity" could turn from an intellectual question into a day-to-day living problem. I thought I had learned enough translation theories,

methodologies and techniques to do and teach translation. But did I really understand translation in relation to what is being translated? Did I ever step back from using and teaching historical facts, theories and methods of translation to see how I myself as a translator was being translated? Did I ever distance myself from those theories and methodologies, both domestic and foreign, and take the Chinese historical experiences of translation as a text to see how China was translating the rest of the world and being translated? I asked myself; my practice of translation was translating back on me.

That night I stayed awake in bed late as usual. I recalled and reflected on some details of when, why and how I began to learn English and try my hand at translation. I remembered, among other things, the difficulties, frustrations, satisfaction and excitement I had experienced over those years. The lessons drawn from interpreting and translating H. D. Thoreau, W. C. Williams, Ezra Pound, Tennessee Williams, to name but a few, came back to me... All these might have constituted part of a true myth of my own identity.

My mind extended from my personal identity to my national identity, and further to the meaning of identity in a world in which personal and national boundaries are being reshaped and redefined by a force identified as globalization. The extension, I realized, rendered translating "identity" into Chinese more problematic. That night, however, for the first time, I did not fall asleep to dream of going back home - to the place I had been so excited to leave with a vague but earnest hope of finding a new, better home. My home, I sensed, might be located somewhere between my memory and future, between an imaginary and a real world, between Chinese and English, between the Confucian river I did not really understand and the Old Man river I could not approach, and in a broader sense, between China and the West.

I woke up to a sunny day. When I went out to the backyard for some fresh air, Cody, my host's German shepherd who had given me the greatest "culture shock" the evening I arrived in Canada, ran up to me waving his tail as if in a gesture of friendship. I opened my arms to him and played a ball game with him. When I returned to my basement, Cody followed me into my bedroom. I talked with him in Chinese and English. He seemed to understand both languages perfectly. I looked round my bedroom. A feeling of warmth arose in me. On my desk lay my manuscript. Although it was still full of

"identities" in English waiting for me to translate, the word identity together with what it meant to translate it into Chinese seemed to be opening up new dimensions. With Cody settling himself cozily and peacefully on my bed, I felt I was ready to work. A sense of "home" began to establish itself in an otherwise "homeless" environment.

2. Translation in a Global Era

a. Translation in a historical context

Since the present thesis has been developed out of my particular experiences, it may differ significantly from what is usually expected of translation studies. Such an undertaking is also difficult to locate. One might, however, proceed with a quote from Voltaire (in Schulte and Biguenet, 1992, p. 219):

I do not know why it is said in *Genesis* that Babel signifies confusion, for *Ba* signifies father in the Oriental tongues, and *Bel* signifies God; Babel signifies the city of God, the holy city. The Ancients gave this name to all their capitals. But it is incontestable that Babel means confusion, either because the architects were confounded after having raised their work up to eighty-one thousand Jewish feet, or because the tongues then were confounded; and it is obviously from that time on that the Germans no longer understand the Chinese; for it is clear, according to the scholar Bochart, that Chinese is originally the same tongue as High German.

What Voltaire wrote may serve as a good reminder of the long-standing questions of where we - the East and the West - came from, where we are now, and where we are going. If the Tower of Babel symbolizes the powerful memory of a prehistoric harmony among the human race, free from travails of miscommunication, what the West and non-West have been doing throughout their recorded histories may be viewed more positively as constant efforts to rebuild a lost harmony by clearing away confusion and removing various walls separating different peoples. In this endeavour, translation, as one of the oldest forms of human activity, has played the major role. Although post-structural, postmodern and deconstructive theories of language have cast some doubt upon many of the notions about translation traditionally held to be true, rendering the nature and forms of translation problematic, yet, to a certain extent, human history as we know it today

may well be described as a history of global intercultural translation. Without translation, there would be no way even to talk about the world with people different from ourselves.

It was European translation of China (mainly by Jesuits) that enabled such figures as Descartes, Leibniz and the Enlightenment philosophers like Voltaire to enlighten Europe with the idea of basic human reason applied to questions of civil life. This idea of reason was derived not from the Greeks but from Confucianism (Xin, 1991). Prior to the Enlightenment, in the more ancient times, it was European translation of other civilizations, such as the Islamic sciences of order, that had laid the foundation for Western scholarship (Smith, 2000, p. 66). Then around the mid-8th century, according to Shen (1987, pp. 316-357), documents illustrating China's major discoveries and inventions of paper-making, movable-type printing, compass and gunpowder began to be translated and introduced into Europe. They enabled Europe to move out of its Dark Ages fully armed with the then world's most advanced science, technology and other intellectual achievements.

The Enlightenment concept of Reason, established at a particular time in history when Europe was looking for a way out of the impasses of its religious wars (Smith, 2000), was proclaimed as the universally right path for human development. It provided the moral and philosophical ground for, among other things, Western industrialization and its subsequent global expansion for markets, pushing the world to a common course of modernization through several centuries of colonization. The ascendance of the Euro-American Empire, like its predecessors such as the Egyptian, the Chinese, the Persian and the Roman empires, relied heavily upon translation. In fact, the trajectory of the Western Empire is reflected and recorded in its Orientalist practice of translating the "Other" (Said, 1978; 1993). As Susan Bassnet suggests (1999, p. 5), for centuries translation was "a one-way process, with texts being translated *into* European languages for consumption, rather than as part of a reciprocal process of exchange." This view is echoed by the postcolonial scholar Robinson (1997, p. 10):

...translation has always been an indispensable channel of imperial conquest and occupation. Not only must the imperial conquerors find some effective way of communicating with their new subjects; they must develop new ways of subjecting them, converting them into docile or 'cooperative' subjects...

Viewed from this perspective, translation has always been associated with the building of empire. It implies a cultural, international, and geopolitical power play. As a double-edged sword, it may serve as a tool for slavery, imperial domination, cultural hegemony, ethnical, national and international oppression and suppression - a tool for knowing the Other in order to control and change the Other. At its worst, translation can mean cultural destruction in the good name of intercultural exchange.

Meanwhile, for the oppressed and suppressed within empire, translation, being a political act, may function as a form of resistance, subversion, even liberation. Within the colonized and semi-colonized nations, as Chen (1995) shows, translation can work as a weapon for both the official and anti-official sides in their fight against each other, with each side taking the image and knowledge of, and the power to interpret, the Other to strike the other.

Recent studies have also shown how translation is a profoundly gendered practice, with translation as an abused maid at the disposal of her male-chauvinist master. Similarly, although translation studies has been an old discipline, the cultural and intercultural dimensions and implications of translation have not received due attention. For example, the function of translation as a working out of the respective roles of translator vs. original writer, translation vs. its original work - especially in the context of the dynamics of colonialism - has been traditionally minimized. Feminist scholarship has led the way in deconstructing/reconstructing a richer image of translation. In the less or non-dialogical tradition of Enlightenment Reason, which asserts *yang* by constantly denying the presence of *yin*, the patriarchal nature of Euro-American imperial translation has been evident. As Sherry Simon (1996, p. 1) suggests:

Whether affirmed or denounced, the femininity of translation is a persistent historical trope. "Woman" and "translator" have been relegated to the same position of discursive inferiority. The hierarchical authority of the original over the reproduction is linked with imagery of masculine and feminine; the original is considered the strong generative male, the translation the weaker and derivative female. We are not surprised to learn that the language used to describe translating dips liberally into the vocabulary of sexism, drawing on images of dominance and inferiority, fidelity and libertinage. The most persistent of these

expressions, "les belles infideles," has for centuries encouraged an attitude of suspicion toward the seemly but wayward translation.

Feminist translation theory, according to Simon,

...aims to identify and critique the tangle of concepts which relegates both women and translation to the bottom of the social and literary ladder. To do so, it must investigate the processes through which translation has come to be "feminized," and attempt to trouble the structures of authority which have maintained this association.

Feminist theories in the last two or three decades (see, for example, Von Flotow, 1997), in fact, have successfully demonstrated the extent to which translation has been manipulated through gender.

The tensions and dynamic patterns in translation between the colonizer and the colonized, colonization and anti-, self- and de-colonization, the West and the non-West, etc. are indeed complex and conflicting. Today one has to put contemporary discourse of translation into yet another context, that of globalization.

b. Translation and globalization

As an emerging field of discourse, globalization carries multi-faceted and multi-layered connotations. David Smith (1999) has proposed two modalities for understanding globalization: that of the *imaginary* and of *facticity*. The former refers mainly to regnant essentialist and formulaic Euro-American economic theory, derived from Christian Fall and Redemption mythology and the Enlightenment idea of Reason, which claims itself to be universally applicable. The latter encompasses the conflicting tension between Euro-American globalizing agendas and projects based upon the global forces of resistance to the same. Smith (2000) has summarized globalization briefly as follows (this is a paraphrase):

- a. As a Euro-American dream, globalization is a generative force that has experienced about five hundred years of development dating back to the papal reforms of the Middle Ages;
- b. The Euro-American empire thus established is now being undermined by counter forces from previously conquered, subjugated and oppressed peoples;

- c. The Euro-American economic interpretations of human life are eroding the power and authority of nation-states;
- d. The modern technology and communications revolution has basically changed the traditional modes of material and intellectual production, and the meaning of labour is being redefined;
- e. The fact that, globally, human values have been radically commercialized invites reflection about human values themselves from peoples of different traditions;
- f. The cultural mixing and interfacing that has resulted from Euro-American colonialism holds promise for a constructive dialogue about a shared future.

Smith's summary demonstrates awareness of contemporary globalization as a historical construct. Such a historicized interpretation points to various challenges the globalizing world is facing. One of the issues arising from Smith's description would be the need for a new form of translation studies that can help address global cultural issues from an inter-civilizational perspective¹. For one thing, recent centuries of increased worldwide inter-translation has created a network of global interconnectedness and interdependence, making the current talk of globalization possible. But what does globalization mean from the viewpoint of translation - a key generator of global integration? In particular, what does it mean to the silenced and voiceless participants, who have to "translate" the triumphant language of Euro-American neoliberal globalizing agendas into their own life? How do the silent global participants understand translation and their own histories of translation in order to locate themselves in a globalizing world that is diminishing and destroying personal, local, ethnic and national identities?

Indeed, the age of globalization could be described as an age of translation, and an examination of the historical contexts in which intercivilizational translation is done may inform studies on the complex forces working at the heart of the present circumstances. As a term, globalization may stand for a renewed Babel - the city of God in Voltaire's term - or intensified confusion². Huntington (1993) suggests globalization portends a clash of civilizations.

¹ This is a suggestion from Pasha and Samatar. See "The Resurgence of Islam" in J. Mittelman (ed.), *Globalization: Critical reflections* (1997, pp. 187-204). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

² There is the irony too that "bab" in Hebrew means "gate" (bab-el = gate of God), hence a linguistic connection to Bill "Gates," who has designed the "platform" for all computerized information.

Partly due to the history of Euro-American colonialism, human languages have been reduced in number to "something like 5,000 languages in about 200 countries" (Edwards, 1994, p. 1). Among these living (but mostly dying) languages, only 12 have speakers of over one hundred million (ibid., p. 32). Of the 12 major languages, according to *Megatrends of 2000* (Liu et al., 1994, p. 1), in the 21st century, the number of Chinese (1.5 billion) and English (1.5 billion) speakers amounts to nearly two thirds of the world population. A look at some of the ways in which these two language groups interact with and upon each other might help to foresee a picture of the "global village" being established, and to open new and productive avenues for a shared future.

Translation studies as a field is especially relevant to emerging global tensions. These tensions play out in several ways: intercultural dialogue (Bhabha) vs. cultural isolationism; economic fundamentalism (Kelsey, 1996) vs. different forms of religious fundamentalism; economic integration vs. protection of local identities and economies, etc. The present globalizing world is characterized by a deep-embedded irony. While the free market economy, media and communication networks, the end of the Cold War, et cetera, seem to point to a unification of humankind, there have also been phenomena that contradict it. A new, universal revival of religion, ritual, tradition, tribalism, nationalism and so on is pulling the world apart, something some critics (e.g. Smith, 2000) have suggested as forms of resistance to any form of globalization that is based solely upon the Western imperialist imaginary.

Although English has become the dominant language for global communication, and the Internet has been a most powerful language of human technology, yet the United States, as the sole superpower, in order to keep world order basically to an American design and construct, had to "use the only language" that the Saddams and Milosevics of the world could "understand" (Reagan, Bush, Albright, etc.), a language that kills thousands of lives with each syllable uttered. It is small wonder, then, that some suggest the world is in a state of conflict headed toward a "Clash of Civilizations" (Tennesson, 1993, online). According to Huntington (1993), global politics in the future will be dominated by the clash between the following civilizations: Western (Europe and North America), the Confucian, the Japanese, the Islamic, the Hindu, the Slavic-Orthodox,

Latin American and possibly African. In short, Western vs. non-Western cultures, and particularly Western vs. Confucian-Islamic alliance.

c. Translation and modern China

Such a gloomy picture of global reality is a negative translation of what is happening in both the West and non-West. Take China's experience. From 1949, when the People's Republic of China was founded, to the end of 1970s, China was for various reasons alienated from the rest of the world. Although China engaged in an ideological struggle against Western capitalism and imperialism, in terms of culture the West was but a nominal figure to the Chinese, largely as a demonized Other. For thirty years since the end of the WWII, China was actually shut out of the global process of integration - although as this study will try to show later, this alienation was in fact a form of Chinese engagement with, or Occidentalist translation of, the West.

At the end of 1970s when Deng Xiaoping came to power, China began to practise its open-door policy. With foreign goods, fashions, ideas, life-styles, literary and intellectual products pouring into China, Chinese people woke up from the long dream of "tightening our belts to fight for the liberation of the working class all over the world." This had been a form of official occidentalism (Chen, 1995, p. 7) to legitimize Communist rule. The Chinese people opened their eyes to a more realistic vision of the West, one that was contrary to what they had earlier been presented with and were inspired to imagine. The differences between the two images of the West undermined the basis of China's social, cultural and political stability. More thoughtful intellectuals in turn picked up the theme of the May 4th Movement (1919) - the idea of freedom, democracy and equality - inspired and prepared by the unprecedented rate of textual and cultural translation of the West. This historical moment will be examined later in the thesis.

Fuelled by the Taiwanese writer Bo Yang's *The Ugly Chinese* at the beginning of 1980s, people from all walks of life participated in the debate surrounding the more negative Chinese national characteristics versus the more positive Western traditions. Particularly in the academies throughout the country, East-West comparative studies began to flourish. Western works, which had been regarded as "poisonous" and absolutely banned since 1949, were sweepingly translated and re-translated into Chinese,

and tasted, chewed, swallowed, digested and transformed by the Chinese people themselves. Art, literature and even the tightly controlled official media began to paint a dramatically different picture of the previously demonized West. As a result, a form of anti-official occidentalism took shape. Some intellectuals used their translation, knowledge and interpretation of the West to delegitimize the present government. Such translated concepts as 人权 (human rights), 异化 (alienation), 民主 (democracy), 民选 (democratic election), etc., became a fashionable discourse that was politically subversive. Thus a violent storm for social, political and intellectual change was gathering, which involved complex workings of different forces in postcolonial Chinese society, and which culminated in the 1989 Tiananmen Incident.

In July 1988, less than a year before the Tiananmen Incident, one of the most shocking cultural events took place. The voice of the Communist government, CCTV (China Central Television) broadcast a TV series *He Shang* (河殇, *Death of the Yellow River*), an extraordinary political commentary. By carefully choosing and translating historical facts all over the world in a unique China-West contrastive context, and narrated in a poetic voice, *He Shang* sent the following message to its vast audience: the Chinese yellow civilization symbolized by the mother river, was already dead. The only way ahead for China would be to embrace the "blue or ocean civilization," symbolized of course by the West. *He Shang* literally caught, broke and tortured the heart, mind and soul of the Chinese. (I remember myself trembling and bursting into tears many times while watching it.) It helped to ignite, from within the Chinese Communist Party, the tragic students' movement in 1989.

In a sense, the Tiananmen Incident can be regarded as a whole-hearted embracing of Western globalism on the part of the students and liberal intellectuals, who actually spoke of "importing a Premier from the United States" into China. As Deng Xiaoping remarked the next day after the crush, the revolt was inevitable. It would come sooner or later. It was determined by the larger international climate, and by the smaller domestic climate created through a small number of people holding Western bourgeois liberal values and determined to westernize China.

The irony is that as China became more deeply involved in the process of globalization, and as the Chinese came to know more of the "true face" of the Western

globalizing agenda, things started to turn upside down. In June 1996, a year before I came to North America, a book titled *China Can Say No* (Song et al., 1996), written by five young men in their twenties and thirties who had never been to the West, hit the Chinese book market. Within three weeks, over two hundred thousand copies were sold out. In October, the five authors published their next bestseller *China Can Still Say No* (Song et al., 1996). In December, another bestseller, *Behind Demonization of China* (Li et al., 1996) by eight Chinese scholars and students in the United States, became #1 bestseller. All the books listed the negative things done to the Chinese by the West, from the position of Western values, including the Taiwan Issue, Hong Kong's return, Tibet, the alleged nuclear proliferation, China's application to join the WTO, and China's bidding for the 2000 Olympic Games. Indeed, the year 1996 can be called an anti-American year in China. The popular sentiments and resentment against a globalizing West headed by the United States found their peak when NATO aircraft bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. This event triggered off worldwide Chinese protests and demonstrations. It was perhaps the first time that ordinary Chinese all over the world united spontaneously with the Chinese Communist government. Yet ironically this Chinese protest barely made the news in Western media. The fact that the Chinese reaction was so strong, while that of the West was so weak suggests a grave intercultural crisis.

Huntington's gloomy interpretation of world reality falls short of a clearer understanding of how the positive side of intercultural translation in the last several hundred years has changed the global landscape of culture. For instance, either within or outside of China, not many people realize how the Chinese language has come to be what it is today. While even many in the West may think China has a homogeneous, distinctly different culture that stands alone, most Chinese themselves are not aware of the fact that the language they are using is a product of historical intercultural mediation. In the first place, a great part of the core vocabulary reflects a cultural mix of well over fifty linguistic groups now collectively called Chinese. Most words that are functioning academically, philosophically, politically, socially, militarily, economically and so on have been the result of translation, borrowing, sinicization and naturalization. Influences include Indian Buddhism in ancient times, Euro-American (including Japanese) science,

technology, politics, philosophy, religion, literature and art in modern times, as well as the unprecedented exchange of information in the contemporary period. This linguistic transformation of Chinese may point to a more meaningful way for China-West intercultural dialogue, because it shows how language and culture are inexorably open and mutable, and hence available for engagement with others.

Modern Chinese history from the Opium War (1840) to the present may well be described as, in a sense, the beginning of a process of Chinese translation of the West. The Opium Wars (1840 ~ 1856), Taiping Rebellion (1851 ~ 1864), Yangwu yundong (Westernization Movement, 1861), Sino-Japanese War of 1894 - 1895, Boxer Uprising (1900), Sun Yat-sen Revolution (1911), May 4th Movement (1919), founding of the Chinese Communist Party (1921), Anti-Japanese War (1937 ~ 1945), Civil War between the Communists and the Nationalists (1946 ~ 1949), campaign to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea (1950 - 1953), Anti-Rightist Movement (1959), Cultural Revolution (1966 ~ 1976), Deng Xiaoping's Reform (1978 ~ present), Tiananmen Incident (1989), return of Hong Kong (1997) and Macao (1999), etc. - all these can be described as particular Chinese responses to the West. Each of these social, political and cultural moments and movements was largely facilitated and conditioned by particular images of the West translated into Chinese.

Very specifically is modern Chinese *educational* and *intellectual* history one of translating the West to China. This history is highlighted through the following kinds of events: the establishment of missionary schools (first in 1843); founding of foreign (English) language schools (first in 1862); constant debates over Westernization (dating back to the late Ming and early Qing dynasties); sending students to the West (first in 1872); textual translation movement led by Yan Fu (1853 - 1921) and Lin Shu (1852 - 1924); adopting school textbooks in translation (1900s); gradual curricular and pedagogical move from the *Keju* (Imperial Examination) system to the more modern, Americanized system, and to the final abolition of the *Keju* System (1906); the Vernacular Movement (1900s), the anti-Confucianism and New Cultural Movement (1919); introduction, especially of Darwinism, Marxism and Neo-Confucianism (1920s); practice of Maoism; the current educational reform in the face of global competition, etc. All these cultural movements and events, both positive and negative, reflect the crooked

journey of Chinese interpretation of the West as an inevitable condition for China's survival. At the same time they constitute a solid basis for better mutual understanding and cooperation between China and the West, if they can be brought to the table of mutual dialogue.

An examination of the process of Chinese translation of the West is a key to understanding Western influences upon China, and China's response to and engagement with the West, revealing some inner rules governing cultural encounter, understanding, interpretation, acceptance and resistance. From one point of view, it may lead to some better insight regarding the historical destruction of the Chinese identity, and China's occidental practices in relation to Western colonialism. As well such a translation study may point to how these destructive feelings and attitudes can be transformed into something constructive, through a healthier translation of the West.

Conversely and in a broader sense, such a study may provide an interculturally reflexive discourse for the West to see how its identity has been perceived and defined in contrast, comparison and contradiction to a long silenced "Other." By way of example of the typically one-sided nature of the West's cultural understandings, the University of Alberta library, the second largest in Canada, has a rich collection of over four hundred volumes of Western construction of my homeland China. They form a grand narrative of how China has been worshipped, appreciated, 'objectively' observed, 'scientifically' studied, depreciated, dehumanized, demonized and now "feared" in the West. On the other hand, relatively few books in English can be found that give a fair and clear picture of the other side of the story without which Western studies themselves can hardly be verified, validated or justified.

Such a study of translation as cultural mediation in the age of globalization may also offer a moment to realistically explore if there is a way out of Western Eurocentrism and Orientalism. For almost half a century, Western mainstream scholarship, including poststructuralism, postmodernism, feminism and psychoanalysis, has largely exposed and deconstructed the logocentric nature of Western cultures and traditions. Many West-based scholars from the peripheries - from former colonies including notably Nigeria, India and the Middle East - have contributed their knowledge and wisdom to the tremendous project of dismantling the non-dialogical, impenetrable yet ever-present

Western Self. But given the current postcolonial situation in which the marginal can locate itself only through using, or to be more exact, translating the language of the centre, what can be made out of the destroyed identities of both the West and the Rest? In an age of globalization when personal, local and even national identities have become relativised and folded into a vision of economic determinism, what language can those marginalized adopt to speak about themselves as they stand in a relationship with the West that must eventually and inevitably be dynamic and reciprocal? Translation, as an agent and witness positioned between the centre and the margins, may have something to say about all this.

Translation studies in the age of globalization may be characterized as being concerned about the possibility of a more fairly and realistically shared human life. At the moment this life has been conditioned and contextualized within a larger narrative of human integration envisioned by the great architects of modernity such as Descartes and Voltaire. As such, it suffers from a "lack" (Loy, 1999), an absence of an acknowledged other as an indispensable part of the self. Even when the self has awakened to the ontological truth of the other, the other has been silenced and dumb for so long that it can hardly reclaim its voice. It has lost its ways or means to express itself. Moreover, in this postmodern era, the historically constituted other suffers a deeper loss. Just as H. L. Gates complained to his colleagues (in Zhang, 2000, online), when the moment at last came for the black people to construct their own subjectivity and cultural history, they were told subjectivity and history had been theoretically discarded by everyone else as meaningless. Yet as Derrida (1976, p. 66) wisely pointed out, what is suppressed and oppressed still exists in the form of "traces." The historical process of translation is full of "traces" that can tell us where we are, why we are here and where we might go.

3. Scope of the Present Study

What this thesis attempts to do is to first interpretively build Chinese experience of translating the West, both verbal and nonverbal, both textual and cultural, into a text. It will read this dynamic and changing text to see what may lie behind this translation, how the changing image of the West changes Chinese translation and vice versa. It tries to investigate how textual translation is conditioned in a specific culture, and how culture is

porously permeated and transformed through textual translation. Then it moves further to the reader-response domain in order to see how 'foreign' meanings are established, interpreted and practiced among the readers. In other words, it is about how the image of the West has been perceived, defined and shifted in relation to the Chinese sense of identity.

The thesis plans to end by raising the question of where the current practice of translation is leading China in relation to the West, in cultural and educational terms. In a sense, it is a humble attempt, from the author's personal experiences, to trace the process of how China lost her identity in her translation of the West, and to see if this loss could be transformed into a basis and gain for a sounder translation of the West. Finally, an attempt will be made to develop a kind of 'hermeneutics of translation' relevant to the age of globalization. If this study must have a name, it might be called a cultural study of China-West translation.

a. Translation and translatology

Translation is a flexible term with different levels of both denotation and connotation. In Chinese, it (翻, *fan* or 译, *yi*) literally means "reverse" or "interpret." According to Zhu (in *Editorial Board*, 1984a, p. 39), the word *yi* (译) comes from another *yi* (易, "change" or "exchange," as in *I-Ching*, the Book of Changes), meaning to exchange what one has for what one does not have.

In English, according to the *Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary of Current English*, translation means: 1) give the meaning of (sth. said or written) in another language; interpret; 2) show, make clear, the meaning of (either in words or by artistic performance); render; 3) clarify (sb's behavior, etc.); 4) transform or realize; 5) remove to a different place or position; 6) take to heaven without death.

In both Chinese and English definitions, translation includes understanding, interpretation and rendering one text (verbal and/or nonverbal) into another. But the different meanings of translation as defined in *Oxford* and differences existing between translation and its equivalents in other languages point to the difficult nature of translation. For instance, the title of the thesis itself, "Chinese Translation of the West," can hardly be translated into proper Chinese. This is because the Chinese *fan* or *yi* does

not have as many meanings as the English *translation*, Chinese does not have the word "of" to show the relationship between "translation" and "the West," and Chinese grammar does not allow "translation" to be modified at the same time by "Chinese" and "the West" in that manner. Even if it is word-for-word translated into Chinese, the Chinese version does not really convey the meaning as intended.

As one of the oldest disciplines, translation has received extensive study. Historically, translation studies (see Wang, 1994) includes the following aspects:

- a. Theories of translation, which interpret and theorize the nature, standards and process of translation. Modern and contemporary theories of translation have drawn heavily from linguistics, semiotics, philology, reader-response theory, sociology and cultural studies to interpret various phenomena of translation;
- b. Methodologies and/or techniques of translation, which analyze differences and similarities between the source and target languages, inquire into the understanding of an original text and its expression (s) in the target language, evaluation and assessment of a certain translation, etc.
- c. Histories of translation, which record translation activities as they have occurred, including literatures in translation, schools and organizations of translation, translators and their (pro)positions and methods, etc.

Chen (1992, p. 3) divides translatology into two categories: internal and external studies. The former encompasses studies in the basic theoretical models, nature, principles, norms, mode of thinking, translatability, methodologies (literal, liberal and transliteration), processes, aesthetics, style, techniques and so on. The latter includes studies on the relationships between translation and other disciplines such as philosophy, sociology, cultural studies, linguistics and psychology, as well as curricular, pedagogical issues and critiques of translation, etc.

The present study may involve most of the aspects listed above, but may not fall into any specific category. It is trying to create an interpretive space of its own.

b. What it means to translate

In discussing translation, Octavio Paz (in Schulte & Biguenet, 1992, p. 152) said: "When we learn to speak, we are learning to translate; the child who asks his mother the

meaning of a word is really asking her to translate the unfamiliar term into the simple words he already knows." In this sense, Paz went on to say, "translation within the same language is not essentially different from translation between two tongues, and the histories of all peoples parallel the child's experience." From this viewpoint, whatever we think and do with language about the world, we are translating. And the world, according to Paz:

...is presented to us...as a growing heap of texts, each slightly different from the one that came before it: translations of translations of translations. Each text is unique, yet at the same time it is the translation of another text. No text can be completely original because language itself, in its very essence, is already a translation - first from the nonverbal world, and then, because each sign and each phrase is a translation of another sign, another phrase. (P. 154)

What Paz said can revolutionize our traditional understanding of translation as a secondary and marginal activity. It sheds light on our interpretation of the nature of language and translation, and the nature of the world as a linguistic construct. When translation and learning to speak a language are regarded as having equal, primary value and status, the world as we see it, especially in this global era, makes better sense. To survive, today, different nations have to translate one another. In translating one another, different peoples may acquire more vocabulary and grammar to speak about their local realities in relation to others. In so doing, a new, global language of the human race might emerge that might help move traditional concepts of identity to a more shared space of understanding.

Paz's insightful statements, however, invite further inquiries on different levels into the real situations of translation in the globalizing world. For example, indeed, when one encounters something new and different from what is already known, one is driven to look for a word or name which makes sense and works in the given linguistic system. Translation in any culture may be described as a process of finding or developing new, workable terms and grammatical expressions in the community of the target language group. However, the working of an existing, identity-giving linguistic system in a specific, historically developed culture may not be the same as that of a child. If a child develops his or her identity by learning what the mother has to translate from their shared

day-to-day life, translation between two independent, highly developed languages might not work in that way. In particular, the relationships between the source and target language, between the original writer/speaker and translator, between the original and translation, and between the translation and the reader, do not resemble the relationship between the mother and the child.

Similarly, so far as the development of vocabulary, grammar and rhetorical devices in any given language is concerned, it seems to be true, as Paz said, "the histories of all peoples parallel the child's experience." However, when one examines the historical experiences of different peoples, for instance, Chinese and Anglo-Americans in the last five hundred years, it is easily seen that they are radically different. It might be said that English translates to 'gain,' and Chinese translates to 'lose,' in terms of cultural identity, as this study will try to show. As a result, the contemporary linguistic conditions of English and Chinese are vastly different. What is at work here is that the social and cultural conditions between the two language groups are different. The relationship between the two is more like that between the colonizer and the colonized rather than that of the mother and the child.

Furthermore, even if it is true that the world as a growing text is a translation of translations of translations, somewhere in the growth of this grand text, some translations claimed and are claiming themselves as the original and the only original. Since they have the hegemonic power of interpreting 'translations,' they are imposing themselves upon the world as the ultimate translation - through economic, political, religious, military and any other means. Consequently, the open, diverse and interpretive world of translations has been pushed to the dead corner of one version of translation as the original for everybody else to copy. For instance, the contemporary economic fundamentalism lying at the heart of the Euro-American globalizing agendas might be described as one version of translation of the world. It claims to be "the right path," in Madeleine Albright's words (in Smith, 2000), for all the other peoples, who can survive only through following it. As has been pointed out (Gray, 1999; Loy, 1997; Smith, 2000, etc.), this fundamentalism is interpreted out of deep Euro-American religious and philosophical traditions. If the globalizing world is ruled by this 'self-justifying' version of translation, it would be doomed to fail, since it is an extension of the long-standing

logic of war (Smith, 2000). In this sense, translation might lead to death of all instead of taking all "to heaven without death," as the Oxford Dictionary has put it.

With this in mind, the present study intends to recover the lost meaning of translation suggested by Paz through examining Chinese experiences of translating the West. What Paz said about the nature of translation still holds water, although historical experiences as discussed above may prove otherwise. The point is that somewhere in human histories, translation went astray in its relationship with what is translated, a relationship which parallels that between the mother and the child, a relationship of love, understanding, teaching, learning, and most importantly opening more possibilities about translating the world shared by all. To recover the meaning of that relationship is what is urgently needed in the global era; to do otherwise is to put the globalizing world of translation in danger. This is clearly shown in the Chinese experiences of translation.

c. Challenges

Examining the text of Chinese translation of the West is in itself a form of translation that involves interpretive paradigms, as well as skills. This is something that perplexes the author. As someone whose cultural traditions and personal and national identity have been 'broken' and 'destroyed' precisely in translating the West, where can I find a supporting point from which to begin an exploration? In the first place, my very sense of broken and destroyed identity has been evoked, inspired and fostered largely by (translating) the particular scholastic tradition of the West which interprets the West as the 'destroyer.' The language and perspectives of examination employed here have been acquired from the West. The framework within which the introduction to the thesis has been made so far is obviously of the West's design, which has traces of Marxism, postmodernism and post-colonialism. Where then lies my own original contribution to this intercultural dialogue? In other words, the present study aims to bring a Chinese perspective to the study of translation as intercultural dialogue, but what is the point of interpreting Chinese experience with theoretical perspectives acquired from the West?

This dilemma is deepened by the fact that peoples from all traditions are now trapped in a kind of economic monotheism. Because of worldwide colonial experience, the global language that is more and more used by everyone to translate and re-translate their

realities has been reduced to the language of the Market defined in Euro-American logocentric, imperialistic terms. Under these conditions, there seems to be no other way to communicate with one another except using economic vocabulary and grammar. In fact, the economic historian, Karl Polanyi (1957), has named this the age of *Homo oeconomicus* (Economic man). Consequently, for instance, as this study will show, the ongoing Chinese translation of the West under various names has, at its heart, economic gains in view. Even the ultimate concern I have about the present study - concern for the 'original,' 'value,' and 'usefulness' of it - may come from that economic mindset.

To live for material gains is a world outlook that was long ago morally and philosophically criticized, rejected and suppressed, in a sophisticated way by the Chinese Confucian-Taoist-Buddhist tradition. Within that tradition, academic work seemed to be for the purpose of translating human understanding to a higher level of humanity instead of being driven by utilitarian purposes. But the voice of that tradition has been marginalized and silenced in translating the West. It is as difficult to reclaim that voice as to give up the idea of viewing everything from an economic angle. How, then, would it be possible to bring the Chinese voice back to life for a meaningful dialogue?

Faced with the above challenges, the present study remains open to various and sometimes conflicting interpretive frameworks. Theories have their own validity and legitimacy in interpreting specific situations, and they themselves stand in a dynamic relationship with what is being interpreted. For instance, when one reflects on the various schools of thought emerging successively in the West in modern times, it is interesting to see how intellectual patterns change with the physical conditions they attempt to explain. The binary, dichotomizing and dualistic vision deeply imbedded in Enlightenment Reason find its imprints in early modern philosophers and intellectuals such as Newton, Darwin and Hegel, who tended to speak about the world in terms of oppositions: advanced vs. backward, civilized vs. barbarian, scientific vs. benighted. Under this intellectual climate, and guided by religious and economic commitments, the West accelerated its global mission of colonization, drawing the whole world to the door of its prescribed system of world order. Meanwhile, ironically, this Western tradition also gave birth to Marxism, a different form of dualism that was to create a challenging system of global order characterizing inter-national relationships for nearly a century.

In a sense, as Zhang (1999, online) pointed out, with the world drawn into the process of modernity, dualism gave way to the new vision of an ontological centre in the form of structuralism, existentialism, psychoanalysis, etc. Later, as the world came to be trapped in modernity, post-structuralism, post-modernism and post-colonialism and so on emerged as different ways to interpret the de-constructed and de-centralized new reality. The end of the Cold War, having created a cultural, political and intellectual vacuum, gave birth to a new global vision in the form of globalization. No matter what paradigm shifts take place, however, they seem to be different forms of Western 'translation' of itself.

From the viewpoint of translation, those forms of Western 'translation,' characterised by a kind of deep-seated orientalism, have been affecting the non-West, whose identity seems to have been depending on how well the Word of the West can be translated. On the other hand, the non-West's passive and submissive translation of the West, ironically, has developed a kind of deep-rooted Occidentalist tradition, which has been destructive rather than constructive to the shared future with the West. This may explain why up till now globalization has been a one-way engineering project on the part of the West in the name of 'globalness.'

Modern Chinese intellectual history is one of translating the various versions of Western 'translations' (in Paz's sense) of the world. It is only by putting that history in a dynamic relationship with the West that one can make sense of those historical experiences. In this regard, Western critical theories are not only valid but crucial in interpreting the various and sometimes confusing phenomena. In particular, postcolonialism, along with other theories before it, is important in examining how Chinese translation has come to where it is, and current theories of globalization are helpful in addressing issues that Chinese translation of the West is facing.

However, viewing that history merely through Western theories, including the more globalized framework within which theory of globalization is supposedly working, would not be productive to a healthy dialogue about the shared future. Since any theory is translated inevitably out of particular issues in a particular time and place, it is inadequate to address the kinds of intercultural realities resulting from adherence to other theories. What is more beneficial, therefore, might be to resort to the lost voices of

Chinese translation, and create an empirical space where the Chinese experience can be interculturally reconstructed in a contrastive and comparative context against that of the West. To achieve genuine understanding is what translation is about. It is understanding with love, respect and compassion that is lost in the histories of translation. By going on a journey into the gradual loss of Chinese identity through its translation, that identity might be regained by a re-awakening to the true meaning of translation lost both in the West's orientalist translation of China and China's occidentalist translation of the West. The space envisioned here is Homi Bhabha's "third space," where China and the West can truly engage and translate each other in a way that might address postcolonial challenges.

d. Periodization

The text of Chinese translation of the West is long and complicated, and the meaning of "West" in Chinese is complex and ambiguous. Historically, the word West refers to anything west of China, including India, Arabia and beyond. For two thousand years, China was engaged in introducing Central Asian cultures, including, most notably, Buddhist translation, which exercised great religious, linguistic, cultural, philosophical, political and other influences upon Chinese tradition. At that time, Central Asia was the "West," as is seen in the title of a classical household novel *Pilgrimage to the West* about Chinese Buddhists' journey for authentic scriptures, featuring the Monkey King.

In this study, West is used to mean Euro-American traditions. Written records of China-West encounters through the silk trade can be traced back to the ancient Romans, who believed "silk was combed from the leaves of the forest" (Mackerras, 1989, p. 1). However, the age of Chinese translation of the West did not come until after the Jesuits arrived in China towards the end of the 16th century. Matteo Ricci and other missionaries were the first translators to bring the geographically more distant but culturally more modern West to the Chinese.

In this first period that lasted for over two hundred years, Chinese translation of the West was, on the whole, an occasional, personal and individualized activity. It demonstrates the cultural, social and political conditions of acceptance of the West. The Chinese were confined by their Celestial Empire mentality, a version of 'translation' of

the world vastly different from, if not contrary to, that of Europe. This period forebodes the cultural and civilizational failure on the part of China in front of a colonizing West that was re-creating the world according to its own interpretation.

From the China-British Opium War (1840) to 1949 when the People's Republic was founded, China was forced to translate the West for survival. This period of translation was massive, profound and radical, changing every aspect of Chinese culture, and destroying and redefining Chinese identity in every sense of the word. In fact, it is a period of translation as anti-colonization, self-colonization, revolution and liberation. While it helped China to win its independence, it almost destroyed China as an ancient Confucian nation, fully demonstrating translation as a double-edged sword in linguistic and cultural terms.

Translation under Chairman Mao's leadership from 1949 to 1978 when Deng Xiaoping came to power is a phenomenon that deserves careful examination. On the one hand, for various reasons, China was isolated from the rest of the world. Textual translation of the West seemed to be limited and later almost banned. One can even say it was a period of anti-translation for the purpose of decolonization. On the other hand, a close look at what was happening in this period will show that it was actually a different form of Chinese translation of the West. It could be put under the general umbrella of postcolonial translation, only that the political, social and cultural situations in China were extremely different from those in other colonized nations.

Since 1979 when China began to practice its open-door policy, the massive, ongoing translation of the West has displayed a kaleidoscopic pattern that is defining the Chinese identity, and in a larger sense, defining the future of globalization. On the one hand, it may reveal the extent to which China is being Westernized. On the other hand, it may show how intercultural translation is sometimes impossible when translation is understood in a Darwinian, utilitarian, occidentalist and economic way.

Since part of the purpose of this study is to try to bring some understanding of China-West translation, first of all an empirical examination of what it involves to translate English into Chinese might be necessary.

III. Textual and Cultural Translation

1. An Anecdote

During the global expansion of the West, as a maritime power Portugal sent a fleet of envoys under Fernao Peres de Andrade and Thome Pires to China in 1517 (Shen, 1987, p. 263). The team "paid their tribute" by firing their cannons and rifles "like thunders" in Guangzhou, one of the major doors to China. This showoff of force offended the Chinese imperial court, which had been accustomed to receiving tributes from more humble and submissive subjects called *man* (蛮) or *yi* (夷) (both meaning barbarians). As a result, the Portuguese were denied the status as a "subject" and access to inland China. Meanwhile the imperial court of China was content to call the "red-haired barbarians" *fulangji* (佛朗机), a transliteration of the Arabian term *al-Frandj* for Europeans in general.

With more *fulangji* constantly and persistently forcing their way into China, the more open-minded imperial officials began to sense some differences among the "red-haired barbarians." They tried to name different *fulangji* through sound translation. In a memorial to the throne, a court official gave the Chinese names *putaoya* (葡萄牙) for the country Portugal and *xibanya* (西班牙) for Spain. These two Chinese words, probably among the first Chinese translations of the West, did not mean anything. Literally, *xi-ban-ya* and *pu-tao-ya* are respectively three separate Chinese characters: *xi* - West, *ban* - team or class, *ya* - tooth; *pu* and *tao* both stand for "grape" independently but can and often go together as one word for the same thing.

The translations, however, led another imperial official without any idea of or any desire to know the outside world to memorialize the throne, stating:

It might make a little sense to say *putao* (葡萄, grapes) have teeth. But what is *xiban* (西班牙)? How could it grow teeth? Apparently the Minister was making a false memorial to the throne, and I hereby earnestly request that the Minister be accused of deceiving the Throne. (Zhu, 2000, online. Translation mine.)

If so charged and convicted, the minister, perhaps along with his whole family, would be beheaded.

No one knows whether it was out of innocent ignorance or political intention to frame a case against the minister that the other court official presented such a ridiculous memorial. But in retrospect this historical incident at least demonstrates, among other things, the following points:

- a. The condition of response to and acceptance of translation of the West resulting from ignorance of Europe as a civilizational and geographic entity in the then China. The Chinese viewed themselves as the centre of the world, and there was no language for the family-based culture to imagine, less to name, anything that was equal to China as a country, since China was already everything under the sky¹.
- b. The inability derived from the Middle Kingdom mentality prevented the Chinese from getting to know an industrializing Europe that was shaping the world according to its own Eurocentric understanding. The Chinese did not and could not know what the European powers came to China for.
- c. It is difficult to translate European alphabetic and word-based languages into pictographic, ideographic and character-based Chinese. The fact that each Chinese character can at once stand alone as an independent word and serve as a "morpheme" to form a word with (an)other character(s) leaves Chinese translations ambiguous, vulnerable to different interpretations for different purposes on the part of the reader.
- d. Translation is risky, involving linguistic, cultural, ideological and political power struggle. Both translations and what is being translated can be manipulated, distorted and retranslated for different agendas, as is clearly seen in the above case.

It is against this linguistic, cultural, social and political background that China has been translating the West for over four hundred years. In so doing, China has been translating itself in terms of the West, both emotionally and intellectually, both textually and culturally.

¹ The Western idea of a country or nation-state can hardly find an equivalent in ancient Chinese. Although there was a character *guo* (国) for country in the modern sense, and *zhongguo* (中国, literally central nation or middle kingdom) - China - had been in use, yet this *guo* was more like a suffix to any province, prefecture or county for geographic location. There were many *guos* within China. In fact, the Chinese had seldom called themselves *zhongguo*. Instead they used terms such as *zhongtu* (中土, central land), *zhongyuan* (中原, central plains), *huaxia* (华夏, Cathay) and *shenzhou* (神州, the Divine Land). Even today the standard word for country or nation is *guojia* (国家), literally "national family."

2. Textual Translation

Interesting and suggestive facts and anecdotes abound in the history of Chinese translation of the West. When Victor Hugo's *Notre Dame de Paris* was first introduced into China at the beginning of the 20th century, it was translated as, literally, *My Wife of Paris*. The English term Milky Way was first rendered as "*niulailu*" (牛奶路, road of cow milk) (Xie, 1994, p. 240), which did not make any sense since the Chinese equivalent is "*yinhe*" (银河, silver river). The important Western concept "Fair Play" could not find any equivalent in Chinese except through transliteration as "*fei e po lai*" (废厄泼赖, Lu Xun, 1926), as were the cases with science, democracy, parliament, etc. (赛因斯, *sai yin si*; 德莫克拉西, *de mo ke la xi*; 巴力门, *ba li men*) (Liu et al., 1984, p. 299). At the time when Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) was in power, story has it that one of his senior officials was sent along with his wife to the airport to meet an important Western official. When the host and guest met, a dialogue took place:

Western Official: Your wife is very beautiful!

Chinese Official: *Na-li! Na-li!*

Interpreter (translating literally): Where? Where?

Western Official (taken aback and puzzled): From head to toe!

Interpreter: Beautiful everywhere in her body!

(What the Chinese official said was a typical Chinese polite and modest response, something like "You are too kind!")

Here is an incident: At the beginning of 1980s when Westerners began to storm into China again, China, after more than thirty years' isolation, had not prepared enough qualified translators. Many undergraduate students majoring in foreign languages had to serve as interpreters. There was one student from the Sichuan Foreign Languages Institute in Chongqing who was accompanying a group of Americans travelling down the Yangzi River. One of the American tourists had an interest in playing Chinese chess with a Chinese passenger. It took the American quite some time before he got to know the basic rules. But the American learned fast, and when he was in an advantageous position to take a piece, the interpreter, being very excited, exclaimed in English, "Eat it! Eat it!" The American, being ignorant of the linguistic background, thought it was the Chinese custom to "eat" the piece when you take it. So he followed that imperative sentence, took

the piece up, put it in his mouth, and began to chew obediently and forcefully on the hard (wooden), big thing. The Chinese, standing or sitting around watching the game, were more than surprised, thinking it was a weird American practice!

Such anecdotes are also readily found in English translation of China. Scholars have pointed out various problems with the better English translations of the Chinese classics. They include *The Four Books* (*The Great Learning*, *Doctrine of the Mean*, *The Analects of Confucius*, and *Mencius*) and *The Five Classics* (*The Book of Songs*, *The Book of History*, *The Book of Changes*, *The Book of Rites* and *The Spring and Autumn Annals*), which have been done by such great translators as David Collie, James Legge (1815-1897), Arthur Waley, etc. (see Liu et al. 1994, pp.350-369). The well celebrated translation of the novel *Honglou meng* (Dream of the Red Mansions) by David Hawkes (*The Story of the Stone*), for example, shows the extent to which translation can so easily stumble into blunders. The hero of the novel, Jia Baoyu, the only heir of one of the four greatest aristocratic families who grows up surrounded by beautiful young ladies (and by "eating their rouge"), and named "*yi hong gong zi*" (怡红公子, literally son of the red mansion), is translated as "Green Boy." This rendition does not in the least evoke the same kind of image in the English reader as in the Chinese reader.

In Chapter 28, there is a reference that some servants are "*ti qiu*" (踢球, literally kicking a/the ball) in the alley, without identifying exactly what ball it is. David Hawkes must have racked his brains to decide what ball it was, since English does not allow such kind of ambiguity. He concluded it was "football," whereas in fact it was a "stone ball" that was popular in the then China. In Chapter 61, there is mention of a "*shuipai*" (水牌, literally water board) for making random notes. Hawkes translated it into "blackboard," but it was actually a wooden board painted white for writing with brushes with black ink, according to some Chinese researchers (see Xu, 1988).

It is not hard to imagine how frustrated Hawkes as a translator might have felt when he had to deal with all the special terms identifying the specific relationships between all the characters. There are more than four hundred characters in all, who are related to one another one way or another. Chinese tradition does not allow ambiguity in addressing those relationships that have their own special names. Consequently, a simple English

word, cousin, like another word uncle, has at least eight equivalents in Chinese. The same can be said of course of those high-brow and low-brow poems throughout the novel.

The great Song Dynasty (960-1279) woman *ci* poet, Li Qingzhao (1084 - ?), wrote a famous poem describing a young wife missing and yearning for her young husband (who was perhaps out for war against invaders). It was early spring, the time of awakening love, tenderness and sweet memories, a time that finds the most and best expressions in Chinese literature. The newly-wed lady was alone in her chamber, gently recalling, re-clutching, re-feeling, re-living and perhaps quietly fantasizing and longing for the sweet and intoxicating moments she had shared or would share with her husband. She leant against the high pillow, sleepless late into the night, tears gradually wearing away her make-up, and the silent, suppressed and oppressed emotions de-colouring, bit by bit, her hairpins. Like the pace and rhythm of ancient Chinese relaxed way of life, it was a slow-moving and deeply touching picture of a faithful young wife tenderly but soundlessly suffering from her pains of love. The translation of this stanza by an American poet, however, reads like this (in Guo, 1992, p.74):

I put on my new gilded robe
Sewn with gold thread
And throw myself against a pile of pillows,
Crushing my phoenix hairpins.

What kind of image this translation evokes in an English reader is hard to tell. For a Chinese, this is turning an ancient Chinese pure, tender and gentle woman of chastity, well-educated within the Confucian moral tradition into a modern, sexy, uncontrolled and uncontrollable Hollywood figure like the one in *Sleepless in Seattle*, an image that quite betrays the original.

Such an act of betrayal is not necessarily an inevitable truth. It has much more to do with the translator-as-interpreter's intercultural qualifications. For example, the funny mistake committed by the student from the Sichuan Foreign Languages Institute points to the lack of understanding of his own mother tongue. Since Chinese culture is known as one of cuisine or gastronomy, the Chinese word "*chi*" (吃, eat/eating) has many more connotations than one can easily take in. According to the *Modern Chinese Dictionary* (p. 139), *chi* has the following definitions: 1) put (food, medicine, etc.) in the mouth and

swallow after chewing, including drinking and sucking; 2) eat where food is sold or served (for example, 吃馆子, literally "eating at the restaurant"); 3) live on something (for example, 靠山吃山, 靠水吃水- literally Eat the mountain if living by the mountain, and eat the river/lake/sea if living close to it.); 4) wipe out; occupy; take over (used mainly in military affairs, chess, etc.); 5) consume; expend; 6) absorb; soak up (for example, 道林纸不吃墨, meaning Daolin paper does not absorb ink.); 7) suffer; incur (e.g. *chi piping*, meaning be criticized). It is clear here that the student mistook the *chi* in the fourth sense for its first sense.

3. The Chinese Character vs. the English Word

The above example does reflect, however, how the two languages are vastly different cultural constructs. It is well known that Chinese is a pictographic, ideographic and tonal language, which means there is no necessary connection between the sound of the Chinese word/character and its spelling form, as in English. One is synthetic and poetic, the other analytic and prosaic. An English word may be composed of several morphemes (or root, stem, suffix and prefix), but it is always a word, whereas a Chinese character may be a morpheme or an independent word depending on different contexts.

For example, *chi* can be part of a word, as in *chi xiang* (吃香) - be very popular, where *chi* and *xiang* (literally sweet, fragrant) form a whole concept that can not be separated. It can also be a word, as in 她/他在吃苹果 (S/he is eating an apple), in which case *chi* stands independently as the predicate of the sentence. The formation of the Chinese character is "vertical" (classical Chinese writings run the line from top to bottom and from right to left), whereas English is "horizontal," flowing from the left to the right.

For all the differences, in a subtle way one thing seems to be shared in common between the Chinese character and the English word, that is, both of them are made through different means. As is known, the English word is not of pure Anglo-Saxon origin. It has its roots, stems, prefixes and suffixes from Sanskrit, Hebrew, Greek, French, Latin and so on, consequently open to and tolerant and expressive of foreign ideas and concepts. The Chinese character is not just pictographically formed. According to Xu Shen, author of the *Dictionary and Interpretation of Characters* (说文解字) compiled in

the Eastern Han Dynasty (25-220 AD), it is composed in at least six ways. A knowledge of the formation of the Chinese character, made up of the dot, the horizontal, the vertical, the left-falling stroke, the right-falling stroke, the turning stroke and the hook stroke [look at the character *yong*, 永, which contains all the above elements and means forever or eternal], helps in understanding the difficulty of how Western words, or more precisely alien concepts, can be translated into this totally different system of world construct.

One has to bear in mind that Chinese characters, in more than three thousand years of development, have experienced eight major changes in form from the ancient *jia gu wen* (inscriptions on bones and tortoise shells of the Shang Dynasty, 1751-1112 B.C.) to the current *jian hua zi* (simplified characters, used in mainland China). These processes have made characters less "pictographic" or "ideographic" than they originally were. Zuo (1984, pp. 4-14) has described six ways in which Chinese characters are formed:

- a. Pictographic (象形, *xiang xing*), which means of course resembling in appearance and form what is signified by the character. For example, 日(*ri*), 月(*yue*), and 山(*shan*), in their ancient forms, look respectively like the sun, the moon and the mountain.
- b. Indicative (指事, *zhi shi*), which means "look at it and you recognize; observe and you know (what it is or stands for)," for instance, 上(*shang*) and 下(*xia*), which the reader may guess refer to (going) up and (going/coming) down.
- c. Ideographic (会意, *hui yi*), which is the method of combining one pictographic character with another to make a new character that signifies a new concept or idea. For example, the character 卡(*ka*) [block(ed) or check(ed)], picturizes the entangled situation where you can neither go up nor go/come down.
- d. Semi-pictographic/indicative and semi-(homo)phonic (形声, *xing sheng*), a method that employs one character for its pictographicalness and the other for its sound. For example, the character 鲤(*li*) (carp, whose Chinese equivalent is pronounced *li*) is composed of, on the left, *yu* (鱼, fish, since *yu* in its original form resembles a fish) that stands for the attribute or property of the signified, and *li* (里) which is adopted for its accepted sound.

- e. Mutually annotative (转注, *zhuan zhu*), which refers to characters that are derived from the same radicals and annotative of one another.
- f. Derivative or borrowing (假借, *jia jie*), which refers to characters that are employed to mean what they do not originally signify on occasions where there are already such words used in oral Chinese but no such written characters available.

The above six methods make it possible for the Chinese language to constantly enrich itself, and to be, in a different way from English, open onto and creative of new meanings and concepts. Mere pictography is of course too limited. For instance, one could hardly picturize abstract concepts and ideas. In fact, most of the Chinese characters are created through the fourth method. In the dictionary of the Han Dynasty, 7,679 out of the 9,353 characters (about 80%) belong to the fourth category. In the dictionary of the Song Dynasty (960-1279), 21,343 out of the 24,352 characters (about 88%); in the dictionary of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), 42,300 out of the 47,035 (about 90%) (see Zuo, 1984, p. 11). Combination of pictography with sound is the most effective way for Chinese to take in what is foreign. For example, many Western terms, especially in science and technology, have been translated into Chinese by using this method. This will be elaborated later in this study.

As far as the meaning of a word is concerned, there are few words in English that can find exact equivalents in Chinese except for some modern and contemporary scientific, technological and popular culture terms - not even words like father and mother, since in English a father or mother may refer to religious figures. Take the easiest words "room" and its Chinese equivalent *fang jian*(房间). Although both words refer to "a space enclosed by walls or partitions," room has at least two other meanings that *fang jian* does not have: 1) space that is or might be occupied (e.g. Is there room for me in this car?); 2) scope; opportunity (e.g. There is room for improvement in your work.).

On the other hand, the English word *die* or *death* has dozens of Chinese equivalents that can not possibly be exactly translated into English. Perhaps because "All men are created equal" before death, there seems to be actually only one word (although there are over 70 expressions for death) in English. In Chinese, however, due to China's traditional patriarchal system, and co-existence of Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, Muslim, Christianity, etc., there is a long list of words for death. Consequently, an

emperor dies a different death (驾崩, *jia beng*) from a layman (死, *si*); an old (wo)man dies a different death (去世, *qu shi*) from a child (夭折, *yao zhe*); a Buddhist dies a different death (圆寂, *yuan ji*) from a Taoist (大行, *da xing*); a hero dies a different death (牺牲, *xi sheng*) from a villain (毙命, *bi ming*); and even a Communist member dies a different death (见马克思, *jian ma ke si* --- literally going to see Marx) from a non-Communist (逝世, *shi shi*).... Even within the same religion, family, officialdom and so on, people of different age, sex and rank die different deaths (in Guo, 1992, p.15).

On top of such differences are different shades of meanings of words. In different contexts, words take on different conceptual, connotative, social, affective, reflective/ed, collocative and thematic meanings. For example, in Walter Scott's *Ivanhoe*, there is a sentence that reads: "There are cattle in the fields, but we sit down to beef. Chickens become poultry."

For a fairly educated English reader with or without knowledge of the Norman Conquest, this sentence is not difficult to understand. For a Chinese, however, the words cattle and poultry stand in the way of sense-making. A Chinese translator rendered the sentence into:

Zai di li fang yang de jiao sheng-kou, zuo xia lai chi de jiao niu rou, ji bian cheng jia-qin. (Emphasis mine)

a rendition that makes the Chinese reader think Scott was talking nonsense, since "*sheng-kou* (牲口)" is indeed "cattle" but in the sense of "domesticated 4-legged animals held as property or reared for use," and "*jia qin* (家禽)" "poultry" in the sense of "domestic fowl kept for the eggs or meat they produce." [Cattle and poultry here of course mean, specifically and respectively, "bovine animals (e.g. cows) kept on a farm or ranch" and "(hens, ducks, geese etc.) considered as food," definitions that appear following their first meanings in the *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary*.]

In Hemingway's *The Old Man and the Sea*, there is a dialogue:

"How much did you suffer?"

"Plenty," the old man said.

Typical of Hemingway's style, the words used are simple, concise but powerful. How, then, should a Chinese translator handle the simple word "plenty" here? Surely, a Chinese equivalent given in any English-Chinese dictionary will never do!

4. Linguistic and Cultural Translation

a. Grammatical differences between Chinese and English

The differences in the meaning- and sense-making process as reflected in sentence structures of one language are even harder to be translated into the other. As different frameworks of knowledge and world order that are historically constructed through the linguistic order of language as cultural codes, Chinese differs from English in diction, grammar, syntax, rhetoric, taste, etc. In structural and grammatical terms, the following differences stand out between English and Chinese (see Yang & Li ed. 1990; Liu et al. ed., 1994; the whole article by Wang, 1990):

1. Hypotactic vs. paratactic. This refers to different ways in which words and sentences are joined together. English sentences are subject to formal and grammatical changes (plural forms of nouns, comparative and superlative degrees of adjectives and adverbs, verb tenses, etc.), which are non-existent in Chinese. Therefore, such a simple sentence as "I bought two books yesterday" (in which "buy" has to be changed into "bought" because of "yesterday", "book" has to be "books" because of "two", and "yesterday" can be placed anywhere) would be in Chinese simply "I yesterday buy two book." Similarly, the sentence "If you move, I'll shoot" would be in Chinese "You make a move, I will shoot."
2. Grape-like vs. bamboo-like. This refers to the fact that English sentences, theoretically speaking, can be very long and winding --- clusters of grapes crisscrossed grammatically upon the very simple "subject-verb-object" structure with its infinitives, gerundial phrases, participle phrases, adjective phrases, prepositional phrases, independent structures, noun-clauses, attributive clauses, etc. All these are absent in Chinese but can be inserted into any English sentence at convenience and at will without the fear of being ungrammatical. Chinese sentences are more like bamboo, mostly short and straight. Consequently, a long

and complex sentence in English may take many independent sentences to translate into Chinese. And this does change the sequence and logic of the narrative of the original. Therefore, it is said that Chinese is synthetic and poetic: synthetic in that one has to make sense of one's own while reading the grammatically loosely connected sentences (In classical Chinese, there was even no punctuation mark. One has to learn reading by learning to decide where to pause or stop); poetic in that the absence of grammatical elements enables the image - the soul of poetry - to stand independently alone, while in comparison English is analytic and prosaic.

3. Post-positional vs. pre-positional. The many grammatical elements listed above are attached post-positionally to what they modify. While they are non-existent in Chinese, modifying elements in Chinese sentences come usually pre-positionally before what they modify. Even adverbial clauses, which are present in Chinese, are often placed before the main clauses.
4. Regular-triangle vs. inverted triangle. Just as Western classical paintings choose to have regular-triangle composition, which perhaps reflects the ideal Trinity, English sentences tend to be in end-weight structure. When several place names and time periods are juxtaposed, they come usually in the order from the more specific to the more general, the smaller to the bigger, and the more concrete to the more abstract. For example, the sentence "Ribbentrop mounted the gallows in the execution chamber of the Nuremberg prison at eleven minutes past 1 A.M. on the 16th of October, 1949," would have to be re-ordered in Chinese as: 1949-16th-1 A.M.-11 minutes, Nuremberg prison-execution-chamber-gallows. This difference, coupled with the Chinese moral practice of putting others before oneself¹, caused many problems in the communications of the Chinese with the West at the beginning of the 1980s when China opened herself onto the outside world. For example, many letters sent out by the Chinese from China were returned to the senders. The senders had written the receivers' addresses on the

¹ According to the modern Chinese philosopher Liang Suming, who predicted the 21st century would be the century of China due to Chinese traditional moral principles, in Chinese, ethics (伦理, *lun li*) means moral principles governing human relationship, since *lun* means two, even or in pairs, and *li*, principles, i.e. always attaching more importance to others.

upper and their own on the lower part of the envelopes (in a to-from order), and the addresses had been written in the order of country-state/province-city-street-room/house number!

5. Montage vs. imitative. The fact that English verbs have 16 tenses along with their definite formal changes and various conjunctions allows more flexible narration and description of events without having to have sentence order correspond to time order according to the time and space sequence of events. For instance, a simple sequence of event like "The train left before I reached the station" can be described in many ways in English:

- a. I reached the station after the train had left.
- b. The train had left before I reached the station.
- c. I didn't reach the station until after the train had left.
- d. When I reached the station, the train had already left.

No matter how you phrase it, no confusion would possibly arise. As a result, such narration is like montage, where the time-space narrative can go against natural sequence and order. In contrast, the bamboo-like Chinese sentences often have to follow the natural sequence and order of events, something like copying and imitating reality.

6. Noun-dependent vs. verb-dependent. While English does have as many simple verbs as Chinese, such as rest, walk, view, act, discuss, generate, analyze, go, etc., in actual use people prefer to say:

to have/take a rest (break, walk, swim, bath...)
to come into view, go into action, put into practice, etc.
under discussion (construction, attack, repair, study...)
generation of electricity, the analysis of a problem...

Here verbs take on their noun forms either in an active or passive voice. But Chinese is heavily verb-dependent, which means you simply say "rest" when you want to "have a rest."

These differences, subtly dynamic rather than static, are but formal differences like icebergs rising out of the dark ocean of cultural, philosophical, religious, aesthetical, conceptual, cognitive and many more differences.

b. Cultural implications

A translator of written works enjoys more advantages than an on-the-spot interpreter. The differences summarized above are living and alive. "Words are people," as James Hillman (1991, p. 37) has put it, living organisms that carry the lived experience of others" (Smith, 1999, p. 58). For an interpreter, transcendence of these differences does not lie in their conceptual knowledge but in proper treatment of each living sound, word, phrase, sentence, paragraph, passage, text, rhythm, intonation, rhetoric devices and even somatic expressions that constantly keep coming and going without allowing one any time to "cross the gap" in real communicative situations. S/he has to simultaneously "think" and therefore "live" by expressing in two linguistic, therefore, cultural, systems. S/he has to acquire genuine understanding of both systems from words, grammar rules, rhetoric devices to history, culture, philosophy, religions -- anything that is constructed by the language.

In a book written by A. L. Strong (in Xu, 1979), there is a vivid account of her interview in 1940s with Chairman Mao in Yan'an, the then headquarters of the Maoist Revolution. When talking about the American imperialists, Chairman Mao made his famous remark about American imperialism and all its running dogs as 纸老虎 (*zhi lao hu*). The Chinese interpreter for Mao was quick in finding some kind of existing equivalent in English, and he translated the term into "scarecrow." Although Chairman Mao did not understand English (he spent much time later in his life learning English though), he was suspicious of the interpreter's rendition, and paused to ask what "scarecrow" meant. After hearing the explanation, Mao was very dissatisfied, saying that was not what he had in his mind. He meant exactly "*zhi lao hu*," which looks very frightening but is too vulnerable to stand even a poke. The interpreter had to make a literal translation into "paper tiger," which later became known throughout the world.

Little is known perhaps in the West about an incident involving translation of one seemingly unimportant sentence, which was a turning point during the Korean War in the early 1950s. According to the chief translator/interpreter of the Chinese side (Ling, 1990), the Chinese involvement in the Korean War drove the Americans back to the 38 degrees latitude in Korea. The War came to a deadlock. The Chinese side did not want to go on

fighting, and the Americans, for fear of igniting a Third World War, also wanted peace, but a decent peaceful settlement with the Chinese. Both sides intended to go to the table of negotiations, but neither side wanted to speak out first.

During the cease-fire in 1953, the Americans bombed the headquarters of the Chinese delegation of peace negotiation. China protested against the attack and demanded an investigation into the incident. In a short American response to the Chinese side in the name of UN forces, there was one sentence which seemed to be unimportant and did not make much sense to the Chinese translators, who almost decided not to translate and send it back to the Chinese government in Beijing. The sentence was (the author did not give the original) something like "The UN forces would not talk about anything that has nothing to do with peace negotiation." As in the way Chinese translators were trained, they translated it faithfully. It was sent back to Beijing, and the top leaders Chairman Mao and Zhou Enlai immediately sensed the subtle message in that response, which, interpreted from the other side, meant "we would only be interested in peace negotiation." Thus the two sides came to the table of negotiation. The author acknowledged in his paper that the Chinese leaders were indeed wiser than the translators including himself, who were so called interculturally well educated.

If intercultural qualification of the translator is something improvable and changeable, differences between Chinese and English often set limits to the translatability between them. For instance, proverbs, jokes, riddles, tongue twisters, word games, puns, etc. are not inter-translatable, since they rely upon twists and turns of sounds, patterns, forms, meanings and allusions that are unique to the language as a historical and cultural product. There is an anecdote well known in the circle of Chinese interpreters. When Chairman Mao received foreign guests, he would talk in his usual free, casual and vivid style, employing many Chinese old sayings to make his point. Once Mao remarked that he was *heshang da san, wu fa wu tian* (和尚打伞, 无法无天) literally a monk with an umbrella, no hair no heaven). The translator was at a loss what to do, since *fa* (发, hair) here is a homophonic of *fa* (法, law), and *tian* (天, heaven) here refers to sense of authority. The two-part allegorical saying, of which the first part is descriptive, while the second part carries the message, actually means "defy laws human and divine." In the same vein, it is impossible to translate the following into Chinese:

1) What keys are too big to carry in your pocket?

___ A donkey, a monkey, and a turkey.

2) What does the pig say when the butcher takes hold of its tail?

___ That's the end of me.

In literature translation, it is difficult to fill the "gaps." For literature is, to some extent, a free play of mind, imagination, wit, intellect and often personal and individualized aesthetic experiences and experiments by making the best use of the language. For example, works of Dadaism, Surrealism, and Stream-of-consciousness are hard to translate. James Joyce's *Ulysses* and Proust's *A la Recherche du Temps Perdu* defy any rendering efforts. Similarly, a great number of Chinese literary works, dearly cherished and loved by the Chinese, do not make much sense when translated into English due to the Chinese literary tradition inspired and conditioned by the Chinese language as uniquely Chinese historical experiences.

When it comes to poetry, a translator feels hopeless and helpless - to the extent that "Poetry is untranslatable," a rule that is popularly accepted. But good poetry often contains the germ, so to speak, of a people's aesthetic aspiration, the embodiment of a nation's moral and spiritual character. And China is a nation of poetry with a poetic language. For example, 对联(*dui lian*), antithetical couplet written on paper or scrolls and pasted or inscribed on either side of the door/gate, forms a special, long-standing cultural landscape across China. But there is no way for the Chinese to share their visual, imaginative, sense of the local and so on so forth with other peoples of the world. Many Western visitors to China may have physically entered the doors to many Chinese historical sites. However, they may not have had access to the Chinese poetic heart/mind openly displayed at those entrances. Here are some examples.

烟锁池塘柳

炮镇海城楼

Yan suo chi tang liu

pao zhen hai cheng lou

(fog locks pond's willows/ cannons protect sea city tower)

It is an antithetic couplet inscribed at the gate of the historical site Humen (the Bogue), where over a million kilograms of opium handed over by the British merchants was publicly burned in 1839, which resulted in the Opium War (1840). The characters/words in both lines of the couplet, perfectly matched in image, rhyme, rhythm and even parts of

speech, contain respectively the five elements (fire, metal, water, earth and wood) represented by the left parts of the characters. A famous *dui lian* at the gate of a hotel by the river in Changsha reads:

进 退 连 还 运 道 通

远 近 迎 送 逍 遥 过

Jin tui lian huan yun dao tong

yuan jin ying song xiao yao guo

(advance retreat inter-link transport route open

coming near going far ushering in ushering out freely pass)

All the fourteen characters, except the seventh in either part, can stand alone and go with the neighbouring one to form a word, evoking different visual images and cultural associations in the readers/viewers from different backgrounds. They have the same radical on the left side "辶," which means go/moving, forming a vivid picture of friendliness, vigour, prosperity and anything a traveller could expect from a hotel. The word *yun dao* (运道) conveys the traditional Chinese wish for fortune and happiness, and *xiao yao* (逍遥) has a strong Taoist idea of free way of life. Indeed, while the couplet stands among the best of its kind in literary taste, it is perhaps one of the best advertisements one can find worldwide.

According to historical records, when Queen Victoria was celebrating her sixtieth birthday, the then Chinese minister to London, Li Hongzhang, a fine poet, presented the Queen with a pair of collected verses or couplet that deemed the most precious of gifts according to the Chinese tradition:

西 望 瑶 池 降 王 母

东 来 紫 气 满 函 关

Xi wang yao chi jiang wang mu

Dong lai zi qi man han guan

Literally it means:

Looking westward from the Jasper Lake descends the Queen-Mother,

Out of the East a purple mist enshrouds the Han Gu Pass.

What a grand, mysterious and glorified picture in Chinese to a Chinese mind! The Queen-Mother is the most benevolent and best beloved fairy goddess in China, and the Han Gu Pass was, in Lao Zi's time, China Proper to the West. Taoist legend has it that Lao Zi (Li Dan), the founder of Taoism who bears the same family name as the Chinese minister, travelled beyond the Han Gu Pass when purple clouds closed him in and he became lost to mortal eyes. Commenting on the two lines, a Chinese scholar could not

help but sigh emotionally: "Had Queen Victoria understood but half of the pretty things that were said in this couplet, all England would have sat in ashes on account of her China wars" (Lu, 1982, p. 128). Unfortunately, as history shows us, literature always comes late. And understanding between peoples speaking different languages is never timely.

Let us look at a Chinese *ci* poem by Ma Zhiyuan, which does not contain the usual literary devices as understood in English. Literally translated, it reads:

Withered cane(s), old tree(s), sleepy crow(s),
Small bridge, running water, someone's home,
Ancient path, west wind, thin horse,
The sun is setting in the west,
The broken-hearted one on the outskirts of heaven.

This is a classically powerful poem expressing the feelings of someone away from home. All the images bear such strong cultural associations and aesthetic suggestiveness that any attempt at explaining the poem is bound to be a failure. The question is: Does the translation, even if paraphrased according to the English grammar by adding all the grammatical elements that are not needed in the original, make any sense at all to an English reader?

All this leads to the deeper question of culture that constitutes the background for any working of translation.

It can be seen from the above that any textual translation of the source language is conditioned by the culture encoded in the target language. Consequently, any word, sentence or text translation inevitably involves the working of the cultural system in which translation is done, accepted/rejected and transformed. Conversely, the cultural system of the target language always sets limits to the translatability, comprehensibility and acceptability, leaving the translator often hopelessly and despairingly caught in the divides between the two cultural systems.

While culture as an abstract term refers to the sum total of material and spiritual wealth and the corresponding creative talents that have been created in the human history, it becomes very specific and concrete when it comes to translation. Culture may be said to be composed of two parts, one is hard, or material or static culture, which is as easily

identifiable as a person's skin color. The other is soft culture, or the spiritual and attitudinal side (Li, 1997, p. 1), which is the deeper structure and can not be easily transformed or changed.

English vocabulary is not just words recording the spoken sounds. They are products of historical, lived and living experiences of those who speak it. It always has, among other things, specific historical, social, religious, political, philosophical and aesthetic references which form a cultural discourse that does not have a shared basis with the Chinese. Although centuries of China-West cultural exchange, Euro-American colonial history and/or the long process of globalization, have brought China and the West to some kind of shared experiences especially in modern times, yet East is still East and West still West. And these mutually independent identities, or different paradigms of cultural construct, are living in the languages.

For instance, it is fascinating to see how the Chinese official and the American anti-Communist media have been engaged in political, ideological and diplomatic fighting. The best-seller *Behind Demonization of China* (1996), describes the many kinds of American hegemonic action against China, from Hollywood's portrait of the always "incomprehensible and ugly Chinese," through American intervention in China's bid for WTO, to the subversion-oriented Voice of America. According to the book, key words that dominate the American stingy, biased and prejudiced media reports (newspapers, magazines, books, TV, radio, movies and the Internet) on China include:

political movement, totalitarianism, class struggle, corruption, graft, bribery, dissidents, human rights violation, inhumane, nuclear proliferation, copyright violation, drug abuse, forgery, arms and ammunition smuggling, sales of human organs, nationalism, impotence, starvation, despotism, spying, nuclear espionage, labor camps, Tiananmen massacre, military threat, China threat, religious persecution, the issues of Tibet and Taiwan... (Li et. al. 1996, p. 2)

These terms ordinary Chinese understand well and know are being used to describe them.

On the other hand, key words that dominate Chinese media against the USA are not few:

anti-China, hegemony, imperialist, barbarian, demonization, containment (of China), Cold-War mentality, racial discrimination, immoral, arrogant...

The point is both the Chinese and American sides are using the same words, terms and concepts that have been mostly American/Western inventions naming and addressing the reality they are facing or perceive to be existing. How have these words been translated, accepted, popularized, used and manipulated in the Chinese cultural context? Are they gradually but basically changing the Chinese consciousness, way of thinking, social, economic and academic norms, politics and ideology?

In his *Science of Logic* (in Zhang, 1985, p. 385), Hegel declares that "The Chinese language is supposed not to have developed to this stage (i.e. 'when a language possesses an abundance of logical expressions, that is, specific and separate expressions for the thought determinations themselves; many prepositions and articles denote relationships based on thought') or only to an inadequate extent." What he was talking about was in fact different stages of a people's consciousness associated with or determined by the culture they live in. Although Hegel, like many other well-learned Western scholars before and after him (Voltaire, Montesquieu, Diderrot and even Karl Marx, etc.) faltered, falsified and faulted in their understanding of China for different reasons, one thing underlying his statement is still true, Darwin notwithstanding: there are different stages of human cultural development. These differences form bigger gaps than those between different religions, philosophical paradigms for the translator to fill.

According to Lowe (1982), so far there have been four levels of cultural development: 1) oral/aural or indigenous culture, in which authority or power is achieved through voice in direct contact; 2) chirographic/script or pre-modern culture, in which the voice is "dead," meaning becomes more independent of the speaker, and direct authority is lost; 3) typographic or modern culture, in which the "subject" is pulled away from the "object," and knowledge rests in the book rather than in the person/speaker; 4) telematic or postmodern culture, which is filled with hyper vision/hearing and imaginative simulation.

Then how is translation possible when the major English-speaking countries are in the modernized, postmodern, electronic and informational stage with their own cultural vocabulary and grammar while China is still largely in its oral-aural (for many minorities and remote areas in China), paper and machine stage? Is it possible that language can transcend its cultural limitations to be more universal?

Comparative studies in recent years in China have led Chinese scholars to conclude that, as compared with Western culture, traditional Chinese culture, which is still dominating and in which all the discourses in Chinese are carried out, differs from the West in many, sometimes unbridgeable ways. Since China has been a family and agriculture-based nation with the longest feudal tradition, it has a distinctively different system of culture and cultural codes in the form of linguistic expressions.

Before coming to China-West translation, it may be helpful to take a historical look at Chinese translation of Buddhism as a background. In a sense, one can hardly talk about translation of the West without referring to Buddhist translation. First, Buddhist translation shows how other languages can be translated into Chinese. Second it was part of what had made China before China-West encounter. It had both enriched the Chinese culture and strengthened China's Middle Kingdom mentality, which stood in the way of translating the more heterogeneous West. Third, it speaks more about the positive and constructive side of translation as a peaceful, natural and spontaneous cultural choice, exchange and enrichment. It forms a sharp contrast to the later translation of the West as a destructive Other.

IV. Historical Experience: Translation of Buddhism

1. Background

China enjoys one of the longest traditions of translation, estimated to be over two thousand years based upon historical written records. As a matter of fact, as early as in the Xia (2183-1752 B.C.) and Shang (1751-1112 B.C.) dynasties, there were accounts of "guests from distant and barbarian lands." At that time, translation as cultural practice was mainly in the form of oral interpretation in foreign affairs, and interpreters were called *she ren* (舌人), literally, "tongue men." According to Liang Qichao (in Yuan, 1985), the first textual translation that has been found is *Yueren ge* (越人歌, The Song of the Yue People), appearing during the Warring States Period (403 - 222 B.C.). The ancient *Book of Rites* tells us that translation had different names: *ji* (寄) in the East, *xiang* (象) in the South, *di di* (狄鞮) in the West and *yi* (译, interpret, translate) in the North (where the Han nationality inhabited) (Guo, 1992, p. 11).

Theory of translation in China is also a long-standing discipline, quite comparable to that in the West. Western translation theory is generally regarded as starting from Cicero (106 - 43 B.C.), who warned in his *De Oratore* against word-for-word translation, but as a discipline it had not taken shape until Martin Luther wrote his "Circular Letter on Translation" (1530) (Chen, 1992, p. 12). Recently, however, it has been traced back to Herodotus (484? - 430/20 B. C.), who showed in his *Histories* central concerns "with cross-cultural communication - how people speaking different languages manage to pass ideas on to each other - and he places that process in an insistently geopolitical context" (Robinson, 1997, p. 1). So in *The Twittering of Birds* and *The Origin of the Class of Egyptian Interpreters*, as Robinson commented:

... we see Egyptian priestesses learning to translate their religion into Greek as a result of being abducted and sold into slavery by Phoenicians, and an Egyptian 'translator corps' being formed through the sending of Egyptian boys to live with Greeks and to learn their language: both geohermeneutical events more typical of Montaigne's account of Brazilian kings than of Cicero translating Demosthenes or Jerome translating the Bible (pp. 1-2).

Translation theory in China is generally considered to have begun with Zhi Qian (Chih Ch'ien, ? - 255), who wrote "Preface to *Fajujing* (Dharma-phrase sutra)" during the reign of Emperor Xian in the late Han Dynasty (189 - 220). In this preface written in about 224 A.D., Zhi Qian discussed the difficulties, standards and techniques of translating Buddhist texts into Chinese. According to Chen (1992), however, translation theory can be pushed back to Confucius (551 - 479 B. C.), who made brief comments on translation on several occasions, as recorded in a number of sources. For instance, in Chapter 13 of *Zhuang Zi: The Heavenly Way*, Zhuang Zi (Chuang Tzu, bet. 399 and 295 B. C.) wrote that "*kong zi fan shi er jing*," which can be translated as "Confucius translated numerous classics." Unfortunately the different interpretations of the meaning of *fan*, which can mean "translate" and "refer to something repeatedly," make it difficult to further investigate into what Zhuang Zi actually meant.

In another ancient book *Chunqiu guliang zhuan* (Spring and Autumn: The Book of Guliang), there is a reference that "Confucius said: 'When it comes to using/translating names (of foreign countries), (we should) follow the sounds as pronounced in their own countries. When it comes to (names of) things, (we should) follow Chinese customs.'" Still in another ancient book *Dadai li ji: xiao bian* (On Rites: Minor Skills), there is a story that after hearing Confucius's advice not to learn minor skills of distinguishing between different arts, the King of the Kingdom of Lu asked him how to govern a country without mastering those skills. Confucius answered:

Minor skills of differentiation destroys speech (discourse/talk/word). Minor speech destroys meaning. Minor meaning destroys *dao* (道, way, path or road). If *dao* is narrow, nothing can get through it; things are simple if *dao* is wide and unobstructed. Therefore by following the strings (of musical instruments) one can know the music so as to know the social customs. By reading classics, one can distinguish between speeches. Since there are translators to translate speeches of different countries, it is simple and easy to know what is said (in other languages without learning them) (in Chen, 1992, p. 13. Translation mine).

What Confucius said on the first occasion about translating foreign names has been a guiding principle in Chinese history of translation, but what he said on the second occasion has played down the role of translation as secondary and insignificant.

Confucius regarded translation as a minor skill, not important enough for the ruler to pay particular attention to.

It can be seen here that while Herodotus paved the way for Western translation to explore different means of cross-cultural communication, the Confucian idea of translation allowed a very "narrow *dao*" for Chinese translation to develop. It never viewed translation from a 'geopolitical' or 'geohermeneutical' perspective, and cross-cultural translation was hardly a conscious activity. This narrow understanding of translation seemed to have decided the failure of Chinese civilization in front of the West two thousand years later.

Although translation in China did not enjoy a high status, inter-translation between Chinese and various other languages surrounding China exercised great influences upon one another's languages and social customs and institutions. For instance, the Persians, the Turks, the Mongolians, the Manchurians and the Koreans borrowed many words from Chinese (Shi, 1991, pp. 1-10) mainly through sound translation, including *su su* (broomcorn millet in Persian), *tutuq* (governor in Turkic), *kong tco* (princess in Tibetan).

On the other hand, Chinese borrowed its words heavily from other languages, including thousands of words from Mongolian and Manchurian (see Shi, 1991, Yang, 1996, Liu et al., 1984). In fact, as is the case with English, etymological studies of Chinese can anthropologically and archeologically excavate the history of China in its relationship with other nations around and yonder -- farther from its West or East (Japan).

As is usual with inter-national exchange, major Chinese written translation of the West started with religion. The term West or 西方(*xi fang*) has been a changing concept in China - changing geographically, geo-culturally and geo-politically. In ancient times, the West first referred mainly to the home of Buddhism - India and other Central Asian countries. Together they were called the Land of the West (西域, *xi-yu*) or the Heaven of the West (西天, *xi tian*). As was the East or the Orient to the Westerners in the past, the West stood for mystery, legends, fancy and even paradise (since in Chinese to die is said to 归西- *gui xi* - return to the West) to the Chinese, possibly because of the influence of Buddhism. One of the most popular classical novels, *Pilgrimage to the West* (西游记), demonstrates the extent to which the Chinese fantasized the West.

When missionaries, especially Jesuits, stormed to China beginning from the 17th century, the West itself, an image that was more vague and ambiguous than clear, shifted to mean Western European countries - vaguely called "*tai xi*" (泰西, the extreme or further West). The Chinese did not, or to be more exact, did not care to, know what countries they were. For Chinese historical records about the visits, tributes, envoys and traders from Western Europe were fragmentary, incoherent and confusing as far as their translated names are concerned.

When Britain broke open the Chinese closed door with the Opium War (1840), the West, an image that was monstrously clearer, shocking and immoral, became Britain, which was called the "English devil." When the Western Powers including Japan and Russia, rallied against China toward the later half of the 19th and the early 20th century, the West became the aggressors and invaders, a collective image of butchery, robbery and lechery. As the United States rose to supremacy after the WWII, the West became the United States, a paper tiger that was not to be feared (as in the Korean War and the Vietnam War) but better to be left alone, as the general attitude showed during Chairman Mao's leadership. The open-door policy practiced since the end of 1970s has somewhat changed the image of the West, which now stands for all the industrialized countries (including Japan) headed by the United States. Greater intercultural engagement particularly by way of extensive translation and with new and advanced means of technology has offered the Chinese a fuller, perhaps two-sided, picture of the West. However, it remains doubtful whether the 'truth' of the West can be constructed in China through translation, as will be shown later in this study.

2. Translation of Buddhism

Buddhism, one of the three major beliefs (the other two being Confucianism and Taoism) in China, has been called the Second Chinese Traditional Culture (Shi, 1991, p. 168). Founded in the 6th century BCE in India, Buddhism, as a cultural gift from India readily accepted in China (Wang, 1989, p. 2), came to Xianyang in China as early as in 242 BCE, when 18 Buddhists arrived there with Buddhist sutras (Shen, 1987, p. 78). But Buddhism did not take root until around 80 BCE when some disciples of the Buddha came to the northwest part of China, i.e. what is now known as Xinjiang Province

through Kashmir. Buddhist sutras began to be copied (on wooden boards) and distributed mainly in Sanskrit.

Introduction of Buddhism was greatly facilitated by the open and liberal policies adopted by the emperors of the Han Dynasty (BCE 206-220 CE). Having been liberated from the extreme authoritarian and totalitarian rule of the Qin Dynasty (BCE 221-206 CE), the early emperors of the Han Dynasty adhered to the politics of the Taoist *wu wei* (无为, non-action) (Sun, 1992, p. 202). It offered opportunities for different schools of theories and thoughts to grow. Records (Shen, 1987, p. 79) show that in the year 2 BCE in the Western (former) Han Dynasty (206 BCE-8 CE), Buddhist Scriptures, as was the case in early Britain, began to be orally interpreted and taught to the Chinese by Buddhists from the lands of the West, including what are now known as India and other Central Asian countries, which were transliterated into many different names. Since the Buddhist monks (Samgha) came from different parts of India and other countries, they brought different versions of sutras in different dialects/languages, such as *Qieliu* spoken in the northwest, Pali in the south and *Jiantuoluo* in the north. Consequently there are many different Chinese transliterations of the same words, terms and expressions from the sutras. Standardized translation was needed for Buddhism to be popularized in China.

While the first adaptation of an Indian Buddhist text appeared in 100 CE (Gernet, 1996, p. 700), written translation started around the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty (25-220CE) soon after An Shigao (An Shih-kao), son of the King of Anxi (Parthia, now Iran) Chosroes (106-130), arrived in Luoyang, the capital of the then China in 148. An studied and mastered Chinese. Over a period of more than 20 years, he translated 95 volumes (54 volumes extant) Buddhist scriptures into Chinese, ranging from Mahayana (the Greater Vehicle) to Hinayana (the Little Vehicle) (Shen, 1985). About the same time, another monk, Lokaksema (from Dayuedi) came to Luoyang to preach Buddhism. For forty years, he translated 14 (some say 23) volumes of sutras into Chinese while teaching Buddhism.

Circulation and practice of Buddhism became very popular in China. During the reign of Emperor Huan (158-166), Buddhism achieved equal status in the imperial court along with Huang-Lao (the beliefs of the legendary Yellow Emperor Huang-di and Lao Zi). According to Gernet (1996, p. 701), first mention of Buddhist ceremonies at the imperial court in Luoyang was made in 166 CE. Between 220 and 225, Zhi Qian, the

monk from an Indo-Scythian family of Luoyang, translated in Nanjing texts of the Greater Vehicle *Amitabha* and *Vimalakirti* (Gernet, 1996, p. 703). As the Chinese historian Jian (1981, p. 44) noted, "there were 1,367 temples and monasteries in Luoyang in 534. There was a total of 30,000 temples and monasteries and more than two million monks in the whole of the north."

Under such cultural and religious climate, not only Buddhist monks came from the West, but China sent many scholars to the West for Buddhist scriptures. In the year 259, the first known Chinese pilgrim departed for central Asia (Gernet, 1996, p. 703). According to clearly recorded accounts (Wang, 1989, p. 4), from the Han to the Tang Dynasty (618-907), there were the following monks/translators to and from the West:

Monks from the West			Chinese Monks to the West		
Dynasty	Number	Place(s)	Dynasty	Number	Place(s)
Han (206-220)	6	Luoyang	Han (206-220)	2	Tianzhu (India)
Three Kingdoms (220-280)	3	Wuhan Luoyang	Three Kingdoms		
Jin (265-420)	16	Dunhuang Chang'an (now Xi'an)	Jin	11	Tianzhu (India)
South and North (420-589)	19	Yangzhou Chang'an	South and North	7	India
Sui (581-618)	3	Chang'an			
Tang (618-907)	29	Chang'an	Tang	41	All India

From the chart, it can be seen that Buddhism reached its height in the Tang Dynasty, politically the most open, liberal and tolerant of all dynasties in Chinese history. This period produced the most outstanding Buddhist translator of all, Xuanzang (Hiuan-tsang, 596-664). For seventeen years starting from 629 (Gernet, 1996), Xuanzang travelled extensively to Kanyakubja, Sravasti, Kapilavastu, Kusinagara, Varanasi, etc., visited all the six sacred places of Buddhism, came back with "authentic Scriptures," and devoted the rest of his life to Buddhist translation. For nineteen years, he translated 1335 volumes. Upon the edict of Emperor Taizong (reigned 626-649), who had received requests from the Western countries to establish friendship with China, Xuanzang translated Lao Zi's

Tao De Jing and *Awakening of Mahayana Faith* into Sanskrit. His travel accounts, entitled *Record of Travels to Western Lands* (653), have been regarded as most important historical documents (Shen, 1987).

Buddhist translation continued to flourish in the Song Dynasty (960-1279). History has it that Emperor Taizu (reigned 960-976) once sent a group of 157 monks to the West for Buddhist sutras (Shi, 1991, p. 169). Over the one thousand years from 2 CE. to the Northern Song Dynasty (960-1126) when the Imperial Court dismissed the Academy of Buddhist Translation, 8641 volumes of the Mahayana and Hinayana sutras and biographies were translated into Chinese (Wang, 1989), including *Jin Gang Jing* (Vajracchedika) by Kumarajiva (344-413), *Hua Yan Jing* (Flowery Splendor Scripture), and *Nie Pan Jing* (Nirvana Scripture). From the Imperial Court down to the laymen, Buddhism constituted a grand cultural landscape that deserves careful examination.

From the Western Han to the late Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) when Jesuits came to China, generation after generation, China meticulously translated numerous Buddhist texts into Chinese. In this process, Chinese theory of translation developed considerably. There is a long list of Buddhist translators who contributed to Chinese translatology, including notably (Lin, 1988; Guo, 1992; Chen, 1992):

Zhi Qian of the late Han Dynasty, who began to theorize translation in a preface written in 224;

Dao'an (314-385), who advocated literal translation, and proposed his famous theory of "five essential losses and three fundamental obstacles of translation;"

Kumarajiva (344-413), who was inclined to liberal translation, and discussed the literary styles of the original Buddhist texts;

Huiyuan (334-416), who tried to explore a "middle way" between literal and liberal translation;

Sengrui (371?-438?), who inquired into the problems of understanding and interpreting the meanings of the original words and deciding on Chinese equivalents;

Sengyou (445-518), a celebrated historian of Buddhist translation and Buddhist translator, who compared differences and similarities between Chinese and the original languages in which various Buddhist texts were written;

Yancong (557-610), the author of the important treatise on the dialectics of translation, who suggested "eight requirements" of a translator;

Xuanzang (596-664), the greatest Buddhist translator, who put forward "five principles" for transliteration. Under his leadership, his important *yichang* (academy of translation) adhered to eleven standardized steps and/or procedures of translation;

Daoxuan (596-667), who critically reviewed translations done in the past, and opened up a critical tradition of translation based upon observation and practical experiences;


Zanning (919-1001), who summarized and commented on different theories of translation that had appeared before him, and established his "six standards" of translation.

The above listed and many others formed an unbroken chain of translation and translatology in the first millennium that exercised various influences on Chinese culture and civilization.

3. Buddhist Influences

a. Linguistic

In general, as Wang (1989, p. 77) noted, translation works by enriching and gradually changing a culture in the following inter-related ways:



Although it is impossible to make a detailed account of the various, multi-layered and multi-faceted impact Buddhist translation had upon various aspects of the Chinese culture, one may follow the pattern outlined above to briefly discuss its positive as well as negative sides.

First of all, from a religious point of view, popularization of Buddhism transplanted a strong sense of religion that had been obviously lacking in the Huang-Lao and Confucian traditions. Although Taoism and Confucianism had functioned as a kind of religion to spiritually bind the Chinese together, yet the two were essentially theories and philosophies of the relationship among human kind, Nature, and politics. They were inadequate to address such higher, ultimate but practical concerns of humanity as

meaning of existence and purpose of life. Introduction of Buddhism served as an agent to combine and integrate Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism together, creating a spiritual network of beliefs and philosophies of life. This led to what is called "*san jiao he yi*" (三教合一, literally unification into one of the three religions, i.e. Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. In the Chinese original, *jiao* (教) means both education/teaching and religion).

According to Liang Qichao (1924, in Wang, 1989, p. 6. Translation mine), Buddhism

1. Taught us (the Chinese) that there is absolute freedom, freedom of the heart/mind that is not fettered by any received habits and intellectual trends, and freedom of the spirit that is not enslaved by material life. In brief, it is not a freedom dependent upon oppressing and enslaving others, but ... an absolute freedom achieved through liberating the self.
2. Taught us that there is absolute love, pure love without jealousy or hate for anyone; persistent, compassionate and benevolent love for the foolish and the evil ones; absolute love based upon recognizing that self and others are inseparable, the loved and the hated are equal, and subject and object are the same... In short, (it) taught us to achieve absolute freedom through wisdom, and absolute love through compassion and benevolence.

These Buddhist teachings, at the crucial time when China was finally united under one social, political and linguistic system, guided the Chinese civilization to develop in a direction different from that of the West. The religious and philosophical influences of Buddhism were materialized through Chinese textual translation of the original Buddhist texts, which were further translated and re-translated in the Chinese contexts of linguistic, social and academic practices. Take language for example.

Although the Chinese language had borrowed heavily from the "barbarian languages" surrounding China, the most profound and heterogeneous linguistic changes came only with Buddhism. Chinese had to create new characters, new words and expressions, develop new syntax and rhetorical devices and set up new language standards and rules to translate Buddhist texts. Take the translation of Buddha. The word Buddha in Sanskrit means awakening or the awakened. Since Chinese transliterations had been done according to different dialects/languages from the West, Buddha was transliterated into

at least twenty-one names in Chinese (Shi, 1991, p. 173), including *fo tuo*, *fo tu*, *fou tou*, *bo tuo*. Later, Buddha came to be standardized in written form as *fo* (佛), due to the establishment of the Buddhist school of Chinese translation with especially the tremendous efforts of Xuanzang of the Tang Dynasty.

As a character and a word in Chinese, *fo* (佛, human being on the left-hand side, and literally no, not or negation on the right) was solely invented both in form and in sound for Buddha. This means that there is no homonym of *fo* in the Chinese language well noted for its homophones. Later, with *fo* as one of the basic morphemes in Chinese, numerous words, proverbs and sayings came into being including *bai fo* (worship Buddha) and *fo jiao* (Buddhism, literally Buddha religion).

Another example is the translation of Mara (devil, referring to disturbing, destroying and obstructing in the original) into *mo*. Originally Mara had several transliterations, such as *mo luo* and *mo luo ye*. In the Liang Dynasty (502-557), the character *mo* (魔) was invented based upon the originally used *mo* (磨, meaning troubling, grinding, wearing away, etc.) by changing the "*shi*" (石, stone) in the lower part of the character into "*gui*" (鬼, ghost or devil) (Shi, 1991, pp. 180-181). Again as a morpheme and a word, *mo* has been so magically powerful that even today new words are being formed with it, only that few realize it has anything to do with Buddhist translation. There is a long list of words, proverbs and idiomatic sayings associated with *mo* in Chinese such as *zhao mo* (be-bewitched; be possessed) and *yao mo* (evil spirit; demon).

Other examples include Amitabha, Bodhiattva, Yama-rajā, Naraka/Niraya, Upadhyaya, Samgha, Nirvana (Sanskrit)/Nibbana (Pali), Brahma/Brahman, etc.

Through such translations, not only were new characters and words invented, new concepts, ideas, theories and beliefs imported and circulated, but what were invented and imported came to be part of the basic cultural vocabulary and grammar in Chinese. The characters and words created through translation were gradually associated with Chinese cultural traditions, clothed in Chinese cultural garments and functioning both on a day-to-day life basis, and on a higher level of metaphysical pursuits.

As a matter of fact, according to Liang (in Wang, 1994, p. 9), Buddhist translation created and invented more than 3,500 new words and concepts in Chinese. It helped to

change the Chinese grammar and literary styles in more than ten ways, including rejection of excessive use of inverted sentences and suffixes such as “之, 乎, 者, 也, 已, 言 and 哉” (*zhi, hu, zhe, ye, yi, yan, zai*) that had characterized Chinese writings in, for instance, Confucius' time.

b. Literary

Buddhist influences on Chinese literature are particularly extensive and profound. As Shen (1987, pp. 82-84) noted, the literary methods of metaphor, simile and analogy characterizing Buddhist texts found ready echoes, application and adaptation in Chinese literature. Many Chinese poets, prose writers and even historians were inspired by Buddhist stories. They borrowed, paraphrased, imitated or referred to the translations of Buddhist texts available, especially the *Agama Sutras*, *Vimalakirti Sutras* and *Dharma-phrase Sutras* (Shen, 1987; Wang, 1994; Wang, 1996). For example, the two great poets of the Three Kingdoms (220-280), Cao Cao (155-220) and Cao Zhi (192-232), composed their most renowned "*Duangexing*" and "Seven- step Poem" by modeling upon the Buddhist sutras freshly translated into Chinese. Other widely loved poems in China inspired by Buddhist translations include folk narratives *Kongque dongnan fei* (written during the reign of Emperor Xian, 196-219) and *Mulan* (written during the South and North Dynasties, 420-589).

In traditional operas and fiction is also found strong impact of Buddhist translations, without which such highly influential novels as *Soushen ji* (Records of Spirits, between 317-322), *Fenshen bang* (Canonization of the Gods) and *Xiyou ji* (Pilgrimage to the West, 1592) would have been impossible. To deify and Buddha-ize emperors, for hundreds of years, even those royal historians, who are said to be objective to facts, described their emperors as having "extraordinary" appearances and looks that resembled Buddhas. As a result, from the official histories especially from the Wei Dynasty (220-265) down to the South and North Dynasties, one can read such descriptions of the emperors:

long hair that reaches the ground

ears big enough (for himself) to see

teeth as white as jade

long arms and hands that go down the knees... (Shen, 1987, p. 84)

In fact, according to the initiator of the Literary Revolution, Hu Shi (in Wang, 1994, p. 9), Buddhist translations: 1) created a new form of literature - that of the vernacular; 2) fostered the growth of a highly imaginative literature - Romanticism; 3) alerted Chinese literature to the importance of composition and structure.

Translation of Buddhism opened up new dimensions for the Chinese literature to grow, and the growth of the literature under strong Buddhist influences popularized Buddhism throughout China.

c. Cultural

Other aspects of Buddhist influences include music, dance, architecture, painting, sculpture, astronomy, medicine, education, etc. (Shen 1987; Wang, 1989; Chen, 1992; Sun, 1992). In all parts of China there were (and still are) Buddhist temples. Although at home the Chinese set up the five memorial tablets for Heaven, Earth, Emperor, Ancestors and Teachers, they went regularly out to Buddhist temples for spiritual, psychological, moral and religious guidance.

It should be noted, however, that although for a long time in ancient China Buddhism almost dominated over Taoism, yet its translation was conditioned by China's domestic politics, and its growth experienced ups and downs with the changes of the Chinese imperial attitudes. From the Wei (220-265) all the way down to the Tang Dynasty, the Chinese supreme rulers adopted, to borrow an American saying, the "carrot and the stick" policy towards Buddhism. Most of the emperors of the Eastern Jin Dynasty (317-420) were Buddhist believers, but Buddhism was banned towards the later years of the Dynasty. In the Northern Dynasty, Emperor Taiwu (424-452) issued an imperial edict to rebuild Buddhism, but during the reign of Emperor Wu (560-578), Buddhism was again banned. In the Tang Dynasty (618-907), starting from the Emperor Taizong (626-649), Buddhism was strongly advocated and supported. But at the hands of Emperor Wudi (840-846), it was persecuted for the third time (Li, 1997, p. 137).

From a cultural perspective, however, translation and popularization of Buddhism seemed to have its own logic of development going beyond political control. Towards the mid-Tang Dynasty, with Buddhist texts massively translated and theories of translation gradually established by Zhi Qian, Dao'an, Xuanzang and others, Buddhism

entered the period of sinicization. The Sixth Patriarch, Hui-neng (638-713), a great genius whose life marks an epoch, founded the Zen sect of Buddhism. It was the beginning of Chinese Buddhism growing on Chinese soil as opposed to the earlier schools of Buddhism that had emphasized upon Thusness, Suchness or Ultimate Reality, and had been "completely alien to the Chinese (philosophical) tradition" (Chan, 1973, p. 373) of synthesis. Down to the Song Dynasty (960-1279), the Zen Buddhism exercised great influences upon neo-Confucianism, and was incorporated into the "Song-Ming Idealism," the mainstream philosophy that guided China to the point of China-West encounter in the 17th century.

Parallel to the introduction of Buddhism, Islam and Christianity were also, though to a much lesser degree, translated into China. Islam came to China in the early Tang Dynasty. The earliest mention of The Koran was made in a travelogue by Du Huan, who had sojourned in Arabia from 751 to 762 (Xiao, 1983). Later, the Koran was introduced into China in Arabic. The Ahong (also Ahung) or Imam or Mullah taught it orally in Arabic, a custom that is still practiced in China today. Many Chinese Islam believers can recite the Koran fluently in Arabic although they have never learned the language. Excerpts of Chinese translation of the Koran emerged in the 16th century. It was not until 1927 that the first complete translation of the Koran was published in Beijing. The translator, Li Tiezheng, did his work by translating the Japanese rendition of the Koran with an English version as his reference (ibid.).

Christianity came to China also in the Tang Dynasty. The earliest arrival of Christianity in China was recorded when a heterodox cult of Christianity named Nestorianism established itself in Luoyang, the then capital of China. According to Gernet (1996, p. 712), the Gospel was brought to Chang'an (i.e. now Xi'an) by Nestorians from Iran in 631. In the year 781, the Nestorian stele in Chinese and Syriac was set up in Chang'an. Christianity was called *jing jiao* (景教, Grace or Luminous Religion) in Chinese (Shen, 1985, p. 365), and was officially protected until in the year 845 when Emperor Wuzong banned all the foreign religions (Li, 1997, p. 138).

Historically, China's translation of others was a continuous intercultural effort. As a major cultural cause, however, it was, for nearly two thousand years, too limited to Buddhism and/or inter-religious mediation. This poses many questions of interest. Why

did China accept Buddhism so confidently and readily without any fear of losing China's own identity? Why did generation after generation of imperial rulers in general tolerate and even promote Buddhism? Why was Buddhism so smoothly transformed into part of Chinese own culture? What does the successful translation of Buddhism tell us of the nature of translation as an intercultural activity? Why did China choose not to translate foreign cultures in a more modern, secular, democratic, diplomatic, military, scientific, technological and economic sense? Why was China's later translation of the West so different? A brief examination of these questions may set a stage for different dynamic forces to be played out in Chinese translation of the West.

4. Buddhism and Chinese Culture before East-West Encounter

a. Integration of Buddhism and Confucianism-Taoism

In retrospect, Chinese translation of Buddhism seems to be a spontaneous cultural event that took place naturally. It reflects China's own cultural values and choices. It also mirrors limitations as well as openness in cultural exchange involving geographical, geo-cultural and geopolitical factors. Further, it shows what conditions are needed for intercultural mediation as positive cultural enrichment.

That Buddhism should take root, grow and blossom on the Chinese soil is due to many factors. First of all, in those ancient times, means of transportation and ways of communication were limited. China's understanding and knowledge of others were confined to those peoples and regions it had direct contact with - especially along the Silk Route. Before translating Buddhism, China had already had hundreds of years' cultural (art, music, dance and acrobatics) and technological exchange, and trade (silk, lacquerware, ironware, fur, herbs, etc.) relationships (Shen, 1987, pp. 30-77) with those Buddhist countries and regions. Translation of Buddhism was a spontaneous and natural extension of exchange at a deeper, more spiritual level.

Secondly, the challenging profundity of Buddhism was something that appealed particularly to the Chinese mind. It represented an alien civilization that was on equal terms with the Chinese civilization. It opened up new dimensions of spiritual pursuits that were as sophisticated as Taoism and Confucianism.

Thirdly, the peaceful, non-assertive, non-aggressive and non-subversive nature of Buddhism found ready echo in the intellectual, social and political psychology in the then China. It was in conformity with the Chinese peaceful, nature-oriented, non-competitive agricultural way of life. Neither the emperors high above nor laymen down below would find Buddhism a threat to China. Instead, the Chinese felt Buddhism could reinforce the hard-won peace and stability that were regarded as the basis for happiness and felicity.

Most important of all was perhaps Buddhist affinity to Confucianism and Taoism. Most of the concepts and doctrines of Buddhism seemed to be another way of expressing Taoist and Confucian ideas. This homogeneous rather than heterogeneous relationship of Buddhism to Chinese culture is obvious from the viewpoint of translation. For instance, generations of Buddhist translators did point out various kinds of difficulties they encountered. In his widely acclaimed preface (382 CE) to the translation of the *Heart Sutra*, Dao'an suggested "five losses" and "three difficulties:"

Translating *hu* (胡, foreign language) into Qin (Chinese) suffers five losses: First, to the Chinese, *hu yu* (胡语, Buddhist texts in the original) seem to be inverted in word order. When translated into Chinese, they are re-arranged and re-ordered according to the Chinese grammar... Secondly, Buddhist texts are written in a simple and unadorned way, whereas the Chinese favour literary grace. To cater to the reading tastes of the masses, they have to be literarily refined... Thirdly, Buddhist texts are too elaborate, making repeated and excessive use of the same songs and odes, to the extent that when translated into Chinese they have to be omitted... Fourthly, in the original texts, after each section there is a five hundred- or one thousand-character summary retelling the story. It is omitted in translation... Fifthly, in the original, at the beginning of each section, what has already been said in the previous section is repeated again as a start to what is to be said. It has to be omitted in translation...

According to Dao'an, the "three difficulties" are:

First, the Saints expounded their dharmas according to the customs and circumstances of their own time. Now that times have changed, it is difficult to adapt them to the present. Secondly, the wisdom of the Saints is beyond the reach

of the worldlings. It is no easy job to convey what is contained in the subtle and profound language of the Saints who lived a thousand years ago to the worldly masses of today. Thirdly, after Sakyamuni died, even his disciples like Anan were timid and overcautious in their expositions of Buddhism. Today, for a worldling to translate and convey the ideas of the Saints is indeed difficult (in Chen, 1992, pp. 18-19. Translation mine).

What Dao'an and other major translators before and after him said about difficulties challenging Chinese translation is of course true. However, most of the difficulties they pointed out were by nature different from the kinds of difficulties Chinese translators had to face when translating the Euro-American empire over a thousand years later. In fact, judging from what those translators wrote, the problems were mostly centred around how to deal with foreign names, religious rituals, rhyme and rhythms of songs, odes and chants, incantations, grammar, syntax and literary styles. As far as philosophical and social concepts and ideas are concerned, they could conveniently resort to the existing Chinese cultural vocabulary for equivalents. Such basic and fundamental vocabulary of Buddhism as "wisdom, awakening, nothingness, emptiness, precept, quiescence, truth, etc." is already present in one way or another in Taoism and Confucianism.

For instance, Lao Zi's *Tao de jing* was already an awakening book of wisdom on Nature. His metaphysical meditations and thoughts on the relationship between *wu* (无, nothingness) and *you* (有, somethingness, being) could be used as a reference to the Buddhist concepts of *se* (色, form) and *kong* (空, emptiness) and vice versa. The translators could assign, find or decide on Chinese equivalents by extending, developing and inventing Chinese words that could be easily accessible to the ordinary Chinese mind. Even such Buddhist concepts as Thusness and Ultimate Reality, which were alien to the Chinese relativistic, dialogical and synthetic discourses of philosophy, seemed to be echoed in Lao Zi's *tao* (道) and Confucius' *ren* (仁, humanity/benevolence) or *li* (礼, justice/propriety). Chinese Buddhists and philosophers could integrate the three schools into a whole by pushing the leading philosophy of Confucianism one step forward, as did the Song-Ming Idealists.

This integration, however, turned the compassionate, freedom-oriented, and liberating Buddhism into part of the suppressing and oppressing tool for the Chinese

rulers. Historically, Confucianism had been persecuted and banned at the heavy hands of the first emperor Shihuangdi (reigned 246-210 BCE), who united China for the time from the confusion of the Warring States (403-222 BCE). In the following dynasty of Han (206-220), the early emperors, as mentioned above, adopted a more tolerant policy based upon the Taoist idea of *wuwei* (无为, non-action). When Wudi (reigned 141-87 BCE) came to throne, he was dissatisfied with the political and social conditions. He was determined to practice a policy of *youwei* (有为, active, action, a Confucian idea). Supported by one of the greatest educators and philosophers in Chinese history Dong Zhongshu (179-104 BCE), Confucianism was re-staged as the national guiding philosophy. Around this time, as is said above, Buddhism came to China.

One of the reasons why Confucianism was royally established is that Confucius highly valued the patriarchal order for social stability, which was later summarized as the Three Cardinal Guides and the Five Constant Virtues. The Three Cardinal Guides are: ruler guides subject, father guides son and husband guides wife. The Five Constant Virtues are: benevolence, righteousness, propriety, knowledge and sincerity. These moral and ethical codes of conduct justified the absolute power of the Emperor and the male figure, and were gradually established as an indisputable order of Nature. They were believed to be representing both Lao Zi's *dao*, and Confucius' *li*. With the introduction of Buddhism, these feudal moral principles became religiously strengthened, ensuring the peace and order of the society. According to Jian (1981, p. 43)

The study of metaphysics was very much in vogue during Wei (220-265) and Jin (265-420), and Buddhism spread among the literati amid their study of metaphysics. Towards the close of Eastern Jin, Buddhism became linked with Confucian ritualism which had dominated feudal society. The Buddhist ideas of transmigration and retribution were widely accepted and the power of the ruling class was further consolidated by this linking of feudal ritualism with Buddhism.

In a sense, the process of the unification of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism was a process of establishing the collective, absolute masculine power represented by the emperor at the cost of individuality. It throttled any sense of creativity which had manifested itself at the time when Buddhism began to be translated into China. For a

millennium and a half, China was a stagnant society, a country of space without time, a history of non-historicalness, in Hegel's words (in Xin, 1991, pp. 255-268).

b. Some features of traditional Chinese culture

This non-historicalness of the Chinese history characterizes Chinese culture before China-West encounter in many ways. It posed profound challenges to Chinese translators of the West. A brief view of the characteristics of the Chinese culture may help understand what it means for China to translate the West.

According to Li (1997), Liu & Lin (1988) and others, there exist five features in Chinese traditional culture which stand in sharp contrasts to Western cultures. These features are: integrated unity (within thousands of years in time and millions of square kilometres in space), continuity, agriculture-centredness, native/local ideology and provincialism, and pan-moralization. They constitute both linguistic and cultural barriers to translating the West. For instance, the agriculture-orientedness fostered and promoted a simple and pragmatic attitude among both the peasants and the cultural elite. It became part of the national character which led to the extensive development of applied philosophies of life at the cost of the more metaphysical pursuit of pure science. It developed a cyclic theory and a consciousness of eternal constancy like the endless cycle of the seasons. It created a discourse largely different from the West that values commerce, trade, individualism and change.

Behind the characteristics mentioned above are two features in the spiritual life of the Chinese. First is the idea of unification of heaven (nature or universe) and man, which contradicts the Western concept of the opposition between man and nature. The second is the middle way or doctrine of the mean. On the one hand, this middle way led the Chinese to a kind of tolerance, generosity and benevolence towards each other and towards other cultures. On the other hand, it prevented China from developing its military, commercial or technological power.

In brief, Chinese traditional culture, heavily influenced by Buddhist translation, differs from and even contradicts with Western traditions in many ways. During the May

4th Movement, through dialogues and interviews with the Indian philosopher and writer Tagore (1861-1941), a Chinese scholar was inspired to illustrate China-West civilizational differences in the following chart (in Wang, 1996, p. 25):

Chinese	Western
Valuing class (background)	Valuing equality
Valuing the past	Valuing the present
Conservative	Enterprising
Metaphysical/meditative	Practical/active
superstitious	Science-oriented
Concessionary/yielding	Competitive
Nature-oriented	Human-oriented
Supermundane	Mundane/intervening

The way the differences are listed may be generalized and questionable, since Western traditions also have what is labeled as Chinese and vice versa. But the list does point to some essential differences between the two civilizations that take on various verbal and non-verbal forms. Compared with Chinese translation of Buddhism, translation of the West would be much more complicated in terms of language, culture and identity.

V. Translation of the West

1. Background

China-West direct encounter came in the early 16th century, when what is now called globalization began to take shape. This was made possible through the major geographical discoveries of Bartholomeu Dias, Christopher Columbus, Vasco da Gama, and Ferdinand Magellan. However, Chinese translation of the West, which refers hereafter to Euro-American tradition, did not formally come until mid-19th century. This strange phenomenon invites examination, as it serves as a hidden background against which China has been translating and being translated.

In a feudal and conservative country like China, translation was largely, if not absolutely, conditioned by political situations. As discussed in the last chapter, translation of Buddhism, for all its limitations in an intercultural sense, was allowed to flourish due to the open, liberal and supportive political attitudes and policies of the Han and Tang Dynasties - the zenith of the traditional Chinese civilization. Again, for all the negative impact Buddhism had upon Chinese culture, Buddhist translation helped China to survive as the only ancient empire on earth. In fact, the Chinese culture was hailed as a model of humanity in the eyes of the Western Enlightenment philosophers. In terms of science and technology, according to a 1975 statistics report, from the 6th century B.C. to the 16th century A.D., there were 298 major inventions and discoveries in the world. 178 or over fifty-three percent were contributed by China alone (Hao et al., 1996, p.14).

Had China maintained the open and liberal attitudes of Han and Tang, had the growing Euro-American empire chosen a different route of global expansion, Chinese translation might have developed spontaneously, naturally and peacefully to include more alien and heterogeneous cultures than Buddhism. Unfortunately, before China had time to awaken to the more intercultural implications of translation, it was being "translated" as an Other in a way different from Chinese Buddhist translation by a heterogeneous civilization. Ironically, that civilization had been empowered by the very civilization it was translating to conquer and destroy.

According to the politically subversive commentary mentioned earlier, *He Shang* (1991), in the year 751 AD, China engaged itself in a major war with the Arabian

Muslims. The complete defeat on China's part resulted in China never again returning to Central Asia. The war, however, was of great importance in the history of science. Thousands of captured soldiers brought with them the paper-making technology to the Arabians and the Westerners. Then, the movable-type printing, the compass and the gunpowder were successively introduced to the Dark-Age Europe, where miracles exploded. For instance, the compass opened up world markets and established colonies, and printing became instrumental to the Protestants. Europe achieved its second height of technological development since ancient Greece. Francis Bacon once said that no empire, no religion, or no illustrious figure had ever contributed as much to the great cause of human kind as the great inventions.

In the 17th century when the newly-armed and equipped Euro-American empire was designing and creating a global order, China was still involved in a Neo-Confucian revival. On the one hand, the successful assimilation of Buddhism into the system of Chan or Zen (Dhayana) had reinforced the Chinese idea of the unification of Heaven and Man, without further inquiring into the form of Heaven and nature of Man. The previous dialogical philosophies of Taoism, of *yin* and *yang*, and of the *Book of Changes* that acknowledged the logic of the "negative" had given way to the Confucian principles of the Three Cardinal Guides and Five Constant Virtues. The Chinese had chosen to believe in the Confucian doctrine that "Men are born good." On the other hand, assimilation of Buddhism had encouraged the Chinese to assimilate anything else into the 'grand narrative' of Confucianism. The result was an egocentric attitude, a blind belief that China was the centre of the world with everybody else despised and "marginalized" as *yi* and *man* (barbarians).

Toward the end of the Song Dynasty, China was so confined to the neo-Confucian order of social peace that it did not even realize the danger from the surrounding "barbarians." At the beginning of the 13th century, the Mongols, a nomadic people living in the Onon valley to the northeast of China, rose in a world-shaking effort under Genghis Khan (1155-1227) and later Kublai Khan (reigned 1260-1294) to defeat the Song and founded the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368).

According to Jian (Jian et al. 1981, p.65), in the Yuan Dynasty, people were divided into four classes. The Mongols comprised the first class as the privileged. Next on the

social ladder were the Semu people from the Western Regions. Still next came the Han people. The southern Han were treated as the lowest. The Han, both in the north and in the south, were excluded from either positions of command in the national armed forces or high administrative posts. They could serve as local officials, but had to be under the supervision of a Mongol or a Semu overseer. They were denied access to weapons unless permission was provided.

The Mongols practiced a discriminating, suppressive and oppressive system of politics over the Han people. The failure on the part of the Chinese (mainly the Han) to translate "barbarians" resulted in the Chinese being "translated" by the "barbarians," both literally and metaphorically.

Under the rule of the Mongols, Chinese translation came to an ironic situation. On the one hand, the Mongolian rulers had to translate themselves into Chinese to exercise their control. Since the Mongolian Empire conquered not only Asia but a great part of Europe, it brought the Yuan Dynasty into unprecedented contact and communication with the rest of the world. Moreover, the defeated and oppressed Han people still maintained their "Middle Kingdom" mentality in front of their conquerors. Consequently, the Yuan Dynasty seemed to be an age of translation. The Chinese translated the Mongols for survival - without any fear of losing Chinese identity. The Mongols had to learn and translate the language and culture of the ruled for their survival of power - only to be assimilated later into Chinese culture itself. While the Mongols occasionally assumed a hostile attitude towards Taoism, as Jian (*ibid.* p. 69) noted, they practiced a liberal policy towards religion. Being devout Buddhists, they held the lamas in great reverence. At the same time, they tolerated the spread and propagation of Islam and Nestorian Christianity. Consequently, Chinese religious translation continued.

On the other hand, the political and social structure of the time prevented translation as a cultural act to grow in any positive sense. Except for some Mongolian vocabulary and customs which entered the Chinese language, Chinese translation of others did not achieve any breakthrough to reach the further, culturally more heterogeneous West. Although many Westerners came to China, bringing with them Western merchandise and Western culture, as Jian (*ibid.*) wrote, little, if any, Chinese translation of the West

seemed to have appeared. The West left virtually no trace of existence in the Chinese mainstream, Confucian "Celestial Empire" consciousness.

The rule of the Mongols, however, did bring China to the West. For instance, Marco Polo (1254-1324), the Venetian who spent fifteen years in the service of the Grand Khan, "lauded and publicized the wealth and splendours of China when he returned to Europe. Westerners became envious and sought to acquire Chinese culture and civilization" (Jian, 1981, p. 69). In fact, according to Xin (1991, p. 101), at least two of the four major geographical discoverers mentioned at the beginning of this chapter were directly inspired by Marco Polo's travel accounts. In particular, in the morning of August 3, 1492, Christopher Columbus went on his voyage with the Spanish king's letter of credence to the Chinese emperor, and a copy of the reply from Palo Toscanelli about China known as Cathay at that time. Although Columbus did not reach China, the voyage inspired by a dream China was to change the global history.

In 1368, the nobles of the Mongols, most of whom had already been 'sinicized,' were finally driven out of China. The Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) was founded. With the Mongols still posing as a threat in the north and northwest, Japan rising to harass from the sea in the east and southeast, and the European ascending powers 'pirating' in the southern seas, the Ming rulers led China to another cultural irony.

Many Chinese scholars of history are still puzzled about the fact that, on the one hand, the Ming emperors seemed to adopt an open attitude towards alien cultures, and promoted trade relationships with foreign countries. For example, during the reign of emperors Yongle (1403-1424), Hongxi (1425-1425) and Xuande (1426-1435), the court eunuch, Zheng He (1371-1433), an admiral, explorer and diplomat, led an armed fleet on seven voyages to the South Sea Islands and the Indian Ocean from 1405 to 1433. According to *Encyclopedia* (2001, online), the giant fleet was composed of over one hundred huge ships with 27,800 crew of pilots, craftsmen, sailors, doctors, clerks, translators and soldiers. Zheng's majestic and luxurious ships, as described by Hao et al. (1996, pp. 10-11), "were 48 *zhang* (150 metres) long, and 18 *zhang* (60 metres) wide," with as many as nine masts. They demonstrated the degree to which China was more advanced than Europe, since sixty years later, when Christopher Columbus led his crew

of 88 to America, the biggest of the three ships, St. Maria, was less than 17 metres in length and 6 metres in width.

As noted in the *Encyclopedia* (2001, online), the fleet visited Indochina, Indonesia, Malacca, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Calicut (now Kozhikode, India), the Persian Gulf, East Africa and Egypt. The voyages, surpassing all previous naval expeditions in the world, opened trade and diplomatic relationships for China with about 35 countries. The ships returned with cargoes of exotic goods, and envoys from more than 30 countries followed to pay homage to Emperor Yongle.

Strangely, on the other hand, from the viewpoint of textual translation, little intercultural value seemed to have been left from those imperial voyages. In fact, few textual translations could be found. As Su et al. (1991) commented, the voyages were no more than a parade, a show of China's imperial might to the rest of the world. Meanwhile, intellectually, the neo-Confucianism of the school of Cheng-Zhu Idealism inspired by Buddhist translation "had become decadent, and had fallen into dispute among a section of the literati" (Jian, 1981, p. 77). This led to the birth of a new school led by Wang Shouren (1472-1526). It advocated "the unity of knowledge with practice" as opposed to "the hypocrisy and pedantry of the Cheng-Zhu school" (ibid.). However, the unity of the same Confucian knowledge with practice based upon the same feudal codes of conduct did not help the elite class understand the world they were living in. China was still confined to the same old Middle Kingdom mentality.

Furthermore, domestically, from the beginning of the Dynasty, the emperors concentrated all power in their hands, exercising an extremely despotic and centralized rule. While keeping all the peasants toiling on the land and suppressing the growth of internal trade and commerce, they practised an unprecedented policy of isolationism. The founding emperor of the Dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang (reigned 1368-1398), issued many imperial edicts to ban any maritime trade or intercourse with foreign countries. He even "outlawed all the shipping companies in Quanzhou, Mingzhou and Guangzhou" (Hao et al., 1996, p. 42), the three major doors to the world. During the reign of Shizong (1522-1566), when in Britain the Tudor regime (1485-1603) was at its height of maritime exploration and exploitation, China reached its peak of isolationism and autarchy. In the imperial edicts are found such orders as follows:

Any large ships violating the laws be destroyed without any exception.

Along the coastal regions, anyone, military or civilian, who dare engage in illegal trade with any barbarians, be imprisoned along with their neighbours who know but fail to report it.

Anyone who dare build two-masted ships for maritime purposes, be arrested and punished by any means.

Those who should sail a two-master on the sea, be arrested. Even if no goods from barbarians are found, those sailing the ship be exiled to the frontiers (in Hao et al. 1996, p. 42, translation mine).

Beginning from 1372, the policy of banning intercourse with foreign countries lasted until 1685, when the four coastal provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangnan were officially permitted to trade with foreigners. As a result, China lost all possibilities for interacting with foreign cultures. At this very period of time, the Euro-American empire was ascending to global dominance. A cultural nightmare was awaiting China.

2. Beginning of Chinese Translation of the West

On the other side(s) of the oceans and seas a different story was emerging. As mentioned earlier, inspired by Marco Polo, nicknamed by the people of Venice as "Marco Millions," who brought his "almost fairy tales full of numbers large and marvelous" (Durant, 1954, p. 760), Europe was eyeing China for progress and prosperity. At the same time, "the horizons of Rome's intellectuals had widened enormously. They now included not only Rome, Greece, and Egypt but a Far Eastern culture that westerners had hardly known since the days of Marco Polo - China" ("How Rome Went to China," online).

The maritime powers of Portugal, Holland, Spain and Britain spared no efforts trying to break open the closed door of the Ming Dynasty. According to historical records (Shen, 1987; Xin, 1991; Hao et al. 1996; Jian, 1981):

As early as 1517, the Portuguese came to China, but had to stay in Macao, which eventually became a Portuguese colony and was returned to China in 1999;

In 1601, the Dutch arrived in Guangdong and requested trade with China. Having been rejected by the Ming government, they turned to advance on the Portuguese stationed in Macao, and later occupied Taiwan;

In 1600, Britain's East India Company was founded, which later changed China's history through the Opium war;

In 1620, the British ship Unicorn was shipwrecked near Macao and was rescued by the Chinese. After 1630, the British turned to the Spanish and the Portuguese for help to trade with China. On July 23, 1635, the British landed in Macao;

In 1636, a British fleet headed by John Weddell came to Guangdong but was kept offshore. On August 12, 1637, two British warships attacked Humen (the Bogue), and forced their way into the city of Guangzhou.

For nearly a century and a half, the European powers could not find a way to inland China. The trade-minded, ill-behaved Europeans could never reason out why China should reject them. Meanwhile, the feudal Celestial Empire had no idea why the "yellow-haired barbarians" should come to harass its order of peace. There was no way for the two sides to carry on any form of dialogue. Two centuries later, Allan (1870, p. 26) reflected on the situation, saying:

It was partly owing to the evil deeds of the Portuguese and Spanish freebooters of the sixteenth century, that the Chinese government and people manifested such a distrust of foreigners who came by sea from the West. Violence, pillage and massacre were not likely to recommend peoples of Europe as fit and proper associates for the subjects of the Celestial Empire. Moreover the Chinese have never had a high opinion of merchants and traders, these are placed in an inferior category in their social and national life. It was therefore very natural that the unwelcome visitors to the shores of China should be looked upon as barbarians and be dubbed "Ocean Demons." They represented a type of people evidently skilled in the art of warfare, but ignorant of methods and usages which make for a higher civilization. Without any opportunities of discrimination, the Chinese looked upon all the sea-borne adventurers as rude and uncouth representatives of a state of society much inferior to their own.

As Allan went on to suggest, it was to break down this prejudice and enlighten this ignorance that Valignano (ibid. p. 27) secured people like Ruggieri and Ricci, who were specially fitted by education and religious discipline. However, the journey of the missionaries into the heartland of China was difficult. As early as 1550, Francis Xavier (Sha Wulue), after preaching several years in Japan and concluded that to convert the Japanese it was important first to convert the Chinese since China had been the source and inspiration of Japan, had attempted to enter Guangzhou. But he had to stay on a small island called Shangchuan (Gu, 1995, p.1) and died of illness there not long after. As noted in the *Catholic Encyclopedia* (1999, online), after St. Francis Xavier died (November 27, 1552) a series of fruitless attempts were made. The Jesuit, Melchior Nunez Barreto was the first missionary to be able to go twice as far as Canton, where he spent a month each time (1555). Father Gaspar da Cruz, a Dominican, also made his way to Canton and stayed there for a month, but had to refrain from 'forming a Christian Christianity.' Still others, Jesuits, Augustinians, and Franciscans in 1568, 1575, 1579, and 1582 stepped on Chinese soil, but were forced to withdraw, sometimes with ill treatment.

On January 24, 1601, however, two missionaries, Matteo Ricci (Li Madou, 1552-1610) and Didacus Pantoja (Pang Diwo), broke through all the barriers and found their way to Beijing, the heart of China. Their passports and visas were their Confucian scholar-style attire, something they had found most acceptable and appealing to the then Chinese officialdom. They made no mention of their intention to preach Gospel. Instead, they declared "that they were religious who had left their country in the distant West because of the renown of the good government of China, where they desired to remain till their death, serving god, the Lord of Heaven" (*Catholic Encyclopedia*, 1999, online).

For a closed and arrogant nation whose encounters with the aliens (the Mongols and the Moslems from Central Asia, for instance) had been more negative than positive, the only way to get to its heart seemed to be behaving the way that nation identified itself with. Ricci had had a hard time getting accepted in the nation "who had hitherto fancied that outside of their country only barbarism existed" (Knight, 1999, online). According to Gu (1995, p. 2), in order not to arouse any suspicion and resentment, while in Zhaoqing, Guangdong in the 1590s, Ricci had clothed himself in kasaya, a patchwork outer

vestment worn by Buddhist monks, and called his church *si miao* (Buddhist temple). To draw the local Chinese to his church, he had displayed in his church such interesting Western products as clocks and armillary spheres. Knight (1999, online) offered a vivid account of what happened at that time:

One of the articles which most aroused their (people in Zhaoqing) curiosity was a map of the world. The Chinese had already had maps, called by their geographers "descriptions of the world," but almost the entire space was filled by the fifteen provinces of China, around which were painted a bit of sea and a few islands on which were inscribed the names of countries of which they had heard - all together was not as large as a small Chinese province. Naturally the learned men of Chao-k'ing (Zhaoqing) immediately protested when Father Ricci pointed out the various parts of the world on the European map and when they saw how small a part China played. But after the missionaries had explained its construction and the care taken by the geographers of the West to assign to each country its actual position and boundaries, the wisest of them surrendered to the evidence, and beginning with the Governor of Chao-k'ing, all urged the missionary to make a copy of his map with the names and inscriptions in Chinese.

In order to cater to the arrogance of the Chinese officials and Confucian scholars, Father Trigault, the historian of the China mission, wrote (in Allan, 1870, p. 34):

Father Ricci, being well versed in mathematics which he had learned from Christopher Clavius, the prince of the mathematicians of his century, applied himself to the construction of a map, which suited well with his design of preaching the Gospel, knowing that the same means cannot be employed to attract different nations to the faith of Jesus Christ. In truth, by this decoy, many Chinese were drawn to the bosom of the Church. This map was of large dimensions the better to contain the Chinese characters as well as many annotations... I will not either omit to mention a contrivance of his to gain the good graces of the Chinese. They believe that the sky is round, but the earth square, and that their empire is situated in the midst of it... He therefore altered a little our plan for maps of the world, and by placing the first meridian of the Fortunate Islands at the margin, right and left, he brought the empire of China into the centre, to their great satisfaction."

This observation is echoed by Pei Huaxing, who said the Chinese visitors, seeing that the Western European countries were divided by the vast oceans and seas, and so immeasurably far away from China, had no fear of foreign invasion (in Gu, 1995, p. 2)¹.

The methods and strategies with which Ricci and others exercised their prudence worked. Ricci was not only accepted but well liked and respected. Although expelled from Zhaoqing in 1589 by a viceroy of Canton "who had found the house of the missionaries suited to his own needs," Ricci could always find "powerful friends to protect him" (Knight, 1999, online). After traveling to some other places in the South, Ricci decided that the *kasaya* caused many inconveniences in his interaction with the Chinese officials and scholars. In 1594, he changed into the Confucian scholar-style attire, wore the Confucian scholar-style hat, and claimed himself a Confucian scholar (see Gu, 1995, p.3). Well versed in Chinese classics, Ricci would cite numerous Confucian texts and demonstrate to the Chinese that Catholicism was in conformity with Confucianism. For example, during his preaching services, he once told the Emperor Wanli: "*Shangdi* (God) is what you call *tian* (Heaven). He once inspired your Confucius, Mencius and many of your past emperors and kings. We are not here to deny your Confucian tradition but to present to you something complementary" (Fei, 1938, in Gu, 1995, p. 6. Translation mine).

"Through the 'backdoor' of some court eunuchs," Ricci won great favor of Emperor Wanli, who offered him a position at the court (Chen, 1992, p. 58). Inspired and encouraged by Ricci, many other missionaries from Italy, Portugal, Spain etc. followed suit. Catholicism became so popular that toward the end of the Ming Dynasty, as many as 540 at the imperial court alone had been converted to Catholicism (Xu, 1938, p. 202), and Catholic believers in China totaled about 150,000 (Gu, 1995, p. 9).

With Ricci and other Jesuits, early Chinese translation of the West began. Since there were no Chinese who understood European languages, it was in fact Chinese translation of the West by Westerners. Both Ricci and Michele de Ruggieri had learned Chinese in Macao. According to Knight (1999, online):

¹ Ricci's version of the world map with China in the middle is still the standard version in China, although in 2000 a Chinese researcher patented his version based upon the international practice.

Ruggieri reached Macao in July 1579, and, following the given orders applied himself wholly to the study of the Mandarin language, that is, Chinese, as it is spoken throughout the empire by the officials and the educated. His progress, though very slow, permitted him to labour with more fruit than his predecessors in two sojourns at Canton (1580-81) allowed him by an unwonted complacency of the mandarins.

In 1584, dictated by Ruggieri, recorded and polished by a Chinese scholar, the first Chinese translation of a biblical text, *Tianxue shen lu* (True Record of the Lord of Heaven) was published. Historically translation of the Bible can be traced back to the Tang Dynasty, since on the Nestorian stele set up in 781 in Chang'an are written "*zhen jing*" (the authentic Bible), "*jiu fa*" (ancient laws), "*fan jing jian si*" (translating the Bible and building churches) and "27 volumes of the Bible in translation" (Gu, 1995, p. 433). However, none of the translations is extant. During the Yuan Dynasty under the Mongolian rule, the Franciscans sent missionaries to China. In a letter sent from Beijing on January 8, 1305 (Gu, 1995, p. 434) by Giovanni di Monte Corvino who had been appointed in 1307 Archbishop of Khanbalik (Gernet, 1996, p. 726) to the Pope in Rome, there is mention that "I have completely translated the New Testament and the Psalms into Chinese, and had them hand-copied in the most elegant style of (Chinese) calligraphy" (Gu, 1995, p. 434. Translation mine). However, none of them has been found.

In 1595, Ricci published his *Tianzhu shiyi* (The True Idea of God) in Nanchang, Jiangxi. The book was "the little catechism of Chao-k'ing (Zhaoqing) which had been delivered from day to day, corrected and improved as occasion offered, until it finally contained all the matter suggested by long years of experience in the apostolate" (Knight, 1999, online). It was reprinted respectively in Beijing in 1601 and Hangzhou in 1605. Rather than a textual translation of the Bible, it was an interpretation of Christianity in comparison with Chinese history, with numerous references to and quotations from classical Confucian texts to show the affinity and sameness of Christianity with Confucianism. With extensive knowledge and acknowledgement of the Chinese culture, the book was foundational for Christianity to take root in China.

In the spring of 1600, on his way to Beijing, Ricci met in Nanjing the Confucian scholar Xu Guangqi (Paul Hsu, 1562-1633), who had been, three years before,

nominated *juren*, a successful candidate in the imperial examinations at the provincial level. Their meeting turned out to be a major China-West intercultural event. Disappointed with the futile philosophy of Idealism and the 'useless' nature of the eight-legged/part essay-ism that had stifled China's intelligentsia, Xu looked towards Western learning represented by Ricci for a way out. Having made a preliminary study of Ricci's writings in geography and science, and Catholic doctrines mediated with Confucianism, Xu received baptism on January 15, 1603. The following year, Xu became a *jinsshi*, successful candidate in the highest imperial examination. He held high positions at the imperial court (General Inspector of the Salt Gabelle, Grand Secretary of State, Senior Guardian of the Heir Apparent, and Grand Secretary of the Imperial Library), thus able to keep close contact with and patronize Ricci and other missionaries. During one of his early meetings with Ricci in Nanjing, as Xu noted in a postscript in 1604, he said to Ricci (in Chen, 1992, p. 62. Translation mine):

The (Western) classics you have brought here contain profound knowledge and meanings in simple language about heaven and earth. We could invite a group of scholars to work together translating them (into Chinese). In this way, everybody (in China) could have access to those great classics... It would be helpful to the masses. It would be significant for the generations to come. Would you agree?

So they started their collaboration of historical importance. Since Xu did not understand Western languages and Ricci was not qualified enough in Chinese, they had to discuss their translation line by line, carefully deciding on Chinese equivalents and refining their literary style in a classical, elegant form. The greatest achievement they made was the translation of the first six of the 16-volumed Latin version of *Elements* by Euclid. Their cooperation set an example for other missionaries and Chinese scholars.

As is known in the West, at that time there were three major converts, the "Three Pillars of the Catholic Church in China." The other two were Xu's close friend, Li Zhizao (Leo Lee, 1565-1630), baptized on March 3, 1610, and Yang Tingyun (Michael Yang, 1557-1627), baptized on Easter, 1613. Other major collaborators include Wang Zheng (1571-1644), Li Tianjing (1579-1659), Feng Yingjing (?-?) and Yang Zhihua (?-?), etc. They worked together with Sabbathinus Ursis (Xiong Sanba, 1575-1620), Nicholas Trigault (Jin Nige, 1577-1628, who brought a huge library of 7,000 Latin books to

Beijing from Europe), Joannes Terrenze (Deng Yuhua, 1576-1630), John Adam Schall von Bell (Tang Ruowang, 1591-1666), Ferdinandus Verbiest (Nan Huaiwen, 1623-1688) and so on. Their translations ranged from Christianity, mathematics, astronomy, physics, mining and metallurgy, hydraulics, to anatomy, biology, metaphysics and logic.

As early as 1629, a year before his death, Li Zhizao, who had collaborated with Ricci and Francisco Furtado, edited and published in Beijing his *Tianxue chuhuan* (First Collection of Celestial Science). The series of translation is composed of 54 volumes in two parts (Lin et al., 1988, p. 45). The first part, entitled *Lipian* (Ideas), includes the following books (see Lu, 2000, online; Lin et al., 1988; Gu, 1991; Chen, 1992):

1. *Brief Presentation of the Curriculum of the Western Schools* (Oral presentations by J. Aleni on rhetoric, philosophy, medicine, laws, canons, and theology)
2. *Stele of Grace Religion of the Tang Dynasty*
3. *Ten Chapters from a Foreigner* (Questions and answers between Chinese scholars and Matteo Ricci, showing human life as a pilgrimage to the true and eternal home in heaven. Appendix: Eight Songs for Harpsichord)
4. *On Friendship* (Maxims narrated by Matteo Ricci)
5. *Twenty-five Maxims* (Also by Ricci on cultivation of moral virtues to please God)
6. *The True Meaning of Celestial Science* (*Tianxue shiyi*, a compendium of theology and philosophy in response to religious questions raised to Ricci in China)
7. *Apologetics Recorded* (A booklet in defense of Catholic teaching against the Buddhist accusations, by Ricci, and by his disciples after his death)
8. *Seven Mortifications* (*Qike*, an ascetical treatise of virtues against the seven capital sins by D. de Pantoja, 1604)
9. *Short Treatise on the Soul* [In four parts: (a) On the Nature of the Soul; (b) On the Powers of the Soul (c) On the Dignity of the Soul; (d) On the Desire in the Soul for the Supreme Good. Written by Francis Sambiasi, 1624]
10. *Julius Aleni's World Atlas with Explanations* (1623, six fascicles showing the countries of the five continents, including America as newly discovered by Columbus. Composed under a decree of Emperor Wanli, to show the world outside China)

The second part of the collection is entitled *Qibian* (Instruments), including the following:

1. *Western Irrigation Methods* (*Taxi shuifa*, by Sabathinus de Ursis, 1612)
2. *Astronomy Illustrated* (Two fascicles, by Leo Lee)
3. *Euclidian Geometry* (*Jihe yuanben*, narrated by Matteo Ricci, translated and revised by Xu Guangqi. Six fascicles)
4. *Sun Dial* (Explained orally by Sabathinus de Ursis, transcribed by Tze-Yu Chow, 1614)
5. *Summary Study of Heavens* (A booklet of astronomy written by Manuel Diaz on the 12 Heavenly Spheres, 1615)
6. *Calendar Method Simplified* (Explained orally by Sabathinus de Ursis, transcribed in notes by Xu Guangqi)
7. *Guide of Arithmetic* (Taught by Ricci, with exercises written by Leo Lee, 1613)
8. *A Comparative Study on Roundness* (*De Circulo*) (Taught by Ricci, written by Leo Lee, with exercises)
9. *Method of Measurement* (in Geometry of Euclid) (Explained orally by Ricci, transcribed by Xu Guangqi)
10. *Trigonometry Explained* (Written by Ricci, transcribed and revised by Xu Guangqi)

In fact, from the time when Ricci entered China to the death of Cardinal Tournon in Macao in 1710, intercultural exchange between China and the West flourished for 126 years. As Lu (2000, online) writes, from the arrival of Ricci to the death of the last Jesuit, Father Louis de Poirot, in Beijing in 1814 after the suppression of the Jesuit order, within some 233 years, there were 69 Jesuit authors, including later J. Bouvet (Bai Jin 1656-1730), who published 212 books in Chinese. Of these books, as Lu (*ibid.*) notes:

Thirty-five... were of the highest quality in astronomy, science, machinery, agriculture, and technology, by the standards of the Academia of Lincei in Rome, whose members included Galileo, Kepler, Leonardo da Vinci, Christopher Clavius (teacher of Matteo Ricci and Joannes Torrenz) and others. Fifteen books belong to philosophy and theology proper, including parts of the "Cursus Coimbricensis" of Coimbra University, Portugal, and Saint Thomas Aquinas' "Summa Theologiae," under the title of

"Summary of Supernatural Science." The remaining 162 books were strictly religious, dealing with selected readings from sacred Scripture, catechisms, maxims, liturgy, hagiographies, prayers, and devotions.

For various reasons, in China, the historical significance of this period of translation in changing China has been far from realized. A brief examination of why and how the translations were done, how China responded to them, and what impact they had or failed to exercise on traditional Chinese culture, is important for understanding what happened later to China in its relationship with the West.

3. Translation by Missionaries and Converts

a. Different visions

As can be seen from above, Chinese translation in this period was carried out mainly by missionaries with their Chinese converts. It is characterized by ironies, gaps, compromises and hidden agendas between the missionaries and the converts, between the Chinese and Western languages, and between the two cultures within which the languages were working.

First of all, the missionaries and the converts seemed to have different purposes and agendas of translation. From numerous historical documents left behind by Ricci and other Jesuits, available both in European languages and in Chinese (e.g. Ricci, 1953; Trigault, 1625; Allan, 1870), it is clear the Jesuits did not go to China with an open heart and mind for intercultural understanding or mediation on reciprocal terms. They had a clear, unaltered mission of their own. According to Lu (2000, online), the Jesuits embarked on the following four tasks:

- (1) To unite with Confucianism in whatever was true in it, invoking any Proto-Confucian texts available for interpretation, rediscovery and analysis in comparison with Catholic teachings. In particular, Matteo Ricci attempted to interpret all the key words of Confucian doctrinal classics from the Catholic perspectives, including morals, social discipline and ritual practices;
- (2) To supplement Confucian classics in all truths that were missing, exploring, exploiting and discovering any contact points or points of similarity to familiarize the Chinese with Catholic beliefs;

- (3) To correct Confucianism in anything that was found incorrect from Catholic viewpoints;
- (4) To transcend Confucianism by showing the superiority of the supernatural over natural truths and virtues.

With these tasks in mind, the missionaries learned the Chinese language to understand the Chinese mind so as to convert it. They befriended the mainstream Confucian scholars as the most effective way both to protect themselves and to reach the ordinary Chinese. They translated scientific and technological writings not only because it was a strategy to attract Chinese audiences, but because the body of Western knowledge was regarded as part of the divine revelation. They made a "complete and deep" survey of the ancient Confucian classics in order to christianize the Chinese history, although "their approach was human and friendly." And "they did not lessen their great humanist respect toward the textual integrity of the literary documents and towards the authority of the Confucian teachers of their time" (Lu, 2000, online).

On the other hand, their converts, most of whom being leading Confucian scholars, turned to Christianity more for an opportunity to learn Western sciences and technology from the missionaries than for spiritual salvation. They were more interested in resorting to Western scholarship for the enlightenment of the Confucian mind. From various historical sources and the writings they left behind, it is seen that they were translating to find a way out of the closed framework of the then dominant Celestial Empire mentality. For instance, in the preface to his translation of Euclid's *Elements*, Xu wrote:

From the macro, one enters the micro. From suspicion, one arrives at belief... To me personally, (the *Elements*) is no less than a recovery of and complement to the ancient learnings of mathematics that have been lost for two thousand years... It is of great benefit to our times... (in Chen, 1992, p. 62. Translation mine).

In a memorial to Emperor Congzhen in the spring of 1631, Xu put forward a comprehensive list of European works to be translated. He said that "We, your servants, believe to surpass (the West), we must study and master (Western learnings); before we can master (them), we must translate (them)" (in Chen, 1992, p. 64. Translation mine).

Xu might be described as the first Chinese to have understood Western sciences and technology and their importance to China as a country. From what he said above, one

might even conclude that Xu was the first Chinese to have sensed and perceived the grander picture of the world he was living in, the power of an alien empire, and the competitive nature of international relationships that was manifesting itself. It may be safe to say that Xu was translating to transform the consciousness of the Chinese in a secular, cross-cultural sense rather than to convert other Chinese to Christianity as his sense of obligation to Rome might have required.

Xu's friend, Li Zhizao, another leading Confucian scholar holding high positions at the court, "had the most and closest contacts with Ricci among all the imperial officials." He studied "earnestly from Ricci Western mathematics, astronomy, philosophy and logic," and collaborated with Ricci and other Jesuits in translating some of the most important works in those areas (Chen, 1992, p. 66. Translation mine). Although Li's friendship with Ricci ran deep, he was baptized only a few months before Ricci's death in 1610, when Li himself was seriously diseased.

In 1613, on the 51st birthday of Emperor Wanli, Li presented a memorial requesting translation of Western works. Having mentioned the names of Pantoja, Ursis and Trigault, etc. Li said:

All of them came (to China) with exceptional talents, profound knowledge of mathematics and astronomy, and a great number of foreign books. Gradually they have learned and mastered Chinese. They have discussed and shared their learnings with officials and scholars in Beijing, elaborating on some fourteen areas (of learning) that have never been touched upon by Chinese scholars throughout our history (in Chen, 1992, p. 67. Translation mine).

In a sharp tone, Li pointed out to the Emperor why those foreign countries had been able to surpass China in the fourteen fields:

This is because in those foreign countries, astronomic and calendar studies is not a forbidden area. For over five thousand years¹, great scholars from all over their countries would gather together to discuss, compare and analyze... Whereas in China, it would take hundreds of years for such a scholar to emerge, who would work alone, without any teacher or colleague... (ibid. Translation mine).

¹ This does not correspond to the facts in European history.

Li then went on to describe the shabby infrastructure and bleak situation in China due to lack of support from the rulers, appealing to the Emperor to invest in such studies, including sending scholars abroad. In addition, Li suggested other works in hydraulics, geography, medicine, physics and so on, should also be translated into Chinese, saying:

Most of the books mentioned above have not appeared in our Chinese treasury of books. But in other countries, there are many such works written by great scholars which have formed different disciplines of learning. They are of practical importance, useful to our current times. It is profoundly understood that there is no limit to learning, and no division/separation between our and others' knowledge². Art is long, but life is short. These people (the Jesuits) have sailed a long way, braving the elements, from afar, and their energy can be worn out soon. Years ago, Matteo Ricci, the most awakened, enlightened and learned one, passed away like a morning dew, unable to pass his learning onto us. What a pity and shame! Now people like Pantoja and me are already white-haired. Our days in this world are numbered. The classics these people have brought here and the classics by our own sages can mutually inspire, enlighten and illuminate, as far as their meanings and academic principles are concerned. However, the languages (in which the foreign classics are written) are absolutely different (from ours). Who else, except these few people, can interpret and translate them? If we lose this opportunity, I'm afraid, your majesty, there will be nobody who can understand them in the future. We will forever regret that these useful books should be lying there useless! Your majesty... if no effort is sponsored to translate the books from afar into Chinese so as to advance our culture and education, then how to celebrate the grand meeting of writings from various countries today? How to advance the limitless cause of learning of Heaven and Man in the future? (Ibid. Translation mine.)

What courage and risk it might have taken for a minister to point fingers at the Emperor and lecture him in that way on the importance of pursuing Western learning! That Li was filled with deep concern about the then academic situation and fiery enthusiasm to open China to Western science and technology is more than apparent. Li's interest was not

² The original, written in the Classical Chinese, is *shenhua wu wai*, which can be translated into "there's nothing outside of divine creation."

confined to science and technology translation. In fact, later in his life he became the first to co-translate with Francisco Furtado two important books of Western philosophy *Huan you quan* (part of Aristotle's philosophy of world outlook), and *Mingli tan* (Aristotelian logic). Li spent years on the two books, for which he even lost sight in one eye. His faithful, expressive and elegant translation set a high standard for later translators. Many of the terminologies from his creative translations are still used today.

Li's perspectives on and attitude towards translation were healthy and sound. He translated more for China-West mutual understanding and enlightenment. He believed in the shared humanity between the peoples. In a preface to a reprinted version of Ricci's *True Doctrine of the Lord of Heaven*, Li wrote: "Eastern seas or Western seas, (we) share the same heart and reasoning/principles; what is different is the languages" (in Chen, 1992, p. 69. Translation mine). In another preface written in 1623, Li said: "Learning is an infinite land of fertility, which should be limitlessly cultivated. Translation should not be confined to and judged by the standards of translations done by Kumarajiva and Xuanzang" (ibid. p. 70. Translation mine). Here Li was referring to an important work translated by his close friend Yang Tingyun, another major convert and translator.

Nominated in 1592 as a *jinshi*, a successful candidate in the highest imperial examinations, Yang also held high positions at the court. He had been a Buddhist. In 1613, he turned to the Catholic Church, "obviously also for the purpose of gaining an opportunity to learn Western scientific knowledge" (Chen, 1992. P. 70). Although he did not translate as much as Xu or Li, his views on translation, his awareness of difficulties of translation and his ambition to translate the West, are best reflected in his preface (1623) to *Xixue fan*, translated by J. Aleni. Literally, *Xixue fan* means "a general introduction to Western learning." In fact, it was the curriculum practised in the then Europe, composed of six disciplines, namely, liberal arts, sciences, medicine, law, canons and theology.

In the preface, much in the same spirit as Li had presented his memorial to the emperor, Yang first reflected on the long way Western learning came to China, and how Ricci had been admired and respected in Beijing for his wide range of knowledge. He then commented that because of the problem of language, among the vast number of books the Jesuits had brought to China, only those with numbers, charts and diagrams

could be translated into Chinese. The profound meanings and theories, things that were beyond pictographic, oral or physical expressions in those works were still in the dark. Yang was particularly concerned about bringing up qualified Chinese translators, saying that (in Chen, 1992, p. 71. Translation mine):

Scholars from foreign lands are not equally qualified (as Ricci)...It takes at least twenty years for the extremely talented (missionaries) to become academically prepared (at home), who are then allowed to travel abroad.... It takes years for them to arrive in China, where they have to learn Chinese for many years. When they master Chinese and get to the point where they can interpret and translate meanings and theories, they are already old. On the part of us Chinese, few would like to take the trouble to learn from or with them (missionaries). Consequently, generations of well-learned missionaries have passed away without being able to fully impart their knowledge to us....Now that the classics of the so-called six disciplines, approximately over seven thousand books, have been shipped here, waiting to be translated....To this (great cause of translation), could the translation of the small number of (Buddhist) texts from our neighbouring lands by Cai Yin, Xuanzang and others be comparable?

In an ambitious tone, Yang went on to say (ibid. Translation mine):

Our Chinese culture and education is as bright as the sky. Our treasury of books, from the most mysterious to the least interesting, is comprehensive and all-inclusive. How can we leave (Western) learning (represented by the above mentioned books) out in the cold so that its splendour will never become brilliant? Give me ten years, and I will unite dozens of comrades to work together...so that we will never have to say that the profound works that have come from afar have been deserted and reduced to ashes!

Had China understood and accepted but half of what Yang was advocating, had the Chinese begun to learn European languages and, bit by bit and step by step, translate Western learning, the history of Chinese translation, and in fact the history of China in its relationship to the rest of the world, would have gone in a different direction.

From what Xu, Li, Yang and many other converts said and did, one may conclude that the Chinese converts were looking beyond the religious scope of translation. It is fair

to say that they seemed to have realized the limitations of the previous Buddhist translation, and were seeking new ways for China's intellectual advancement. They seemed to have become aware of some of Chinese civilizational defects resulting from Confucian mentality of safeguarding social order at the cost of individuality, peace at the cost of creativity, "justice" at the cost of material prosperity, moral highness at the cost of scientific and technological development (regarded as *diaochong xiaoji*, insignificant skill), etc. They showed genuine interest in cross-cultural understanding for national strength. They were traditional Confucian scholars first, and Catholic believers second.

Although the missionaries and the converts had different agendas about their translation, one thing they had to face in common was how to translate the verbal West into Chinese. Even though their translation centred round the three fields of theology, sciences and philosophy, the linguistic and cultural incommensurability was already working there. Here it would be helpful to examine the translation of a number of Western concepts into Chinese to see what happened or did not happen in this first China-West dialogue.

b. Linguistic and cultural divides: A textual analysis

In a sense, the missionaries and the Chinese literate elite were the unconscious bearers of a whole civilization (Gernet, 1985). The two parties wrote a lot about the difficulties they encountered in translation (Chen, 1992, pp. 56-81). Jacques Garnet, a major scholar in this period of translation, pointed out that the reason why they so often came up against difficulties of translation is that different languages express, through different logics, different visions of the world and man (Gernet, 1985). And language and thought, according to Benveniste, "are coextensive, interdependent, and indispensable to each other... Linguistic form is not only the condition for transmissibility, but first of all the condition for the realization of thought" (in Hart, 1999, online). In Chinese thought, suggested Gernet (*ibid.*), there was a

...tendency ... to deny any opposition between the self and the world, the mind and the body, the divine and the cosmic....For Chinese thought never had separated the sensible from the rational, never had imagined any 'spiritual substance distinct from

the material,' never had conceived of the existence of a world of eternal truths separated from this world of appearances and transitory realities.

Consequently, Garnet asserted (ibid.), "Chinese conceptions are in every regard the opposite of those taught by the missionaries." How, then, could the two parties cross the cultural divide in the form of language? In particular, what could they do to produce translations that were both in line with Christian knowledge and systems of belief and understandable and acceptable to the ignorant and arrogant Confucian officialdom, without whose support no translation would be possible?

The missionaries and the converts, faced with linguistic, cultural and political divides, employed different methods in their translation to fill the gaps. Unlike the previous Buddhist translators, they seldom resorted to transliteration. When they did, the transliteration usually played the introductory or annotative role instead of functioning as a loan word. For instance, a paragraph in *Mingli tan* (1623-1630) co-translated by Furtado and Li Zhizao reads like this:

Yanyu zhi lun you san: yi yue tanyi, xi yun e'leimadijia; er yue wenyi, xi yun ledulijia; san yue bianyi, xi yun luorijia; er you you shi, xi yun yisiduoliya; you you shi, xi yun bo'edijia (in Shi, 1991, pp. 229-230).

Literally translated into English, it is:

The theory of speech and written language has three (parts): first is the art of speech, called in the West *e'leimadijia* (grammatica); the second is the art of written language, called in the West *ledulijia* (rhetorica); the third is the art of reasoning, called in the West *luorijia* (logica). In addition, there is history, called in the West *yisiduoliya* (historia), as well as poetry, called in the West *bo'edijia* (poetica).

The sound translations above were not intended as new words in Chinese. Since few Chinese understood alphabetical words, the translators had to use Chinese characters to transcribe the original sounds. It is interesting to note here that first the Chinese translation is explanatory rather than literal or liberal, which may be one of the few ways to get the original meanings across. Secondly, there were as yet no Chinese equivalents for *grammar*, *rhetoric* or *logic* as developed branches of learning, although the converts might have understood these three words. Even if they seemed to have found equivalents

in Chinese, the Chinese words are not really equal to the original terms. Take the following paragraph:

Xiuxue you fen you san: yi zai keji, xi yun e'dijia. Yi zai zhi jia, xi yun e'geluomijia. Yi zai zhi shi, xi yun bolidijia ye. (Ibid.)

In English it will read like this:

Xiuxue consists of three parts: first is *keji*, called in the West *e'dijia* (ethica). The second is *zhijia*, called in the West *e'geluomijia* (oeconomica). The third is *zhishi*, called in the West *bolidijia* (politica).

The Chinese terms given above deserve special attention. Since Aristotle's original work upon which the translation was based is not available, I have to analyze them through common sense. First the categorial term *xiuxue* is hardly comprehensible to a Chinese. Literally it means the study of *xiu*. In the classical Chinese in which the translation was done, the character/word *xiu* means: (a) decorate; (b) readjust; repair; (c) build; (d) write; compile; (e) study; learn; (f) perfect; good; (g) long; high. Which meaning did the translators choose to have *xiu* cover the three disciplines of ethics, economics and politics?

Secondly, *keji* for ethics. *Keji* literally means to restrain one's selfishness or be strict with oneself. It can also mean to be economical and frugal. It is a Confucian concept of "denying self and returning to propriety," a piece of advice Confucius gave to his contemporaries to return, through self-sacrifice, to the moral, just, orderly and compassionate time of the Zhou Dynasty. Although the term contains some of the elements that ethics is concerned with, it is hardly equivalent to ethics, which, by definition, is the science of morals in human conduct.

Thirdly, *zhijia* for economics. Literally, *zhijia* means management (*zhi*) of household (*jia*), which, ironically, is what "economy," etymologically derived from the Greek word *oikonomia*, exactly means. However, *zhijia* refers simply to household management, whereas the original word it wants to translate means science of production and distribution of wealth, a Western science that was to change the global order of production and distribution.

Fourthly, *zhishi* for politics. Literally, *zhishi* means management (*zhi*) of society/state/secular world according to Confucian doctrines. It is a form of politics, but hardly a science and art of government that the well defined word "politics" stands for.

The inevitable conclusion is that the Chinese equivalents are derived from the traditional Confucian motto of the way of all men: *xiushen, qijia, zhiguo, ping tianxia*. Literally meaning "cultivate one's moral character, put one's family affairs in order, then learn to manage the state affairs, and all the human affairs under the sun," it is the four steps a responsible man of virtue should follow. The *Great Learning*, the surviving work of the Confucian school celebrated as the gate through which a person enters into virtue, says:

Things have their roots and branches. Affairs have their beginnings and ends. To know what is first and what is last will lead one near the Way.

The ancients who wished to manifest their clear character to the world would bring order to their states. Those who wished to bring order to their states would first regulate their families. Those who wished to regulate their families would first cultivate their personal lives. Those who wished to cultivate their personal lives would first rectify their minds (Chan, 1973, p. 86).

The translation of Aristotle's work by Furtado and Li, then, is not "exchanging with what one has for what one does not have," as the Chinese word *yi* (translation) originally means. It does not bring new things to the Chinese horizon or create new meanings in Chinese. As a result, it is less an intercultural dialogue between two different civilizational perspectives than old wine in new bottles - another way of preaching Confucian doctrines through Aristotle's mouth.

Such a translation, however, could be regarded as part of the Jesuits' efforts to recover, through translation, the knowledge that had been supposedly the same as the Christian West but lost especially since the burning of Confucian classics by the first emperor of the Qin Dynasty in 213 BCE. Therefore, resorting to ancient Chinese classics for equivalents was their usual means of translation. For instance, the strategic translations of the central concept "God," which gave rise to what is known as the Rites Controversy, and resulted in the pope forbidding the use of the translations in 1704, can be a good case for examination here.

"God" is translated by the Jesuits and their converts into *tianzhu* (literally heaven's master), *tiandi* (literally heaven's god), and *shangdi* (literally the supreme god). While *tianzhu* along with *tiandi* is a term found in Buddhist translations and still the standard name for Catholics (*tianzhu jiao*), *shangdi* is a Chinese mythological concept. It is found in many early Chinese texts, including the *Great Learning*, the *Book of Rites*, the *Book of Odes*, etc. Although representing the ultimate power controlling the fate and destiny of humanity, *shangdi* is simply an unknown force, far removed from humanity, with few accounts of creation available. It does not evoke the kind of feelings in the Chinese as does God to Christian believers. Furthermore, *di* basically means emperor or king.

Consequently, the translation of God into *shangdi* was not only acceptable but pleasing to the China's supreme ruler, the emperor, who believed himself to be the sole representative of and mediator between Heaven, Earth and Man. However, it was in contradiction with the Catholic faith. The translators were caught between the two masters, two great, irreconcilable powers that were beyond mediation.

Although later the Jesuits attacked Buddhist doctrines as "perversions of Indian beliefs that were no longer accepted in India, doctrines that had in fact originated in the false beliefs of Pythagoras" (Hart, 1999, online), the missionaries, as mentioned earlier, had claimed themselves to be Buddhist monks. Therefore, a large number of Buddhist terms were appropriated, particularly by Ricci, as equivalents for Catholic concepts, including (see Hart, 1999, online) *tiantang* (literally mansion of the gods) for Heaven, from Sanskrit *devaloka*; *diyu* (literally prison in the underworld) for Hell, from Sanskrit *naraka*; and *mogui* (literally evil ghost) for Devil, from Sanskrit *mara*.

Like Buddhist translators mentioned earlier, the Jesuits and converts also adopted the approach of "loan translations - the creation of semantic neologisms by combining characters" (ibid.). This is where they contributed most in opening the Chinese language to alien concepts in theology, Aristotelian philosophy and Western sciences and technology (Hart, 1999; Shi, 1991). In particular, Ricci and Xu's translation of Euclidean geometry established the basic modern Chinese vocabulary in mathematics - the language of all sciences. According to Lin et al. (1988, p. 83), such terms as *dian* (point), *xian* (line), *zhixian* (straight line), *quxian* (curve), were first determined and established

by Xu. They influenced mathematics terminology in countries like Japan and Korea, and are still used today.

However, even in science and technology translation, the linguistic and cultural incommensurability intervened. In *A History of Chinese Mathematics* (1987), Martzloff remarked:

In addition to the terminology, the even more formidable problem of the difference between the Chinese syntax and that of European languages had to be faced. The main difficulty was the absence of the verb "to be" in classical Chinese. The translators were unable to find better substitutes for it than demonstratives or transitive verbs such as *you*, *wu* and *wei*... But often, the verb "to be" disappeared altogether, as in the following case: [The] circle: [a] shape situated on flat ground (*pingdi*) [sic] within [a] limit. [The] straight strings (*xian*) constructed from [the] limit to [the] centre: all equal (in Hart, 1999, online).

As a result of these and other differences, Martzloff concluded that the Chinese had failed to comprehend the deductive structure of the *Elements*. The failure resulted, Martzloff pointed out, from the absence of the copula in classical Chinese. And the absence of the copula, as suggested by Martzloff, brings up a question inevitably beyond the scope of the present discussion: the Chinese concepts of, or lack of such Western concepts as, *existence*, *being* and *becoming*, *the intelligible* and *the sensible*, *the spiritual* and *the corporeal*, etc. This lack on the part of the Chinese lead some Western critics to assert that "the Chinese language inhibited the development of science," and that "the lack of counterfactuals and universals in the Chinese language inhibited the ability of the Chinese to think theoretically" (in Hart, 1999, online).

Although the conceptual and philosophical question of whether the Chinese shared the kind of Western notions cited above can not be deliberated here, it re-introduces the issue of lexical, grammatical and syntactical differences briefly discussed in the first chapter. From a modern Chinese translator's point of view, the classical Chinese used in the 17th century, for whatever reasons, did pose a series of linguistic challenges. First and foremost, the mostly mono-syllabic vocabulary had been, for nearly two thousand years, contextualized within the Confucian-Taoist-Buddhist world of discourses. It was inadequate to organize the world from culturally Other perspectives. As cited above,

whenever the translators created, from Chinese classical texts, equivalents for their Western originals, the words or terms seemed to be automatically assimilated or drawn back to the 'black hole' of the Confucian-Taoist-Buddhist discursive world. Consequently the cross-cultural values of such translations were largely compromised.

Apart from the absence of 'copula,' for which the translators had to use *you* (have, exist or somethingness), *wu* (have not, not exist or nothingness) and *wei* (do or act), the Classical Chinese suffers from other kinds of 'lack.' For example, there were no punctuation marks - one of the first things a student had to learn was how to *duanju* (make pauses in reading unpunctuated writings); there was (is) no article (a/an or the) to denote 'definite' or 'indefinite;' there were even no pronouns for "she/her" or "it;" there were no attributive clauses, etc. All these differences and disadvantages seemed to be pointing to the need, and meanwhile holding promise, for changes at a deeper level and on a larger scale for a possible dialogue with the more heterogenous civilizations.

c. Impact and compromise

In fact, changes in China were already taking place with the translations. For instance, with his map of the world, Ricci brought a better picture of the world, along with the new concepts of the earth as a globe, the continents and the oceans. Many of the geographical terms and names of countries used today were invented by Ricci, including *yaxiya* (Asia), *ouluoba* (Europe), *luoma* (Rome), *daxiyang* (the Atlantic Ocean), *beiji* (the Arctic) and *nanji* (the Antarctic) (Shen, 1987, p. 415). The *Western Irrigation Methods* co-translated by Xu and Ursis in 1612 was applied in improving irrigation in Tianjin, which proved to be economically beneficial. For many years, Xu co-ordinated the large-scale translation of European science of calendar called *Congzhen lishu* (130 volumes), which proved to be more accurate than China's own *Datong li* and the *Huihui li* (Mohammedian astronomer's system) imported from Arabia in the 13th century (Lin et al. 1988, p. 83). The missionaries and the converts opened up, for the first time, many new areas of studies with their basic vocabulary, principles and application in China, including physics, mechanical engineering, astronomy, philology, biology, medicine, architecture, painting and music (Shen, 1987, pp. 388-438).

Specifically, the beginning of the study of philology was instrumental to later translation and China-West exchange in general. The first Chinese-European (languages) dictionary was compiled in 1576 by Martinus de Rada, a Spanish Augustinian geographer. It was entitled *Art y Vocabulario de la lengua de China*, based upon the southern dialect of Quanzhou. Between 1584 and 1588, Ricci, who had earlier compiled with Lazarus Cattaneo the *Vocabularium Ordine alphabetico europaeo more Concinnatum, et peraccentus suos digestum*, co-authored with Ruggieri the *Dizionario portoghese-cinese*. The first book with Latin alphabet/phonetic transcriptions was Ricci's *Xizi qiji* (The Miracle of Western Characters/Words), published in Beijing in 1605. It brought Latin alphabet and phonetic transcriptions to the attention of Christian believers in China (Shen, 1987, p. 426). The most important work of this period was *Xiru ermu zi* (literally an aid for the ears and eyes of Western scholars), co-written by Trigault and Wang Zheng and published in Hangzhou in 1626.

The purpose of the three-volume 'aid,' according to Trigault, was "to enable the Chinese to master the Western linguistic system(s) within three days" (ibid.). In the introduction, the aid offered a general survey of Western philology and outlined the basic principles and stylistic rules and layout of the aid. In the second volume, with a full list of Latin phonetic transcriptions at the beginning, the Chinese characters were arranged according to Latin phonological system. In the third volume, the Chinese characters were listed in the usual Chinese way, that is, according to the radicals on one side of a character, but with Latin phonetic transcriptions. The aid, therefore, was both for the ear (sounds through Latin phonetic symbols) and the eye (Chinese pictographic and ideographic characters). Indeed, this pioneering and foundational work, a great influence upon the development of Chinese linguistics, provided a key to breaking the barriers between Chinese and European languages.

Unlike Xu, Li or Yang who did not understand Western languages, the Chinese collaborator, Wang Zheng, first a Buddhist, then a Taoist and finally a Catholic, was one of the few Chinese who had some qualification in European languages (Latin). As the first scholar to study the Chinese phonology from Western linguistic perspectives, Wang encouraged his contemporaries to learn Western languages, stating that for a Chinese to learn a Western language was no more difficult than for a Westerner to learn Chinese.

The purpose of the aid, according to Wang, was "to celebrate thousands of years' glorious order of peace through cultural sharing" (in Chen, 1992, p. 73. Translation mine). In the preface to the aid written in 1626, Wang said:

China is undoubtedly a civilized nation under the sun. The dialects and slang within China, although similar in essence, are numerous and mutually unintelligible....The world under the sun is actually one family. In this family, the Chinese and foreign languages are fundamentally different....It is only through one door after another that translation leads people to some kind of mutual understanding....Yet when we open our eyes to the whole world under the sun, the people from foreign lands are also members of our family. How can we stand the situation that while we are all one family, the members of the family should be simply separated from one another by differences in language? (In Chen, 1992, p. 72. Translation mine.)

Wang's scope of Western learning was not limited to the linguistic "aid" to the Chinese ears and eyes. He also worked with Joannes Terrenze in introducing European sciences of physics and mechanics. He divided Western works into three kinds, namely philology, science and technology, and philosophy, which, in his opinion, could serve respectively as aid to the ears and eyes, aid to the hands and feet, and aid to the heart/mind. Therefore, the three kinds should be translated simultaneously (Chen, 1992, p. 74).

It is interesting to note here that Wang, together with Xu, Li and Yang, seemed to be natural pacifists, globalists or universalists. They did not show such personality traits of "pride, xenophobia, conservatism, and fear" (in Hart, 1999, online) as Western anthropomorphism assigns to the Chinese. The Confucian-Taoist-Buddhist mentality within which their understanding worked seemed to endow them with a kind of openness to alien and foreign cultures. And they were working hard, through difficult translation, to break language, religious, conceptual, ideological, philosophical and other walls.

The same mentality, particularly the strong Confucian sense of moral, social and political responsibility in the converts, however, found its way to their understanding of Christianity and Western cultures in general. As discussed above, the converts were discontent with the cultural and educational policies and the general intellectual climate of their times. This discontent, ironically, turned into a fanciful idealization of the

Christian West. In his "*Bian xue zhang shu*," a memorial on distinguishing learning, Xu wrote:

Thus the learning of serving Heaven transmitted (by the Jesuits) can truly be used to supplement the moral influence of our sovereign, aid Confucianism and correct Buddhism. Thus in the West, there are more than thirty neighbouring kingdoms which implement this doctrine. For over a thousand years up to the present, the large and small help one another; the superior and the inferior live together in peace; borders require no defenses; dynasties exist without change; countries are entirely without cheats or liars; ever since antiquity there has been no lasciviousness or thieving; people do not pick up objects lost on the roads; and doors are not locked at night. And as for disturbances and rebellions - not only are they without such affairs and without such persons - there are not even words or written characters to denote such things (in Gernet, 1985. Cited and modified in Hart, 1999, online).

About the image Xu presented here and elsewhere, Allan (1870, p. 93) commented: The apology then goes on to state definitely that Christianity is the religion that can really reform the empire, and gives as proof the condition of the European countries. This description is decidedly flattering, so much so as to be almost unrecognizable to us who are acquainted with their history. No doubt Hsu (Xu) himself believed all that the missionaries taught him about the West, and having no means of checking their descriptions filled in with his imagination what was really lacking.

The picture Xu painted of the West was true more to his imaginary West as an appeal for China to reform than to the facts. Xu was here projecting his ideal land - his sense of lack - onto a dream West inspired by the Jesuits, which was ironically looking up to China for fulfilling its sense of lack. Interestingly, such a Utopian West was drawn solely with the traditional Confucian vocabulary and grammar of what a land of morality, justice, peace, order and felicity should be like. It had little to do with what the realistic West was. The West that Xu was trying to interpret, translate and present might not be understanding human life in those terms. In fact, it was rising to destroy the very hope of such a world in a language that Xu and his comrades failed to understand, less to mediate, and still less to be critical of.

4. Conclusion: A Closure to a Beginning

a. Reflections on missionary-convert translation

As discussed above, unlike the previous translation of Buddhism, this first episode of Chinese translation of the West, mainly by westerners, constitutes a complicated, dramatic text on which there is much to reflect. First and foremost, it forms a unique pattern of China-West relationship quite different from the usual pattern of Western engagement in those days with others, the "primitive," "heathen," "savage," aboriginal Other. It points to the possibility of a more open, flexible and negotiative mind and attitude within the general Eurocentric mentality that was to shape the world according to its own version of translating itself and others. It should have held promise for a more humane, creative and constructive intercivilizational dialogue than what turned out to be.

In a sense, it is the first encounter between two great civilizations, two fully developed cultural minds represented by great scholars of the time. It can be further described as the first encounter between two self-centred worldviews: the Christian vision of a monotheistic world vs. the Confucian-Taoist-Buddhist vision of a secular world of patriarchal order. Both sides being self-centred, one was trying to assimilate the other into its own 'translation' of the world. The difference is that one side seemed to be more 'outward' while the other more 'inward.' This drama of translation so staged is full of tensions against a dark background of civilizational divides and power plays, which seem to have laid out the basic patterns of Chinese translation ever since.

First of all, in contrast to Buddhist translation as a more natural and spontaneous act, this period of translation is characterized by religious and political purposes. The interesting relationship between the Jesuits and the converts constitutes a special case for examination. Without doubt, either party had its own cultural end as well as means in view. The missionaries, with their colonial mission, were determined to draw China into their grand vision of Christianity through any workable means, including the agency of their converts. The converts, with their more humanistic concerns about China's cultural and intellectual development, more or less used the Jesuits along with their translations as a means for reform and change. On his conversion, Xu Guangqi wrote:

I turned to Catholicism not because I rejected Confucianism, but because (many of the) Chinese classics had been lost. Explanations, annotations and commentaries

had been divergent, and in particular the Buddhist versions had been most controversial. Belief in Catholicism can help reject Buddhist fallacies and complement Confucianism (in Xin, 1991, p. 109. Translation mine).

The hidden agendas brought the two parties to the table of mutual, intellectual engagement.

Although the conflicts in their intentions did never go public or become visible, the strategic compromises (both textual and cultural) they had to make were apparent. Instead of adhering doggedly to their own missions, both sides found a safer and more neutral space in academic translation. This strategy helped the Jesuits to justify their efforts in translation as a most effective means to the end of their mission in China. Meanwhile it helped the Chinese scholars to carry out their cultural mission in the good name of pursuing the infinity of Confucian learning. As a result, translation served as a tool, a means to different ends. Out of this tension, one can see, however, that whatever intention the translators might have for mutual engagement to be possible, the process of translation itself inevitably involves moving to a third space between the two cultures.

The colonial-minded Jesuits seemed to be both translators and the translated. In a sense, when they were translating to convert, they became what was being translated themselves. This has manifold implications. For instance, their success in converting the Chinese relied heavily upon their seemingly genuine respect for, knowledge and understanding of the Chinese Confucian culture represented by their converts. The conversion of the Confucian scholars, in turn, largely depended upon the potential converts' 'translation' of the converters as embodying that part of Confucian knowledge which they believed had been lost but recoverable. In translating the West into China, the Jesuits, in a way, became part of China. Their mission-oriented translations helped China to grow according to its own logic.

In understanding China, the missionaries became both emotionally and intellectually attached to what was being understood. Ricci and a number of other missionaries were appointed to high positions at the imperial court and were deeply respected in China, which had little to do with their religious contribution to China. This may tell a life story somewhat different from the version known in the West based upon their mission-guided

writings sent back to Europe¹. Obviously, the Jesuits devoted themselves to a cause which in actuality had more to do with intercultural exchange. From this perspective, the process of translation is a process of transformation between the translator and the translated.

In translating the West, the Jesuits became forerunners of Western Sinology. Their letters, reports, travel accounts and translations of Chinese classics culminated in an agent for change in the West, a 'blasting fuse' particularly for the intellectual revolution of the Enlightenment Movement. On the one hand, their understanding of China from a Christianity-centred point of view had strong impact on their observation, selective introduction and critical interpretation of the Chinese civilization. It helped in deepening and strengthening the Eurocentric world outlook that was taking shape. On the other hand, their studies of China dwarfed Marco Polo's travels, bringing to the West a China of history, geography, philosophy, literature, politics, law, etc. Interestingly, the Jesuits' translation of China was to be, in time, translated back into China to influence the Chinese understanding of themselves, a case that will be studied later in this thesis. From this perspective, the process of translation, which is manipulative in a sense, is a catalyst for mutual transformation between cultures.

In comparison, the role of the Chinese converts in the translation was more passive than active. This seemed inevitable, since the converts did not understand Western languages, both literally and figuratively. The passivity enabled the missionaries to manipulatively interpret not only Western but also Chinese texts. As a result, textual and cultural translation became one of translating the Jesuits' mission-directed translations of the West in relation to China, thus diverting the course of Chinese translation to a Western maze of often conflicting and contradictory concepts, ideas and theories. Even today, Chinese translation of the West is still trapped in the European (and later American) textual and cultural, verbal and non-verbal maze of contending vocabulary and grammar.

The passivity was, however, to eventually turn into an active practice of imported but un-mediated ideas. Instead of developing a critical point of view of a West being

¹ For instance, when Ricci died in Beijing, Emperor Shenzong issued an edict to bury him as an imperial minister at Fuchengmenwai. His tomb has remained as one of the relatively few historic spots in the Chinese memory.

translated, the converts took an attitude of wholesale acceptance of what was taught to them by the Jesuits, as in the case of Xu's description of the Christian West. Moreover, the converts' translations of the Jesuits' translations were manipulatively used to attack Buddhism, edge out Taoism, and transform Confucianism according to Christian doctrines. Hence is marked the beginning of those intellectual, political and cultural wars that characterize modern Chinese history. This characteristic of the period betokened the coming struggles and fights among the Jesuits themselves, between the Jesuits and other Chinese scholars at the court, between the converts and other court officials, and between Rome and the Chinese emperor(s). It led to the Rites Controversy, a series of persecutions of the Jesuits in imperial service launched by other groups of court officials, finally Rome's forbidding of rites advocated by Ricci, and the Chinese emperor's banning of Catholicism altogether in 1724.

From the viewpoint of textual translation, all the conflicts, tensions and struggles seemed to arise from linguistic and conceptual incommensurability manipulated to serve different ends. Roger Hart, in his insightful paper (2000, online), writes:

...studies of the 'first encounter' of these two great civilizations have acquired a particular urgency. Interpretive approaches have often been limited to two alternative models - conflict, opposition, and misunderstanding, or synthesis, accommodation, and dialogue... in recent years, relativism - again formulated within the context of an assumed plausibility of a divide separating China and the West - has become yet another important approach.

By employing Derrida's deconstructive approach to language, philosophy and translation, Hart attempts to show that the failure of Christianity in China was due more to the manipulation of translation by both the Jesuits and the converts than to an absolute civilizational divide as suggested in Gernet and Martzloff's studies. According to Hart:

While ordinary translation seeks to establish equivalences, Martzloff seeks to convey radical differences... The extremes to which Martzloff takes the translation are necessary to evoke the linguistic differences that are to serve as an analogy for radical differences in thought (ibid.).

On a philosophical level, Hart may be justified in suggesting that similarities between China and the West may be greater than differences as reflected in terms of language.

However, the dramatic tensions in translation as described above can not be eased or solved by suggesting the cultural divide is nothing but a form of fantasy. For the possible similarities in thought to transcend the deep-rooted linguistic differences, there would be a long way to go - a new language would have to, in the first place, be developed to bridge the linguistic gaps. Moreover, cross-cultural translation is not just a linguistically or intellectually manipulative game. It is life, involving a long process of understanding, acceptance, personal and collective transformation of one's own reality that could not be fully addressed without the lived but often untranslatable experiences of Others. This introduces an important issue that has not so far been touched upon, namely the Chinese acceptance of and response to the missionary-convert translations.

For all the achievements of the Jesuits and the converts in Chinese textual translation, the missionaries remained, after all, foreign missionaries, and the converts Chinese Confucian scholars. Their translations failed to go beyond textual manipulation to draw the one into the other's horizon of world order. On the one hand, the Jesuits adopted an effective strategy of winning the favour of the elite class of Confucian scholars, and were thus able to carry out their mission through the converts at the court - the heart of the Empire. On the other hand, the same strategy confined their work to the circle of the Chinese literati. Any new ideas that might have been created out of their translations at the heart of China could hardly find their way to the ordinary people across China.

On the part of the converts, several factors contributed to their failure to make any intended difference in the intellectual and political situations. First of all, the language they helped the missionaries translate into was Classical Chinese, which was hardly intelligible to the majority of the Chinese. Secondly, the educational system of meritocracy, structured round the Imperial Examinations in the form of eight-legged essays in the Confucian tradition, and inaccessible to the vast masses, denied entry of even their science and technology translations in the school curriculum. Schools were exclusively teaching Confucian classics. Thirdly, the converts themselves were actually limited to their Celestial Empire mentality, so that their understanding of the West was truly problematic.

For instance, the comprehensive collection mentioned earlier of translated works in Christianity, sciences and technology edited by Li Zhizao in 1629 was titled *Tianxue*

chuhuan, literally a primer of celestial or heavenly studies. *Tianxue* could be interpreted, as Lu (2000, online) did, as Celestial Science,¹ which could be further interpreted as Catholic Science, since Celestial and Catholic share the same character/word *tian*. However, it can be more convincingly interpreted as studies of Heaven in the pure Confucian sense. Given the possibility that Li and the Jesuits might be trying to manipulate the translations by being ambiguous, how could one possibly put theology, astronomy, geography, ethics, philosophy, arithmetic, agriculture, geometry and so on so forth under the one and same umbrella of *tianxue*? The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that Li did not or could not distinguish science from theology, or theology from humanities. To him, it seems, all the studies were part of the Confucian Heaven, or, in Lu's understanding, Catholicism.

Furthermore, the converts along with the missionaries were serving an empire that was collapsing and crumbling, which will be discussed later. It was a time of political struggle, moral corruption and social unrest. Therefore, they were caught between different forces. Even though their work was supported, at times, by the Emperor, they were faced with attacks from different sides, who had less or no idea of Western learning. Outside the small circle of intercultural engagement between the missionaries and Confucian scholars, China was still intellectually caged in its Sinocentrism. Consequently, the translations were no more than a stone cast at a closed and stagnant pond.

b. Chinese response

The stone, however, did trigger off some waves. Except for the few positive ripples of change described earlier, most of the waves swept back against the translators. For instance, some of the court officials perceived, with reason, the translations to be a heterogeneous system of nature, society and human life that was fundamentally challenging the Chinese system of unquestioned beliefs regarded as self-evident. Headed most notably by Xu Changzhi of the late Ming Dynasty and Yang Guangxian of the early Qing Dynasty, they campaigned against the Jesuits and converts. They were determined

¹ The proper translation of *xue* here should be *studies* rather than *science*, since the Chinese equivalent of science, *kexue*, was not created until at least two hundred and seventy years later.

to vehemently play down and "demonize" (to use a contemporary word) the West. According to Allan (1870, p. 157):

In 1659, he (Yang Guangxian) had published a tractate under the title of "Avoid Evil Practices." This was a libel against the missionaries themselves and a denunciation of the erroneous doctrines that they preached. Shortly after, he published another book which was even more scurrilous, and in 1662 Fathers Buglio and Magalhaens, in answer to theses publications, issued an apology for the Christian Faith. This was circulated about the time of the emperor's death. Two years afterwards, Yang addressed a long letter to the Chief Censor of the court, reproaching him bitterly for allowing the false teachings of strangers to be disseminated in the empire to the detraction of the great principles of Confucius. In September of the same year he addressed a memorial to the throne, suggesting the suppression of Christianity, and denouncing Schaal as an imposter and a fomenter of rebellion. He based his insinuations on the falsity of Schaal's astronomical calculations and also on the fact that Schaal had interceded on behalf of the Portuguese at Macao.

To discredit the Western theory of the earth as a globe, for instance, Yang, who later sent Schaal and his colleagues to prison and took Schaal's position as Director of the Astronomical Board, said (in Gu, 1995, p.11. Translation mine):

Suppose it was true that the four major continents of numerous nations is a giant ball...then it follows that the arches of the feet of the people living on the top of the ball are in direct opposition to those living on the bottom...Have you ever thought it means people on the bottom are inversely suspended?...How ridiculous this is to a rational mind. We know man is standing on earth with heads towards the sky, and no one has ever heard of people standing horizontally or inversely vertically...It can be seen here that the earth is not a round ball.

The above is a most rational comment out of the innocent logic of this dominating group of traditional Confucian official-scholar class. Their purpose, however, was not to prove the falsity of Western science through their "common sense," but to reject a whole West as evil, vicious, heterodox, heretical as opposed to the Confucian legitimacy, righteousness, integrity, justice and uprightness. Two books of collected essays and

political commentaries against the West, one from the late Ming and one from the early Qing dynasties, are titled *Shenchao poxie ji* (Collected Works on Eradicating the Heretical in the Sacred Celestial Empire) and *Bu de yi* (No Alternative But Speaking Out). Written by well-educated Confucian scholars in high offices, they were full of arrogance and ignorance, very often pitifully irrational and absurd. Indeed one can feel the fiery but blind hatred and genuine but short-sighted and unfounded worries of the traditional scholars suffering from their Celestial Empire mentality.

The Chinese response to Western learning is best seen in the attitude of the editors of the *Siku quanshu* (Imperial Catalogue or Four Partite Library) - the world's longest series of books containing 3,503 titles bound into more than 36,000 books totaling 853,456 pages. Comprising four traditional Chinese divisions of learning - classics, history, philosophy and belles-letters, and finally completed in 1782, the Library attempted to collect all the Chinese valuable works from the antiquity according to the Confucian norms and standards. Without doubt, the imperial editors knew the missionary-convert translations. Of the twenty books anthologized in Li Zhizao's *First Collection*, all the ten works in the section of "Instruments" were included in the Library. Except *Julius Aleni's World Atlas with Explanations*, the works in the section "Idea," including J. Aleni's *Curriculum of the Western Schools*, were rejected. From the "Idea," the imperial editor sensed a spirit of "total subversion of the Chinese world order...at amalgamating Catholicism and Confucianism in order to defeat all other religions in China along with the power of the Confucian minded Emperors" (Lu, 2000, online). The editor declared Li guilty of intellectual treason against the Emperor. The specific reasons the editor gave for rejecting the works, as Lu (ibid.) summarized in his own way, were:

- (1) Epistemologically, the arguments in those works were 'not investigable,' not controllable by human reason based on reality;
- (2) Economically, they did not touch the immediate needs of the daily life of the people, therefore, useless;
- (3) Politically, by exalting the position of the Pope and of the religious teachers in the name of God, they were downgrading the Emperor and parents, violating the Confucian principles of loyalty to the Emperor as the Son-of-Heaven and of filial piety toward the true father and mother in the human family. They were pernicious

because they tended to undermine the public order of the "Heavenly Way of Life" in each household and in the whole Universe under Heaven;

- (4) Religiously, they contained many points repetitious of Buddhism and Zoroastrianism worshipping the Light and Fire in Heaven and Hell, among other similarities.

According to Lu (ibid.), the imperial editor once commented that Catholicism and Buddhism, in refuting each other, seemed like two naked swimmers each putting the other to shame by ridiculing each other's nudity. In fact, both are guilty of the same shameful absurdities. Moreover, their teachings find no evidence in the Confucian classics, although they claim it by their distorted and forced interpretations.

Looking back from the 21st century at what the Chinese mainstream scholars represented by the imperial editor said and did, one cannot fail to see that they were rational enough to open the Confucian mind to alien cultures. They welcomed Western sciences and technology. They even valued Western philosophy, since the translations of the two books by Aristotle were included in the imperial *History of the Ming Dynasty: Art and Literature* (grouped in the section of *Taoist Writings*) and the *Imperial Catalogue* (in the section of *Miscellaneous Writings*). What they resented, rightly, were religious wars launched by the missionaries that were threatening and undermining the Confucian order and vision of human life characterizing Chinese identity in Western terms.

Had the missionaries been Western non-religious cultural ambassadors, Chinese translation might have developed in a different way. China might have peacefully, patiently and persistently tried to cross any linguistic, conceptual and intellectual divides. Unfortunately, due to the hidden agendas of the Jesuits, strong objections among part of the Confucian scholar-officials, and the China-Roman Catholic disputes over the rites, Emperor Yongzheng banned Christianity along with maritime intercourse with foreign countries. China lost her opportunity to further translate, be informed about, or learn from the rapidly growing West. The waves stirred up by the 'stone' cast in the pond of the Confucian heart gradually died down, and the 'stone,' as will be seen, seemed to sink into oblivion in the Celestial Empire consciousness. A century later when the West headed by Britain returned by breaking open China's closed door through opium, fleets and cannons, China had no way to avoid facing the West as a realistically destructive Other.

VI. Translation, Colonization and Anti-Colonization

1. Background

Within the larger picture of Chinese history, the first Chinese response to the translation of the West reflected the cultural and spiritual poverty and exhaustion of the Confucian tradition. Confucianism coupled with Taoism and Buddhism had developed to a point where the language of the closed, feudal, self-sustained, agriculture-based system, while profound and resourceful in one way, was insufficient to address the new reality of China in relation to the growing capitalist culture. The West that was being modernized, secularized and capitalized was speaking a world language increasingly unintelligible to agrarian China, which was repeating its endless cycle of violent dynastic change.

While Ricci and the converts along with other Jesuits were translating with different purposes, the Ming Dynasty as a whole was declining and dying. The centre of the imperial power - the court in Beijing - was dominated by eunuchs. According to Jian (1981, p. 76), the eunuchs excluded all political opponents from office and were in turn opposed by a group of literati known as the Dong Lin party. The internal strife in the ranks of the ruling class spread rapidly, resulting in deeper political crisis. Beset with corruption, the civil administration imposed heavy levies upon the already desperate people under the pretext of strengthening the defenses of Liaodong against the Manchus. As a result, in 1628, peasant revolts broke out.

The following two decades witnessed bloody wars across China between the government and the peasant armies led by Li Zicheng (1606-45) and Zhang Xianzhong (1606-46). In 1644, Chong Zhen, the last emperor of the Ming Dynasty, hanged himself at Jingshan behind the imperial palace. Before the peasant leader Li Zicheng had time to establish his administration in Beijing, the Manchus, a branch of the Nuzhen nationality, crossed the Great Wall.

Like the Mongols in the Song Dynasty, the Manchus, originally dwelling at the confluence of the Mudan and Sungari rivers, had been regarded as no more than another group of *man* (barbarians). From 1580s when the Jesuits were trying to enter China from the seas in the south, this agriculture and livestock-breeding-based tribe, under the chief Nurhachi, was developing into the state of Jin in the northeast. Later it not only

conquered Mongolia but seized many cities and rural areas of the Ming Dynasty. The fall of the Ming offered the opportunity for the Manchus to conquer China. In 1644, the Manchus under Fu Lin defeated the peasant army under Li and occupied Beijing. China entered the last dynasty, Qing (1644-1911).

Since the conquerors were small in number in comparison with the vast Chinese population, they were constantly fearful of the Han people's resistance (Jian, 1981, p. 81). Under such a political and cultural climate, Chinese translation, again, entered another cycle of irony, another age of translation in a paradoxical sense. On the one hand, the "culturally backward" (Jian, 1981, p. 78) Manchu rulers had to understand and translate the much more advanced language of the conquered in order to rule. In fact, only shortly before the Manchus conquered Beijing had they had a written language created under the reign of Nurhachi, which was improved by the linguist Da Hai under Emperor Taizong (reigned 1627-35) into the new Manchurian, i.e. the official written language of the Qing Dynasty. As Chen (1992, p. 76. Translation mine) noted, " In the early years of the Qing Dynasty, in order to strengthen and consolidate the (Manchurian) rule and meet the urgent needs of introducing the advanced Han culture, the tasks of mutual translation between the Manchurian and Han languages were extremely heavy." There were many professional interpreters and translators. In 1739, the Court even established a new discipline within the Imperial Examinations system - *fanyi jinshi ke* (equal to Doctor of Philosophy in translation). One of the Manchurian translators, Wei Xiangqian, contributed one of the rare and valuable translation treatises to Chinese translatology in 1740 titled *Fanqing shuo* (On Manchurian Translation) (ibid. p. 74).

The Manchu rulers took delight in showing off their Chinese literary and art qualifications. Not only did they adopt the political and administrative systems of the Ming Dynasty, but they relied upon Confucian classics for spiritual unification of the empire. The great project of the *Siku quanshu* (Imperial Catalogue) mentioned earlier demonstrated the Qing rulers' respect for and determination to identify themselves with the Confucian tradition. For instance, according to Durant (1954, pp. 767-768), Emperor Kang Xi (reigned 1661-1722), known as the greatest Manchu emperors:

...ruled it (China) with a wisdom and justice that filled with envy the educated subjects of his contemporaries Aurangzed and Louis XIV... Under his generous

patronage and discriminating appreciation literature and scholarship flourished... He tolerated all the religions, studied Latin under the Jesuits, and put up patiently with the strange practices of European merchants in his ports.

This cultural attitude and policy made it possible for Western missionaries to continue their mission-oriented translations of science and technology at the court. As in the late Ming Dynasty, a small number of missionaries, especially from France, were employed by the Imperial Court mainly as astronomical experts, painters, architects and gardeners. They carried on the cause of translation opened up by their predecessors like Ricci. They helped the Court, for example, to design and build the imperial garden Yuanmingyuan¹, a perfect combination of China-West cultural ideals.

Internationally the Manchu rulers maintained the Ming Dynasty's policy of isolationism, rejecting any European capitalist request for trade and commerce. Consequently, the Dynasty had no idea of the Industrial Revolution well under way. Take the 7th emperor of the Qing Dynasty, Qian Long (reigned 1736-96), another able emperor of the Manchu line. He "wrote 34,000 poems; one of them, on 'Tea,' came to the attention of Voltaire, who sent his 'compliments to the charming king of China.' French missionaries painted his portrait, and inscribed under it these indifferent verses:

Occupied without rest in the diverse cares of a government which men admire,
The greatest monarch in the world is also the most lettered man in his empire
(ibid. p. 768).

However, it was this emperor who prevented China from opening her eyes to the growing West. As Durant (1954, p. 768-769) noted, in 1792, a British commission under Lord Macartney was sent to China to negotiate a commercial treaty with Qian Long. The commissioners explained to the emperor the advantages of trading with England, adding that the treaty which they sought would take for granted the equality of the British ruler with the Chinese emperor. Qian Long, who had been angered by Britain's importing opium into China, dictated this reply to George III:

¹ Called the "Jardin des jardins" by J. Denis Attiret in a letter written in 1743 to M. d'Assaut, this imperial park began to be built from 1709, and it took 150 years to be completed. Missionaries including Joseph Castiglione (Italian), J.D. Attiret (French), Thebaudet, Joannes M. de Ventavon participated in designing and building. From Oct. 18 to 19, 1860, the British-French allied forces looted the park and burned it to ashes (Shen, 1987, pp. 430-431).

I set no value on objects strange and ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufactures. This, then, is my answer to your request to appoint a representative at my court, a request contrary to our dynastic usage, which could only result in inconvenience to yourself. I have expounded my views in detail and have commanded your tribute envoys to leave in peace on their homeward journeys. It behooves you, O King, to respect my sentiments and to display even greater devotion and loyalty in future, so that, by perpetual submission to our throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your country hereafter.

This arrogantly worded response, out of ignorance of what the new world reality was, directed China onto the road of fulfilling the prophetic parting words of the Great Emperor Kang Xi: "There is cause for apprehension lest, in the centuries or millenniums to come, China may be endangered by collisions with the various nations of the West who come hither from beyond seas" (in Durant, 1954, p. 768). At this very time, the West was pressing onward by way of translating the rest of the world, trying to bring its global expansion to reality.

2. Western translation of China

Western images of China date back to the pre-Herodotus (484 B.C. - 424 B.C.) time (see Xin, 1991, p. 30). However, until Marco Polo's travels, China had mostly remained a mysterious land. It had to take plenty of time for Matteo Ricci to prove to the West that the various historical accounts in the West of Sina (Ptolemaeus), Cathay (Marco Polo), China (Portuguese), Sina (Indian), Tang (Japanese), etc. were in fact referring to the same China. Starting from the missionaries, however, China became a realistically existing "other" for Western admiration, observation and study. The following works played the most important role in bringing China to the vast readership in Europe:

The Historie of the Great & Mightie Kingdome of China (De Mendoza, 1585)
Lettres edifiantes et curieuses, concernant l'Asie, l'Afrique et l'Amerique, avec quelques relations nouvelles des missions, et des notes geographiques et histoiques (1702-1776, 34 volumes in all. Paris, 1843)

Description géographique, historique, chronologique, politique, et physique de l'empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie chinoise (Du Halde, 4 volumes. Henri Scheurleer, The Haque, 1736)

The Chinese Repository [1776-1814, 16 volumes in all. Gabriel Brotier (1723-1789), Joseph Guignes (1721-1810) and Antoine Isaae Sylvestre de Sacy (1758-1838) eds.]

Historie generale de la Chine [12 volumes in all. De Maillac, (1669-1748)]

A New Map of China (D. Anville, 42 pages. 1737)

Other important individuals who introduced China to the West include Louis de Conte (1655-1729), Claude de Uisdelou (1656-1737), Jean Franceis Gerbillon (1654-1707), Joseph Maric de Premare (1666-?), Antoine Gaulbil (1689-1759), Jean Joseph Marie Amiot (1718-1793), Pierre Martial Cibot (1727-1780), etc. (see Xin, 1991).

In the 17th and 18th centuries, Europe, in its own way, became well informed about the various aspects of the Chinese civilization, and Sinology took shape. From 1552 to 1773, missionaries alone contributed much to the establishment of this professional study with their works on China as listed below (see Xin, 1991, p.135):

Type	Number
1. Comprehensive Reports	90
2. Question of Rites	43
3. History	36
4. Geography and Astronomy	58
5. Religion and Philosophy	34
6. Natural Science	44
7. Translations	47
8. Dictionaries and Grammar	38

The inter-translating efforts especially of the missionaries played an important part in European Enlightenment, whose major figures were more or less influenced by China studies. In France alone, philosophers such as Descartes (1596-1650), Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), Malebranche (1638-1715), Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), La Mothe Le Vaer (1582-1672), Bernier (1620-1688), Tenelon (1651-1715) and Verjus Le Gobien drew

inspirations from the Chinese tradition in different ways and from different perspectives (Xin, 1991, pp. 146-188).

When Cartesianism flourished in Italy, the Italian scholar Giambattista Vico (1668-1744), also inspired by China studies, began to challenge Descartes with his *Principi di una Scienza Nuova intorno allo Commune Natura della Nazioni*. Vico made a lot of references to the Chinese language, culture of the Dragon and Confucianism. In Britain, philosophers, writers and political commentators such as David Hume (1711-1776), John Milton (1608-1674), Daniel Defoe (1660-1731), Sir William Temple (1628-1699) and Oliver Goldsmith (1730-1774) cited examples from China for different purposes. In Germany, philosophers like G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716), B. Spinoza (1632-1677), A.H. Franke, C. Wolff (1679-1754) and J. G. von Herder (1744-1803) were greatly influenced by what was available to them from and of China (Xin, 1991, pp. 189-230).

Chinese influences found their good expressions in the French Enlightenment philosophers. While Voltaire and Francois Quesnay (1694-1774) saw things mostly positive of China, Montesquieu (1689-1755) and Denis Diderot (1713-1784) held more critical views of the Chinese civilization. What is interesting is that, on the one hand, the Sinology in Europe during this time helped a great deal in the development of modern European philosophies. On the other hand, the dichotomy rooted in Cartesianism put China in the position of the "Other" to be studied in order to be conquered.

This knowing of and about China encouraged Daniel Defoe's figure of Robinson Crusoe (in Zhang, 1988, p. 122), one of the prototype figures of the European colonizer, to speak about China in such a triumphant manner:

...what are their (Chinese) buildings to the palaces and royal buildings of Europe? What is their trade to the universal commerce of England, Holland, France and Spain? What are their cities to ours for wealth, strength, gaiety of apparel, rich furniture, and an infinite variety? What are their ports, supplied with a few junks and barks, to our navigation, our merchant fleets, our large and powerful navies? Our city of London has more trade than all their mighty empire. Our English, or Dutch, or French man-of-war of eighty guns would fight and destroy all the shipping of China...a barbarous nation of pagans, little better than savages....I saw

and knew that they were a contemptible herd or crowd of ignorant, sordid slaves, subjected to a government qualified only to rule such a people....

In an ironic sense, Robinson Crusoe seemed to be justified in making such claims. The European interest in and appetite for China were not known to the Chinese. In China, the door to a better knowledge of the West remained tightly closed. Behind the closed door, however, the Chinese had their own dreams, fantasizing themselves as the most civilized under the sun. At the same time that Robinson Crusoe was created, the greatest Chinese novel, *Hong lou meng* (Dream of the Red Chamber) by Cao Xueqin, son of a Manchu declining noble family, was being conceived. Although the novel has the main characters from the four major aristocratic families sometimes appreciate and marvel at the newfangled gadgets such as clocks from the West, it seems to have a sense of cultural superiority over the West. As Zhang Longxi (1988, p. 124) observed, while the Westerners viewed the Chinese as fundamentally Other, sometimes the Chinese would think the Westerners eager to become like the Chinese themselves, that is, if they wanted to become civilized at all. Zhang cited an occasion in chapter 52 of the *Dream of the Red Chamber* as an example, in which a Western girl "from the country of Ebenash" not only "had a perfect understanding" of Chinese literature but "could expound the Five Classics and write poems in Chinese." Zhang commented that as literary art was the watermark of the cultured, here the writing of poetry would become a symbolic act of the ritual of initiation by which a foreigner was admitted into the society of culture, for which the only culture worth having was Chinese.

It is interesting to note here that Chinese traditional culture had a strong power of assimilation. It had not only assimilated the Manchus into the mainstream Confucian culture, but endowed them with a Sinocentric perspective about the world. Consequently, under the Manchurian rule, the Celestial Empire mentality was strengthened rather than weakened. Moreover, the limited knowledge and understanding of the West through the Jesuits-converts' translations appeared to have been completely forgotten. Even the earlier debates over Western religion and science had died away. The intellectual ignorance and silence led China to the verge of a general cultural destruction toward the beginning of the 19th century.

In the then China, as Durant (1954, p. 799) noted, there was a Colonial Office, for managing such distant territories as Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet; but there was no Foreign Office. China recognized no other nations as its equals, and made no provisions for dealing with them beyond arrangements for the reception of tribute-bearing embassies. The government was weak with its limited revenues, inadequate defenses, and rejection of any instructive intercourse with the outside world. China was essentially leaderless when half the wealth and power of the world were joining in an assault upon its independence, its resources and its institutions. Consequently, as a nation among the nations of the world, China was doomed, in the sense of a nation-state, to fail for its reluctance to acknowledge others as its equals and for its refusal to translate the West.

3. The Opium War

The inevitable defeat on the part of China came with the Opium War with Britain (1840), when China had no idea of modern Western concepts of nation-state, of science, democracy, law, military affairs, finance and economy, or of international diplomacy and trade rules of Western design. As discussed earlier, China tried to keep the West off its shores. As early as 1557, the then Chinese government strategically allocated Macao (returned to China in 1999) for the Portuguese to settle and govern it as their own, because the Portuguese had helped China fight against other European pirates. But the Portuguese taught the Chinese to smoke and buy tobacco.

In the latter half of the 18th century, opium began to be imported/smuggled to China from India mostly by the British. Although the Chinese government forbade the use of the drug that was weakening the national vitality, the tremendous profits from the opium trade encouraged the East India Company, the notorious and biggest drug dealer in human history, to only rapidly increase their trade. The profits from opium alone (\$17 million) outvalued the British imports (\$13 million) from China. The Chinese minister responsible for enforcing the imperial edict to ban the use of the drug, Lin Zexu (1785-1850), wrote a letter to Queen Victoria for help to stop smuggling. But there was no response, and opium smuggling had doubled and re-doubled. In 1838, China seized from the British through what were called diplomatic channels, and destroyed, 20,291 chests

of opium in Guangdong. The British withdrew to Hong Kong, and in London a debate took place in the British Parliament to declare war against China.

With their translations and knowledge of China, the British made a "wise" decision to go into war with China, since the latter had been least prepared. As a downside of this civilization so admired by the Enlightenment philosophers for its rule by reason, China had traditionally played down the role of the military. In *Tides from the West* (Chiang, 1947, p. 106), the author said:

In my youthful days I noticed that civil ranks came invariably above the military. Imperial officers wore buttons of different colors at the tops of their red-tasseled hats. The red button was highest in rank; next came the pink, then dark blue, brilliant blue, white and finally golden, the lowest. Often my wondering eyes watched a military pink-button, though higher in rank, bowing before a blue-button civil official. It was explained to me that the Imperial system had chosen to put the military under control of the civil in order to eliminate the evils of military dictatorship in the country. Through centuries of history we had learned that when the country came under the control of warlords it was divided into spheres of influence; the authority of the Imperial Court became a mere shadow and peace and order vanished like a bubble. We learned this lesson from the later Tangs. Thus there was a popular saying that "good iron is not to be beaten into nails, and good men are not to be made into soldiers." We were taught to look down upon soldiers....

Consequently the military impotence could not resist "the onslaught of powerful invaders; thus it was that the Sungs (Song Dynasty) fell into the hands of the Mongols and the Mings (Ming Dynasty) into the hands of the Tartars" (Chiang, 1947, p. 106). And now the Qing Dynasty was to fall before invaders from afar.

On the part of China, the ignorance about the British was well reflected in the following anecdote. On the eve of the War with Britain, the Chinese military remembered that when the British envoys first came to the Chinese Imperial Court, they did not kneel down before the Emperor Qian Long. It was believed that the British were born to be unable to stand on their knees. Therefore, although the "yellow-haired barbarians" were good at fighting on the sea, it would be otherwise on the ground. The

Chinese side needed only to prepare a lot of long bamboo sticks. The Chinese general, Governor Lin Zexu, respected as "the first Chinese to open eyes to the West" and the most informed Chinese about the West, may not have believed the story. But he said "Except their cannons and rifles, the barbarian soldiers are not good at bayonet fighting, since their feet and legs are tightly wrapped, so that it is inconvenient for them to stretch or move on land. This means they are not invincible" (in Lei, 1999, online. Translation mine).

In 1841, the imperial general Yi Shan was sent to Guangzhou to fight against the British. He thought the British must have employed some *xie shu* (evil or perverse method, a term that can not be properly translated into English). Otherwise how could the British fleets, riding on the waves, have hit the Chinese targets much more accurately than the Chinese cannons fixed in the forts on land? Therefore he ordered to have women's sanitary towels, toilet staff, etc. collected as it was traditionally but superstitiously believed such things were the most powerful to defeat the evil (see Lei, 1999, online). The Confucian *zheng* (good or upright) could not stand a chance before the "barbarian" *xie* (evil or perverse).

On August 29, 1842, according to Jian (1981, pp. 89-90), China was forced to sign the Treaty of Nanking, which began to breach China's customs autonomy, and impair its national sovereignty. The Treaty, with subsequent documents and regulations, stipulated that China must cede Hong Kong to the British, pay an idemnity of 21,000,000 silver dollars, and open the five ports of Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo and Shanghai for foreign trade, grant extra-territorial rights to British traders and nationals in China. Similar treaties with other powers, including the United States and France, soon followed. The Chinese did not in fact understand what the terms of the treaties of Nanking, Wanghia and Whampoa meant to China as a country.

Ironically, there was something 'positive' to the war - the returning of the role of translation by missionaries. According to Gu (1995, pp. 47-53), from the beginning to the end of the Opium War, British and also American missionaries played their own roles as translators and interpreters for the British army with their knowledge of China and mastery of the Chinese language. The missionaries Charles Gutzlaff and John Robert

Morrison were the chief negotiators and translators representing Britain for the drafting and agreement of the Treaty of Nanking.

4. "Translating 'Barbarians' in order to control them"

The Opium War threw China into political, social, intellectual and cultural turmoil - an unprecedented identity crisis for the Chinese. China had to re-conceive its reality in relation to a West it had no way to avoid meeting. The Qing Dynasty was doubly cursed: internally, it was faced with constant and continuous peasants' rebellions against the ruling class and foreign invaders, and the fear of the Han nationality's rising against the Manchus. Internationally, it was challenged by the Western colonizing powers trying to cut China into different spheres' of influence.

Against this background, several political forces rose. One was represented by Empress Dowager Ci Xi, who adhered to the conventional Confucian principles of order and was opposed to any change or reform. Another was headed by Zeng Guofan (1811-72), Li Hongzhang (1822-1901) and Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909), who, in their high positions as ministers, attempted to incorporate the Western body of science and technology without changing the political and cultural soul of China. Another force, emerging later than the former two, was led by Kang Youwei (1858-1927) and Liang Qichao (1873-1929). They embraced not only Western sciences but also political and social theories with the hope of establishing a constitutional monarchy. Still another political force was guided by Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) and Zhang Taiyan. They were revolutionaries, aiming to drive away the Manchus and establish a republic. Except the first, all these political groups, although different in political ideas, had one thing in common: they realized the urgency and importance of, and aired their opinions about, translating the West (see Chen, 1992, pp. 82-84).

Specifically, within the intellectual circle of the Confucian scholars' class, a new round of pro- vs. anti-West debates started. Although the whole situation had changed and China was faced with an organized, brutally colonizing West, the dominant elite class still regarded the West as fundamentally not different from the 'barbarians' geographically surrounding China. The question of what had been wrong with the Chinese cultural tradition out of touch with a new world reality seemed to have never

occurred to their mind. As a result, what was achieved through the debate was no more than recognizing that in order to defeat the foreigners, China had to and only needed to learn from them the more advanced science and technology. Thus a movement called "yangwu"¹ (literally meaning Foreign Affairs but in fact referring to learning science and technology from the West) began.

In 1842, the forefather of this movement, the more progressive Confucian scholar Wei Yuan (1794-1857), published the first half of his one-hundred-volume *Haiguo tuzhi* (history, geography, science and technology of the West). It was based upon the translations done by the above mentioned minister Lin Zexu, who had headed a group translating foreign language writings into Chinese as a way for the government to be informed about the West. In the preface, Wei wrote:

The present work is based upon, first of all, Governor Lin's translation of the Western barbarians' *si-zhou-zhi* (General Survey of the Four Continents), secondly upon (Chinese) historical records and the records of ocean islands since the Ming Dynasty, and upon the Western (barbarian) maps and relevant writings in their own languages recently available. It is a thread to string things together as a pioneering work....Then in what way is this work different from all the previous works (in China)? The answer is: Those works are Chinese talks about the West, whereas this one is Western descriptions of themselves. Then what is the purpose of the present work? The answer is: for the purpose of using the West (barbarians) to fight against the West, using Westerners to pacify Westerners, and learning Western advanced technology to control the West...(in Chen, 1993, p. 2. Translation mine).

The three purposes summarized in this most influential work that opened Chinese eyes to the outside world set the general intellectual tone and attitude for the next fifty years or so. As can be sensed from between the lines, a strong Middle Kingdom Complex was working at the heart of the Chinese efforts. One might feel sympathetic with Wei, since he was working against a cultural background which generally regarded Western learning as a betrayal of the foundation of Confucianism and treason of the nation. To justify his work, Wei had to resort to the above form of disguise. Otherwise he would be

¹ The standard translation of *Yangwu yundong* is Westernization Movement. From this thesis' perspective, it can hardly be called Westernization in the cultural sense of the word.

accused of "using the West (barbarians) to subvert China," an accusation that was readily and conveniently used against many intellectuals of his time. Such a disguise, however, began to separate the soul from the body and the heart from the mind. And Western learning thus became an object of the Chinese subjectivity, and a tool for China to maintain her identity in the face of a barbarian West that was believed to know, like the earlier Huns (Mongolians), nothing more than material gain.

Lin's student, Feng Guifen (1809-74), pushed the reformist efforts to a higher level. Having experienced the two opium wars (1840-42 and 1856-60), and with more rational knowledge of China-West differences as a spin-off of the above-mentioned debates, Feng came to see the defects of traditional Chinese culture. In 1861, he wrote a series of papers. Some of them, including *Cai xixue yi* (On Adopting Western Learning) and *Gai keju yi* (A Proposal for Reforming the Imperial Examinations System), were among the most influential in this early period of modern Chinese intellectual history. Feng pointed out four disadvantages of Chinese culture in comparison with the West:

China is inferior to the barbarians (the West) in the following ways: in wasting no human resources; in wasting no natural resources; in effective communication between the King and the people; and in assigning correct *ming* (name) to specific *shi* (reality) (in Chen, 1993, p. 15. Translation mine).

In modern terms, Feng was here talking about education, state personnel system, science, philosophy and democracy, the four aspects that are still perplexing contemporary China in its reform. Elsewhere Feng said: "The way for China to become strong is: learn from and follow the example (of the West), then catch up with it, and finally surpass and control it" (ibid. Translation mine). With these purposes in mind, Feng proposed specific plans for reform in political administration, foreign affairs, military affairs and education.

"On Adopting Western Learning" is a most insightful piece advocating organized and systematic translation of the West. Here Feng reflected on the growth of Chinese learning, stating that all the great scholars were inspired by classics from different countries (nationalities). For instance, said Feng, Confucius had resorted to books from 120 states and kingdoms while writing his *Spring and Autumn*. Now that the world was completely different from that of the Confucius time, China needed to be better informed through translation. In view of the fact that many of his contemporaries ascribed China's

defeat in the opium wars merely to China's lack of rifles and cannons, Feng alerted his countrymen to China's greater lack in other areas in comparison with the West. He suggested Chinese translation should go beyond the scope of the missionaries-converts' efforts in the late Ming Dynasty to include industry, agriculture, natural sciences and education. He went on to propose translation institutes be established in Guangdong and Shanghai, native speakers be employed to teach Western languages, and Chinese scholars be invited to teach Confucian classics and history. In an angry tone, Feng wrote:

For the past twenty years since the beginning of commercial intercourse (with the West), large numbers of Westerners have been learning Chinese. Among them, the better ones are able to read our classics and history, and talk about our imperial laws, administration, geography and social customs. On our part, however, even those in charge of foreign affairs are absolutely ignorant of Western countries. Isn't that a shame? Consequently, we have to rely on some stupid and least qualified *tongshi* (interpreters), who quite often fail to convey our subtle messages in translation, and turn minor misunderstandings into major disasters! ... Under such circumstances, no wonder why we have no knowledge of the West, we can not tell true from false, and we almost do not know whether we are negotiating peace or war. This should indeed be our national concern (in Chen, 1993, pp. 18-19. Translation mine.)

Feng believed that "China has plenty of outstanding talents. Some of them can certainly outwit the barbarians through learning from them." In the same paper, he stated that "To control the barbarians is currently the first and foremost important political task under the sun." However, he concluded that China should hold the Confucian cardinal guides and constant virtues as national principles, and resort to Western science and technology for national strength and prosperity (in Chen, 1993, pp. 17-19. Translation mine).

This dominant attitude of the time brought some changes to the Chinese cultural landscape. It led to the establishment of the *Zongli geguo shiwu yamen* (Foreign Affairs Department) in 1861 at the imperial court dealing with foreign countries. Symbolically, it meant the Qing Dynasty finally recognized other countries as having equal status as itself. In order to be able to conduct foreign affairs, a number of foreign language institutes were successively founded to train translators and interpreters. For instance, the *Jingshi*

tongwen guan (School of Combined Learning) was established in 1862 in Beijing under the direct supervision of the Foreign Affairs Department. It was composed of the following departments: English (1862), French (1863), Russian (1863), German (1872) and Japanese (1896). The students were selected exclusively from Manchu children under the age of 13 or 14, and the teachers were employed from respective countries. In 1863 and 1864, two other similar institutes were established in Shanghai (*Shanghai guang fangyan guan*) and Guangzhou (*Guangzhou guang fanyan guan*), where foreign contacts were frequent (see Fu, 1988, pp. 15-18).

In the field of education, some Western elements began to be incorporated into the Confucian school curriculum that had been confined exclusively to reading and reciting Confucian classics. Take the 8-year curriculum guideline practiced from 1865 on in *Jingshi tongwen guan*. It does not in any way represent the usual school curriculum across the nation. However, it does reflect the degree to which the reformist ideas were beginning to influence school education.

1st year: Chinese Literacy; Chinese Handwriting; Simple Grammar and Syntax

Explanation

2nd year: Simple Grammar and Syntax Exercises; Short Notes/messages Translation

3rd year: World Map; Brief Histories of Foreign Countries; Selected Translations

4th year: Mathematics ABC; Algebra; Translation of Practical Writings

5th year: Physics; Fundamentals in Geometry; Triangle; Translation (of books)

6th year: Machinery; Calculus; Navigation Survey; Translation (of books)

7th year: Chemistry; Astronomy (I); Surveying (I); International Laws; Translation (of books)

8th year: Astronomy (II); Surveying (II); Geography; Mining; Policies to Enrich the Nation; Translation (of books) (see Fu, 1988, pp. 16-17).

Even from today's perspective, such a curricular framework is very modern indeed. It shows the degree to which curriculum was Westernized in this kind of schools. In fact, during the Yangwu Movement, government-funded education became a tool for "learning from the barbarians in order to control them." Since 1860s, a large number of military, science and technology schools were successively founded. Military academies included: Fujian Naval School (1866); Tianjin Naval School (1881); Tianjin Military

Equipment School (1886); Guangdong Naval and Ground Forces Academy (1887); Nanjing Naval School (1890); Tianjin Army Medical School (1893), etc. Science and technology schools were: Machinery School (under the Jiangnan Arsenal in Shanghai, 1867); Tianjin Telegraph School (1879); Shanghai Telegraph School (1880), etc. In addition, there were many postal and railway schools (see Fu, 1988, pp. 21-22). Establishment of these schools reflected the authorities' understanding of why China had been defeated by the West.

In industry and military affairs, quite a number of arsenals, shipping and machine factories were established. One of them, the Jiangnan Arsenal, according to Gernet (1996, p. 739), was one of the biggest in the world in 1870. The Arsenal engaged itself not only in weapons manufacturing but also in education and translation. It sponsored one of the then largest translation institutes in China, the *Jiangnan zhicao zhu yishu guan*. Within some twenty years before 1896, the institute translated 353 Western books into Chinese (see Lin et al. 1988, p. 22). Needless to say, it translated the West as a utilitarian target.

Such an attitude, on the other hand, developed into a unique theory of "*zhongxue wei ti, xi xue wei yong*" (literally Chinese learning as the body, and Western learning as function). This theory turned out to throw China time and again into chaos and despair. In the first place, the Western "function" would never be compatible with the Chinese "body." In practice, they seemed to be mutually repelling. Secondly, the West, having a colonizing agenda of its own, would not wait for China to gradually draw strength from the West into its system of culture. One after another unequal and humiliating treaties with various colonizing powers were imposed upon and signed with rifles against the neck of China, whose body was being torn into different parts instead of maintaining a Confucian identity as a whole.

5. John Fryer: An End as well as a New Beginning

a. John Fryer as a symbol of intercultural pursuit

John Fryer (Fu Lanya, 1839-1928) is perhaps the best symbol of the end to the line of translation opened up by Ricci and Xu Guangqi, and a new beginning of Chinese translation by Chinese. As mentioned earlier, although the Ming Dynasty was overthrown by the Manchus, the early rulers of the Qing Dynasty followed the

convention of keeping Jesuits at the court in imperial services. Chinese translation thus continued until 1724 when Emperor Yongzheng banned Catholicism as a result of the Rites Controversy. Although the Pope disbanded the Jesuits in 1773, Rome reinstated the organization in 1814. After the first Opium War (1840), not only Jesuits along with other Catholic societies, different branches of Protestants from Europe and America, as well as members of the Eastern Orthodox, but also travelers, merchants and other individuals, stormed into the defenseless China.

Against this background, Fryer, born in England to a clergy family, came to China in 1861 at the age of 22. He had been inspired as a child by missionaries and merchants about a legendary China. He first worked as the president of the St. Paul Academy in Hong Kong. The next year, with the Beijing School of Combined Learning established, he was offered a position as an English instructor there. In 1865, Fryer went to teach at the Anglo-Chinese College in Shanghai. In 1868, when the above mentioned *Yishu guan* (translation institute) sponsored by the Jiangnan Arsenal had been established, Fryer was appointed as an editor-translator, responsible for the management of the institute. Since then, for over thirty years, he devoted himself to Chinese translation, rendering 129 urgently needed books into Chinese with the aid of his Chinese colleagues. His translations ranged from physics, mathematics, chemistry, astronomy, geology, zoology, botany, engineering, to medicine, agriculture, military affairs, history and politico-economics. For his contributions, he was awarded a high title by the government. His colleagues praised him with the following couplet:

Jun ming yuan mai Nan yu Tang

Hao si dian huo sheng ying guang

Your fame by far out-shines Nan (F. Verbiest) and Tang (J. A. Schall von Bell)

In the way electric light does to that of fireflies

(in Lin et al. 1988, p. 22. Translation mine.)

The lines seem to be making an apt comparison, since Fryer not only introduced Western new science and technologies into China, but advanced Chinese translation in relation to education to a higher level as an academic discipline. As a teacher, he was a translator. As a translator, he was a teacher. In a letter to his family, Fryer said translations can enlighten the Chinese people, and translating is indeed a sacred

responsibility. Knowledge should not be restricted by national boundaries, and in education, there should be no place for racism (see Chen, 1992, p. 94).

In his *Brief Accounts of Translations in the Jiangnan Arsenal* (see Chen, 1992, pp. 95-99), Fryer systematically expressed his ideas about translation. In response to the popular Western observation and opinion that the old language of Chinese was not fit for translating Western science and technology, Fryer said:

This is absolutely not the case. Ricci and others in the Ming Dynasty and current translators have not encountered the kinds of difficulties that would put translation to an end. The first important thing for translating Western works is deciding on correct equivalents. If all the meanings of all the terms are to be explained according to the existing Chinese dictionaries without allowing any other interpretations, translation would of course be impossible. But the Chinese language is basically similar to any other language, changing and renewing itself gradually with time. If the past can give birth to things new, so can the present to things of the future. In recent years, with China-West contacts growing year by year, new terminologies have increased day by day (ibid. Translation mine).

Fryer went on to suggest ways for choosing proper materials to be translated. He insisted that priority should be given to things that are new, immediately applicable and in proper, progressive order. To facilitate this project, he ordered a copy of *Encyclopedia Britannica* from England so that the Chinese would know what Western works were the best to translate. Fryer also advocated standardization of terminologies in translation, putting forward three principles, namely, (1) adopting terms already existing in Chinese; (2) establishing new terminologies by partly employing the Buddhist and Jesuits-converts' methods; and (3) compiling Chinese-English dictionaries of standardized terminologies. One of the greatest contributions he made was compiling such dictionaries, including *Chinese-English Dictionary of Chemical Terms* (1885), *Chinese-English Dictionary of Western Medical Terms* (1887), *Chinese-English Dictionary of Metalurgic Terms* (1883). Many of the terms in those dictionaries are still used today.

In view of the sentiment of the time that "English will soon become the universal language, therefore there is no need for translation" (in Chen, 1992, p. 98. Translation mine), Fryer pointed out:

The Chinese language has been handed down from the ancient times without being replaced. The Chinese highly value their language, and the government relies on it for administration and governance. Has there ever been a vast, autonomous nation who abandoned its own language to adopt another one? Should China be subjugated by another country, it might be possible that a Western language would be used. However, this would never happen, and there is no reason for such a thought (ibid. Translation mine)!

Finally, Fryer hoped that with translations, there would be some changes in the Chinese educational system, and Chinese traditional ideas that viewed science and technology as trivial skills. "I would not dare to expect China to select talents through examinations exclusively on Western learning," said Fryer, "but I do hope to see such subjects as mathematics and physics be incorporated into the imperial examinations" (ibid. Translation mine).

Indeed, Fryer epitomized the Chinese tradition of science and technology translation. In him, one can see different dimensions of translation. Although changes were taking place, they developed in directions Fryer might have never expected. In the first place, China could maintain neither its cultural identity nor its territorial integrity. Outside the small, relatively peaceful academic circle Fryer was living in was a miserable world of a semi-colonized China. Internally, the Qing Dynasty was faced with peasant rebellions that were threatening both the existence of the Manchu Empire and the shaky relationships of peace it tried desperately to keep with the foreign colonizing powers. In fact, ever since the beginning of the first Opium War, different forms of Chinese resistance against Western aggressors and their capitulationist mandarins did never stop, especially in the coastal provinces.

b. Chinese Celestial Empire mentality vs. Western colonial appetite

Toward the end of 1840s, with the increasing import of opium draining the limited imperial resources, and enormous cost of war reparations imposed by various foreign powers, the ordinary Chinese had fallen into stark poverty, bankruptcy and chronic starvation. The situation led to the revolution of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom (1851-

1864), which was inspired ironically by a Chinese version of Christianity, established a new dynasty within the Qing Dynasty, with Nanjing as its capital.

While trying to suppress the Taiping rebellion, the Government was called upon to defend itself against Europe in the Second Opium War. As Durant (1954, p. 806) commented, encouraged by their easy victories in the opium wars, the European powers proceeded to help themselves to one piece of China after another. First Russia took the territory north of the Amur and east of the Ussuri River (1860). Then the French appropriated Indo-China (1885). Later, Japan, Germany, the United States took their own shares. China was partitioned into different "spheres of interest," in which special privileges for mining and trade were secured for certain Western powers, with the United States and Japan having an "Open Door" to all.

In the face of such a West, the ignorant and close-minded Qing government was staggering between its sense of inferiority in science and technology and its sense of superiority in the moral qualities of Chinese culture. It could never rationally or realistically locate China in relation to a world that was being reshaped by the West. It could never step out of its deep-rooted illusion of the Celestial Empire, and come to terms with the fact that the Empire was but one of the nations under the sun that were more and more governed by Darwinism. Consequently, the Qing government failed consistently in dealing with internal and external conflicts and confrontations. For example, According to A. Smith, in 1858, a suggestion was made by the U.S. that the Qing government should appoint consuls abroad to look after the interests of the Emperor's subjects settled in foreign lands. In response, a Chinese plenipotentiary said: "When the Emperor rules over so many millions, what does he care for a few waifs that have drifted away to a foreign land?" When he was told that some of those in the United States were growing rich from the gold mines and that they might be worth looking after on that account, the official replied: "The Emperor's wealth is beyond computation; why should he care for those of his subjects who have left their home, or for the sands they have scooped up?" (in Smith, 1907, pp. 221-222).

Such a Celestial Empire mentality was harmful and destructive in two ways. Rejecting the modern Western invitation wounded and harmed the spiritual and physical interests and welfare of the Chinese. However, it also partly encouraged the United

States, and also Canada, to carry out its racist, anti-Chinese immigration policies in the late 19th and early 20th century, leaving North America with some most complicated colonial issues to be addressed and redressed in the post-colonial age.

Under such a political climate, the self-contradictory Yangwu Movement, in which Fryer played an important role, was doomed to fail. The Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) dealt a final blow to and proclaimed the fall of the Movement. Historically, China had been Japan's civilizer. Against the global colonial background, China and Japan had experienced more or less the same defeats and humiliations. Both started to reform respectively in the form of Yangwu Movement (from 1861) and Meiji Restoration (from 1868). While China was caught in the dilemma of Chinese body vs. Western function, Japan had accomplished its political, economic, industrial, military, legal and educational westernization (modernization) by 1889, when the new Constitution was established. Just as Japan had traditionally translated China for its civilizational progress, it translated the West in every sense of the word, textually and culturally. Within several years, as Durant (1954, p. 918) noted, Japan brought its armed power to a point where it could speak to the 'foreign barbarians' on equal terms, and could undertake that gradual absorption of China which the Euro-American empire had contemplated but never achieved.

In 1894, as Jian (1981, pp. 109-111) described, the Korean people headed by the Tonghak Society (Eastern Learning Society) rose against feudal oppression and Western aggression. The Korean government appealed to the Qing Dynasty for aid. Japan, resenting China's persistent reference to Korea as a tributary state under Chinese suzerainty, seized the opportunity to invade Korea. Before the Chinese troops arrived in Korea, the uprising was already over. The Qing government sent a note to the Japanese government, proposing simultaneous withdrawal of the Chinese and Japanese from the peninsula. The Japanese refused. They seized the Korean king and occupied all the strategic points leading to the Korean capital, Soeul. Soon, the Japanese, in Durant's words, declared war upon their ancient tutor. The Chinese, totally unprepared, lost the war at a surprising speed. In 1895 Japan forced the Qing Dynasty to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki, whereby China: (1) accepted the cession of the Liaodong Peninsula, Taiwan and Penghu Islands to Japan; (2) agreed to pay an indemnity of 200 million taels

to Japan to cover its war costs; and (3) granted permission to Japanese nationals to set up and run industries in the treaty ports of China.

In a sense, it was a war between China's Yangwu Movement and Japan's Meiji Restoration. The Chinese had laid much hope on the reformists, expecting them to build up national strength to resist Western partitioning of China. The sea battles against the Japanese were a display and trial of that strength. In light of the Opium Wars, the Chinese had thought building a strong naval force was of primary importance, and had high expectations of Chinese potential power over the seas with naval development. Much had been invested in the naval bases, related academies and arsenals. But the hope was shattered to pieces when the war against the small Japan, called *dongyi* (Eastern Barbarians) in Chinese, almost destroyed China's entire naval force in a matter of days.

On a symbolic level, the shocking defeat helped the Chinese realize that the more than 30-year-old Yangwu Movement, characterized by its conflict between the Chinese body and Western function, was leading nowhere. A new round of pro- vs. anti-Westernization debate took place in the cultural arena. Different schools were reflecting on why neither Western missionaries, nor Western powers, nor the more progressive Confucian scholars, nor the reformists, nor the imperial government, could fundamentally bring China to a road more compatible with the greater trends of global development. Although opinions differed, one idea seemed to be held in common: translating Western science and technology was by no means an effective way "to control the barbarians by learning from them." The West might mean much more than science and technology, or, in the Yangwu Movement's terminology, *chuanjian paoli* (strong ships and sharp weapons). Then what was it that China should translate out of the West, which now included Japan, and how?

At this historical moment, something happened, which was more powerful than almost any other single factor in decentralizing and destroying the Old China. That was: Westernization through overseas (indemnity) students both from within and from without. The Yangwu Movement, for all its limitations, paved the way for this to take place, which, in turn, brought China to a new culture era. With it, Chinese translation took on a completely new look, something John Fryer might not have foreseen.

VII. Self-Colonization

1. Overseas and Returned Students

a. Background

For national survival, the colonized Chinese were ready to colonize themselves, in various forms and fashions and at whatever cost. To gain a new national identity in the new global order, the Chinese were forced to destroy their old identity. As seen from above, with the older generation failing on all fronts, the hope for a new nation fell upon the new generation, who were growing with a culturally broken identity. The elite part of the new generation, overseas and returned students, took up the task of transforming the Old China from the inside by learning, translating and speaking both textual and cultural vocabulary and grammar of a capitalized West.

The history of Chinese overseas students dates back at least to the Tang Dynasty, when Buddhist translation was at its peak. Many Chinese scholars went to the Land of the West and returned with genuine experience and understanding of Buddhism.

Meanwhile,

historically, China welcomed foreign students from many smaller and less “developed” countries (at least 28, see Sun, 1992, p. 299) such as Japan and Korea at least beginning from China’s Sui (581 ~ 618 CE) and Tang (618 ~ 907 CE) Dynasties. Those students brought back to their homelands not only friendship and knowledge of China, but Buddhism, Taoism, philosophy, politics, language, literature, art, gastronomy, gardening, technology, etc. They helped to shape Japan and Korea in their national advancement into the more organized feudal systems. Japan began sending students to China from 600 CE. By the year 894, 12 delegations had successively been to China, each composed of up to 500 people (Sun, 1992, p. 301). The Japanese students returned to Japan with the Chinese writing system, educational system, medicine, manufacturing, craftsmanship, cultural values and so on. All these the Japanese adopted through translation, imitation and wholesale transplantation. Ironically, as China was too much China-centered, it did not think of sending students abroad.

It was not until after the Opium War that Chinese students began to go to the West. That event took place with missionary efforts. The repeated frustrations experienced by

the missionaries in China awakened them to the idea that perhaps a more practical way to convert the Chinese was through education. In 1839, the British missionary Robert Morrison moved his Anglo-Chinese College (founded in 1818) from Malacca to Macao, and then in 1842 to Hong Kong. It was called Morrison School and was the first Western-style school in China (Gu, 1995, p. 226). By 1875, missionary schools rose to 800. The number grew so fast that according to the statistics in 1921 (Fu, 1988, pp. 40-41), missionary schools of different levels (kindergarten, elementary, secondary, vocational and post-secondary schools) across China amounted to as many as 13,637 (7,382 were Christian and 6,255 Catholic), and their student population 358,518. By the year 1926 (see Gu, 1995, p. 227), Christian schools had increased to six thousand (16 colleges and universities, 200 secondary schools, and over five thousand elementary schools) with the student population totaling three hundred thousand. Catholic schools had added up to about nine thousand (3 universities, more than 200 secondary schools, the rest being elementary and theological schools), and the students amounted to five hundred thousand¹.

All these educational institutions were independent of the then Chinese government, which had neither supervisory nor administrative control whatsoever over their curricular and pedagogical practice. They formed their own national organizations in China: The Committee of School Textbooks (founded in 1877), which developed in 1890 into China Education Association, and in 1912 into China Christian Education Association. These organizations were responsible for establishing school curriculum, compiling school textbooks, laying down educational policies, conducting educational investigations, holding symposiums and seminars, exchanging and promoting Christian educational experiences in China (see Gu, 1995, pp. 228-243).

The missionary schools prepared many Chinese students with language and academic qualifications for overseas studies in the West. The first two Chinese students, Yung Wing (1828-1912) and Huang Kuan, who were students at the Morrison School, were sponsored and sent to Britain and the United States by the American missionary Samuel R. Brown. In 1846, four years after the Opium War, the two started on their journey to

¹ In China, Christian (*jidujiao*, 基督教) refers to Protestants as opposed to the earlier Catholicism (*tianzhujiao*, 天主教).

the West. Yung Wing attended MIT and Yale. In 1854, he returned to China and became a major reformist and a minor translator. Huang Kuan went to the medical school at the University of Edinburgh. In 1857, he returned to China, and became the first Chinese doctor of Western medicine, which to a large extent changed (or at least added new dimensions to) the Chinese concept and philosophy of medical science.

In his *My Life in China and America* (1909), Yung Wing, the first returned student from the West, described his reforming efforts from within the Chinese tradition. Among his many important proposals was one submitted to the Imperial Court in 1868 about selecting and sending students to the United States. Yung Wing (1909, p. 173) wrote:

The second proposition was for the government to send picked Chinese youths abroad to be thoroughly educated for the public service. The scheme contemplated the education of one hundred and twenty students as an experiment. These one hundred and twenty students were to be divided into four installments of thirty students each, one installment to be sent out each year. They were to have fifteen years to finish their education. Their average age was to be from twelve to fourteen years. If the first and second installments proved to be a success, the scheme was to be continued indefinitely. Chinese teachers were to be provided to keep up their knowledge of Chinese while in the United States. Over the whole enterprise two commissioners were to be appointed, and the government was to appropriate a certain percentage of the Shanghai customs to maintain the mission.

Yung's proposal was adopted. In 1870, the Qing government appointed him as director of the Bureau of Overseas Studies Affairs, which was responsible for selecting, training, sponsoring and sending Chinese youth (aged between 12 to 15) to foreign countries for a term of 15 years. Starting from 1872, the government sponsored annually thirty students (Fu, 1988, p. 29). In 1881, the program came to an end, as the appointed commissioners reported to Beijing that the Chinese students were spiritually corrupted in the United States, and most students were brought back to China. At the same time, many Chinese students went to other Western countries through other channels.

b. Western colonial agendas

Formal sponsorship by the Chinese government of great numbers of students came as a result of the war in 1900 by the “Allied Forces of Eight Powers” (Britain, USA, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, Italy and Austria) against China. The war, called the Boxer Movement, started with the rise of some patriotic peasants in Shandong Province, which alone had over one thousand Western missionary strongholds (Gu, 1995, p. 197) against Western colonization. Just as what had happened from 1840 to 1890, during which time China had been forced to sign dozens of unequal and humiliating treaties with the Western powers, the Boxer Movement ended in bloody repression by the “Allied Forces.” The Allied Forces permanently destroyed a vast number of Chinese cultural treasures and heritage. They charged China for an indemnity of 450,000,000.00 *liang* (= 50 grams) of silver, that is, one *liang* per Chinese. Plus interest, the indemnity was more than 980,000,000.00 *liang* of silver, to be paid in installments for thirty-nine years (Fu, 1988, p. 30).

The United States took more than 32,000,000.00 *liang* (over 24,000,000.00 US dollars) plus 4% annual interest out of the total. In 1906, the US missionary Arthur Smith (1845-1932), who went to China in 1872 and was to become one of the best versed in Sinology, enthusiastically lobbied US President Theodore Roosevelt into using part of the indemnity to sponsor Chinese students to study in USA. The rationale behind it was that since the then anti-Chinese immigration legislation prevented Chinese students from entering USA, China was sending thousands of its youth to Europe and Japan.

This means that when these Chinese return from Europe they will advise China to imitate Europe rather than America... It means that they will recommend English and French and German teachers and engineers for employment in China in positions of trust and responsibility rather than American. It means that English, French and German goods will be bought instead of American, and that industrial concessions of all kinds will be made to Europe instead of to the United States...(Smith, 1907, p. 215).

The most explicit expression of the American colonial agenda is best seen in the “Memorandum concerning the sending of an Educational Commission to China” submitted in 1906 to the US President by Edmund J. James, President of the University of Illinois:

China is upon the verge of a revolution... Every great nation in the world will inevitably be drawn into more or less intimate relations with this gigantic development... The nation which succeeds in educating the young Chinese of the present generation will be the nation which for a given expenditure of effort will reap the largest possible returns in moral, intellectual, and commercial influence (in Smith, 1907, pp. 214-215).

The Memorandum went on to say that if the USA opened the door to Chinese students, it would "be controlling the development of China in that most satisfactory and subtle of all ways, - through the intellectual and spiritual domination of its leaders" (in Smith, 1907, pp. 214-215).

As a result, in July 1908, the US government decided to return, month by month from January 1909 to 1940, part of the reparations (\$10,785,000) to China, only for the Chinese government to send Chinese students to study in USA. In October 1908, the Chinese government laid down with the USA specific regulations over overseas studies. From October 1908 on, the annual select group of one hundred Chinese students, including Jin Tao, Hu Shi, Zhao Yuanren, etc., started on their journey to America. Not long after, the other Western powers followed suit. Thus, Chinese went in large numbers to Britain, France, Germany, Russia.... As Will Durant noted (1954, pp. 808-809):

These "indemnity students" and thousands of others now left China to explore the civilization of its conquerors... They came at an early and impressionable age, before they had matured to the point of understanding the depth and values of their own national culture. They drank in with gratitude and admiration the novel education given in the science, methods, history and ideas of the West... Year by year thousands of such deracinated youths returned to China, fretted against the slow tempo and material backwardness of their country, and sowed in every city the seeds of inquiry and revolt.

It is beyond the scope of the present study to address the issue of whether the Chinese students were spiritually dominated, as Arthur Smith had expected, by Western, especially American values. However, it can be safely assumed that the historical role played by Chinese overseas students in changing the landscape of Chinese civilization could not be overestimated. As a matter of fact, modern Chinese culture was shaped

largely by the first generation of returned students. From a negative point of view, for various reasons, many of the issues they were trying to deal with remain unsolved even today. In a positive sense, those students helped to navigate the old, broken yet gigantic boat of China onto a course where China found itself actively engaged in cultural dialogues with the West.

Thus, at the turn of the century, a series of cultural movements were launched by joint efforts of students at home and in Europe, North America and Japan. These movements helped in “deconstructing” the conventional patriarchal system, feudal superstructure of ideology and morality and absolute power of the imperial family. They helped establish modern political, economic, educational, cultural and even military institutions, and academic, scientific and technological disciplines according to Western/international standards and norms. Most political and military leaders had some educational experiences abroad, and the founding fathers of nearly all the areas of modern science, technology and humanities were predominantly returned students. But first of all, they struggled to translate the language of the West for a new language of Chinese to speak about their new reality.

2. Yan Fu and Lin Shu: Groundbreakers

Chairman Mao (in Lin et al., 1988, p. 89. Translation mine) once wrote:

Since the defeat of the Opium War in 1840, the progressive Chinese experienced all kinds of hardships in their search for truth from the West. Hong Xiuquan (1814-1864, leader of the 1850-1864 Taiping Rebellion), Kang Youwei (1858-1927, leader of the 1898 Wuxu Reform), Yan Fu (1853-1921) and Sun Yat-sen represented this line of Chinese before the birth of the Chinese Communist Party.

That Mao should give such a credit to Yan as a translator is somewhat surprising. However, Yan's life indeed reflected the undoing process of the Old China. He was born in Fuzhou, one of the most colonized cities in the coastal province of Fujian. At the age of 13, he was enrolled in the Fujian Naval Academy, one of the major academic institutions founded during the Yangwu Movement. At the age of 24, as part of the Qing government scholarship program for overseas studies, he was picked by the Imperial Court to be sent to the Greenwich Naval Academy in Britain. There he became interested

in Western philosophies and politics in comparison with the Chinese practices. Graduating in 1879 from the Academy, Yan returned to the Fujian Naval Academy as an instructor. Later he became the director of the Tianjin Naval Academy. Meanwhile he sponsored and supported several translation journals and newspapers, and was involved in establishing several academic societies. In 1908, he was appointed the head of the Imperial Institute for Examination and Approval of New Terminology. In 1912, Yan became the first president of the Beijing University.

Yan's interest in modern Western scholarship in relation to China was always in him. But the decisive moment in his patriotic efforts had not come until the Sino-Japanese War on the sea of 1894-1895. As discussed above, the War woke the Chinese up to the fact that mere import of Western science and technology could not save or defend China. There was something working at a deeper level. People both in and off the centre of political power were looking for some answers. By this time, having been repeatedly defeated, humiliated, dehumanized, exploited and oppressed by the foreign powers, the feudal, absolute political and moral power and authority of the Qing Dynasty had been eroded, leaving a kind of cultural vacuum for new replacement. The previously valued "body" was not functioning, and the "function" had no "body" to realize itself.

Against this background, the new generation of Chinese both inside and outside of China joined hands in re-locating China and redefining the Chinese identity by launching a new translation movement. Unlike the previous generations of translators, who had to rely on Westerners for their work, these translators were more or less bi-lingual and bi-cultured. With their linguistic qualifications, they enjoyed the freedom of choice. With their first-hand knowledge of the West, they knew what to translate to bridge the gaps between China and the West. Most importantly, they learned to acquire insights into problems with China and the Chinese from Western perspectives. This endowed their translations with a more intercultural and intercivilizational quality. Yan Fu and Lin Shu stood out among this generation.

Immediately after the Sino-Japanese War, Yan published two most influential essays *Yuan qiang* (On the Basic Principles of Strengthening the Nation) and *Jiuwang jue lun* (On Saving China) in 1895. In the first essay, Yan analyzed the domestic and international situations from Darwinism and Spencerian sociological theories. He pointed

out that neither the old, feudal system of laws, nor the Western science and technology-oriented Yangwu Movement could secure the survival of China in the new international context. Instead, Yan suggested, China should proceed to reform simultaneously in three aspects: enhancing the physical strength of the people, enlightening the intellectual power of the nation, and renewing the civil virtues of the Chinese society. Yan then proposed a package reform, which touched on China's essential issues of education, society and politics. Many of the concepts and ideas in this essay, well translated from the West, were new yet understandable and acceptable to the readers.

In other essays such as "On the Establishment of Girl's Schools in Shanghai" (1898), "Letter to the Editor of *The Diplomat* on Education" (1902) and "On the Relationship between Education and the State" (1906), Yan elaborated on the rationale and methods of the reform he had proposed in this first one. It was for this purpose of reform that Yan devoted himself to his translations which were to reshape the Chinese mind.

In a letter to a friend written in 1899, Yan briefly mentioned his original intention in doing translations. He said:

Since last year (the 1898 Wuxu Reform), I have been closely observing changes in the times and in human affairs without accomplishing anything. If our fellow countrymen remain unenlightened, nothing can be achieved by either the conservatives or the reformists. However, even if the Imperial Court does nothing or does everything wrong, the descendants of the Yellow Emperor will not fall into foreign slavery so long as more and more Chinese become informed of both China and the West. Even if we Chinese are temporarily enslaved, the day for our national resuscitation will surely come. Therefore I have kept myself away from any worldly attachment, and devoted to nothing else but translation (in Chen, 1992, p. 126. Translation mine).

In his aloof detachment, Yan actively engaged himself in Western learning, carefully choosing to translate those theories he regarded as most fundamental and indispensable for Chinese survival and rebirth. His choice was based upon his understanding of China-West cultural differences and the complicated relationship between the two. In his essay "On the Urgency for Reform," Yan criticized the theory of "Chinese body and Western function." He made a famous remark: how could it be possible for a cow to be the body

with a horse as its function? To him, Western advanced sciences and technologies could hardly be related to the Chinese feudal system of society. "Chinese learning has its own body and function, and so does Western learning. Divided, the two can exist side by side; united, both would die." In his opinion, there were fundamental differences between the two cultures:

While Chinese value the three cardinal guides, Westerners hold equality as of the first importance. Chinese appoint people on grounds of personal favour, Westerners on their merit. China rules by filial piety, whereas the West rules by justice. China honours emperors and/or masters, while the West honours people... China has numerous taboos, while the West is open to criticism. Economically, Chinese emphasize regulating the flow while Westerners focus on opening up the source; Chinese value a simple way of life while Westerners tend to pursue luxury and entertainment.... As far as learning is concerned, Chinese find pride in erudition, Westerners value new knowledge. When disasters occur, Chinese put the blame on the mandate of heaven, Westerners on human factors (in Wang, 1996, pp. 361-362. Translation mine).

These insights, coming out of a genuinely bi-cultured mind, illustrated some major gaps between China and the West. To bridge the gaps, from 1894 onward, Yan undertook to translating such Western theories as had never been heard of in China, including evolution, politico-economics, and ethics. His translations, among others, include:

Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays (T.H. Huxley, 1894) (1898)

An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (A. Smith, 1776) (1901-1902)

The Study of Sociology (H. Spencer, 1873) (1903)

On Liberty (J.S. Mill, 1859) (1903)

A System of Logic (J.S. Mill, 1843) (1905)

A History of Politics (E. Jenks, 1900) (1904)

The Spirit of Laws (C. L. Montesquieu, 1743) (1904-1909)

Elementary Lessons in Logic (W. S. Jevons, 1870) (1909)

One can hardly reconstruct the cultural earthquake impact these translations exercised upon the vast ancient land of China. The appearance of each translation was no less than a shattering moment of the Chinese long-cherished traditions. Together with Lin Shu, Yan launched a cultural enlightenment movement that led to the Literary Revolution (1908) and the May 4th Movement (1919).

Lin Shu (1852-1924) was also born in Fuzhou, Fujian. Gifted in Chinese literature and art, he was to become a famous writer, essayist, poet and artist. Unlike Yan, Lin did not go to the West or learn any Western languages. But assisted by many returned students and scholars who interpreted the original texts word by word and line by line, he was able to translate, with his excellence in the use of the classical Chinese language, over 180 Western works into Chinese. Although he could not choose to translate what he wanted to, more than forty of the novels he translated are world renowned.

In 1900, Lin co-started the translation journal *Yilin* (Translation Forest), a monthly devoted to political and economic translations. In the editorial to the first issue, Lin expounded his views on translation. He said:

How could one compete with others in swimming without going in the water to practice swimming?... Asia's inability to compete against Europe lies in the fact that Europeans are committed to learning as daily practice, whereas Asians are simply idling away their time, regarding Western learning as minor skills... This is indeed competing with others in swimming without going in the water to practice swimming! In my opinion, to enlighten the Chinese intellectual power, we must establish schools. Schooling is, in comparison, slower in accomplishing the task than delivering public speeches. However, to hold public speeches is no easy job. As a result, there is no better choice than translating books (in Chen, 1992, p. 133. Translation mine).

Lin not only regarded translation as the quickest and most effective way to strengthen the nation, but believed most Western writers "resort to novels for national enlightenment." Therefore, he concentrated on literary translation. His translations covered a wide range of countries such as Britain, USA, France, Spain, Belgium, Norway, Switzerland, Greece and Japan, and a variety of over 90 writers. They include Aesop, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Defoe, Swift, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Victor Hugo,

Tolstoy, Dumas Senior, Dumas Junior, Dickens, Charles Lamb, Walt Scott, Washington Irving, H. Beecher Stowe, Arnold, Ibsen, H. R. Haggard and Conan Doyle.

Among his generation of translators, according to Chen (1992), Lin put the most emphasis upon the patriotic purpose and function of translation. In the preface to his emotional translation (1901) of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, Lin wrote:

The purpose of my translation in collaboration with Mr. Wei of this book is not to make a sensational narration of miseries so as to evoke meaningless tears from readers. The translation is expected to serve as a loud warning that our nation is on the verge of becoming slaves.... At a time when everybody rejects things old and pursues new learning, our translation, although superficial and shallow, aims at encouraging the Chinese and helping in ensuring the survival of the nation (in Chen, 1992, p. 134. Translation mine).

In the preface to his translation of *Ivanhoe* written in 1905, Lin said: "Reading this book would put any one of the yellow race on the alert." On another occasion, Lin wrote:

I am an old man now, with neither wisdom nor bravery.... I can not contribute to canceling out our national hatred.... Therefore I devote myself to translating novels. The nibbling away of Africa by the whites is clearly seen in my translation. If the whites can annex Africa, they can also annex Asia! (Cited in Chen, 1992, p. 135. Translation mine.)

In 1913, at the age of 61, Lin published an essay entitled *Yi tan* (A Lament over Translation). He wrote:

Alas! Why am I writing this piece? To lament over this fact: we are being despised, devitalized, trampled on and nibbled away by foreigners. What a shame! The foreigners are doing this to us in the name of love and sympathy. Their strategy is working - to the extent that they are talking about us in any triumphant and arrogant way they choose, as if all the Chinese were animals and beasts for their fun (in Chen, 1992, p. 136. Translation mine).

It was with these goals in mind that Lin laboured and toiled in the field of translation. His translations were so popular that his biographer Han Guang (1930, in Guo, 1992) said "For a time there was shortage of paper in China." His hometown fellow Yan wrote

two famous lines: "With his translation of *La Dame aux Camelias*, (he) simply broke all the hearts of the young Chinese."

With the two great translators, a truer West, both on a rational and emotional, metaphysical and daily-life levels, began to enter the heart and mind of the Chinese. The West was no longer a group of alien missionaries, a bunch of pirates, robbers and plunderers from the edge of the heaven. The West began to have actual geographical and national names in Chinese. Yan transplanted a freshly new paradigm of philosophical, ethical, sociological, political, economic and scientific thinking which was subversive of the Confucian paradigm; and Lin unveiled the humane, emotional and affectionate side of the "Western barbarians" that had been overshadowed by their use of force and violence. In a nation that had valued literature over and above anything else, Lin's literary translation won genuine echo, sympathy and respect from the Chinese for the otherwise seemingly very evil West. .

It is not exaggerating to say that the contributions of Yan and Lin to the Chinese understanding of the West were far greater than those of the previous centuries of Western missionaries-converts, envoys, travellers, merchants etc. put together. According to Han Guang (1930, in Guo, 1992), in the end of the 19th century, two volumes of translations, *Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays* and *La Dame aux Camelias*, awakened the then Chinese intellectuals and advanced the Chinese society to a new level of development. The former inspired the Chinese to see that there should be basic social change in order to become stronger, and to become stronger China had to fight against Western imperialists. The latter, with its ideas of the nature of human love, inspired the Chinese to consider the issue of freedom of marriage, and to achieve this China had to fight against feudalism at large. Some believed that the rise of the democratic movements in the late Qing Dynasty and the victory of the Sun Yat-sen Revolution owed to the two translations.

Given the clearly defined purposes and great success of Yan and Lin as translators, questions of interest here are many. As far as the present study is concerned, how could the two translators manage to convey the culturally heterogeneous ideas of the West into Chinese that was confined largely in the linguistic world of a feudal society? In cultural terms, what changes did the translations bring to China as a nation struggling for survival

in relation to the colonizing West? What tensions occurred between the translators' intention and the actual consequences of their translations?

3. Evolution: Multi-faceted Challenges

a. Yan Fu's road: A textual analysis

What challenged Yan Fu and Lin Shu as translators was, in a broader sense, different paradigms of cultural and social constructs encoded in the two different linguistic systems. In a narrower sense, the challenge was they could hardly find verbal or cultural equivalents in the target language, although they might have very well understood what was conveyed in the source language. In comparison with the difficulties encountered by the Jesuits and converts in their mostly science and technology rendition, what Yan and Lin faced was often civilizational divides defying easy mediation. For instance, while Ricci and Xu Guangqi might have had problems deciding on mathematical equivalents in Chinese, they could follow their respective lines of mathematics traditions, and arrive at points of equation through verbal, non-verbal or illustrative means. For Yan and Lin, however, things were much more complicated.

In the case of Yan Fu, the difficulties lie in the languages of philosophy, ethics, morality, anthropology, economy, religion, sociology, politics, etc. of the industrializing West. When translating works of philosophy, as the linguist Sassure pointed out, translators shoulder responsibilities that go far beyond translation. They have to introduce a whole new system of philosophical concepts into the target culture. In the process, what matters first is not translation of words, but of their definitions, not of signifiers but of the signified (see Gao & Wu, 1992, p. 118). Looking for or creating equivalents in the classical Chinese to Western modern, bourgeois, capitalist vocabulary was already an onerous task. To define those Western concepts and ideas in the feudal language of Chinese would seem beyond reach.

For example, in a linguistic tradition that talked about Nature and Man as one and the same, how could one express the concept of *evolution* in the scientific, Darwinian sense which involves the whole process of Cartesian dichotomy? This tradition worshipped its cultural ancestors such as Confucius and Lao Zi as the source and highest order of civilization, and taught its young to follow, and therefore to constantly return to the

cultural realm envisioned by those sages. Paradigmatically it was a philosophy of regress. This does not in any way mean that the Chinese culture had no idea of progress, competition or survival of the stronger in the usual senses of the terms. However, its language was indeed inadequate to convey the idea with its associated, clearly defined vocabulary and grammar that human history is a linear process of progress towards the survival of the fittest.

In a patriarchal tradition that had taken for granted the absolute power of the emperor in national affairs and of the male in the family, the language so developed could hardly work in the contexts of the theories Yan was translating. There was no way for the Western ideas of *equality, freedom, democracy, liberty, autonomy, individualism* and so on to have a shared basis with the Chinese social and political discourses. These ideas were not only alien to the Chinese concepts of familial and social order; they were running exactly against the Chinese way of individual and social thinking. To translate such theories would involve subversion of the very basis upon which China as a long-standing civilization had been socially organized.

Another challenge Yan as a translator was confronted with was the language of acceptance in his time. Although the empire was falling apart, its working language was still the Classical Chinese, which was accessible mostly to the elite, scholar-official class. These people monopolized not only the linguistic and intellectual resources, but also political and material resources of the nation. An irony thus emerged. On the one hand, his translations were intended for the new generation of Chinese who stood for the hope of overthrowing the old by creating a new culture with the help of Western learning. On the other hand, the language of translation available to him which would hold promise of intellectual and social changes was something beyond the reach of the intended reader, something he was translating to revolutionize. This irony, as will be seen, characterizes Yan as a translator of the West and a mainstream scholar of the Confucian tradition.

The above and other challenges were so strong that, as Yan himself said in his famous preface to his translation of Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays*, he often "hesitated for half or one month on determining an equivalent" (Editorial Board, 1984a, p. 6). Some of Yan's writings may be taken as best examples to show linguistic

and cultural divides and his efforts to overcome them. In his comments on translating the word *economy*, which he translated as *ji xue*¹, Yan wrote, in Classical Chinese of course:

Ji xue, called *ye ke nuo mi* (economy) in the West, comes from Greek. *Ye ko* (eco) refers to family/household. *Nuo mi* (nomy) is the transferred meaning of *nie mo* (*nomia*), referring to *zhi* (management). In the sense of *ji* (calculating or settling accounts), it starts from the household. By extension, it means things such as measuring, paying, receiving payments and managing. In its broadest sense, it covers everything concerning a country's production and supply. Since it is all-inclusive, the Japanese have translated it into *jing ji* (economy), and the Chinese have given *li cai* (managing financial affairs or wealth) as its equivalent. From the viewpoint of equivalence, *jing ji* seems to be too broad, while *li cai* too narrow. Therefore I have chosen to use *ji xue*.... In ancient classics, we find many such words as *kuai ji*, *ji xiang*, *ji xie* (account or accounting); in oral speech we have words like *guo ji* and *jia ji* (national economy and livelihood) - all these appear to be more equivalent to the Greek *nomia*. In fact (A. Smith's) *Inquiry into the Nature and Cause of Wealth of Nations* is a book of *ji xue* (in Gao & Wu, 1992, p. 128. Translation mine).

In another note, Yan said:

I have reasons for translating it into *ji xue* rather than *li cai*. *Xue* (study or learning) is different from *shu* (technique or skill). The former examines principles and mechanisms of Nature, and establishes natural laws. The latter works to achieve things possible based upon the known principles or laws. *Xue* is concerned with knowledge while *shu* with practice. *Ji xue* is a (branch of) study/learning (science) while *li cai* technique/skill. A term of technique can not translate a (branch of) study/learning. Secondly, production, distribution, management and accumulation of *cai* (wealth) are within the scope of *ji xue* but far beyond the range of *li* (accounting). Thirdly, *li cai* has become a conventional term. Whenever it is used, it is used in the sense of the state rather than the people. I have heard that in ancient times, a *si nong* was called a *ji xiang*. When *shou ling* (local officials) submitted

¹ *Ji xue* is composed of *ji* (settling accounts or calculation) and *xue* (studies or learning). Although Yan seems to be right in his comments within the Classical Chinese context, modern Chinese chooses to use the Japanese translation, *jing ji*, as the equivalent for economy.

their financial reports, it was called *shang ji*.... This is why I adopt the term *ji xue* (ibid. p. 131. Translation mine).

In a letter to the most important reformist Liang Qichao (1873-1929), Yan wrote: One might think with thousands of years' civilization, special terms for all studies (learning or sciences) concerning human life can be found in (Chinese) classics. In fact, it seems to me absence of special terms (in Chinese) is not at all limited to *ji xue* (economy). The most frequently used words in *ming li* (philosophy), including *yin guo* (cause and effect), *ti yong* (essence-function) and *quan shi* (reality), all came into being only with the import of Buddhism. Today, words like *right* and *obligation* are key words for politicians. However, where can one find their equivalents in our Chinese classics?

... The word *right*. Three years ago, when I was reading Western political works, I found it could not be translated into Chinese. An awkward translation might be *quan li*, but it would be no better than using *ba* (despot or overlord) for *wang* (king).... Later I happened to open the *Hanshu* (History of the Han Dynasty, written in 82 CE), and came across the sentence "*zhu xu hou fen liu shi bu de zhi* (Zhu Xuhou was angry that Liu did not do his bit)." It dawned upon me that the *zhi* (职, duty, responsibility) here should be the right word for "rights." However, *zhi* is interchangeable with "duty," and can hardly be applicable. So I had to give up the idea. Not long after, I came across the sentence "*yuan de wo zhi*" in Gao You's *Jing yi shu wen* (Explanations of the Confucian Classics). The "*zhi*"¹ here... is the same as the ...*zhi* (duty, responsibility) in *Guan Zi*².... Therefore I have been convinced that (the latter) *zhi* is exactly the right word for *right*. When translating a major concept, one has to think it over by tracing back to the very original, earliest meaning of the Western word. Then examine all its derived and extended meanings. After that, one should decide on the Chinese equivalent by going through the same process in Chinese classics and find their similarities (ibid. p. 130. Translation mine).

¹ The *Zhi* (直) here is a different word, pronounced also *zhi*. It has different meanings, including: (1) straight; stiff; (2) just; fair; upright; (3) erect; vertical.

² *Guan Zi*, also translated as *Kuan Tzu*, is an ancient book attributed to the Legalist Guan Zhong, who died in 645 BCE. Confucius highly admired him.

In the preface (1903) to his translation of J. S. Mill's *On Liberty*, Yan said:

Some might say the Western word *li bo er te* (liberty) should be translated into *gong dao* (justice) instead of *zi you* (自繇)... In my understanding, the word *li bo er te* comes from *Libertas*, originally the name of the God of *zi you* (freedom). It is synonymous with *fu li dang* (freedom). Freedom means "the condition of being unrestricted." It is the antonym of *slavery, subjection, bondage, necessity*, etc. When a person is imprisoned, in English he is said "to lose his liberty," but not his justice. When one unties a dog, in English he is said "to set the dog at liberty," that is, to give the dog *zi you* (freedom) but not *gong dao* (justice). There is a special word for *gong dao* in the West, that is *za si zhi si* (justice). The two are related but not to be mixed...

The Chinese word *zi you* (自繇) often implies such derogative meanings as dissolute, unconventional, reckless and so on so forth. However, these meanings have been derived from *zi you*. The original word simply means unrestricted or unconfined by anything outside (of something). It does not have commendatory or derogatory implications.... J. S. Mill is here using the word *zi you* in its very original sense....

The characters *you* (由) and *you* (繇) are interchangeable in ancient times. In this translation, *zi you* (自繇) rather than *zi you* (自由) is used. This is not because I value the past and slight the present, but because, according to the origin of the Western word... I translate it into *zi you* (自繇) so as to show the slight difference (ibid. p. 133. Translation mine).

In an article written in 1913, Yan said:

Nowadays no other word can unite everybody more powerfully than *ai guo* (loving the nation). *Ai guo* is translated from the Western word *patriotic*, which comes from the Latin word *Pater*, meaning "grandfather/ancestor." *Ai guo* means to love grandfather/ancestor from whom one's life is born, and one becomes civilized and enlightened through loving one's grandfather/ancestor (ibid. p. 137. Translation mine).

Examples are too many to be cited here. Nearly all of them point to the fact that Yan was caught in between both textual and cultural tensions and conflicts. As a textual

translator, Yan was faced with two incommensurable cultural texts; as a cultural mediator, he was often lost in the linguistic gaps. But above all, as a pioneer in bringing China and the West together on some of the fundamental issues separating them, Yan became a major builder of a China-West intercultural text and of an intertextual culture. His efforts laid the basis for modern cultural discourses in China, and modern Chinese cultural discourses could not have been possible without Yan's hermeneutic interpretation and translation of the West.

Textually, Yan employed any method available to bridge the gaps and divides. He meticulously investigated traditional theories and methodologies of Buddhist and missionary-coverts' translations. As a comparative study between Yan and the Buddhist translator Kumarajiva (CE 344-413) conducted by Wang (1988, pp. 38-39) shows, Yan followed the practices of the latter in omitting part(s) of the original texts, in rearranging chapters or sections of the original, and in changing the actual original texts. For instance, in his translation of Huxley's *Evolution*, here and there Yan omitted quite a number of sentences or even paragraphs he regarded as unimportant. Sometimes instead of translating, he would summarize what is said in the original, replacing Western historical stories and fairy tales with Chinese ones to create a sense of familiarity and affinity.

To make his translations understandable, sometimes Yan gave lengthy and detailed notes and comments regarding historical developments and contexts of certain ideas. For instance, a statistic (Gao & Wu, 1992, p. 83) shows that Yan's introductory remarks and comments in his translation of Huxley's *Evolution* amounted to over half of the book (17,704:33,814 Chinese characters). Out of the 35 chapters, 28 received comments. In six chapters, Yan's introduction and comments outnumbered the original texts. In all the ten books he translated, Yan gave more than seven hundred notes, comments and introductory remarks, which add up to over ten percent of his translated texts.

Yan read extensively, both Western works and Chinese classics, in order to compare and find points of contact for equivalents. He would not let go of one equivalent that was not, in his eyes, linguistically and culturally grounded in the Chinese tradition. This could be seen from his discussion and arguments about translating the words *economy*, *liberty*, *right* and so on. In deciding equivalents, he would systematically take into account the academic and disciplinary contexts in which they appeared. Therefore, when

creating an equivalent, he was in fact establishing a new field of study in Chinese that had never been named as such. For instance, he invented the following Chinese terms (Wang, 1984, p. 481; Shi, 1991, pp. 232-247; Gao & Wu, 1992, pp. 108-118):

<i>ming xue</i> (logic)	<i>zhi xue</i> (chemistry)	<i>zi xue</i> (philology)	<i>qun xue</i>
(sociology)	<i>xin xue</i> (psychology)	<i>sheng xue</i> (biology)	<i>li xue</i>
(metaphysics)	<i>xue xue</i> (the science of science itself)...		

Meanwhile he established, in a systematic manner, Chinese equivalents for the core vocabulary of those fields of science and studies, including:

<i>yu</i> (space)	<i>zhou</i> (time)	<i>xing</i> (body)	<i>gan</i> (sensation)	<i>jue</i>
(consciousness)	<i>qing</i> (emotion)	<i>zhi</i> (volition)	<i>xin</i> (belief)	<i>yi</i> (concept)
<i>shi</i> (memory)	<i>shen</i> (mind)	<i>zhi</i> (matter)	<i>shuo</i> (theory)	<i>lei</i> (genre)
<i>bie</i> (species)	<i>cha</i> (differentia)	<i>ping</i> (quality)	<i>yuan</i> (premise)	<i>li</i> (major
premise)	<i>an</i> (minor premise)...			

In cases where Yan could not find any equivalents in Chinese, he would resort to sound translation. Some of the transliterations he invented are still used today, including *wu tuo bang* (utopia), *luo ji* (logic), *luo ge si* (logos), *tu teng* (totem), etc.

What deserves mention here is that through transliteration Yan actually invented some new ways in creating Chinese new characters by employing *xing-sheng*, the fourth method of Chinese character creation discussed in the second chapter. For instance, in transliterating the word *cori*, a kind of mice, Yan used the character *shu* (鼠, mouse/rat) as the left, indicative part of another character which denotes the sound. Thus two new characters *ke* (可) and *li* (里) were invented to mean *cori*. Another example is the transliteration of *turdi* (a kind of bird). Yan used the character *niao* (鸟, bird) as the right, indicative part of another character denoting the sound. Thus two new characters, *shi* (是) and *die* (蝶), were created as equivalents of *turdi*.

To cater to the Chinese reading habits and tastes, he would at times change the persons, sequences, structures or perspectives of narration. For example, here is the first sentence of Huxley's *Evolution*,

It may be safely assumed that, two thousand years ago, before Caesar set foot in southern Britain, the whole country-side visible from the windows of the room in which I write, was in what is called 'the state of nature.'

Yan translated it into:

Huxley is alone in a room, (which is) situated in southern Britain, against a hill and faced to the plains. The scenery outside the threshold spreads before the eyes. (So he) falls into imaginations of the scenes existing two thousand years ago, before the great Roman general Caesar came (in Gao & Wu, 1992, p. 94. Literally translated into English by myself).

From this sample, it can be seen that Yan strove at a sinicized rendition of the original. He changed the person from 'I' into 'Huxley,' so that the oratorical original was clothed in the more familiar and acceptable language and grammar of classical Chinese histories. He split the original one sentence into three separate sentences - transforming the 'grape' structure into the 'bamboo' pattern discussed earlier. In so doing, Yan restructured the sequence of events and order of narration according to the Chinese reading habits. In between the lines of his version are found drama, suspension and liveliness that could more easily engage the reader. With 'the great Roman general,' he provided an explanatory element in his translation for those who might not know who Caesar was. All these and other strategies were for easier understanding and acceptance in the Chinese cultural context of the alien theory of evolution.

In terms of culture, Yan's sinicized translation sometimes seemed to have inevitably compromised the cultural 'otherness' in the target culture. For instance, the very central concept of evolution, which had no equivalent in Chinese, was translated by Yan into *tian yan* (literally heavenly change), a concept created out of the Confucian-Taoist idea of Nature. By the same token, Yan used *tian* (heaven/heavenly) to translate *nature* (*tian yun/xing*, heavenly destiny/tao) and *survival of the fittest* (*wu jing tian ze*, literally things compete and heaven makes choice), etc. Although some Chinese scholars, such as Wang (1987), marvel at Yan's magical and powerful use of *tian* in many different contexts, such terminologies remind us of the earlier Jesuits-converts' treatment of linguistic-cultural gaps. While *evolution* seems to lay emphasis upon human factor - to the extent of homocentric fallacy, *tian yan* appears actually to minimize the human role. The Chinese *tian*, which implies unification of Nature and Man, is by no means identical with the Western concept of Nature held in the 19th century as the opposite of, and object of conquest by humankind. In this sense, Yan was ironically 'dumping' Western

heterogeneous, homocentric ideas into the 'hold-all' of the highly sophisticated idea of *tian*. Or, to be more exact, Yan could not 'jump' out of the linguistic net of Classical Chinese as a historical product.

Another example is his translation of *On Liberty* into *qun ji quan jie lun* (literally on the boundaries of rights between the group and the self). As can be seen from above, Yan meticulously studied the word *liberty*, and he knew an equivalent that was already in use. However, instead of adopting *zi you*, he preferred to employ an explanatory method of translation. This speaks about Yan as a cultural interpreter and translator on different levels. First, he was translating into a language that had no appropriate way of expressing the idea of liberty in political and philosophical senses. Secondly, within the given linguistic framework, the existing word in the vernacular *zi you*, as he felt, carried a derogatory connotation that sounded almost anarchist and vulgar, since the word literally means "do as (one)self pleases." Thirdly, as a socially and culturally responsible translator, Yan was aiming at creating an image of the West that was at once rational in itself and culturally acceptable to the classical Chinese mind.

Faced with all these conflicts and contradictions, he chose to culturally explain the concept of liberty rather than venturing to establish an equivalent in Chinese. *Liberty* does imply "boundaries of rights between the group and the self," but *qun ji quan jie* is not equivalent to liberty. Consequently, although Yan set a long-lasting standard of "faithfulness, expressiveness and elegance" for Chinese translation in his Preface to his translation of Huxley's *Evolution*, he lived up, at his best, to expressiveness and elegance at the cost of faithfulness. Or, to be more exact, the linguistic and cultural incommensurabilities and divides between China and the West offered too little common ground for him to be 'faithful' to either side.

b. Yan's influences

For all this, Yan's art and strategies in sinicizing his textual renditions did work. As Wang (1982) pointed out, Yan was aware of the fact that the books he was translating were no less than 'bitter medicine' hardly swallowable to the educated, scholar-official class in an intellectual dormancy. His textual appropriations by way of Classical wording, pre-Han Dynasty literary style and constant references to Chinese history were simply

'sugar-coating." They provided a textual basis for subversive and radical ideas to be moderately mediated by the then generally conservative intelligentsia. This is clearly seen in the warm responses from the best known erudite scholars in the then China, including the Classical Literature guru, the "Great Master" of the Tong Cheng School Wu Rulun (1840-1903). Wu wrote a preface to Yan's translation of Huxley's *Evolution*. He praised Yan's style of translation as comparable to the literary grace of the great masters of the late Zhou Dynasty (1111-249 BCE). After reading Yan's translation of Adam Smith, another scholar, Zheng Taiyi, commented that with the appearance of this book, all other schools of learning should be abolished. Even the then British Envoy, who lived in China for 45 years and claimed to be well versed in sinology, remarked that there were no more than twenty scholars in the world who were as profound and erudite as Yan (see Gao & Wu, 1992, pp. 59-60).

As a result, Yan launched an intellectual enlightenment revolution with his partly mediated, appropriated or manipulated text of the West. People both literate and half-literate in Classical Chinese, both old and young, were drawn to this new, verbally sinicized world. They began to interpret their own lives with Yan's interpretations of Western way of life. They began to learn to look at their own history and their history in relation to a rationalized West from an evolutionist point of view. They began to shift their understanding of their own personal and national identity from a feudal, predetermined patriarchal order to the new, Darwinian order governed by the jungle law. A revolution, culturally most radical in Chinese history, was under way, although, again, there was no Chinese equivalent as yet for revolution. Yan's 'sugar-coated medicine,' as it turned out, was not a stone cast to the stagnant pond of the Chinese society. Instead, it was an intellectual and cultural 'nuclear bomb' that was to spiritually as well as physically burn the Old China into ashes - something that was contrary to Yan's expectations.

For instance, partly inspired by Yan's translations, Liang Qichao (1873-1929), the most prominent advocate of the new culture, published a series of influential writings on political, social and educational reform. Liang highly admired Yan, saying that "In respect to the influences of overseas students upon the intellectual world in China, (Yan) Fu stood out as the first and foremost" (Gao & Wu, 1992, p. 59). In one of his

blockbuster works on translation and translatology, *Catalogue of Western Books* (1897), Liang said:

If China wants to become strong, it is of primary importance to translate as many Western books into Chinese as possible; if the student wants to accomplish anything at all, he must read as many Western books as possible (in Chen, 1992, p. 114. Translation mine).

In view of the fact that most of the officially sponsored translations focused upon military affairs and weapons manufacturing, Liang said that the West was powerful in its armed forces, but it was not because of its armed forces that the West was powerful. He appealed to the whole society for more extensive translations of Western school textbooks, laws, politics, histories, economics, literature and philosophies. Meanwhile, Liang insightfully directed the Chinese attention to *dong xue* (Eastern/Japanese learning) as a more effective way to Western learning. As one of the leaders of the Reform Movement of 1898, Liang's voice was widely heard. With more and more bi-cultured students participating in the great course of translation opened by Yan, China truly entered the age of translation of the West.

4. Translation and Linguistic 'Lack'

a. Translating modernity: Linguistic challenges

As discussed above, Yan's classical translations, although moderate and conservative, prepared China for change beyond the imagination of the Yangwu Movement. They helped to provide a larger context of international and global connection and competition for Chinese to re-locate themselves. They awakened the Chinese to the fact that China's repeated failure in confrontation with the West was not due solely to its weakness and backwardness in science and technology. With modern Western philosophical, political, sociological, economical, anthropological and other concepts and ideas circulating far and wide, Chinese were moving from the Celestial Empire mentality to an evolutionist mindset. This Western evolutionist understanding of human life began to foster a sense of history among the Chinese, who had been said (such as Hegel) to have been living without such a sense.

Although there was as yet no equivalent in Chinese to the word *modern*¹, the sense of the West being 'modern' with its associated, vague, verbally as yet undefinable images of progress, democracy, equality, freedom, organization, control, efficiency, science, technology, openness, etc. began to be rooted in the Chinese consciousness. This consciousness grew and was dominated by rejecting anything Chinese as being feudal, despotic, totalitarian, backward, superstitious and so on. In this process, a sense of cultural inferiority arose, which developed into a Middle Kingdom complex still lying behind Chinese sentiments and emotional responses to the West. Under this intellectual trend, to be Western was to be modern; to be modern was to be patriotic - in the sense of securing the survival of the Chinese nation among the jungle of nations in the world. China left itself no time to understand what it meant to become modern or how to ontologically address the relationship between China and the West. It was ready to 'colonize' itself against the background of intensified Western colonization. This self-colonization proceeded in a manner of chaos, confusion, contention and contradiction.

For any change to be possible, however, China was faced with two cultural tasks. One was to find a way to alleviate the linguistic poverty as reflected in translations done by Yan and his contemporaries. The other was the cultural choice between the Classical Chinese that was out of touch with actual day-to-day life, and the vernacular that was regarded by the scholar-official class as sub-literary and vulgar.

Lack of proper vocabulary to signify the changing reality pointed to the social and cultural crisis in China. As discussed above, the process of Western colonization had already destroyed the very socio-economic basis upon which China's political superstructure was based. China became lost between the Classical Chinese that had little to do with day-to-day life experiences, and the new reality that could not be named with the written language available. Although Western ideas were slowly, ambiguously and chaotically disseminated and interpreted through classical appropriations by Yan and other translators, an enlightened, awakened and emotionally boiling nation was desperately in need of a new language to make sense of their destroyed life. The Chinese nation could not live long with a linguistic world full of unmediated, undefined, or generalized terms. For instance, *yang* (foreign or outlandish) was widely used to mean

¹ At that time, the word modern had to be transliterated into *mo deng*.

things that were of, from or for the West, including *yang huo* (matches, literally foreign fire) and *yang bu* (machine-made cloth, literally foreign cloth). Or at its worst, the language of that time was permeated with confusing, incomprehensible and unintelligible transliterations such as:

<i>sai yin si</i> for science	<i>ku die da</i> for coup d'etat
<i>de mo ke la xi</i> for democracy	<i>de lu feng</i> for telephone
<i>ba li men</i> for parliament	<i>mi si tuo</i> for mister
<i>bo li sui tian de</i> for president	<i>mi si</i> for miss
<i>fei e po lai</i> for fair play	<i>ai de mei dun shu</i> for ultimatum

... (see Shi, 1991, pp. 240-246; Liu et al. 1984).

The untranslatability of such vital terms suggested the existential dilemma of the semi-feudal, semi-colonized China lost between the unreturnable Confucian order and unreachable new order designed and controlled by the modernizing West. At this crucial moment of history, something that was unique in global intercultural exchange took place: flowing backward of Chinese new words and expressions from Japan. It provided, for good or bad, a shortcut for the Chinese to some place where understandable signifiers could be found for the signified.

b. Translating Japanese as a shortcut

As mentioned earlier, China used to be a major source of culture and civilization for Japan. As early as 285 CE, in order to learn from the advanced Confucian culture, Japan invited the Chinese Confucian scholar Wang Ren from Korea to Japan. Wang brought with him ten volumes of the Confucian *Analects*. This was the first time Japan ever came into contact with a written language. From then on, Japan had more and more access to Chinese classics. But Japanese had remained an oral language until the Tang Dynasty (618-907), when many Japanese students returned to Japan after being educated in China for many years. Some returned students introduced the radicals of Chinese characters and the *cao shu* (running hand or cursive script) to Japan, and created the Japanese katakana (*pian jia ming*) and hiragana (*ping jia ming*). *Jia* means borrow or loan; *ming* here means written language. Katakana is a system of written forms developed through borrowing

Chinese radicals along with their sounds. Hiragana is a system of character writing based upon the Chinese *cao shu* (see Sun, 1992, pp. 300-308).

Over a thousand years, Japan has used Chinese characters and studied Chinese classics. The Japanese have helped to preserve and develop the Chinese language in their own ways. Even today, there are over one thousand and eight hundred Chinese characters legally used in Japan. While in China, the Chinese characters have experienced several rounds of reform and simplification in form, the Japanese have adopted and are still adopting the older forms of spelling. In some areas the Japanese use Chinese characters in their archaic and/or Japanized senses, which are often misleading to Chinese audiences. In other areas, the Japanese have created, and are creating, many terms and expressions with Chinese characters, which are visually new but semantically, etymologically and lexically intelligible to the Chinese. This unique cultural reciprocity played its historical role when China was in the cultural predicament of linguistic disorientation at the turn of the 20th century.

Again, as briefly discussed earlier, Japan embarked on its national project of modernization - Meiji Restoration - in 1860s. This modernization was quickly accomplished by way of wholesale Westernization. While at the same time when China was caught in the political, philosophical and intellectual wars between 'Chinese body' and 'Western function,' the Japanese devoted themselves whole-heartedly to both textual and cultural translation of the West. By the time when Yan and his contemporaries were racking their brains, often futilely, for proper Chinese equivalents of Western ideas, the Japanese had already gone through the process. They had created numerous words with Chinese characters to translate Western concepts that were alien to the Confucianism-based Japanese culture. And those loan words had linguistically evolved into maturity after years of social and cultural trials and tests in Japan.

At this very time, as a lesson drawn from the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), the Qing Dynasty turned its eyes from the West to Japan for advanced learning. On August 2, 1898, Emperor Guang Xu (reigned 1875-1908) issued an imperial edict to send students to Japan (see Ding, 1990, pp. 197-198). Soon Chinese crossed the 'narrow strip of water' in large numbers to be educated in Japan. Official statistics show that while in 1899, only 200 went to Japan. This number grew quickly by 1903, when over 1300 students, official-

or self-sponsored, went to Japan. In 1906, the number rose to more than ten thousand. Meanwhile, officials at different levels, from county, prefecture, province to the court, traveled to Japan for short-term visits (see Ding, 1990, p. 198).

Soon the waves of Chinese students and scholars storming to Japan started to roar back, in terms of culture. Beginning from 1900, Chinese students in Japan engaged themselves in translating Japanese or Japanese translations of Euro-American works into Chinese. They organized themselves into different translating groups and societies such as *Yi shu hui bian she* (Compilation Society of Translations) and *Jiao ke shu yi ji she* (Society of Translating and Editing Textbooks). Their translations were either printed in Japan and sold in China or printed and distributed in China. At the same time, large numbers of returned students undertook to systematically translate from Japanese. The rate and range of their translations can be seen in the following example. In 1903, a group of students of the Shanghai Literary Society in or returned from Japan, headed by Fan Disheng, translated and published one hundred volumes of Japanese school and university textbooks and references. Under the title of *A General Encyclopedia*, they include books of and on religion, philosophy, literature, education, politics, law, geography, history, natural sciences, industry and commerce. According to Tian, before the Sun Yat-sen Revolution (1911), the majority of textbooks used in China's secondary and post-secondary schools were translated or re-translated from Japanese (see Ding, 1990, pp. 202-208).

In contrast to Yan Fu, who spent over three years (1894-96) on Huxley's *Evolution* and six years (1897-1903) on Spencer's *Study of Sociology*, these translators were working at an astonishing speed. Their work was greatly facilitated by the linguistic affinity between Japanese and Chinese. They did not have to spend 'half a month deciding on a Chinese equivalent' as Yan did. Rather, they could, very often, copy Japanese equivalents of Western concepts. They were importing Western new ideas whose Chinese equivalents had been created or invented by the Japanese using Chinese characters.

The Japanese employed, and are still employing, different methods of translating Western ideas. Their methods were more or less the same as those used by Chinese translators. According to Shi (1991, pp. 247-253; also see the whole book by Liu et al. 1984), their strategies include 1) using Chinese characters to transliterate Euro-American

terms; 2) using Chinese characters to half translate and half transliterate Western words; 3) creating new Chinese characters with the fourth method of Chinese character construction, i.e. *xing sheng* (semi-pictographic/indicative and semi- or homo-phonetic); 4) inventing new Chinese characters as equivalents to Western terms; 5) creating new words with Chinese characters; 6) taking Chinese terms from their contexts in Classical Chinese writings to translate Western ideas; and 7) using words or terms already existing in Classical Chinese writings. Through these and other methods, the Japanese had already produced the kinds of modern Chinese vocabulary desperately needed by the Chinese.

Thus, at the turn of the century, a unique phenomenon of global intercultural exchange took place: while large numbers of Chinese moved physically to Japan to learn from the West, greater numbers of Western cultural vocabulary and grammar clothed in the Chinese language were flowing back to China. In a short period of time, Chinese social customs began to give way to modern Western practices, including clothing, hair style, diet, social etiquette and forms of entertainment. Without much effort, modern Western core vocabulary in politics, law, sociology, sciences, history, military affairs - nearly all areas of Western learning - began to have Chinese equivalents. This includes words which dominate different stages of China's social, political and cultural transformation, such as

<i>jin hua</i> (pronounced in Japanese as <i>shinka</i>) for evolution	<i>ge min</i> (<i>kakumei</i>) for revolution
<i>jie fang</i> (<i>kaiho</i>) for liberation	<i>jie ji</i> (<i>kaikyū</i>) for class (as in class struggle)
<i>gong he</i> (<i>kyowa</i>) for republic	<i>she hui</i> (<i>shakai</i>) for society
<i>she hui zhu yi</i> (<i>shakai-shugi</i>) for socialism	<i>gong min</i> (<i>komin</i>) for citizen
<i>gong chan zhu yi</i> (<i>kyosan-shugi</i>) for communism	<i>gui fan</i> (<i>kihan</i>) for norm
<i>guo ji</i> (<i>kokusai</i>) for international	<i>ji du jiao</i> (<i>Kirisuto-kyō</i>) for Christianity
<i>guo jiao</i> (<i>kokkyō</i>) for state religion	<i>guan dian</i> (<i>kanten</i>) for viewpoint
<i>wei xin lun</i> (<i>yuishin-ron</i>) for idealism	<i>wen xue</i> (<i>bungaku</i>) for literature
<i>wen hua</i> (<i>bunka</i>) for culture	<i>wen min</i> (<i>bunmei</i>) for civilization
<i>zi you</i> (<i>jiyū</i>) for freedom, liberty	<i>zu zhi</i> (<i>soshiki</i>) for organization
<i>zhu yi</i> (<i>shugi</i>) for principle, -ism	<i>jing ji</i> (<i>keizai</i>) for economy, economics
<i>dai biao</i> (<i>daihyō</i>) for representation	<i>ba quan</i> (<i>haken</i>) for supremacy, hegemony
<i>ke cheng</i> (<i>katei</i>) for course, curriculum	<i>jiao yu xue</i> (<i>kyōiku-gaku</i>) for pedagogy
<i>jiao ke shu</i> (<i>kyōka-sho</i>) for textbook	

...(See Shi, 1991, pp. 247-253; also see the whole book by Liu et al. 1984).

Such words stormed into China and were conveniently adopted in all walks of life at such a rate that ordinary Chinese did not, and do not, realize they were from Japanese. Most Chinese would not emotionally accept the fact that the many modern words they use to live with and practice are of Japanese origin. In other words, if those words were deducted from modern Chinese vocabulary, there would not be much for the Chinese to feel proud of, in terms of language. As Shi (1991) noted, even Chinese scholars differ on the issue of whether those words borrowed from Japanese should be regarded as loan words. Some argue that from the ways the Japanese created Chinese characters/words, it should be admitted that except for some Japanized transliterations with Chinese characters of Euro-American words, the majority of Japan-born vocabulary was an extension or variation of Chinese characters/words. This is because most Chinese characters created by the Japanese followed the six Chinese ways of character construction (*liu shu*), and most of the words of Japanese origin were created out of the linguistic and cultural contexts of Chinese classics (see Shi, 1991, pp. 251-253).

Although Chinese may be justified in claiming the ownership of the characters/words, it should be seen that many Chinese words created by the Japanese out of traditional Chinese contexts were endowed with foreign and alien meanings. For instance, the word *min zhu* (democracy) does appear in one of the earliest Chinese classics, the *Book of History*. But in that context, *min* (people) *zhu* (master) is used exactly in the opposite sense of democracy: it stands for emperors or officials - masters of the people. Another example is *ge min* (revolution). Indeed, *ge* (change) *min* (fate, destiny) as a word can be found in the *Book of Changes*. However, in that context, it means "changing the mandate of heaven," whereas revolution is defined as and popularly understood to be a successful attempt by a large group of people, often using violent methods, to change the political system of their country.

Who should be the true owner of this great portion of modern vocabulary may be relevant to what is being discussed here, given the fact that, in an age of capitalism, ownership is highly valued. What is important though is through this two-way intercultural exchange, the way was prepared for the Chinese language to be fundamentally revolutionized in terms of vocabulary and grammar. As was briefly mentioned earlier, Classical Chinese words are monosyllable-based, which means a

character is usually a word. They do enjoy the advantage of being simple, concise and economical. When they are read aloud, they do impress the audience as being solemn and highly refined, especially with those modal particles *zhi*, *hu*, *zhe*, *ye*, *yi*, *yan* and *zai* in Classical Chinese writings. Yan Fu convinced himself that pre-Han Dynasty vocabulary, syntax and wording were more faithful, expressive and elegant than "the vulgar language (i.e. the vernacular) of the recent times" (in Editorial Board, 1984a, p. 6). Therefore he chose to use mono-character words as equivalents to Western terms, including

<i>yu</i> for space	<i>zhou</i> for time	<i>xing</i> for body
<i>shi</i> for memory	<i>gan</i> for sensation	<i>qing</i> for emotio

...(see Gao & Wu, 1992, p. 117).

However, mono-character-based words, having been used for thousands of years, have acquired more meanings than any fairly educated person could master. They tend to be ambiguous and misleading, vulnerable to different interpretations. In contrast, Japanese translations of such words, as can be seen from above, are mostly bi-syllabic. They are actually similar to words used in Chinese daily life. Extensive use of those words in the rising media and school textbooks in China gradually marginalized Classical Chinese mono-character words.

While, to make sense, one has to put most Classical Chinese words within the traditional Confucian-Buddhist-Taoist discursive contexts, those Japanese-made words seem to be neutral. With two or more Classical Chinese words combined into one, the reader has to move out of any specific Classical references to achieve an understanding of the new meaning(s). This neutral quality of the bi-syllabic words strips mono-syllabic words of their historical, local, moral, subjective, superstitious and gender-discriminating contexts and contextualization that often characterize Classical Chinese writings. It endows modern vocabulary with a sense of 'objectiveness' and 'scientificness.' To be clear, objective, scientific, and therefore manageable and controllable is what 'modern' implies, among other things. And the import of Japanese-made words provided a linguistic key for China to the discursive door of modernization, the synonym of Westernization.

From Yan Fu's *tian yan* (heavenly change) to the Japanese *jin hua* (evolution), from Yan Fu's *qun ji quan jie* (boundaries of rights between the group and the self) to the

Japanese *zi you* (liberty, freedom), Chinese revolutionized itself more at the Einsteinian velocity of light than through the Darwinian process of evolution. Within a few years in the first decade of the 20th century, Classical Chinese gave way to Modern Chinese. Given the fact that Modern Chinese was permeated with key Western linguistic and cultural vocabulary and grammar that had not been adequately interpreted or mediated by the Chinese themselves, how would they be translated and transformed in the actual life in China? What linguistic, social and political consequences did they have upon China looking up to the West for progress, liberation, emancipation, independence and material prosperity? How would China establish its new identity with modern Western ideas running against its Confucian tradition?

5. Translation and Literary 'Lack'

a. Background

With new vocabulary and grammar developed to name the semi-feudal and semi-colonial reality through translations, and especially translations of Japanese translations of the West, China entered the age of modernization. Although it took time for China to accept and practice the new vocabulary, it greatly facilitated translations of what had seemed virtually untranslatable. And the massive translations of foreign works began to move the Chinese from traditional/Confucian and "body vs. function" discourses to the discourses of building a new China on a more common, at least linguistically shared, basis with the West. The Chinese were using translated concepts and ideas to reflect on their history, understand their reality and envision their future. Textual translations of the West were thus re-translated through various forms of language and new means of technology into the actual spiritual and material life in China. This is best seen in the field of literature.

In a nation traditionally without a unified state religion in a strict sense, literature in China played a special role. From the very beginning, literature was regarded as a major moral, social and political force. For instance, the earliest classic *Shangshu* (the *Book of History*), said to be edited by Confucius, states: "Poetry (literature, in this case) is the expression of one's *zhi* (will/ideal)." Confucius says to his disciples in *The Analects* (translation mine): "Why do you not study poetry? Poetry is associative, observant,

unitive and critical¹. In the lowest sense, it can serve parents, in the highest, emperors; also it can teach people names of birds, animals and plants.”

Such an understanding raised literature to an almost holy position. Traditionally literature in China ranked above natural sciences and technology. This might in part explain why China emphasized much more the spiritual and aesthetical development of the mind through literature rather than the physical development of applied sciences and technology, which consequently led to her failure in the confrontations with the West. Even a Chinese emperor had to be literarily qualified, whose writing-brush meant as much as the sword (or rod) to a European King, if he ever wanted to secure his crown. Starting from the Sui Dynasty (581-618), imperial officials were selected through the *keju* (Imperial Examinations) System, which, held usually every four years, would be either poetry or prose composition. As legends have it, a princess was sometimes arranged to marry an unmarried *zhuang yuan* (状元, national Number One Scholar - title conferred on the one who came first in the highest imperial examinations).

Such a cultural atmosphere placed heavy responsibilities upon literature as a moral, political, philosophical and social force. It in turn put men of letters in danger. For instance, the first emperor of the Qin Dynasty, Shi Huangdi (246-210 BCE), launched a public burning of books in which an enormous number of books were consigned to the flames, only books on medicine, pharmacy, astronomy and agronomy were exempt from this wanton destruction. And scholars and students who were hostile to the new regime and who denounced the present and praised the past were buried alive in groups (Jian, 1981, p. 21). The incident opened up a tradition in which emperors’ rods were always ready to crush any subversive literary brushes. Even the most celebrated Chinese novel written during the Qing Dynasty, *A Dream of the Red Mansions*, had to be clothed in a Buddhist dream to evade royal suspicion. Yet it was included in the long list of banned books. In fact, in this last dynasty of the Qing, there were much more cases of *wen zi yu* (literally prison for writings) than any previous dynasties. Hundreds of authors, especially of the Han nationality, were imprisoned or executed, sometimes with their whole families, relatives and friends, for writing something considered offensive by the imperial court

¹ What Confucius means here is that Poetry can cultivate a person’s power of imagination and observation, and help him to be gregarious and politically or socially satirical.

(Zhou, 1993). Being constantly suspicious and fearful of the Han people overthrowing their rule, the Manchus were brutally heavy-handed with intellectuals and writers.

The contradiction between the imperial promotion and suppression of literature had in part driven Classical Literature to a dead corner, as far as literary forms and contents were concerned. The literature had been emptied from within of its morally and politically subversive qualities. It came to be disguised, at its best, by being objective and impersonal, adopting natural and independent images and other rhetorical devices. Such an 'escapist' method led the literature to a safer zone of survival: literary beauty, which in turn diverged the literary course into the other extreme, art for art's sake, something resembling the over-sentimental and stylistically clichéd Victorian literature. Meanwhile, the feudal, imperial control over the standards of language and forms of literature offered little space for the growth of any other genre than classical poetry and prose.

In a sense, by the late 19th century, both Chinese and Western literature had come, from vastly different traditions, to a similar cultural dilemma. One's spirit or soul - God - was declared by Nietzsche to be dead. The other's body - the classical language contextualized in the feudal, 'pre-modern' literary discourses - had stifled its soul, rendering itself lifeless and even anti-life. It was at this critical moment that Chinese and Western literary traditions encountered each other through translation.

b. Literary translation at the turn of the century

Historically, Western literature might be regarded as one of the first Western colonizing and globalizing forces to enter and subsequently decentralize the classical Chinese literary mind. This process began with the early English version of the Bible and biblical literature. As mentioned earlier, Christianity fought its way to China as early as the Tang Dynasty (see Shen, 1987). However, the Bible had not been accessible to ordinary Chinese until the British missionary Robert Morrison completed his translation of the Bible into modern Chinese in 1823. According to a comprehensive study (Gu, 1994), from 1823 to the present, over three hundred million copies of the Bible have been distributed, circulated and sold in China. Biblical literature in the Chinese vernacular has exercised manifold cultural, philosophical, ideological and political influences upon the Chinese. In particular, it helped the vernacular to establish itself over the classical

Chinese and promoted general literacy in a society in which public education in the modern Western sense had never been heard of. Many biblical terms, sayings, proverbs, anecdotes and references have become part of the modern Chinese vocabulary.

It is hard to determine exactly when Western non-biblical literature was first introduced to China. As early as the 17th century, the Jesuits translated the Aesop Fables into Chinese. According to Guo (1999, online), the first Western novel translated into Chinese is John Bunyan's *The Pilgrim's Progress*, by the British missionary Rev. William Burns (1815-1868) in 1853. The first Western full-length novel translated into Chinese by Chinese is E. B. Lytton's *Night and Morning* (1841), as Han (2000, online) noted. The translator was Jiang Zirang, and his translation was serialized in a Shanghai literary magazine from 1873 to 1875. As a pioneer in literary translation, Jiang was often rewriting rather than translating. He adopted the then Chinese form of fiction, the *zhang hui ti* (章回体), whereby a novel is divided into chapters, each chapter headed by a couplet giving the gist of its content. He followed the Chinese style of fiction, focusing on the narrative rather than the descriptive part of the novel. His language of translation stood between, or was a mixture of, the Classical Chinese and the vernacular. Very often Jiang sinicized British culture, setting the scenes against a semi-Chinese and semi-English background. He clothed the characters with Chinese attire, and had the characters speak in a Chinese way that would hardly be re-translatable back into English, as was often the case with early Chinese translations of the West (see Guo, 1999, online).

Western literature had not achieved much distinction in China's literary arena until Lin Shu produced his more than 180 volumes of liberal translations, as mentioned above. Highly versed in Classical Chinese, Lin, like Yan Fu, translated Euro-American novels into Classical Chinese following Classical Chinese literary norms and standards. As he was not linguistically grounded in any of the languages he was translating, he erred much more than Yan in terms of faithfulness. Although in a different way, Lin faced as many linguistic challenges and cultural divides as Yan did. For example, in his time, *xiao shuo* (小说, fiction), literally meaning small tales, was regarded as lowbrow. It could hardly be brought to the high table of classical literary discussion. Chinese traditional novels do not pay much attention to either physical or psychological descriptions that are vital in the novels Lin was translating. The Chinese social etiquette, including honorifics, non-verbal

and somatic expressions, and moral standards regulating interpersonal relationships among family members, relatives, friends, and particularly between men and women, were inevitably standing in the way of easy mediation.

For instance, the kinds of explicit, passionate and often heart-breaking love between the protagonists in the novels he was translating were "Arabian Nights" in the Confucian tradition. In this tradition, women were bound not only in their feet, but to their deprivation of education, to their chambers in their maidenhood, to their husbands and sons in their family life, and to their confinement of physical movement even within their homes¹. Even their life and death was in the hands of their husbands or other males in the family, who could put them to death should they have 'committed capital crimes' - adultery for example. They never had any free choice of their own in life, including marriage, which was almost exclusively arranged. As a result, there was no expression of "falling in love" in Chinese, since the bride and groom never met face to face until the wedding night. In fact, as comparative literature shows (see Zhu, 1987; Cao ed., 1985), Classical Poetry since the Han Dynasty when Confucianism was royally established has large numbers of beautiful, tear-evoking love poems lamenting over departure from or death of a spouse. Those poems were composed usually by members of the scholar-official class, who had to leave their families behind in their hometowns to assume their offices in faraway places. However, such love poems, written usually out of anger over the officials-as-poets' deposition or disappointment with the bureaucratic officialdom, were not an acknowledgement of their wives being equal to the poets themselves. In most cases, they reflect the poets' frustrations with power struggle in a male-dominated society. One could hardly find a poem about heart-breaking young love before marriage.

A life of *yang* without any ontological presence of *yin* was half-dead. A literature of humanity without genuine existence of the other half of humanity was inhumane, if not anti-human. Such was the literary background against which Lin was working across literatures for Chinese literary rebirth in both content and form, although Lin focussed his attention more on the anti-colonial aspects of his work, as discussed earlier.

¹ For instance, 'wife' was called *tang ke* (literally guest of the living room) in many places in China. It means wives, particularly young ones, were not allowed free access to the dining table or living room when there were guests around.

In appropriating Western novels for easier acceptance by his readers, Lin dressed his characters in Chinese clothes and made them speak classical Chinese, in much the same fashion as Jiang had done. Sometimes he omitted a number of sentences or paragraphs in the original. Sometimes he added what he felt was lacking - drama, suspense, taste, etc. - to the original. Sometimes he sinicized Western cultures, including historical and religious references and current social customs, in such funny ways that anyone with some cultural knowledge of the West would find the European saying "Traduttore traditor" holds so true. At other times, Lin so literally followed the originals textually that his language sounded extremely 'westernized' beyond textual or contextual comprehension. In this sense, Lin's translation is vulnerable to double charges of 'traducement' (see Qian, in Editorial Board, 1984b, pp. 267-295).

However, the positive literary impact Lin brought to a thirsty and devouring China dwarfed his textual errors and shortcomings. To be fair, even textually, Lin exercised great influences over the changing language of the changing literature. On the one hand, he confined himself to the traditional Chinese narrative and descriptive methods of novel writing. On the other hand, he pushed the vernacular elements in the traditional language of fiction to a higher degree of freedom, since as Qian (ibid.) noted, Classical Chinese norms had less control over translations. As a result, his translations were fairly accessible to his vast readership, who was generally more open and tolerant to new and free ways of expressions regarded as inherent in foreign literature.

Moreover, Lin adopted many freshly imported Japanese words and expressions in his translations such as *pu tong* (普通 common, ordinary) and *she hui* (社会 society, community). As Qian (ibid.) noted, when Japanese vocabulary was first introduced into China, there was strong resistance from the feudal official-scholar class, who insisted that pure Classical Chinese should not accept any element of New Words, i.e. Japanese words, and that any such words should be crossed out from official documents. Through his popularly received translations, Lin's use of New Words helped early modern Chinese vocabulary to take root and grow.

Most importantly, while opening a window for the Chinese to the Western way of life, Lin's tremendous success as a fiction translator established fiction, the most pro-daily-life but the most despised genre of literature in China, as promisingly 'highbrow' literature.

This was partly due to the vigorous promotion of fiction by the then great reformist Liang Qichao, who saw the potential power of fiction in changing China. In his essay on the relationship between fiction and politics written in 1902, Liang said (in Zhang, 2001, online, translation mine): "*Xiao shuo* (fiction) has unimaginable power to control humanity." He went on to say (in Yuan, 1985, p. 7. Translation mine):

Enlightenment of a nation has to start from reforming its fiction. Therefore, to renew morality, fiction must be renewed; to renew a religion, fiction must be renewed; to renew a political system, fiction must be renewed; to renew social customs, fiction must be renewed; to renew learning and technology, fiction must be renewed. By analogy, to renew the human heart/mind and to renew personality, fiction must be renewed.

Enthusiastically echoed by a group of influential scholars and intellectuals, Liang launched a movement of literary translation as a basis for China's new fiction creation. And Lin's achievements provided a basis for Liang's vision of a new literature that could solve the tension between the vernacular and Classical Chinese, the *lingua franca* of East Asia for two millennia.

Concurrent with Lin's outpouring, at the turn of the century, many other textual translations of Western fiction emerged. Some of them were published in journals and newspapers including Yan Fu's *Guo wen bao* (国闻报, literally National News, started in 1897). According to Yuan (ibid.), in the dying years of the Qing Dynasty, at least over two thousand novels were published, and, for instance, translations of fiction amounted to almost ninety percent of all the novels published in 1907. The translations can be roughly classified into four categories: political novels, love tales, science fiction and detective stories (see Shi ed., 1991; Zhang, 2001, online). This phenomenon deserves a brief examination, as it may provide some insights into the relationship between literary translation and social, political and intellectual trends. Here an accurate and complete list of translated works, original writers, Chinese translators and exact dates of publication is not available, for the following, among other, reasons:

- (1) Many translators used pen-names or pseudonyms;
- (2) No or inadequate information on the original sources was given;

- (3) Some translators even failed to identify the correct nationalities of the original authors, and many works were translated from languages other than those in which they had been originally written;
- (4) Translators used different methods, usually based upon their own local dialects, to transliterate foreign/Western names;
- (5) Instead of using the vernacular to literally translate original titles, many translators tended to entitle their translations according to the norms of traditional Chinese novel writing.

However a very small sample of the most popular and widely read writers and works can be presented as follows (see Shi ed. 1991; Guo, 1998, online; Zhang, 2001, online):

Author	Works	Date of publication in China
Arthur Conan Doyle (1859-1930)	Sherlock Holmes stories	From 1896 on
Jules Verne (1828-1905)	<i>Around the World in Eighty Days</i> (1873)	1900
	<i>From the Earth to the Moon</i> (1865)	
	<i>Mysterious Island</i> (1870)	1903
Allen Upward (1863-1926)	<i>Phantom Torpedo Boats</i>	1900
R. L. Stevenson (1850-1894)	Short stories	
	<i>Dr. Jekyll & Mr. Hyde</i> (1886)	1908
Allan Poe (1809-1849)	<i>Treasure Island</i> (1883)	
Emile Gaboriau (1832-1837)	<i>Golden Bug</i>	1905
	<i>Les amours d'une empoisonneuse</i> (1882)	1907
H. G. Wells (1866-1946)	<i>Ledossier No. 113</i>	
	<i>Time Machine</i> (1895)	1915
	<i>Island of Doctor Moreau</i> (1896)	

c. Translating as literary choice: An analysis

It might seem somewhat surprising that what was most translated and received in China could hardly rank among Euro-American classical literature. This in itself reflected the tastes and sentiments of the Chinese readers, who looked towards the West for intellectual inspiration and emotional, spiritual, social and political liberation. Zhang

(2001, online) offered an excellent interpretation of this situation. According to his analysis, the enthusiastic acceptance of science fiction, over one hundred volumes of translations published in the first decade of the 20th century, was closely related to China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. Science fiction, with its daring imagination sparked by the spirit of scientific exploration, opened up a new literary world different from the ghost stories dominating Chinese fiction in the late Qing Dynasty. It could be used to initiate the young into the realm of science and technology traditionally despised and rejected. Its vision and courage of free exploration into the physically unknown, and its human concerns as reflected in such endeavours, were particularly appealing to the younger generation longing to be emancipated from the autocratic rule of feudalism.

Detective stories, on the other hand, led the readers to reflect on Chinese practice of legal procedures, or lack of it. As Zhou Guisheng (1873-1936), one of the first to employ the method of literal translation into the vernacular, and one of the earliest to introduce Sherlock Holmes, wrote in 1904 (in Zhang, 2001, *ibid.* Translation mine):

All the countries in the West hold utmost respect for human rights. Anyone legally charged is unexceptionally entitled to having lawyers for defence. Without irrefutable evidence, no one could be convicted. This is why criminal investigation is so well developed... (In contrast, the Chinese) legal system is vastly different... (The police in the foreign settlements) are in the least qualified in any respect... As for the cops in the mainland, they can only resort to excruciation, often torturing one into confessing. They would never have to take trouble to think about investigating....

Other writer-translators, such as Liu Bannong (1891-1934) attached more importance to the science-technology aspects of detective stories, which inevitably involve knowledge in chemistry, anatomy, astronomy, science of law, as well as literature and philosophy. Still others regarded detective stories as the least developed theme along with its literary techniques in the Chinese tradition. Therefore science fiction translations could be expected to inform, enrich and inspire Chinese literature.

Since the sense of socio-political responsibilities of fiction was freshly revived through the efforts of Liang and his comrades, and since the imperial grip on ideological power had been greatly weakened, translations of foreign political novels flourished at

the time. Large numbers of foreign political novels were translated by such figures as Liang himself. What deserves special mention here is the appearance of women as a force of reform and change. For example, the female poet-scholar-translator, Chen Hongbi, whose personal information is hardly available, translated with the help of her husband *Around the World in Eighty Days* by Jules Verne in 1900. According to Guo (1998, online), it was the first science fiction ever introduced to China. Chen also translated English and French detective stories including Gaboriau's *Ledossier No. 113*. In particular, in 1906, she published her influential translation entitled *Su ge lan du li ji* (literally A Tale of Scottish Independence, whose original writer and title are not identifiable). Like other political novels translated at the time, this one centred round fighting for democracy and national independence. Naturally such books found strong echoes in the readers and filled them with great longings for a free, democratic and independent constitutional monarchy.

From mid-1850s to 1912 when the Qing Dynasty was overthrown, over six hundred foreign novels were translated into Chinese. Here are some statistics, although incomplete, from Tsai Chen-chang (p. 289)¹:

Name of country	Number of original writers	Number of translators	Number of novels
Great Britain	129	82	149
America	42	34	61
France	45	52	64
Germany	3	4	4
Russia	10	6	10
Japan	34	31	48
India	2	2	2
Hungary	1		1
Austria	1		1
Greece			1
Holland	1		1
Unidentified	18	119	207
Total	286	431	549

¹ His remarkable work from the University of Alberta Library, *Chung-kuo chin tai fan I wen hsueh chih yen chiu* (Studies on Modern Chinese Translation Literature), is undated and in a manuscript format.

All these translations, accomplished mostly by returned students as well as those still studying abroad, were reshaping the Chinese mind, providing the Chinese with a new picture of the West. The previous generalized and stereotyped image of a yellow-haired, high-nosed, blue-eyed, uncivilized and always sinning devil armed with powerful weapons gradually faded. It was giving way to various, vivid, humanly sophisticated, truer-than-reality and larger-than-life images of Armand Duval, Don Quixote, Sherlock Holmes, Hamlet, Robinson Crusoe, David Copperfield and so on so forth. While readers were reinterpreting and re-translating those translations against their own life experiences, most translators were writing their translations into Modern Chinese literature that was a step away from being established through the 'Literary Revolution,' whose Chinese equivalents *wen xue* and *ge min* had been borrowed from Japanese.

The literary situation was well observed by the American missionary Arthur Smith (1907, p. 140), who offered the following account from his 'orientalist' perspective:

Fiction was represented in one year by but twenty-one volumes, and in the next by fifty-seven, showing which way the Oriental mental tides run. Among well-known books translated and for sale, were *Uncle Tom's Cabin*; *Treasure Island*; *The Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes*; *Tales from Shakespeare*; *Joan of Arc*, and even the *Arabian Nights* is said to be in preparation. In a paper on this fertile subject read in 1905 at a meeting of the Educational Association, Mr. Darroch judiciously remarked: "If the Chinese are being interested in Western storybooks they are learning to appreciate our way of looking at things. It will not much longer be true that the mind of the Orient is so dissimilar to the thoughts of the Occident that these two must always remain incomprehensible to one another. This is the one touch of nature which will make the whole world kin, and we shall find this mighty nation of 400 millions as susceptible to the thrills of emotion which sweep over our national life, as are our nearer and more intimate neighbours. That this change of sentiment on the part of the Chinese will have prodigious effects on our work as missionaries and educationalists will not, I think, be gainsaid."

Indeed, as Smith noted, the more the Chinese became acquainted with and informed about the West through massive translations, the more detached they were from the long Confucian tradition. With half-borrowed and half-mediated Western new vocabulary and

grammar increasingly forcing the Classical Chinese largely contextualized within the trinity of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism out of the intellectual and literary discourses, China came to the crossroad of cultural identity. With the half-appropriated and half-translated West as a mirror and frame of reference, more and more Chinese psychologically and rationally admitted China's cultural inferiority. A movement of self-colonization¹ was well under way in the name of anti-colonization.

Although faced with a colonizing West, the new image of the West, ironically, became a paradoxical dream that was replacing the Chinese traditional vision of humanity. It was a dream with a utilitarian touch of national strength, power and wealth, a dream of reforming and revolutionizing China to the civilizational or evolutionary level of the West. Understandably, few, if any, ever thought beyond that dream, or viewed Chinese tradition in relation to the rest of the world in the way Arthur Smith regarded his own triumphant Western tradition. The stumbling block to that dream, it was believed, was Confucianism, which seemed to be preventing China from modernization. All the negative feelings about China's own, perceived image of poverty, weakness, backwardness and so on were turning against Confucianism, an identity-giving tradition to be radically discarded as the source of China's plight and woes.

¹ Colonization is used here strictly in its dictionary definition, i.e. the process by which a powerful country controls less powerful countries and uses their resources in order to increase its own power and wealth (see *Collins*, 1992, p. 268)

VIII. May 4th Revolution

1. Background

a. Political and social turmoil

At the turn of the century, outside the circle of literary translation, China was still divided into different groups, who were speaking polarically different languages from their own positions and perspectives. At one end of the pole was the reformists Kang Youwei (1858-1929), Liang Qichao, Yan Fu, Tan Sitong (1866-98) and their devoted followers. As early as 1895, just before China signed the humiliating treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan, the patriotic scholar Kang, who was waiting in Beijing for the imperial examination, united the other 1,300 waiting examinees in the capital. Together they submitted the historical memorial to the young, relatively open-minded emperor Guang Xu (reigned 1875-1908). In this long guideline written by Kang for national systematic reform, Kang devoted quite some space to the importance of foreign languages learning and translation. He said (in Chen, 1992, pp. 104-105. Translation mine):

When domestic corruption and malpractice are eliminated, diplomatic relationships can be addressed... At the time when different countries are engaged in conflicts and fights, we are shouldering heavy responsibilities. However, our diplomatic personnel are under-educated and under-trained. Being ignorant of foreign affairs, they have been bringing humiliation and shame onto our country, making us an international laughing-stock. Foreign affairs schools are now urgently needed...and foreign languages, politics, education, law, social customs and regulations should be taught.

In his subsequent memorials to the Emperor, Kang reiterated the importance of translation. In August the same year, Kang organized in Beijing *Qiang xue hui* (Society for National Salvation), which was also called *Yi shu ju* (Translation Association). In an article on the Society, Kang illustrated China's crisis with the following words (in Chen, 1992, p. 105. Translation mine):

In the North, Russia is keeping a hawk's eye (on China); in the West, Britain is casting its covetous eyes (on China); in the South, France is fiercely watching; in

the East, Japan is glaring (at China) like a tiger. For China to be the Middle Kingdom caught in between these powerful neighbours, it is in imminent danger! Moreover, at least over ten other countries are clenching their teeth, licking their tongues, thirsting for a part of China.

Therefore translation was part of or a means to his vision for an overall reform for China's survival. Being in the political, economic and cultural centre of China, Kang, Liang and their comrades fought by all means. At last, in 1898, Emperor Guang Xu accepted their proposals, appointed them to high official posts, and allowed them easy access to the Emperor himself. According to Jian (1981, p. 118), during the 103 days from June 11 to September 21, 1898, a series of imperial edicts and new laws were proclaimed in the name of the Emperor. They included abolition of the old 8-legged essay writing in the imperial examinations, establishment of Westernized schools, discharge of redundant officials, opening of modern banks, development of mines, building of railways, promotion of various other industries, and encouragement of inventions and discoveries. They also included permission for publishing newspapers and forming academic societies, drawing up of a national budget and publication of government financial reports. All these new policies were meant to prepare the way for China to become a constitutional monarchy.

At the other end of the pole, however, were the die-hards headed by Empress Dowager, who held tightly in their hands China's political and military power. They were deadly opposed to any reform. Consequently, the policies existed mostly on paper. By the end of the 103 days of reform, Empress Dowager plotted a coup d'etat with the help of the warlord Yuan Shikai (1859-1916), who had secretly vowed to protect the emperor and his reformists with his troops. Soon Emperor Guang Xu was seized and put under house arrest. And Empress Dowager announced her resumption of the regency on September 21. Among the leading reformists, six were executed in Beijing. Some fled to Japan. The tragic failure of the Reform Movement completely destroyed the hope for a constitutional monarchy cherished by the reformists.

While yielding to the will of the Western colonizing powers, the ignorant Empress Dowager was planning to get rid of those foreigners altogether. Seeing that her military might was no rival against the colonizers, she resorted to the 'magic power' of the *Yi He*

Tuan (Boxers of Righteous Harmony). A peasant movement rising against both foreign aggressors (particularly missionaries) and the corrupt feudal rule in Shandong, the Boxers, used by Empress Dowager, later became a mixture of different elements of the society under the banner of "Support the Dynasty and Exterminate the Foreigners." When they almost swept across Beijing, the Allied Forces of Britain, United States, Russia, France, Germany, Japan, Italy and Austria advanced on them in August 1900. The Movement was bloodily repressed. Before fleeing to Xi'an, the Court under Empress Dowager denounced the Boxers as "rioters."

Holcombe, for many years Interpreter, Secretary of Legation, and Acting Minister of the United States in Beijing, reflected on the cause of the Movement. He examined what had happened between China and the colonial powers in the last sixty years, and concluded that

(The Movement) represents the wrath and hate of sixty years' growth. It is the more violent because of these long years of repression. And it receives the hearty sympathy of many millions of Chinese who have taken no active part in it. For, beyond a doubt, it represents to them a patriotic effort to save their country from foreign aggression and eventual dismemberment (Holcombe, 1908, pp. 33-34).

As is seen here, in those years, although textual translation of the West was flourishing, there seemed to be no two-way communication with the West at any level. To be more exact, culturally, there was as yet no common language of politics or diplomacy for the colonial-minded West and the Confucian-Taoist-Buddhist China to have any effective dialogue. Consequently, the 'mutual misunderstandings' led to violence on both sides. Tragically, the Movement ended in thousands and thousands of Boxers put to death and an indemnity of 450 million taels levied on China, as mentioned earlier. As a result, the last ray of Chinese hope in the Qing Dynasty vanished, while national hatred mixed with admiration for the West grew. This love-hatred complex was to characterize Chinese life for a whole century.

All these events facilitated the rise of another political force composed mainly of overseas and returned students led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925). At the age of 12, Sun went to Honolulu, and attended British and American missionary schools there. His extracurricular activities included reading both Chinese books and the revolutionary

stories of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. Later he became a highly qualified doctor of Western medicine. In 1896, Sun went to London, where he did extensive readings in Western politics, diplomacy, law, military affairs, mining, agriculture, livestock husbandry, engineering and politico-economics. There, he also translated a book entitled *Red Cross First Aid* (1897) (see Zou, 2000). He might have become an important translator of Western medicine if he had not found political practice a better cure for China and the Chinese people.

Labeled as a bourgeois-democratic movement in China's official history, this group of revolutionaries did not place any hope on Kang's reform under the Manchu rule. Instead, they looked towards the West further than the Reformists for establishing a republic. In 1905 in Tokyo, Japan, the historical Chinese Revolutionary League was organized with Dr. Sun as its leader. The slogans of the League were: Drive Out the Manchus, Restore China, Establish a Republic, and Equalize Land Ownership. Meanwhile Dr. Sun publicly announced his "Three People's Principles" (the Principles of Nationalism, of Democracy and of People's Livelihood). It was stated in the League's manifesto:

...in addition to the expulsion of the Manchus and restoration of China, the form of the state and the livelihood of the people must be changed. Although many complications are involved, the underlying spirit should be 'Liberty, Equality and Fraternity.' In the past there were heroes' revolutions; today we need a people's revolution (in Jian, 1981, p. 127).

As can be seen here, in comparison with the reformists under Kang, the League under Dr. Sun's leadership was speaking a new language of politics newly introduced into China through translation. The core vocabulary of their political vision, including *ge ming* (revolution), *zhu yi* (-ism, principle), *min zhu* (democracy), *zi you* (liberty, freedom), *ping deng* (equality), *suo you quan* (ownership) and *gong he* (republic), was all from Japanese translations of the West. The strategies of the League worked, since what had happened socially, linguistically, intellectually and (inter)culturally at the turn of the century had already prepared the way for a people's, rather than elite's or heroes', revolution. Five years later, in 1911, the new revolutionary force under Dr. Sun

overthrew the Qing Dynasty. The Republic of China with Sun as president replaced the nearly three hundred years' rule under the Manchus.

b. Linguistic gaps as seen in political translation

From the perspective of translation, however, there was a dangerous gap between the successful 'soft-landing' (to use a contemporary term) of Western vocabulary and grammar and the inadequate cultural mediation within the Chinese historical and realistic contexts. In other words, new signifiers from Japanese did not really correspond to the signified - the changing life that was struggling to redefine itself within the changing national and international reality. For instance, *min zhu* (master of the people) in the classical Chinese suddenly and miraculously reversed itself to mean the opposite - Western democracy. By definition democracy means 'a system of government in which people choose their rulers by voting for them in elections,' a system established through generations of philosophical, intellectual, social and political struggle such as the French Revolution. This inevitably involves a systematic conceptual and technical shift from rule by man under a monarch or emperor to rule by law. It requires a reconceptualization of the rational rule of the emperor as a mediator among the trinity of heavenly mandate, humanity and their regulatory means (law). It dictates an objectification of human will in the form of a democratically elected government. But how could the new, alien notion of *min zhu* define itself in the Chinese context? Was it a philosophy, a theory, an institutional practice, a means to an end, or an end to be achieved? In a country with the world's longest tradition of feudalism, 'rule by man' had been deeply rooted in the national collective unconscious. It could not be realistically changed through a process of magical linguistic twists and turns. Even semantically, the new word *min zhu* means "people rule/master," hardly a perfect equivalent to democracy.

Another example is *ge ming* (revolution). As mentioned earlier, *ge* means change; *ming* means fate or destiny, which always points to the supernatural power of heaven. In the classical Chinese, the word appeared in this context: heaven and earth showed their signs of change, and time was ripe. Therefore Tang Wu, following the mandate of heaven and the will of the people, (rose to) *ge ming* (see Liu et al. 1984, p. 116). Clearly,

the *ming* here is the unified mandate of heaven and human beings. In the West, the modern sense of revolution seemed to have experienced a long process of both verbal and non-verbal changes, and have shaken off its religious or imperial implications. When the Revolutionary League under Dr. Sun used the old word *ge ming* in its new sense (revolution - changing the political system through violent means), they could not well define the nature of the revolution: *ge* (change) whose *ming* (fate, destiny), when *ming* is still mandate of heaven?

The linguistic ambiguity, confusion and contradiction in relation to Chinese reality in Dr. Sun's revolution partly predetermined its failure as a utopian dream. With the outbreak of the Revolution in 1911 in the southern and central parts of China, the warlord Yuan Shikai, who had won the favour of Empress Dowager by betraying the Reformists, was placed in charge of the imperial troops in northern China. Although Dr. Sun had been elected Provisional President of the Republic, the last imperial edict (February 12, 1912) appointed Yuan premier with authorization to form a republican government. In 1913, Yuan became president. He immediately outlawed Sun and his party, and dissolved the parliament. The power of the new Republic was lost to the feudal, evil hands of the warlords headed by Yuan. Thus China was under twofold oppression: foreign imperialists and domestic warlords. But the new visions, ideals and dreams inspired by the translated ideas were still there. The Chinese were determined to more clearly define those new concepts within the Chinese contexts through deeper levels of translation with their lives - translation of the West as literary creation, and translation as revolutionary practice.

2. The New Youth

a. Lu Xun

Although the failure of Dr. Sun's revolution resulted in a period of political darkness in China, the socio-economic basis was being restructured. With more students going abroad and returning home to assume important positions in science, technology, education, media, etc., the cultural landscape was experiencing basic changes. In the field of literature, literary translation and literary creation in the vernacular were taking on a new look. A new literature was beginning to emerge. It was born with translations, and

the ongoing massive translations were accelerating its growth. In fact, one could hardly talk about modern Chinese literature without going to its source of translations.

As in other areas and disciplines, almost all the major modern literary writers were 'baptized' in foreign literary influences through reading Yan Fu and Lin Shu, through learning foreign languages and through trying their hands in translation. In them, translation and creation were inseparable from each other. Similarly, nearly all the forms of modern Chinese literature, along with their vocabulary and grammar, came into being through translation. They include drama, fiction, poetry, prose and literary criticism.

For instance, in the author that many consider to be "the backbone" of modern Chinese literature Lu Xun (1881-1936), one can see a whole range of combinations between translation and creation. Lu Xun was one of those influenced by Yan Fu and Lin Shu's translations. He himself translated over three million Chinese characters of foreign writers from Russia-Soviet Union, Japan, France, Germany, Czech, Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland, Romania, Holland, Spain, etc. In 1902, he went to Japan to learn medicine, as he believed the new medicine had been important to Japan's Meiji Restoration.

However, a humiliating experience in Japan led Lu Xun to realize that

... medicine was not an urgent issue. People of an ignorant and weak nation, no matter how fully developed and strong they are in their physical building, can serve no more than objects for display or on-lookers. No matter how many of them die of illnesses and diseases, it would not necessarily invoke a sense of sympathy.

Therefore, our first priority, I believed, should be to change the people's spirit. To change their spirit, I thought, the most effective way would be through literature and art. That was how I came to advocate a literary and art movement (in Fang, 2001, online. Translation mine).

Starting from 1903, Lu Xun began his career as a translator. His first translations included Victor Hugo's essay on *The Miserable World*, tales of the Spartan heroes, Jules Verne and some other science fiction, some of which he translated from Japanese translations. In 1909, in collaboration with his brother Zhou Zuoren (1885-1967), another major translator and writer, he published his pioneering work *Yu wai xiao shuo ji* (Collected Stories from Foreign Lands, in two volumes). It included translations of 37 recent short stories from Northern and Eastern European countries, mostly 'small and

weak' ones that had been conquered or annexed. It marked a turning point in modern Chinese translation, opening up the Chinese view to a wider range of foreign literature, particularly literature of the colonized, exploited and oppressed nations like China. As Lu Xun wrote (in Wang, 1996, pp. 205. Translation mine):

At that time, rather than writing (stories) myself, I concentrated more on introduction and translation of especially short stories by writers particularly of the oppressed nations. Since at that time there was popular talk of driving out the Manchus, the cries and resistance of those writers found echoes in many (Chinese) young people.... Since the focus was on works of cries and resistance, I tended to look toward Eastern Europe, and I read a lot of works by writers from particularly Russia, Poland and the smaller countries of the Balkans.

Later, while continuing with his literary translation, Lu Xun began to translate his translations into his literary creation in the vernacular. With his knowledge and understanding of his own culture from new perspectives gained through his literary translation, Lu Xun, together with other important figures, launched a literary revolution whose impact on Chinese culture was as profound as Dr. Sun's revolution to China's political system. In May 1918, he published his short story "A Madman's Diary," an epoch-making literary success marking the beginning of modern Chinese literature.

"A Madman's Diary" is a unique literary combination of Chinese body with Western spirits that justified fiction as highbrow literature. Without doubt, it was based upon foreign literary influences. As Lu Xun himself admitted frankly, the success of this story depended on the over one hundred foreign works he had read and the medical knowledge he had obtained in Japan. Lu Xun said in an article that "as early as 1834, the Russian writer N. Gogol had already written a Madman's Diary; in 1883, Nietzsche spoke through Zarathustra's mouth" the same thing. This story of Lu Xun's was the first to put foreign literary ideas, forms, rhetoric and even scientific spirit within the Chinese context of socio-psychological and physical realities.

In a highly symbolic and subversive manner, the story seems to compare the then Chinese society as a historical product to a mad house. With his knowledge of new medicine and his insights brought up by his intercultural learning, Lu Xun defined the commonly accepted Confucian ideas of virtue and morality (*ren yi dao de*) as "a man-

eating-man tradition." Within this feudal, patriarchal tradition, life had been throttled, and ordinary people, particularly women, had been spiritually, psychologically and physically enslaved in the good name of virtue and morality. Any reader of the story can easily see that it is not the hero who is mad, but the society he is trapped in. Following the fear (Chapter 1) of the panic-stricken 'madman' (Reality), the reader comes to a general awareness that the very life the Madman was living had been "for four thousand years" man-eating (Chapters 2 & 3) (History). Now it is eating into the family (Chapters 4~6). Despite the Madman's plea to his eldest brother not to "eat" (Chapters 7~10), his lovable sister is still eaten (Chapters 11 & 12) (Present). The whole story ends with the Madman's desperate call "save the children," leaving some perceivable hope that "Perhaps there are still children who have not eaten men?" (Future)

Unlike either previous Chinese novels or Western fiction, "A Madman's Diary" is unique in its own way. Its language sounds natural and close to the vernacular, hence a great contribution to the language revolution that was under way, yet the mood and atmosphere is comprehensibly foreign and exotic. Its title, structure, style and choice of material are totally different from traditional Chinese novels, yet the background, spirit and ideas are realistically Chinese, accessible to the ordinary minds. Critics differ on whether its method is symbolic, realistic, romantic or stream-of-consciousness-like. However, they agree that it is the first modern Chinese literary achievement, and that it paved a modern Chinese way of literary approach with Western ideas and methods.

Encouraged by this experimental success, Lu Xun poured out in succession about twenty stories. They included, among others, "Kong Yiji," "Medicine," "An Incident," "My Old Home," "The True Story of Ah Q," "The Misanthrope," "Regret for the Past" and "The Divorce." A general survey of his fiction will reveal that Lu Xun focuses on the wretched existence of three kinds of Chinese people: the peasants, the old and new intellectuals¹ and the women, who tragically fall victims of their man-eating-man and male-dominated society. In a sense, by digging up any 'ugliness' that was deeply rooted in the tradition, Lu Xun was constantly seeking hope out of the then hopeless China. As a prolific writer, he published volumes of satirical essays, prose, poems and prose poems.

¹ Here the Chinese equivalent of "intellectual" bears a wider connotation, referring to any one formally educated.

From his works, one can conclude Lu Xun is a thinker, a philosopher, a revolutionary fighter, a social activist, a destroyer of the old and a builder of the new literature. With him, the social and political function of literature was revived; through him, the traditional Chinese and Western literary traditions were engaged, mediated and translated to a newer expression of the Chinese mind.

b. The New Youth Magazine

"A Madman's Diary" was first published in *Xin qing nian* (The New Youth Magazine), the pillar of the new culture that was being established. The year 1915 witnessed the appearance of this historical periodical, the headstream of both modern Chinese literature and modern Chinese translation literature. Its editor-in-chief was Chen Duxiu (1879~1942), the indisputable leader of the Literary Revolution and of the New Culture in general. In the opening page of the first issue, Chen proclaimed in his preface "To Our Youth" the following six aims: 1) democratic, independent and not slavish; 2) progressive and not conservative; 3) advancing and not retreating; 4) universal and not nationalistically closed; 5) practical and not affected; 6) scientific and not illusive.

This widely distributed magazine, trying to establish a new cultural language on a national scale, lived up to these principles. Its influences extended to nearly all the modern Chinese scholars, writers, statesmen, etc. From the very beginning, the periodical laid great emphasis upon translation and translation studies contributed by rising stars like Lu Xun, Zhou Zuoren and Mao Dun (1896-1981). For instance, in the first issue, it published translations of works by Wilde, Turgenev, S. T. Smith and Tagore. All the other issues devoted considerable space to translated works from Britain, America, Russia, France, Portugal, India, Poland, Denmark and Japan (see Liu, 1983). While before 1917, the magazine showed special favor to European realism and aestheticism, from 1918, it turned its attention to literature from countries that shared more things in common with China. Meanwhile, accompanied by insightful introductions to or commentaries on the originals and their writers, the translations displayed a pattern of systematic approach to foreign literature in general and individual national literature in particular. Thus literary translation was gaining an independent status as a discipline and manifesting its nature of interdependence as part of Chinese new literary vision.

In 1918, the magazine devoted its Volume 4, Number 6 to the Norwegian dramatist and poet Ibsen (1828-1906). With the article "Ibsenism" by Hu Shi (1891-1962), and "Biography of Ibsen" by Yuan Zhenying, it included translations of *A Doll's House*, *An Enemy of the People* and so on. The impact of this event can be discerned from an article written in 1925 by Mao Dun (in Wang, 1996, pp. 207-208. Translation mine):

These days the Shanghai Drama Association is putting on Ibsen's famous play *Ghosts*. Ibsen has an exceptional relationship with the "New Cultural Movement" that has shaken our nation over the last few years. Six or seven years ago, *The New Youth Magazine* published a special issue on Ibsen. It introduced this Northern European literary giant as a symbol of such new movements as literary revolution, women's liberation, anti-traditional thinking.... At that time, the name Ibsen rang in the hearts of the young people and lingered in their ears - in a way today only names like Marx and Lenin can compare.

Indeed, Ibsen in the vernacular conquered the heart of the Chinese youth, much more than Dumas fils in the semi-Classical Chinese and semi-vernacular had done over ten years before. Other major periodicals such as *Xin chao* (*Renaissance*, literally New Tides) and *Xiao shuo yue bao* (Fiction Monthly) successively ran their own special editions on Ibsen. A translator wrote (in Wang, 1996, p. 211. Translation mine):

Ever since the 19th century, he (Ibsen) has been a bright and brilliant moon in the literary world that has almost outshone Shakespeare. This is because each and every one of his plays has an 'ism,' a question/issue. In between the lines are soaked his compassionate and humanitarian tears of misery.

Ibsen's major plays, including *Nala* (Nora, i.e. *A Doll's House*), *Ghosts* and *An Enemy of the People*, were staged in major cities in China. Lu Xun offered his analysis of Ibsen's popularity (in Wang, 1996, p. 212. Translation mine):

Why should Ibsen have been chosen? This is because a new, Western-style drama needs to be developed, the status of literary verisimilitude to truth of drama needs to be promoted, and it is necessary to advance prose drama with the vernacular. In addition, specific and concrete examples have to be used to stimulate the intuition of the educated... Furthermore, it is because Ibsen was brave enough to attack the society and to challenge the majority alone by himself. I believe the

introducers and translators of that time might have felt they were lonely fighters hemmed in an old fortress.

Through the works of the lonely social reformist Ibsen, the Chinese lonely translators advanced Western-style drama (*hua ju*) to a higher level using the vernacular. At the time when movies, TV and other modern forms of popular culture were not developed, drama served as a most effective means to reach the masses in a mostly illiterate society. Before the introduction of the new form of drama, there had been only traditional local operas such as the Beijing Opera, which are performed by singing and dancing rather than 'acting.' At the turn of the century, many Chinese students in Japan came into contact with Euro-American drama. According to Wang (1996, p. 92), in 1903 Shakespeare and Moliere began to be staged in Japan. By 1906, quite a number of Japanese troupes had been organized, which performed plays by Ibsen, Materlinck, Strindberg, Bernard Shaw, Tolstoy and Anton Chekhov. All these inspired the Chinese students. In 1906, Ouyang Yuqian (1899-1962) founded China's first drama society in Japan - the Spring Willow Troupe. The next year, the Troupe adapted Lin Shu's translations of *La Dame aux Camelias* and *Uncle Tom's Cabin* into successful plays. It proclaimed the birth of modern Chinese drama. With Ibsen translated into Chinese, many drama societies and associations were organized in many parts of China, including, most notably, the Public Theatre (in Shanghai, 1918), Shanghai Drama Association (1921) and Beijing Experimental Theatre (1921).

More importantly, the lonely translators helped in undermining the traditional Chinese system of marriage and the lot of women that had already been shaken with ideas spread in Western missionary schools, through earlier translations and by overseas Chinese students. Their translations were further interpreted and translated against the Chinese reality by other staunch fighters for a new culture. For example, on December 26, 1923, Lu Xun delivered his famous speech "What Happened after Nora Left" at the Beijing Normal School for Women. He said (in Wang, 1996, p. 215. Translation mine):

But Nora left (her home) after all. What happened thereafter? Ibsen offered no answer. And he has died. Even if he was alive, he would not have to be obliged to give an answer, since he was composing poetry rather than raising a social issue and offering an answer for us...

For Nora's good, (I would say) money, - or to use a more elegant term, economy, is of vital importance. Although freedom could not be bought with money, it can be sold for money. Human beings have a major shortcoming, that is, hunger. To compensate for this shortcoming, in order not to be a doll, economy then plays a most important role in our current society. Therefore, first of all, in the household, there should be equal distribution of properties between men and women. Secondly, in the society, equal rights should be secured for men and women. Unfortunately I do not know how that rod (of power) can be obtained. But I do know that it has to be fought for - perhaps through more violent forms of struggle than just requesting the right to participate in politics.

In fact, the new generation of Chinese women inspired by Nora were already fighting for an answer with their lives. This is best seen in Qiu Jin (1875-1907), the symbol of Chinese women's independence. As a young woman from a moderately wealthy family, at the age of 21 Qiu Jin was arranged to be married to an older man, whose conventional life style was destroying her young life. In 1903, she left him and went to Japan, where she became a leader, a fighter and a role model for Chinese women's liberation. Three years later, she returned to China and became a principal of a school for girls. She devoted herself to the emancipation of women from foot-binding, financial dependence, and lack of marriage or career choices as well as to the cause of liberating China from the Manchu rule. The next year, she was executed by the Manchu government. In an article, the outstanding translator and pioneer of modern Chinese poetry and drama Guo Moruo (1892-1978) said (in Wang, 1996, pp. 216-217. Translation mine):

I think the road Qiu Jin took was exactly the answer to *Nora*. "To acquire corresponding knowledge and skills in life so as to be independent, to win women's self-liberation within the general liberation of the society, to shoulder women's responsibilities for the general social liberation, and to accomplish these tasks at the cost of their lives" - all these are the contents of the answer.

It seems to me the answer Ibsen could not give has been given by Qiu Jin with her life.... Qiu Jin set up an awakening example for not only national liberation movements but also women's liberation movement.

Here it can be seen that the literary translations published by the *New Youth Magazine* initiated the Chinese into various kinds and forms of revolution in China. First and foremost, it started the Literary (or New Cultural) Revolution, which undermined, from the very bottom, the basis of China as a Confucian country.

c. *Hu Shi*

Although the Literary Revolution can be traced back to Yan Fu and particularly Lin Shu's translations, its immediate 'blasting fuse' was an article entitled "A Few Modest Proposals for Literary Reform" published in 1917 in the *New Youth Magazine*. The article was written by Hu Shi, one of the first Boxers indemnity students sent to the United States. Hu had been intended to learn agriculture in America. However, in 1912, he transferred to philosophy and literature under the supervision of John Dewey. In September the same year, he became the first to translate into Chinese the short story "The Last Lesson" by Alphonse Daudet (1840-1897). Later he rendered Lord Byron's "The Isles of Greece" into Chinese, followed by a series of translations of acclaimed Western works. His translations were regarded as the "pioneer of literary reform" by Chen Duxiu (in Wang, 1996, p. 454), the editor-in-chief of the *New Youth Magazine*.

Like Chinese students in Japan, Hu, along with other students in USA, was exposed to the literary influences of the host country. As a necessary digression, here it would be suggestively helpful to see something that was happening to American literature. As mentioned earlier, by the end of the 19th century, both Chinese and Western literatures had come to a predicament. While Chinese were translating the West as a literary breakthrough, the West, particularly America, was translating classical Chinese literature, especially poetry, for inspiration and salvation. Thus, from 1912 to 1922, America witnessed its New Poetry Movement headed by the "Imagist School." The leader of this school, Ezra Pound, had been inspired by the Sinologist Ernest Fenollosa (1853-1908). Through the latter's unfinished works, Pound discovered a new treasury - Chinese poetry. He believed, in the new century, American poetry could find its inspiration and impetus in Chinese poetry (see Wang, 1996, pp. 445-447). He engaged himself in translating classical Chinese poems, and in 1915 published his revolutionary translations *Cathay*.

In 1914, based upon his experiences with Chinese poetry, Pound wrote his important article "A Few Don'ts," which can be regarded as a formal declaration of Imagism. With Amy Lowell, Hilda Doolittle, J. Fletcher, R. Aldington, F. Stuart and Flint Lawrence as key members, this School studied, translated, and modeled upon Chinese classical poetry. A statistic shows that from 1913 to 1922 the flagship publication of Imagism, *Poetry Magazine*, carried far more translations and studies of Chinese poetry than of any other single country (see Zhao, 1985). The Imagists revolutionized American poetry to a point where it could, and would, never return to the Victorian tradition. As the contemporary poet W. S. Merwin said, today, without taking Chinese influence into consideration, it would be hard to imagine American poetry. The Chinese influence has become part of the American tradition (see Zhao, 1985).

Naturally, Hu and other Chinese students were exposed to and swept by the new tides in American poetry. Thus an ironic but suggestive intercultural phenomenon occurred: while the Imagists translated Chinese classical poetry for a new poetic life, Chinese students in America were translating Imagist translations of China for the rebirth of Chinese literature. Two years later in 1916, after long deliberations with his Chinese colleagues in USA and in China, Hu Shi came up with some ideas. He wrote to Chen Duxiu for advice. Chen responded enthusiastically, saying (in Wang, 1996, p. 456. Translation mine):

Literary reform is our nation's utmost important issue... The Magazine intends to reform our literature and art, but cannot find any way to achieve it. Our nation has no tradition of realistic poetry or prose, and merely translating the West has failed to immediately invoke the ideal of realism among our fellow countrymen. I am sincerely looking forward to your contribution of realistic writings and a practical paper on reforming literature.

Soon Hu finalized and sent to Chen his "A Few Modest Proposals" following the style of Pound's "A Few Don'ts." In this explosive essay, Hu proposed his "eight noisms:"

- (1) Must have substance (in any writing);
- (2) Do not imitate our forefathers;
- (3) Must pay attention to literary methods;

- (4) Don't adopt a sentimental pose;
- (5) Must get rid of all platitudes and clichés;
- (6) Don't make classical allusions;
- (7) Don't be particular about antithesis;¹
- (8) Don't avoid using popular forms of characters and daily-life words.

Hu's relatively moderate proposals illustrated some of the ways Chinese literature should go, especially in terms of vocabulary, grammar and literary methods. They pointed to a breakaway from the classical tradition that was hopelessly out of touch with reality. The call for literary reform was strongly and popularly echoed. In the following issue, as a response, Chen Duxiu published his more revolutionary paper "On Literary Revolution," which formally launched a heated and lasting campaign. People from all parts of China and Chinese students around the world voiced their support. The magazine devoted itself to the theme. Besides translations in the vernacular, it published most of the first Chinese literature of importance in the vernacular, including poems, essays and short stories by forerunners of the New Literature like Hu Shi, Lu Xun and Chen Duxiu. Its revolutionary efforts were multifaceted and multilayered. For instance, the Magazine was one of the first to advocate Western writing/printing format and punctuation marks. In so doing, it aimed at revolutionizing the age-long Chinese use of vertical, unpunctuated lines beginning from the right to the left², a practice that may have something to do with the fact that ancient Chinese wrote on narrow bamboo slips.

Being the mainstay of the New Culture, the militant *New Youth Magazine* was bravely but sometimes radically fighting against Chinese tradition, with Confucianism as the target. It repulsed joint attacks from all directions: by feudal scholars, by cultural officials in the service of the warlords and by so-called rightist intellectuals. It united

¹ In the Chinese context, it means a matching of both sound and sense in two lines, sentences, etc. usually with the matching words in the same part of speech.

² According to Fan (2000), in 1917 the Magazine published a letter from Qian Xuantong, who wrote (translation mine):

Human eyes are juxtaposed with each other horizontally rather than vertically... It is much easier for one to move his eyes from left to right or from right to left than upward and downward... Besides, people usually write with the right hand, which moves naturally from left to right... Therefore it is more convenient to adopt the Western methods.

Earlier in 1915, Hu Shi published an article "On Sentence Pauses and Punctuation Marks" in *Science*, in which he proposed ten punctuation marks borrowed from the West. Together they revolutionized the Chinese tradition.

around itself many literary societies along with their newspapers and periodicals in the vernacular, notably, the *Renaissance*¹, *Xiang jiang Review*, *Emancipation and Transformation* (*Jie fang yu gai zao*), *Oriental Review* (*Dong fang za zhi*), *Fiction Monthly* (*Xiao shuo yuebao*), literary supplements of a number of national newspapers, etc. Together, they set out on a long march, step by step, towards the final establishment of the new literature. Ideologically, methodologically and attitudinally, they paved the way for the May 4th Movement of 1919, an overall revolution that pushed China to a point of no-return, dealing a final blow to the Confucian tradition that had been challenged since the beginning of China-West cultural encounter.

3. May 4th Movement

a. *The Movement*

The Opium War of 1840 and the May 4th Movement of 1919 mark two turning points – two demarcation lines – in modern Chinese history. While the former can be described as a Western colonial translation of China through breaking open the closed door of the Middle Kingdom, the latter can be viewed as China's own, active translation of the colonial West by a general and overall rejection of the Confucian identity. In other words, what had happened since the first Opium War can be interpreted as various forms of response to a West that China had profound linguistic and cultural difficulties translating. That process culminated in the May 4th Movement, which came as a radical translation of Euro-American global imperialism and capitalism with a new language that was striving to establish itself. Only by putting the Movement in a global context, particularly WWI and the Russian October Revolution (1917), could we make some sense out of it.

Culturally, the May 4th Movement refers to a decade of historical transition and transformation (largely through ongoing translation) more than to any particular event. While the Western Powers were engaged in WWI, thus temporarily loosening their colonial control over China, the ignorant, feudal-minded warlord Yuan Shikai was trying to push China back to monarchism. At the beginning of 1916, against the domestic and international trends, Yuan crowned himself "Emperor." The militant and roaring

¹ It started publication in January 1919 at the Beijing University, and was supervised and financially supported by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao. The periodical helped to bring up most of the modern Chinese writers of importance.

resistance from all over China, particularly the revolutionary south under the leadership of Dr. Sun, resulted in his sudden death. China's political power fell into the hands of a group of military leaders known as the Beiyang Warlords who were divided into various cliques, including Zhili (Hebei, supported by the U.K. and USA), and Anhui (backed by Japan) (see Jian, 1981, pp. 151-152).

According to Jian (*ibid.*), the warlords from different provinces maintained huge military establishments. Each regarded himself as the "supreme authority" in his own region, and engaged himself in constant internecine warfare against others. Thus China came to an even darker period, in political terms.

With WWI coming to an end in November 1918, the victorious Western powers met in Paris for the Versailles "Peace Conference" in January 1919. In fact, it was a conference about dividing the spoils of war, dismemberment of the defeated nations and redistribution of their colonies. The so-called Peace Treaty signed by all the powers stipulated that all the special "rights" previously seized by Germany in Shandong Province - the place of origin of the Boxers' Movement - be handed over to Japan. The special 'rights' included occupation of Qingdao and control of the mines located along the Jiaozhou-Jinan Railway. Just as the previous Qing Dynasty had done, the government of the Beiyang Warlords was prepared to sign the Treaty, without realizing the changes in the social and economic basis and in people's ideology and consciousness.

News of the Treaty from Paris sparked national indignation especially focussed on Japanese occupation. On May 4th, 1919, students in Beijing gathered at Tian'anmen with the slogan "Uphold Our Sovereignty, Punish the Traitors!" They vowed to fight against Japanese occupation, demanding punishment of three pro-Japanese traitors in the warlord government. They marched from Tian'anmen to the residence of the pro-Japanese Minister of Communications, Cao Rulin, and set fire to it. Later they called on all the Chinese students to stage classroom strikes. People across the nation voiced their sympathy and support for the students. On June 3 in the growing industrial centre of Shanghai, a mass meeting involving people of all walks of life was organized, calling for a national strike in support of the students. On June 5, over seventy thousand workers in Shanghai, Tangshan and Changxindian downed tools. Meanwhile merchants and students throughout the country went on strike. The incident thus developed into a combined

revolutionary movement, and the warlord government had to refuse to sign the Treaty (see Jian, 1981).

For the first time, ordinary Chinese all over China, rather than small, isolated elite groups of scholars, reformists or revolutionaries, united against both the corrupt government and Western powers. In particular, the new generation of students educated by mostly returned students under the climate of New Learning, and the rapidly growing working-class - created largely by Western colonial expansion of capitalism, appeared on the stage as a great political force. The initial victory encouraged them to go deeper into the roots of all the interrelated problems confronting China by way of involving participation of as many members as possible. For instance, while workers and merchants were forming allies against domestic feudalism and foreign capitalism and imperialism, students along with new intellectuals were passionately devoted to disseminating new ideas from the West. According to Hu Shi (1919), in 1919 alone, over 400 new magazines and periodicals were started by students and progressive intellectuals, providing different forums for debate over the future of China.

As the Movement developed, the political control of the warlord government was greatly eroded. The moral and cultural basis of the Old Learning represented by old-fashioned Confucian scholars was severely undermined. Meanwhile Western colonial forces were somewhat weakened by growing international understanding of and sympathy with the changing China. All this created a space of unprecedented intellectual freedom and emancipation, and at the same time a moral and ethical vacuum. The new generation of Chinese, freshly awakened to its own subversive power, was exploring new ways to overthrow, in Mao Zedong's words, the three big mountains weighing on the backs of the Chinese - Western imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism being hand and glove with its Western counterpart.

b. Translating Marxism

Translation played its due part creating this historic moment. In fact, it was extending from its traditional realm of importing Western science, technology, philosophy and literature, to the more sensitive zone of politics. Although the revolutionary role of translation can be easily seen from Kang-Liang's Reform, Sun Yat-sen's revolution and

the Literary Revolution, it played a most significant role in the May 4th Movement, directly leading to the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party. Before examining the cultural aspects of this period's translation, we must first of all take a look at its political dimension, which has ever since served as a 'hidden curriculum' behind China's translation practice.

No one knows exactly when the theory of Marxism and the ideal of communism (共产主义, literally property-sharing/public ownership/co-productionism, a loan word from Japanese) were first introduced into China. The Russian Socialist Revolution of October 1917 sent a flood of communist ideas to China on the eve of the May 4th Movement. As Chairman Mao said, "The May 4th Movement came into being at the call of the world revolution, of the Russian revolution and of Lenin" (in Jian, 1981, p. 144). The victory of Lenin's revolution offered the brightest hope to a group of young Chinese who saw no hope in China's previous attempts at reform or revolution. This group passionately translated Marxist classics, including the "The Internationale," whose first Chinese translation appeared in *Lao dong zhe (Labourers)* in 1920 (Gao, 1983). They rendered Soviet Union's documents and Russian proletarian revolution literature into Chinese. *The New Youth Magazine*, *Fiction Monthly*, *Renaissance* and so on ran special editions of Russian-Soviet literature. They admired, appreciated and idealized the new land of liberation, freedom, equality and felicity of the majority – the working class. The Soviet Union seemed to be a perfect example for China to get rid of the 'three big mountains.'

According to Chen (2001), while Marxism had been fragmentally translated into Chinese before 1919, a complete version of the *Communist Manifesto* did not appear until August 1920. In January of the same year, the leader of the Chinese communist movement Chen Duxiu was released after being imprisoned for his revolutionary activities by the warlord government. Disguised as a merchant, Chen escaped from Beijing to Shanghai with an English version of the *Manifesto* borrowed from the Beijing University Library, hoping to find someone to translate it into Chinese. He soon learned in Shanghai that Chen Wangdao (1890-1977), a Marxist translator newly returned from Japan, was rendering it from a Japanese version. Chen sent him the English version for his reference, and proofread the manuscript when the work was done. Excited about the translation, Chen decided to publish it in a book form, but there were no funds available.

Coincidentally, a Russian envoy from the Communist International was in Shanghai trying to establish contact with Chinese revolutionary organizations to explore the possibility of forming a Chinese communist party. The envoy met with Chen, and offered some funds for publishing the translation. The book was printed in August. Although many problems with both translation and printing occurred in this first edition, it was an epoch-making event. Nearly all the founding members of the Party were to be drawn into the Communist movement by this book. Mao Zedong once remarked that it was in 1920 when he had read the *Communist Manifesto* that he came to understand that class struggle existed from the beginning of human history as the motive power of social development. Premier Zhou Enlai once said Chen Wangdao was the educator of all the earliest Communists (see Chen, *ibid.*).

According to Jian (1981, pp. 144-149), in the summer of 1920, China's first Marxist group was founded in Shanghai. It opened a Communism training program, with Chen Wangdao as an instructor and his translation as the textbook. In August, the Chinese Socialist Youth League was inaugurated. Meanwhile, Marxist groups and Socialist Youth Leagues became established in major cultural, economic and industrial centres such as Beijing, Wuhan and Guangzhou. In Paris and Tokyo, similar organizations were formed among overseas students. While translating Marxist-Leninist theories into Chinese, they used those concepts and ideas as ideological weapons to analyze, reconceptualize and revolutionize China, including words whose Chinese equivalents were borrowed from Japanese translations of German and English terms such as (see Liu et al. 1984):

阶级 (class) 社会 (society) 社会主义 (socialism) 生产 (production)
生产力 (Produktionskraft, forces of production) 剩余价值 (Mehrwert, surplus value)
生产关系 (Produktionsverhältnisse, relations of production)
世界观 (Weltanschauung, world outlook) 特权 (privilege) 唯物论 (materialism)
唯心论 (idealism) 宣传 (propaganda) 意识 (consciousness) 政党 (political party)
资本 (capital) 资本家 (capitalist) 无产阶级 (proletariat)

Soon the Chinese Communist Party was formally founded following the pattern of the Russian Bolshevik Party. It held its first congress in July 1921 in Shanghai, attended

by thirteen delegates representing more than fifty Communist groups. With the emergence of the Communist Party, whose members and supporters were mostly activists in both political and cultural revolutions, Chinese translation entered a new stage characterized by its political implications. Being a cultural activity in a complicated domestic and international situation, it was developing in a way nobody could have foreseen.

Within China's socio-political and cultural context, tensions between different, conflictual and contradictory versions of Chinese translation of the same West surfaced. At no time in Chinese history had translation been so closely related to politics – Western theories of constitutional monarchy, democratic republic and Communism, to name but a few of the key ideas translated during this period. The political agendas began to split Chinese translators into different groups. One was represented by the older generation of translators such as Yan Fu and Lin Shu, who were in the service of the warlord government. Labeled as conservatives and constitutional monarchists, they were still struggling to strike an evolutionary balance between Chinese body and Western function. In other words, they continued to use the more traditional Confucian language to redefine Chinese cultural identity in relation to the West in ontological terms.

Another was represented by moderate scholars like Hu Shi and Zhou Zuoren. Politically named as bourgeois liberalists, they went more in line with Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary visions. They tried carefully to wire-walk a middle-way between the reformist Kang Youwei's Confucianization and the growing sentiments of what could be termed one-turn negation of Confucianism. As bi-cultured thinkers with liberal and democratic ideals, they intended to stay away from politics and devote themselves to progressively rebuilding a new culture in lieu of the old.

Still another was represented by Chen Duxiu, Lu Xun, Guo Moruo and Shen Yanbin, who were more influenced by literature of the globally oppressed and exploited peoples and by the October Revolution. A sense of revolutionizing China with proletariat ideology was deeply imbedded in their translation and literary practice. This revolutionary spirit seemed to leave little time or space for them to think about the cultural nature of translation. Many of them later joined the Communist Party, and their translations became part of the Communist revolution.

Apart from those translators at the cultural centre who could be politically labeled, there was a great number of individual translators in the margins who worked out of personal or cultural interests. With more students returning from different host countries, the number of more interculturally qualified translators using the vernacular increased rapidly. In the field of literature, for instance, within a short period of time, Greek, British, French, American, German, Japan, Indian and Northern and Eastern European literature found its way to China via vernacular translation. An incomplete statistic (cited in Wang, 1996, p. 301) shows that between 1917 and 1927, when the two-decade war between Kuomintang and the Communist Party¹ began, over two hundred and twenty-five books of translation appeared. Meanwhile numerous translations were published in various magazines and periodicals. Among the translated volumes, 65 were from Russia/Soviet Union, 31 from France, 24 from Germany, 21 from Britain and 12 from Japan. It was more or less the same with other fields of translation. This clearly tells what the West came to mean in China and where the May 4th Movement was going, in intellectual terms.

4. Translation as Intellectual and Political Power Play

a. Inner tensions in literary achievements through translation

In retrospect, the intellectual and moral vacuum resulting from the anti-colonial and anti-feudal May 4th Movement created a space for different social, political and intellectual forces to compete with one another. Specifically, what happened to translation constitutes an ongoing Chinese text of cultural intertextuality with the West. In a sense, it seemed to put an end to what the earlier cultural translators such as Yan Fu, Lin Shu and Hu Shi had intended to begin, and began what China seemed to be culturally unprepared for. It succeeded in decentralizing China as a Confucian nation, but failed to rebuild the nation in either political or cultural terms. Consequently, for nearly a century, China has been trapped in a dilemma of translation between the devitalized Confucian tradition and the vigorous West with too many different faces.

¹ Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who had practiced his policy of uniting Russia and the Chinese Communist Party into his revolutionary front against the warlords, died in Beijing in 1925. He was succeeded by Chiang Kai-shek. Soon the pro-American Chiang launched a war against the Communists.

Ironically, instead of narrowing cultural gaps between China and the West, the May 4th translation seemed to be deepening those gaps by radically translating different versions of Western political and social theory. To reach the other end of the gap, China had to keep translating. The more China translated, the farther away it found itself from the other end that at one point had seemed to be so reachable. Filling up this gap of translation, both literally and metaphorically, was to cost China millions and millions of lives. It was a violent political struggle for different visions from the West. The underlying uncertainty, confusion and contradiction threw Chinese translation into an abyss of tangled intellectual warfare in the form of constant debates over what, for whom and how to translate.

Again the inner tensions of the May 4th translation are best seen in the ongoing Literary Revolution. In fact, as in other aspects of Chinese life, one can hardly separate literary translation as a means from Literary Revolution as an end. As early as April 1918, the initiator of the Revolution Hu Shi published an important article in which he said:

The first step for creating a new literature is (acquiring) the tool, and the second the methods... What preparations should be made in order to develop good literary methods? After much thought, I have come to the conclusion that the only way is to translate, in the shortest possible time, as many Western literary classics as we can as our models (in Chen, 1992, p. 206. Translation mine).

In March 1919, the editor-in-chief of the *Renaissance*, Fu Sinian (1896-1950), who studied in Britain and Germany, published what is regarded as the first treatise of translatology of the Literary Revolution. In this paper entitled “Reflections on Translation,” Fu said the academic situations of the then China were similar to the European Renaissance. It followed, he went on to say, that China was about four hundred years behind Europe. To catch up with the West, it did not have to take China four hundred years. China could avoid what the West had failed in, and copy final achievements of the West without repeating the processes. The best shortcut would be to learn Western languages and translate Western works to bring Western modern useful knowledge to the Chinese (see Editorial Board, 1984a, p. 59).

Clearly Hu and Luo valued translation for its utilitarian purposes of facilitating the growth of Chinese new literature in the vernacular. As can be seen from above, the May

4th Movement appeared to be an impetus for vernacular translation to flourish in both quantity and quality. At a superficial level, it accelerated success of the Literary Revolution as far as language was concerned. Toward the early 1920s, the vernacular definitely established itself over the Classical Chinese.

Meanwhile, with more overseas and returned students joining in the literary campaign, new literature in the vernacular began to boom. Like Lu Xun, nearly all the early major writers in the vernacular were at the same time major translators. Almost all of them had some experiences of overseas studies, and were ideologically and aesthetically inspired by the Western writers they had read and translated. Also, like Lu Xun, they were translating their personal, cultural and intercultural experiences into their literary writings. To a certain extent, in them, translation and creation were one and the same. While it is impossible to list all the achievements of this early period of New Literature, a brief examination may provide the other half of the picture of the May 4th translation.

As discussed earlier, with “A Madman’s Diary” by Lu Xun, fiction had established itself as serious literature and as a best means to immediately reach the ordinary Chinese. The greatest achievement of this period, in which short stories were better developed, is Lu Xun’s “True Story of Ah Q” (1921). As a newer representation of Lu Xun’s anti-traditional efforts, the story presents an archetype of the spiritual being of the “ugly” Chinese. The character Ah Q is to the understanding of existential conditions in China what Bloom in *Ulysses* is to the decentralization of modern Western identity. Other important writers include Bing Xin (1900~?), one of the most accomplished female writers. She studied in the United States and later became the major translator of Tagore. In 1919, she published *Wane and Sallow Alone*, a ‘problem novel’ that mirrors the conflicts between two generations in their attitudes towards violent social changes.

Yu Dafu (1896-1944), who went to Japan in 1913 as a student and was to become a major translator of English, German and Japanese novels, published *Degradation* in 1921. It was the first success of modern middle-length novels, a Freudian and naturalistic approach to an overseas Chinese who, with a homeland as weak as himself, suffered injustices and discriminations in a foreign country. Yu opened up the important tradition of literature by and of overseas students, which has brought down-to-earth Chinese

experiences of the West to the vast Chinese readership. In 1925, Yang Zhensheng (1890-1956) contributed his *Yu Jun* to the New Literature. It is a middle-length novel about the tragedy of the heroine, a “goddess” made of jade struggling against feudal morals for women’s liberation. The year 1926 witnessed the appearance of *Lao Zhang’s Philosophy*, a full-length novel by Lao She (1899-1966), a lecturer of Chinese classics at the University of London. The novel is a caricature of a snob who fishes in the troubled waters of the then China.

Drama was gaining its momentum against older forms of operas and vulgar shows. As a newly imported form, it first relied upon translation and adaptation of Western works such as *La Dame aux Camelias* and *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*. There was a period when drama of “social problems” flourished, mainly enthusiastic introduction of Ibsen. In 1921, a monthly periodical *Drama* was started in Shanghai, which published some good plays written by Chinese. Hong Shen (1894-1955, studied in America from 1916 to 1922), the first modern dramatist of importance, published in 1923 his *Zhao Yanwang*, an attack on the warlords. Other important plays include *One Night in a Cafe* (1924) by Tian Han (1898-1968), a major revolutionary drama writer and translator who had been to Japan as a student from 1916 to 1920. Ding Xilin (1893-1974), another famous translator and dramatist who had studied in England, published *A Hornet and Other One-Act Plays* in 1925. The prolific translator, poet, dramatist and scholar Guo Moruo, who had been a student in Japan from 1914 to 1923, contributed *The Tower* and *Three Rebellious Women* (1926). With these historical plays, Guo added much to the accomplishments of the anti-feudalism drama.

Prose in the vernacular was also beginning to flourish. Traditionally it had been the highest form of literature: the word *guwen* (Classical Chinese/Literature) often refers to classical prose. It was an area most challenging to the New Literature. One of the first names that comes to a modern Chinese mind would be Zhu Ziqing (1898-1948), who published a collection *Traces* in 1924. A challenge to classical writings, many pieces in the collection have been ever since well read and recited. There is a long list of prose writers in this period, including Zheng Zhenduo (1898-1958), Bing Xin, Sun Fuyuan (1894-1962), Yu Dafu, Zhou Zuoren, Lin Yutang (1895-1976) and Liu Bannong (1891-1934). Most of them were important translators with overseas experiences. The

outstanding prose writer is Lu Xun, whose volumes of *za wen* (satirical essays or feuilleton) have been compared to “daggers” and “spears” against old traditions. His prose poem *Wild Grass* (1924-26) is like a mountain arising from surrounding hills.

Poetry was also acquiring a new life in the vernacular. As early as 1916, Hu Shi published his *Experimental Verse*, which turned out to be a failure. But new poems by young poets inspired by foreign poetry kept emerging. Kang Baiqing (*Grass*, 1922), Yu Pingbo (*Winter Nights*, 1922), Wang Jingzhi (*Orchid Wind*, 1922), Bing Xin (*Stars*, *Spring Water*, 1923), Lu Zhiwei (*Crossing the River*, 1923), Wen Yiduo (*Red Candles*, 1923) – all these poets were fighting to establish new forms and methods for the New Poetry¹. The most outstanding poet of this period is Guo Moruo, well known for his *Goddesses* (1921). As the first collection of the New Poetry, *The Goddesses* bears, in a subtle way, a striking resemblance (textually sparkling with allusions) to *Tian wen* by the earliest individual poet Qu Yuan. It is the burning love and praise of the child for the awakening mother (land), widely regarded as a rebirth or return to the early Chinese poetry tradition with an awakened spirit of the Dragon and Phoenix.

However, to say that *The Goddesses*, or New Poetry, or New Literature thus born was a return to the early literary tradition that had become corrupted with the feudal dynasties is what is perplexing and problematic. In what sense could it be said as a return when

¹ At the time nine schools of poetry were discernible (see Guo, 1991) as follows: (1) The Romanticists of the Creation Society represented by Guo Moruo, Feng Naichao (1901~1984) and Wang Duqing (1898~1940). They are characterized by their idealism, emphasis upon intuition, inspiration and self-expression, and their strong, fanciful imagination. (2) The “Literary Research Society”, including Zhu Ziqing, Ye Shengtao and Zheng Zhenduo, who maintained that art was “for life’s sake.” Their works were more socially oriented. (3) The “Pop School” represented by Liu Bannong and Liu Dabai (1880~1932), who based their art more upon traditional realism, folk songs and folklore. (4) “Petite Poems School” represented by Bing Xin and Zong Baihua, who were heavily influenced by the Japanese *Haiku* and the Indian poet Tagore. Their poetry has a strong philosophical quality, concise, refined and implicit. (5) The Lake Poets, Ying Xiuren (1900~1933), Feng Xuefeng (1903~1976) and Pan Muhua (1902~1934). Like their English forerunners Wordsworth and Coleridge, they followed the natural and spontaneous flow of their emotions and came out with beautiful poems of love of the new generation. (6) The “Elegance School”, represented by Feng Zhi (1905~1994), who embraced “art for art’s sake.” Their slogan was “externally, taking in foreign literary nutrition; internally, digging up the national soul, discovering the mind’s eye and tongue, contemplating this world, presenting to the lonely songs of the true and the beautiful.” (7) The “New Metrics School” represented by Wen Yiduo and Xu Zhimo (1896~1931). With English poetry as an example, they sought to develop a set of new rules for the New Poetry which should, in their opinion, possess the “beauty of music (syllable), of painting (words), of architecture (balance of syllables and lines).” (8) The “Symbolist School” represented by Li Jinfa (1900~1976) and Dai Wangshu (1905~50), who found inspirations for Chinese poetry from French symbolism, indifferent to forms but careful about the colors and sounds of words. (9) The “Revolutionary School” represented by Jiang

most of the then influential writers were dumping anything traditional into the cosmic container of revolution? In fact, the success of a writer was being popularly judged by how far s/he distanced him/herself from tradition rather than the other way round. Furthermore, nearly all the poets, writers and dramatists were as much inspired and empowered by foreign literature as by their own literary tradition. The Romantic poet-translator Guo Moruo is known to have been influenced by Tagore, Whitman, Shelley, Shakespeare, Heine, Goethe and Schiller (see Lin et al. ed., 1988, p. 254). He might be exemplary of the growth of this generation of writers through translating Western literature. In an article published in 1923, Guo offered a romantic interpretation of translation and of the characteristic of the New Literature in general:

Translating Shelley makes me become Shelley, and Shelley me. Translating poetry is not like parrots imitating human speech or monkeys wearing hats. To be married, first of all a man and a woman need to fall in love with each other. There needs to be a meeting of the hearts that strikes a sympathetic chord. I love Shelley; I can feel and hear the voice of his heart; he can strike a sympathetic chord in me; I am married to him. He and I become one. His poems are poems of my own. Translating his poems is like composing poems myself (in Chen, 1992, p. 270. Translation mine.)

By analogy, when he was composing poetry, he was translating. Indeed, Guo's *Goddesses* seems to be a sinicized, although sometimes awkward, translation of Whitman and Shelley in its free spirit. However, one can hardly say it is a marriage between Qu Yuan's poetic legacy and Western Romantic spirit. Up to that point, the two literary traditions did not yet have any shared aesthetic or critical basis. As a critical term in Western literary tradition, Romanticism is not applicable in classical Chinese literary history. As a Western ruler, it can not be properly used to measure Chinese literary height or width. By the same token, the supernatural, philosophical, moral and political qualities and the strong sense of loyalty to the throne in Qu Yuan are not comparable with Whitman or Shelley. Two heterogeneous but equally self-centred, masculine and

Guangci (1901–31), who sang praise of the Russian October Revolution and the struggles of workers and peasants.

male-chauvinistic aesthetic entities can not be happily married even if one might occasionally find some sympathetic echoes in the other.

As counterevidence to the impossibility of marriage, it would be helpful to see how Westerners interpret Guo. Martin Seymour-Smith (1985, p. 361) regards *The Goddesses* as a “zestful reformist volume, firing out Utopian dreams like bullets from a machine gun...not a bad social verse.” What the reviewer sees in the piece is an undefined and uncontrollable revolutionary spirit rather than Romantic literary ideal translated from the West into the Chinese context. While such a negative review may reflect a Westerner’s self-centred attitude towards Chinese New Literature (see Guo, 1991), it points to the incomprehensibility of Guo’s sinicized and widely acclaimed romanticism to a Western audience. Guo’s poetry translation or translated poetry seems to be lost in the divorce between the two traditions with little romantic possibility of marriage.

It follows that, like other literary practitioners of the May 4th Movement, Guo was manipulating his translation of the West as a weapon against the Confucian – synonymous to feudal – tradition. The irreconcilability between the sense of literary and the sense of socio-political responsibility made it impossible for him to be either Qu Yuan or Whitman/Shelley. It was an inherent contradiction in the New Literature.

b. Debates

The innate contradiction manifested itself in constant debates over the direction of the New Literature and new translation. For instance, following Hu and Chen Duxiu’s call to revolution, Liu Bannong published “My Opinions about Literary Reformation” in 1917. The following year saw two important essays by Zhou Zuoren, “Literature of Man” and later “Literature of the Ordinary People.” Other major critics including Lu Xun, Mao Dun, Li Dazhao, Wen Yiduo, Zhu Ziqing, Zheng Zhenduo and Ye Shengtao joined the deliberations. Although the above and other pioneers did discuss issues concerning the methods of the New Literature, they focused more on what and for whom to translate/write. Everything came to hinge on the conceptual change from Literary Revolution to Revolutionary Literature, at which point they split into a lasting ideological struggle with different political agendas.

Later in his life, as Grieder (1970, p. 186) noted, Hu, who had refused to be involved in politics, regarded the May 4th Movement as a deadly blow to the New Culture of his dream¹, which could never, in his opinion, regain its force or momentum. Here Hu did not provide any rationale for his assessment of the Movement. He might be suggesting that the Literary Revolution was going astray to be politically overcharged. But what was the New Culture in his bi-cultured mind? What is the relationship between translation-creative writing and such a New Culture? How could different traditions and cultures be properly mediated to build a New Culture that was able to distance itself from politics? Above all, how would it be possible to build the New Culture of his dream, given the international and domestic situations that were certainly against any peaceful cultural transformation? While these questions are beyond the scope of the present study, they are relevant to any discussion of the nature and meaning of translation in a global era.

As Grieder (ibid.) pointed out, during the May 4th Movement, even Hu himself was enthusiastically applauding the way the Movement was developing. In his “Intellectual China in 1919” (in CSPSR, 1919, p. 348), he regarded the students, merchants, demonstrations, public speeches and boycotts as non-political forces that were creating new optimism out of the pessimism among intellectuals in the wake of Kang’s aborted reform. He was pleased to see that the Movement was developing a better understanding of democracy as something more than a particular political system. Democracy also referred to the psychology that was conducive to sustaining a particular social condition. To Hu, democracy was the totality of all the democratic and democratizing forces, including social, economic, moral and ideological forces.

Indeed, not only democracy but also a host of other Western concepts needed to be better understood within the Chinese context. However, as it turned out, the democratic and democratizing forces enlightened by the West were soon turning back to point their guns at the very crucial translators of the West – Yan Fu, Lin Shu and Hu himself. Ironically it was Hu’s generation of translators, including Hu himself, who first opened fire at the older generation. As early as 1918, as part of the Literary Revolution, two editors of the *New Youth Magazine* Qian Xuantong and Liu Bannong, launched an attack

¹ According to Grieder (1970), Hu and other bi/multi-cultured intellectual leaders of the May 4th Movement were cosmopolitans.

on both Lin Shu and Yan Fu. While academically justified in their accusations, they were partly motivated by their strong desire to challenge Yan and Lin's prestige and overpower them in interpreting the changing culture.

In a sarcastic tone, the two editors laid the following charges against Lin without regard to the historical factors that had been working: 1) lack of discretion in the choice of originals, often throwing away meat to gnaw the bone; 2) unfaithful to the originals, losing their spirit by distorting their faces beyond recognition; 3) using Classical Chinese and especially the literary taste of the Tang Dynasty to translate Western novels, which had been so sinicized that readers almost forgot they were reading foreign literature. They concluded that in comparison with the ancient Buddhist translators, Lin was irresponsible to either the original or the target language and culture.

The two writers criticized Yan for his appropriation and 'naturalization' of Western concepts as well as his adoption of the pre-Qin style of prose that had won him fame. Ironically, what Yan had meticulously done, as discussed earlier, in hermeneutically taking important Western concept into Chinese historical contexts to decide on a Chinese equivalent, became his heel of Achilles. Qian and Liu wrote:

Take Western *logic*, Chinese *ming xue* (名学) and Indian *yin ming xue* (因名学). Although the three are similar by nature, they are different in range and spiritual qualities. Therefore Indians would not take *logic* to be their own property of *yin ming xue*, and other Chinese would never force it to be China's own *ming xue*. When Yan translated *logic* into *ming xue*, he was "cutting the feet to fit the shoes" (as the Chinese proverb goes). Furthermore, he indiscriminately dragged "*ming jiao* (名教, Confucian ethical code), *ming fen* (名分, a person's status) and *ming jie* (名节, reputation and integrity) into that treatment. Doesn't this mean that any pure Western learning, when coming into China, will have to become... a big garbage can?

By translating *neutral* into *wang liang* (罔两¹), it is obvious that Mr. Yan intended to have 罔 signify "no" and 两 "the two genders of *yin* and *yang*." However, if using the name of a rare beast to mean "no two," it follows that all the "neutral nouns" will become beasts! If Mr. Yan hears what is said here, he would

¹ Possibly the word had been coined by Yan from 魍魉, meaning a rare demon or monster.

surely jump from his opium-smoking bed², and shout out “Damn it!” (In Chen, 1992, p. 211. Translation mine.)

Other fighters of the Literary Revolution followed suit. For instance, later that year, one of the editors of the *Renaissance*, Luo Jialun (1897-1969, who studied in U.S., Britain, France and Germany), mocked at Lin for his ignorance of foreign languages and for sinicizing his translations. Not long after, in his “Reflections on Translation” cited earlier, Fu Sinian severely reproached Yan Fu, saying that

Mr. Yan’s translations of *Evolutions and Ethics and Other Essays* and *L’esprit des Lois* are among the worst (of his translations). Had Huxley and Montesquieu lived a few years longer, mastered Chinese, and read Yan’s translations, they would have filed a lawsuit against him. Or at least, they would have made a statement in the newspaper. This is because Mr. Yan is not responsible to the original writers. He is responsible only to himself. He is responsible only to his fame, reputation and status (in Chen, 1992, p. 218. Translation mine).

By that time, the old, feeble Yan was already too disillusioned with what had happened to China since his introduction of the theory of evolution to rise in defense of himself. As a critical translator and cultural mediator, Yan had his own vision of the future of cultural China with his sharp insights into the downside of Western civilization. Out of that vision, Yan had fought to maintain the Confucian identity against radical efforts to Westernize China in a wholesale manner. He had advocated a constitutional monarchy after Britain as opposed to the Sun Yat-sen revolution with its republic ideal. He had supported the warlord Yuan Shikai in his attempt to restore China back to the feudal order. He had published a series of essays and lectures on returning to the Confucian past. Naturally, Yan was now against the vernacular movement, regarding it as throwing away the meat to gnaw the bone (see Gao & Wu, 1992, pp. 1-38).

In a sense, Yan had marginalized himself from China’s intellectual centre. In 1918, old and diseased, he retired to an isolated life back in his hometown in Fujian. He died there in 1921 in loneliness and disillusionment, but his critical intercultural understanding left a legacy that is of practical value for today, which will be discussed later.

² Unlike most of other scholars returned from the West, Yan was addicted to opium.

Unlike Yan, the chivalrous Lin did rise against attacks from the new youth. His defense was more about upholding the integrity and legitimacy of Classical Chinese and Classical Literature than about his textual translations. Like Yan, Lin was also emotionally and intellectually attached to the Confucian tradition. In his opinion, the European Renaissance did not discard Latin, and the Chinese followers of that Movement should not abolish Classical Chinese. In 1919, Lin published in Shanghai his *Jing Sheng* and *Yao Meng*, two sarcastic stories written in the Classical Chinese ridiculing those vernacular advocates. As a tit-for-tat struggle against the new youth's declaration that "Classical Chinese is a dead language" and "Classical Literature is a dead literature," Lin denounced the vernacular as "the vulgar language of street pedlars" (see Yang, 2001, online). Later he published a letter to the president of the Beijing University Cai Yuanpei (1868-1940), accusing the University of subverting Confucianism and betraying the ethical codes of conduct. The letter made him the central target of ridicule and criticism from the revolutionary front.

Thus the first translator of Cervantes' *Don Quixote* became Don Quixote himself. The picture Lin drew of himself in Classical Chinese might be a vivid description of his generation of progressive intellectuals as tragic and helpless pioneers for a more orderly transformation of the Confucian tradition:

For twenty years, I have been begging my life here in Chang'an (the capital) in cold and hunger. I do not have the intellectual power of Meng or Han¹, but I have undertaken to do a job as difficult as theirs. Although my struggle is called *wei dao* (defending traditional moral principles), it is like a mosquito trying to carry Mount Taishan on its back. Although I know it is a task beyond my ability, I have been hoping that others may rise to join me. However, everybody else is fast asleep, leaving me crowing alone like a morning cock... As a seventy-year-old man, I am close to death now... But is there anyone who has not been a son to his parents? Is there any student who has not read the great teachings of the sages? I would shrink from no sacrifice if only a thin thread of traditional moral and ethical hope was allowed to exist in this universe (in Yang, 2001, online. Translation mine).

¹ Here Lin may refer to Mencius (372BCE-289 BCE), the great Confucian scholar after Confucius, and Han Yu (768-824), the great literary master and leader of the Neo-Confucianism against Taoism and Buddhism.

The lonely and barely heard cockcrow was doomed to die away in the wilderness of radical revolutions without the slightest repercussions. With Yans and Lins disappearing from the intellectual scene, the victorious new youth, aesthetically, ideologically and politically divided into different groups, turned to point their guns at one another. From early 1920s to late 1930s, a series of heated quarrels and debates over what and how to translate arose.

Without doubt, those fights enhanced the growth of translation as an academic discipline in theory and practice in the vernacular. To a certain extent, it was with those fights that translatology in the vernacular grew up to maturity. For instance, Luo Jialun proposed four principles for choice of the originals, use of the vernacular, and proper attitude towards translation in his paper that attacked Lin Shu. Fu Sinian suggested his eight-pointism for what to translate in his criticism of Yan Fu. Zheng Zhenduo discussed the possibility, purpose, function and methodologies of translation. Jiang Baili (1882-1938), who studied in Japan and Germany, came up with a formula of translation in the light of Western history of translation. Mao Dun, Yu Dafu, Wen Yiduo (1899-1946) and a long list of others contributed their insights into theories and methodologies of literary translation to the discussions and debates (see Chen, 1992, pp. 214-288).

At the same time, however, the 'hidden curriculum' of political and social missions behind those disputes overshadowed the deeper mission of translation as intercultural mediation. Since major translators were also major writers belonging to different literary schools, contentions and arguments over translation often had some factional notes in them. The most notable fights in 1920s took place between the Literary Research Society headed by Zheng Zhenduo and Mao Dun and the Creation Society headed by Guo Moruo, Yu Dafu and Cheng Fangwu (1897-1984).

As Chen (1992, pp. 358-359) commented, the members of the Literary Research Society had had deeper experiences of hardships and natural or human-made disasters plaguing China with Western colonization. Heavily influenced by socialist ideas, they had inherited the spirit of realism advocated by the *New Youth Magazine* and valued the social function of translation. Therefore they put more emphasis on the purpose of translation, regarding translation as equally or even more important than original creation, and paying special attention to introducing literature from the conquered, oppressed and

exploited nations. The members of the Creation Society, on the other hand, had grown up in foreign lands, able to read in foreign languages, and had been bathed in the exotic sunshine of Romanticism and Aestheticism. Eager to rise and dominate the literary arena, they were rebellious against any ‘authority,’ old or new. They considered creative writing to be original and primary, and translation secondary.

The leader of the Creation Society Guo Moruo, “politically very flexible...less insincere than excitable” (Seymour-Smith, 1985, p. 361), threw a series of ‘bombs’ against the world of translation. In 1921, Guo cast his first bomb from Japan in a letter to the *Shishi xinbao* (Current Affairs) (in Chen, 1992, p. 266. Translation mine):

I feel that people in the homeland value (woman) *matchmakers* well over and above *virgins*. They concentrate only on translation rather than creative writing. Those who unworthily occupy a place in the world of literature and art are only thinking of showing off flowers from some neighbours instead of growing some flowers in their own courtyards for appreciation... Although it is understandable that at a time when green and yellow have not joined (a new crop has not yet come) translation is a necessity... still it can count only as something subordinate. It should not be allowed to override creation and research and crazily flaunt its violent power... The value of translation, as far as literature and art are concerned, is but reporting to the reader: This flower already exists, or another flower has blossomed in the garden of the world... From another perspective, it amounts to luring the reader: this is what the flower garden of the world looks like, why don’t you grow something like that? Consequently, translation as a cause has little positive value of its own. It can only satisfy a person’s impulsive desire to possess, or stimulate the impulse to create in people... In conclusion, *virgins* should be respected and valued, while *matchmakers* should be contained to a certain extent.

Guo’s radical attitude towards translation, partly resulting from an unpleasant personal experience¹, met with criticisms from Mao Dun, Zheng Zhenduo, Lu Xun and others. For example, Zheng criticized Guo for his “wrong observation” of translation, which was echoed by Lu Xun and Mao Dun. Zheng pointed out that Guo was

¹ As Guo confessed fifteen years later (see Chen, 1992, p. 267), at that time he was mad at Li Shicen, an editor of the *Current Affairs*, who had published a story meticulously created by Guo after a poorly translated piece by someone else.

undervaluing translation, whose function went far beyond the role of a matchmaker. To him, translation worked more like a wet-nurse. When a certain foreign literary work has been created and introduced into China, it does not merely mean that a new flower has blossomed in the garden of the world. Rather it means a new, bright way of spiritual communication among human beings has been opened up. Zheng insisted that literary production included both creative literature (domestic product) and translated literature (foreign produce), and they two shared equal status (see Chen, 1992, pp. 224-228). In his article “Translators in Russian Literary History” (1921), Zheng said:

The greatness of a translator is no less than that of a creative writer. A translator is the supreme communicator in the spiritual and emotional lives of humankind...

Literary communication may greatly reduce misunderstandings among human beings. Before the world has a common language, translators have a very important mission (in Chen, 1992, p. 227. Translation mine).

Such debates were helpful for a healthy understanding of translation but unacceptable to Guo. In July 1922, as a response to the idea of the purpose and function of translation proposed by Mao Dun and Zheng, Guo lashed out at them, accusing them of “assuming an attitude of a dictatorial monarch,” and “obstructing the free will of the people” (see Chen, 1992, p. 207). This kind of practice – putting a political label on others in academic discussions – later became popular in China’s intellectual life, and turned out to be disastrous in the never-ending political struggle throughout the 20th century. In fact, when Guo compared translation to a matchmaker, its political implication was obvious. At that time, with particularly the introduction of Ibsen, China was at its height of women’s liberation and marriage by choice. The disgusting image of the matchmaker was in a sense reactionary and counter-revolutionary.

In an essay published in 1923, Guo (in Editorial Board, 1984a, p. 104) attacked some well accomplished translators and critics such as Wu Zhihui and Zhang Dongsun. His main target was Hu Shi, who had contemptuously rejected some corrective comments Guo and his friends of the Creation Society had made on translations done by Hu and his followers. Hu and his friends were returned students from America, whereas Guo and his comrades from Japan. Both sides were claiming their own authority over interpretation of

Western texts. The intellectual power struggle, sometimes driven by different political motifs, can be clearly discerned from various writings of those days.

With nationwide political crisis deepening due to the struggle between the Warlords, the Nationalists and the Communists, translators became more politically divided and translation more politically oriented. In fact, in 1927 when the Nationalists started to wipe out the Communists, translators spontaneously fell into different political fronts. The most notable was the “Left-Wingers Alliance” headed by Lu Xun, who contributed a series of brilliant essays on translation during his years of discussions with his comrades and debates with various influential men of letters who can be loosely categorized as Right-Wingers.

With factional undertones involving political stands, the discussions and debates were in fact a continuation of deliberations on the relationships between translation and cultural transformation left behind by Yan, the Reformists and the Literary Revolution. At a superficial level, they centred round technical issues, including ways to determine Chinese equivalents, standardization of loan words and concepts, different methods and styles of translation (literal, liberal, rigid, mechanical) in relation to the literary language of the vernacular. Meanwhile, much attention was paid to standards of and attitudes towards translation (see Editorial Board, 1984a). At a deeper level, however, they were about where the new culture should go, given the domestic and international situations.

For instance, from the many disputes and debates between the Left-Wingers and other schools and individuals, two themes distinctly emerged: for whom and, in turn, how, translation should be done. It should be noted here that as the central leader, or fighter (in Mao Zedong’s words) of the New Culture, Lu Xun was disappointed with the changes in the intellectual and cultural landscapes. He could feel no hope in either the Reformists, or the Warlords, or the Nationalists. Constantly viewing China from the perspectives of the poor, the wretched, the oppressed and the exploited, he became sympathetic with the Chinese Communists as a new hope of the nation. Speaking from and for this position, he could easily run into conflicts with those who might take different perspectives from their own positions. Consequently, Lu Xun engaged himself in intellectual wars against some of the most popular, interculturally educated, and otherwise respectable, scholar-translators of the time.

Although it is not clear what vision Lu Xun had of the changing culture in relation to the West, we might come to some kind of understanding from the following instances. Being protective of the revolutionaries who were hunted by either the Warlord or the Nationalist governments, Lu Xun, himself closely watched by the Kuomintang, managed to keep in touch with people from different backgrounds. One of his contacts was Qu Qiubai (1899-1935), top leader of the Chinese Communist Party who had travelled extensively in Soviet Union and met Lenin twice. As an organizer and leader of the May 4th student movement, Qu contributed to the Communist revolution through translating Marxist literary theories, reporting on Soviet Union and editing journals and magazines. His translations were regarded as “unparalleled in faithfulness and expressiveness” by Lu Xun (in Lin et al. ed., 1988, p. 474). The letters Qu and Lu Xun exchanged on translation are valuable historical documents reflecting some viewpoints of the two leaders.

On December 28, 1931, shortly after Lu Xun published his translation of *Rozgrom* by the Soviet writer Fadeev, Qu, in his pseudonym J. K., sent a letter to Lu Xun. He praised the publication as a success of every revolutionary fighter, reader and writer, saying that he loved the translation in the way he loved his own children. Qu then focused on the function of translation in relation to the Chinese language. He wrote:

Apart from introducing the original contents to Chinese readers, translation plays another very important role: helping us to create a new, modern Chinese language. The (current) written and oral language is so poor and inadequate that many daily essentials are nameless. In a sense, it seems to be still a sign language – daily communication could not work without kinetic speech. Such adjectives, verbs and prepositions as expressing subtle differences and complicated relationships are almost non-existent. The remains of the medieval patriarchal feudalism are still choking the living language of the Chinese (not just the masses of workers and peasants!). Under these circumstances, it is a major task to create a new language. The more advanced countries in Europe completed this task three to five hundred years ago. Even Russia, historically a more backward country, ended its “Church Slavic” about a hundred and fifty years ago. In Russia, it was the bourgeois Renaissance and Enlightenment movements that did the job... The Chinese bourgeois class is not capable of the work. Indeed, it was the Westernized gentry

and merchants like Hu Shi who started the movement in China. However, the Movement resulted in serving its political masters. Therefore it is left for the proletarian class to carry out the task and to lead the Movement to victory. Without doubt, translation can help us create many new words, new sentence structures, richer vocabulary and more subtle, accurate and correct expressions. Since we are fighting to create a new, modern Chinese language, we have to require translators to be absolutely correct and to absolutely use the vernacular. *This is to introduce a new cultural language to the masses of people* (in Editorial Board, 1984a, p. 216. Translation mine).

Qu went on to criticize Yan Fu's way of translation. In particular, he denounced translator Zhao Jingshen (1902-1985) and his followers, who had accused Lu Xun of "hard (stiff, unnatural) translations," and preferred to be smooth rather than correct. To Qu, their 'smooth translations' were half-Classical half-vernacular, half-dead and half-alive hybrids resulting from copulation between Liang Qichao and Hu Shi. According to Qu, this 'smoothness at the cost of correctness' was 1) catering to the taste of a less developed language and preventing the language from advancing beyond barbarism; 2) keeping the reader in the dark from knowing the original meanings, hence an obscurantist policy and intellectual tyranny; 3) opposing popularization of proletarian literature, since their accusation had been directed to the proletarian literary translations (see Editorial Board, 1984a, p. 217).

Therefore while upholding the social function of translation, Qu seemed to view debates over translation as a form of class struggle. In fact, in the next part of the letter, he used politically militant language, referring to Zhao and others as "our enemies" (Qu addressed Lu Xun as "Respected and beloved comrade"). He turned to G. Plekhanov (1857-1918), whom he had translated, for dialectical materialist strategies against those later called reactionaries. Meanwhile, like other Communists, Qu believed in the power of proletarian translation in changing the Chinese language in order to revolutionize the political consciousness of the working class. Thus to the Communists, translation was actually an intellectual weapon and political tool, a statement later popularly made and heard in the New China.

Up to that point, Lu Xun, although a prolific and influential translator, had seldom, if ever, talked about translation. But Qu's letter prompted him into contributing a number of most insightful essays to Chinese translatoiology. In his response to Qu, Lu Xun offered some positive comments from a historical perspective on Yan Fu, who had inspired Lu Xun with his social Darwinist translations. He went on to discuss Yan's ideals of faithfulness, expressiveness and elegance in relation to the current faithfulness vs. smoothness debate. It was here that Lu Xun brought up a major issue to the horizon of Chinese translation: for whom was a translation intended? Without a sound understanding of this point, any talk of standards, purposes and functions of translation would be futile.

Lu Xun roughly divided Chinese readership into three groups: (1) well educated; (2) fairly literate; (3) almost illiterate. For Groups (2) and (3), pictures, illustrations, lectures, drama, movies and creative writings rather than translations would be more practical. Textual translation would be mostly for Group (1). For this group, said Lu Xun, he would favour "faithful rather than smooth" translations. He wrote:

What is meant here is that...unlike having tea or porridge that can be swallowed easily, (reading such translations) one will have to use his/her teeth to chew on them. Why not, then, have sinicized or naturalized translations so as to save readers some energy?...My answer is that such translations are not only importing new contents but also new expressions. The Chinese language, written or oral, is indeed imprecise and inaccurate. The recipe for prose writing has been to avoid commonly used characters and to omit functional words...When speaking, one would often fail to express his or her ideas. The inadequacy of the language also accounts for the fact that when teachers give lectures, they often have to resort to chalk (Editorial Board, 1984a, p. 225. Translation mine).

The grammatical imprecision and inaccuracy, said Lu Xun, is evidence of imprecision in thinking, or in other words, mental confusion. In this case, no matter how smoothly or how much one read, what the reader got was still shadows of confusion. To cure this chronic disease, wrote Lu Xun:

I think we have to bear some hardships, and feed (in our brains) some foreign syntactical structures...and gradually keep them for our own. This is not a fantasy.

Take Japan for example. In Japanese writings, significantly different from the time when Liang Qichao was working on his Japanese-Chinese Dictionary, europeanization of grammar is now very common. In China, as you mentioned in your letter, the word *ba gong* (strike, down tools), first created in 1925 for the masses of people, is now understandable to all (ibid.).

Elsewhere, Lu Xun further explained his insistence on literal or hard translations:

To be easily understandable, translation should give way to creative writing or adaptation, which can turn what is foreign into what is Chinese, and foreigners into Chinese. If there should still be translation, first and foremost it should serve the purpose of extensive exposure to foreign works in both emotional and intellectual terms... It is similar to travelling abroad: it must have exotic flavors... In fact, there is no such thing as completely naturalized translation. If there was, it would be something united outwardly but divided at heart (as the Chinese proverb goes), and would not count as translation in its strict sense. Any translation should take into account two sides: one is to try to be easily accessible, the other is to preserve the original appearance. But this preserving is often in contradiction with easy accessibility, making it difficult (for the Chinese audience) to bear the sight of the appearance. However, translation is in itself a 'foreign devil,' hardly appealing to a Chinese eye. To make it fairly more pleasant to the Chinese sight, what can be done is to change his clothes, but not to cut his nose lower or his eyes out (Editorial Board, 1984a, p. 246. Translation mine).

Unfortunately Lu Xun did not go on to elaborate what kind of relationship there might exist between the Western image preserved in translation and the Chinese audience trying to find their own identity in that translated but unaffected image. Neither did he extend his discussion to the question of how the heart within the preserved image might interact with the heart of the Chinese reader.

Without doubt, Lu Xun had a clear understanding of language as a way of thinking and living. His theory and practice of translation were part of his general efforts in changing the Chinese mode of thinking, and revolutionizing the nation from its semi-feudal and semi-colonized mentality. However, contradictions arose here. On the one hand, in the letter Lu Xun seemed to be intending translations for the general masses of

people. On the other hand, his categorization actually excluded the greatest majority of the Chinese (Groups 2 and 3) from his realm of translations. Without involvement and participation of the (semi-) illiterate in deciphering, interpreting, reconstructing, establishing and practicing foreign ideas and meanings, how could the socio-political consciousness be transformed as Lu Xun expected? What was left, then, was some kind of politically-driven intellectual war among the elite group of Chinese, who actually did not have to rely on translations. Consequently, a new elitism, similar to the traditional Chinese elitism being fought against, was present.

Secondly, like earlier generations of translators of Western science and technology, Lu Xun seemed to regard Western cultural vocabulary, grammar and rhetoric as some concrete 'objects' that could be physically transported and transplanted in China's intellectual world. Again on the one hand, the May 4th translation had emerged out of an awareness that previous Chinese science-technology translation had failed exactly because Western science and technology as function were not compatible to traditional Chinese culture as body. On the other hand, what Lu Xun as a leader of the Movement seemed to indicate was that the modern culture of the West as something nameable and fixed could be used, in a wholesale manner, to replace the pre-modern culture of China. Here Lu Xun remained a modernist in his quest for China's modernization without further inquiring into modernity as Yan Fu had done.

As a de-colonizing thinker, however, Lu Xun did at times show his postcolonial and postmodern foresights in his debates over Chinese translation. In an article "Eight Drawbacks in Current Writings," Lin Yutang (1895-1976), one of China's best writers in English who "contributed most to Chinese translatology among non-Left-Wingers Alliance in 1930s" (Chen, 1992, p. 327), criticized Lu Xun and his followers:

...In literature, (they) introduce Polish poets today, and Czech literary masters tomorrow, resenting the already famous writers of Britain, America, France and Germany as out of date... Which is like women being crazy about fashions - they feel inferior and disadvantaged for being females, and try their best to please (their male masters) with colourful fashions...(in Editorial Board, 1984a, p. 248. Translation mine).

To this accusation, Lu Xun, in his usual, cold, poignant, ironic and sarcastic tone, replied:

But (being crazy about) this kind of "new fashions" enjoys a fairly long history. "Introducing Polish poets" started thirty years ago... At that time, the Manchus ruled China and enslaved the Han people. China's situation was similar to that of Poland, and Polish poetry found ready echoes (in us). There was no intention to ingratiate ourselves with any masters (ibid.)

Lu Xun went on to mock at Lin's lack of historical consciousness, and made a point that is still of practical significance:

Those happy youth born and growing up in the Republic do not know (the historical context described above), and still less do those snobbish and money worshipping lackeys know (about it). Even if today we continue to introduce Polish poets and Czech literary masters, why should it be called "ingratiation?" Don't those countries have "already famous" writers of their own? Moreover, who are those who know those "already famous (writers)," and where have they got to know them? Indeed, "Britain, America, France and Germany" have missionaries in China. They had or still have concessions, military bases, fleets, lots of merchants and Chinese employees in China - so many so that ordinary Chinese only know that there are "*da ying* (Great Britain)," "*hua qi* (the Stars and Stripes, i.e. USA)," "*fa lan xi* (France)" and "*qie men* (Germany)" in this world but not Poland or Czech. However, the literary history of the world is seen with literary, rather than snobbish, eyes. Therefore, literature does not need to be screened or covered by money or rifles and cannons. Although Poland and Czech did not join the Eight-Power Allied Forces in attacking Beijing, they do have literature, only that it is not "already famous" to some people (in China) (ibid.).

Although Lu Xun was here counterattacking those Right- or non-Left-Wingers with some factional implications, what he said actually touched upon some fundamental issues still challenging the present postmodern and postcolonial world, including the relationships between knowledge and power, and between centre and margin. It pointed to complications and complexities that China, and indeed all non-West nations, were facing in translating the outside world dominated by the Euro-American Empire. It

alerted the reader to the danger of one-sidedness in global translation characterizing the colonial history, which has led the world to the current intellectual and political poverty of globalization. It represented some hope Lu Xun might have that translation as an expression and communication of humanity could go beyond geopolitical, economic and military power lying behind and at the same time underpinning Chinese translation.

Such insights into the relationship between translation and Chinese cultural identity were overshadowed by the growing political demands. With wars going on among the warlords, the Kuomintang and the Communists respectively backed by various international powers, Chinese translators had to choose their sides. Translation as an academic discipline thus became a field of political crossfire. In a sense, it was a microcosm of different forces - domestic and international, traditional and modern, conservative and revolutionary - that were working at the heart of China. All those roars, shouting and yelling of discord drowned any moderate, thoughtful and culturally responsible voice. For instance, Hu Shi (in Durant, 1954, p. 822) once commented on the radical revolution in China:

It would surely be a great loss to mankind at large if the acceptance of this new civilization should take the form of abrupt displacement instead of organic assimilation, thereby causing the disappearance of the old civilization. The real problem, therefore, may be restated thus: How can we best assimilate modern civilization in such a manner as to make it congenial and congruous and continuous with the civilization of our own making?

Like the 'lonely morning cockcrow' of Lin Shu, this rational aspiration of Hu Shi's evaporated into thin air. In fact, even Hu himself later became the target of revolution. As an official in the service of Chiang Kai-shek's government, he was at times censured and even faced imprisonment by Kuomintang for his liberal criticisms of the Nationalist politics (see Grieder, 1970, pp. 228-257). In that position, Hu was severely criticized by the Communists for his open opposition to Communism. Instead of building a cultural bridge for tradition and modernity, and for China and the West, Hu as a textual and cultural translator was lost between those incommensurable gaps and divides.

In 1936, Lu Xun died - the most thoughtful, profound, insightful and militant voice of Chinese translation stopped. The next year, as part of its geopolitical and global missions

against other Western powers, Japan, the first Asian country modernized through translating the West, having further translated itself into an imperialist and militant power, invaded China. The 8-year War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945) broke out. In the face of the fact that the very existence of the Chinese nation was at stake, the Nationalists and the Communists temporarily joined hands in forming a united front against the invaders. Accordingly the course of translation changed, automatically and spontaneously turning to be part of the National Defense translation. Different schools of translators with different political aspirations put aside their ideological differences in a joint effort to save the nation. Although less discussions and treatises on Chinese translatology appeared, textual translations were still mushrooming up.

c. *Chiang Kai-shek: A 'higher' form of translation*

At this historical moment, the most powerful translator at China's political centre, Chiang Kai-shek, had his own version of Chinese translation of the West. In his *China's Destiny* written in 1940, Chiang first reflected on introduction of the West (Chiang, 1947, pp. 96-97):

After the Opium War, in the belief that the Western powers were rich and strong because of their guns and ships, the Chinese people began to study the technique of making guns and ships. After the War of 1894, the Chinese people also began to study foreign social and political institutions. Famous works of Western social science were translated into Chinese. Discussions of Western social and political theories began to appear in magazines and newspapers. For some decades after this, as a result of discussion, popular study, comparison, and observation, China's applied science, natural science, and social science all made progress.

He then went on to discuss how the Chinese became self-colonized (ibid. pp. 97-98):

On the other hand... under the oppression of the unequal treaties, the Chinese people reversed their attitude toward Western civilization from one of opposition to one of submission, and their attitude toward their own civilization changed from one of pride to one of self-abasement. Carried to extremes, this attitude of submission (to Western theories) became one of ardent conversion and they openly proclaimed themselves loyal disciples of this or that foreign theory. Similarly, the attitude of

self-abasement was carried to such an extreme that they despised and mocked the heritage of their own civilization... Unconsciously, the people developed the habit of ignoring their own traditions and cultivating foreign ways; of respecting foreign theories and despising their native teachings; of depending upon others and blindly following them. Thus, although the Chinese people originally studied Western civilization because of their unwillingness to become slaves, the result was that they unconsciously became the slaves of foreign theories because of their studies of Western civilization.

Chiang was especially critical of the May 4th Movement. The reason is that (ibid. p. 98):

After the May 4th Movement, the ideas of Liberalism (democracy) and Communism spread throughout the country. But those that advocated these ideas had no real knowledge of the enduring qualities of Chinese culture... they merely endeavoured to copy the superficial aspects of Western civilization without attempting to adopt its basic principles for the benefit of the Chinese economy and the people's livelihood. As a result, the educated classes and scholars generally lost their self-respect and self-confidence. Wherever the influence of these ideas prevailed, the people regarded everything foreign as right and everything Chinese as wrong.

To Chiang, different cliques of political forces in China were blind but self-centred worshippers of the West, each clinging to one particular theory of a particular foreign country. He said (ibid. pp. 99-100):

In 1913, the arguments for a parliamentary system, a cabinet system, and a presidential system in reality reflected the differences between the British, the French, and the American political systems. In 1920, the opposing theories of a centralized as against a federal state reflected the differences between the French and the American systems of local government. The theoretical basis of the monarchy of Yuan Shih-k'ai was provided by an American editorial, and the constitution of Tsao K'un was an exact copy of the Weimar Constitution of Germany.

On the struggle between the Liberalists and Communists, Chiang said (ibid. p. 100):

It was merely a reflection of the opposition of Anglo-American theories to those of Soviet Russia. Not only were such political theories unsuited to the national economy and the people's livelihood, and opposed to the spirit of China's own civilization, but also the people that promoted them forgot they were Chinese and that they should study and apply foreign theories for the benefit of China. As a result, their copying (of Western theories) only caused the decay and ruin of Chinese civilization, and made it easy for the imperialists to carry on cultural aggression.

As top leader of the fragmented China, here Chiang, himself well educated in and by the West, almost regarded the May 4th translation as a destructive rather than constructive force. Indeed, by that time anything that could be called Chinese had been basically abolished, from language, clothing, etiquette, communal and social order, to literature, Confucian philosophy, traditional knowledge system, ethical codes of conduct, political and educational systems. Intellectually, different schools armed with different ideas and speaking half-mediated and half-manipulated languages of particularly America, Europe, Japan and Soviet Union fought against one another in interpreting Chinese realities. They diagnosed China's fatal 'diseases' from their cultural paradigms appropriated from the West and came up with numerous prescriptions. However, no school could organically combine various conflictual and contradicting theories from the West with the complex and complicated lived and living experiences of the Chinese into a form of integrated and acceptable framework for China's development. Academically, what was achieved most was in East-West comparative studies: how different the Chinese language was from Western languages, which in turn reflected the degree to which the Chinese civilization was different from that of the West. Ironically, even in this field, most guiding principles were translated from the West, that is, the Chinese were learning to understand themselves through translating Western translations of Chinese.

On the other hand, Chiang's interpretation of the May 4th was contradictory to his Nationalist Party's revolutionary practice. It relativised the political ideal of his Kuomintang. As discussed earlier, Chiang was the successor of Sun Yat-sen, whose revolution had been one particular version of Chinese translation of Western politics. However, Dr. Sun's revolution had been lost to the evil hands of the warlords. It was the

May 4th Movement that had re-energized the Nationalist Party under Chiang, whose Northern Expedition (1926-1927) in a joint effort with the Communist Party had finally overthrown the warlord government. But once in power, Chiang began persecuting liberals and democrats like Hu Shi within his own regime and wiping out the Communists headed by Chen Duxiu, the 'commander-in-chief' of the May 4th Movement. The pro-American Chiang's particular interpretation of the May 4th translation put China in a protracted civil war starting from 1927.

What cultural vision Chiang had, or how to maintain the Chinese identity - if there was one - in China's colonized context, is not known. What is known is that the anti-liberal and anti-Communist Chiang chose to adhere to his interpretation of the May 4th translation. With the ending of the anti-Japanese War and WWII in 1945, instead of uniting all the political forces within China to democratically and constructively rebuild the Chinese identity, Chiang continued to practice his suppressive and oppressive policies. As a result, China fell into the three-year Civil War between the Nationalists and the Communists. The war almost put textual translations and translation studies to a halt. Some well-established translators either died or fled from place to place for life. Others left mainland China to Hong Kong, Taiwan, America and Europe. Without a unifying vision for the future of China, Chiang, although supported by the United States, gradually lost his roots in the mainland. Finally in 1949, he had to flee to Taiwan with his corrupted government and army. A new China, politically unified but culturally disintegrated as a result of translation, was established under Communist leadership headed by Mao Zedong. More radical translations of the West were to come.

Up to that point, textually, Chinese translation had made considerable achievements. In literature translation alone, thousands of works had been rendered into Chinese. A great number of individual translators devoted themselves to textual translations under incredible hardships. One of the highly respected translators is Zhu Shenghao (1912-1944). At the age of 23, Zhu was determined to undertake one of the most difficult tasks challenging Chinese translators - the complete works of William Shakespeare. For ten years, Zhu buried himself in the project. He went through all kinds of trials and tribulations, including extreme poverty, illnesses, family burdens and disasters of war - some of his manuscripts were lost or burned into ashes when the Japanese bombed

Shanghai¹. At the age of thirty-two, a year before the Japanese surrendered, Zhu died of disease, leaving behind thirty-one and a half volumes of quality translations of Shakespeare's plays, and a unique legacy in the history of modern Chinese translation.

The following statistic, conducted by Tsai (p. 507), may provide a picture of the range and width of literary translation under the Nationalist leadership from 1911 to 1956. Largely incomplete, it is based upon the State Central Library of Taiwan's catalogue. It excludes translations of numerous poems, short stories, serialized novels, plays and fairy tales published in various magazines and journals, and those published in the mainland and Hong Kong after 1949:

Country	No. of novels	No. of plays	No. of volumes of poetry and prose	Collections and children's stories	Total
Britain	435	96	29	6	566
France	344	50	10	44	448
America	272	13	2	3	290
Russia	197	36	2	34	269
Japan	111	12	4	37	164
Germany	78	22	10	22	132
Italy	22	6	1	19	48
Greece	6	12	16		34
India	19	7	2	4	32
Denmark	1			25	26
Norway	7	14		4	25
Spain	20	2	1		23
Belgium	7	10		1	18
Hungary	16		1		17
Sweden	5	3	1	2	11
Bulgaria	6		1		7
Jewish	1	1		5	7
Austria	5	1			6
Poland	4	1		1	6

¹ In August 1937, the Japanese invaders attacked Shanghai. They bombed a great number of buildings, including the *Shangwu yinshu guan* (Commercial Press) and *Shijie shuju* (World Books Publisher), China's key publishing houses of translations. Numerous manuscripts in translation, including some of Zhu's, were destroyed.

Switzerland	6				6
Arabia	2			4	6
Holland	3	1		1	5
Persia	1			3	4
Romania	3				3
Finland	1			1	2
Egypt				2	2
Africa	2				2
Czech		1			1
Syria	1				1
Thailand	1				1
Yugoslavia	1				1
Brazil				1	1
Portugal			1		1
Unidentified	251		50	57	358
Total	1838	288	131	276	2533

In social and political terms, these and other textual translations of particularly Western political, socio-economic, educational, ethical and military theories were retranslated into tragically heavy loss of Chinese lives. Millions and millions of Chinese either sacrificed or lost their lives for some undefined hope of a new Chinese identity through half a century's wars for different translated versions of the West. In a sense, all these anti-colonizing and self-colonizing efforts took place against the setting of an unidentifiable, untranslatable, unpenetratable but ever-present, always capitalized identity of the WEST as a myth and dream of modernization.

IX. De-colonization: Translation under the Proletarian Dictatorship

1. Background

Over a half century of mutual generalization, stereotyping and demonization in terms of political ideologies between China and the West has rendered interpretation of Chinese translation since 1949 difficult and problematic. First of all, such a practice of pan-politicization has deepened and widened the linguistic and cultural gaps as reflected in earlier discussions between the two, confining intercultural discourses on both sides to things other than intercultural deliberations. Secondly, the 'hidden curriculum' of domestic and international political struggle has blurred the boundary between translation as a political act and translation as part of day-to-day life. Thirdly, the ongoing process of Chinese translation has become somehow more and more contextualized within the new phenomenon of globalization, an aspect to be identified later in the thesis.

Chinese official projection and manipulation of the colonial memory and the image of the West as an evil colonizer has prevented Chinese scholars from going beyond geopolitical concerns to achieve a deeper and more realistic intercultural understanding based upon a sense of cultural reconciliation. Moreover, it seems to have ironically rendered the image of the Chinese, victims of the colonial history, into an irrational aggressor and 'threat' as depicted in Western media. On the other hand, Western media together with a more fully developed Sinology seems to take pleasure in presenting contemporary China as a de-historicized and de-contextualized Other. In a sense, the notorious anti-Communist McCarthyism (1951-1954) might also be subtly preventing Western scholars from going further than political objectives in their treatment of the New China as a cultural entity.

Under such a political and intellectual climate, it has become more urgent to take a non-political perspective to gain a better insight into contemporary Chinese translation as an intercultural activity. Indeed, the New China was culturally born out of her colonized and self-colonized history, and contemporary Chinese translation is a continuation of the China-West dialogue interrupted and delayed by what happened before and after WWII. Although anti-colonial and anti-feudal translation did achieve one of its goals of helping

China gain independence, its deeper role as interpreting and mediating human conditions in an interrelated and interdependent world would never stop. First of all, how to rebuild the destroyed Chinese culture that would be more compatible with the new world reality still remained a question Mao's China had to answer. The cultural questions arising from the pre-New China translation described above were still there to be textually and culturally addressed.

On the one hand, it is almost impossible to interpret the highly politicized practice of translation from non-political points of view. On the other hand, to acquire a non-political (in the Chinese context) and non-economical (in the Western context in which economy is the other word for politics) perspective is vital to translation studies in the age of Posts (post-Cold War, post-modern, post-colonial, etc.) and of globalization. Amid these tensions and contradictions, what I intend to do here is to at least strike a balance between the different forces to try to reveal the deeper 'identity' of translation as a human and humane intercultural engagement.

With the ending of WWII, the world came to a postcolonial age. While colonized nations like India were fighting for their independence, China was engaged in the Civil War, a way to address and redress colonial issues. In 1949, the Kuomintang retreated from the mainland to Taiwan with whatever movable capital assets, treasuries and cultural wealth that had survived a century of wars, including, for instance, most of the cultural relics stored in the Forbidden City. It also transferred whatever human resources it could attract to Taiwan, including those qualified, bi-cultured translators who had staged the drama of disputes with Lu Xun and others described earlier.

With all the Euro-American colonizing powers driven out of the mainland, the Communists headed by Mao victoriously declared the founding of the New China in Beijing, a city that had served as China's capital long before Matteo Ricci arrived there. By now, although the completely defaced Beijing still remained the national capital, China had been translated and retranslated into anything but Marco Polo's or Matteo Ricci's China. In terms of culture, it could be described as grotesque, resulting from a dismembered body with malfunctions translated from the West, a colonial debt that could hardly be written off with any postcolonial hands. Neither could it be dodged with any

intellectual tricks, since it was the real condition of a people's life that had to be lived in a real world already, in one way or another, interconnected and interrelated.

Externally, the New China was not only ideologically but also physically isolated from the West, which had ironically become its past - something China had been trying to interpret and translate for several centuries while chopping off ties with its own earlier, Confucian past. To its east was the former invader who was metamorphosed into a new form of Euro-American imperialism. To its southeast was the US military threat in the Taiwan Straits, cutting off any possible route to the outside world. To its south were British (Hong Kong) and French (Vietnam) hegemonic presences. To its south- and northwest were more wretched colonial victims (India, Pakistan, etc.) struggling to redefine their new identities. The only door remaining open for China was Stalin's Soviet Union, a door that was leading to deeper isolation.

Internally, as Mao described, the New China was *yi qiong er bai* (economically poor and culturally blank), both literally and metaphorically. Except for an undefined but unified optimism about a new Communist society inspired by the Soviet Union's translation of Marxism, China was a land and a nation in ruins.

On the other hand, the stark poverty and cultural blankness were understood to be a blank sheet of paper on which any new, idealistic picture could be drawn. This idealism, supported by the fresh sense of liberation from all the oppressive forces, domestic and foreign, for a time transcended any awareness of the bleak reality. It was further strengthened by a broken memory of a destroyed Confucian history and broken ties with a past - the West that had walled itself off.

Loss of either chronological or synchronic connections, and isolation from the rest of the world now being integrated, seemed to be pushing China back to the closed, pre-Ricci Middle Kingdom mentality and attitude. On the one hand, there was a general but strong sense of international proletarian responsibility to live and fight for the liberation of the working class all over the world. It was a kind of innocent internationalism, universalism or cosmopolitanism resembling, in an interesting way, both the contemporary Euro-American idea of globalization and the traditional Chinese notion of 'heavenly mandate.' On the other hand, lack of knowledge of, or access to, the living

outside world, made it possible for that global dream to renew itself within the closed 'proletarian' mentality.

The irony is that, for instance, unlike the Europe of Marx's time, the bourgeois and working classes had not been quite developed in China, a largely agrarian country with over eighty-five percent of the population being peasants. But the success of the Communist revolution against foreign colonial forces and the powerful Kuomintang served as a basis for the popular belief that anything was possible. A huge bourgeois class could be theoretically created out of those property-owners in urban areas and physically eliminated; a massive 'proletarian' class could be readily created through depriving the peasants of whatever little properties they had and forcing them to join the state-owned communes. It was believed at the beginning of 1950s that China could economically catch up with and surpass Britain and USA in ten years through massive development of the heavy industry at any ecological cost. It was also believed that the paradise of Communism Marx had designed was only fifty kilometres away, and could be reached through a "Great Leap-Forward." With half-digested and half-manipulated alien concepts, such as *gong she* (commune), *wu chan jie ji* (proletarian class) and *gong chan zhu yi* (Communism), new pictures were to be drawn on 'the blank sheet of paper' with pens from the Russian *Lao Dage*¹ (Big Brother). The New China was to become an experimental site for various social engineering projects designed and described in the vocabulary and grammar translated from the more-hegemonic-than-protective Big Brother, and a West that was as far away as Confucianism.

2. Translation as Ideological Unification

It was against the background briefly described above that contemporary Chinese translation was planned and carried out. Naturally it became a tool for the new socialist construction. It should be noted here that from decades of revolutionary experiences, the Communist leaders fully understood the importance of translation as a revolutionary weapon. As mentioned earlier, most of the Communist leaders of the New China had some overseas experiences as students. For instance, Premier Zhou Enlai studied many

¹ This was exactly what the Chinese called the Soviet Union at the time, without knowing the works by George Orwell.

years in France and Japan. Deng Xiaoping spent several years in France. Just as Tokyo served as Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary base at the turn of the century, in 1920s, Paris and Lyon were sort of intellectual, ideological and organizational bases for the growth of Chinese Communism. Starting from 1930s, the international base moved to Soviet Union, which brought up large numbers of Chinese cadres. Some of the leaders were actually respected translators of Western texts. One of the founding fathers and Secretary General (1921-1927) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Chen Duxiu, was a major translator. Qu Qiubai, the top leader of CCP executed by the Kuomintang, was a major translator and translation theorist. Zhang Wentian (1900-1976), having overseas experiences as a student in Japan and the USA and elected Secretary General of the CCP in 1935, translated such writers as Wilde, Bergson, Storm and Brandes (see Lin et al. ed., 1988, pp. 695-696). The list is long.

Although Mao himself did not have learning experiences abroad, he was keen on learning English, and was surrounded by comrades with linguistic and cultural experiences of the West. Moreover, some of the leaders of the Ministry of Culture, the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP, and the Academia Sinica, such as Guo Moruo and Mao Dun were once important translators. All these personal and revolutionary backgrounds created a situation where the importance of translation as a political and cultural force was almost self-evident. Meanwhile, from the viewpoint of international political struggle, translation was now the only small window for the new isolated China to have some glimpses of what was happening in the West.

Even before the Communist leadership came to power in Beijing, the project of socialist translation had been designed. As early as May 23rd, 1942, at the height of anti-Japanese and anti-Kuomintang campaigns, Mao delivered his famous speech on the policy of literature and art in Yan'an, the then Chinese Communist headquarters. It clearly stated that literature and art, as part of the superstructure, must serve the proletarian political purposes. It evolved into the guiding principle for New China's cultural theory and practice. In 1949, before the New China was founded, a group of Communist translators headed by Dong Qiusi (1899-1969) had established the Shanghai Translators Association, trying to develop better ways to contribute to the historical transition. Immediately the Association started the monthly magazine *Fanyi*

(Translation), with Dong being the editor-in-chief. In July 1950, Dong began editing the first and only translatology journal *Fanyi tongbao* (Translation Bulletin). In his "Lu Xun and Translation," Dong called for establishing a new system of Chinese translation studies based upon Lu Xun's ideas (see Chen, 1992, p. 362) under the guidance of Stalin's linguistic theories. The article was published in *Fanyi* on October 1, 1949, the day when Mao proudly declared to the world that from then on the Chinese people stood up.

In 1951, the Publishing Bureau of the Central Government of the People held the first national translation work conference. The central theme was how to plan and control, as well as how to improve, translations. The keynote speech was titled, literally, "Strive for the Plan-nization¹ and Quality Improvement of Translation Work." The Conference passed two important documents: Draft Regulations on Translation Work of Translation Institutions in Government Functionaries and Organizations, and Draft Regulations on Publishing Translated Books by Public-Private Joint Enterprises (see Chen, 1992, p. 374).

In 1954, the China National Writers Association, a government institution, held the First National Literature Translation Work Conference. Older translators who were now new officials such as Guo Moruo and Zheng Zhenduo addressed the conference, which was concluded with the keynote speech by Mao Dun, now Minister of Culture. In his speech, Mao Dun briefly reflected on the glorious tradition of the two-thousand-year-old translation. He affirmed the proud achievements of translation particularly since the May 4th Movement. Mao Dun said (in Chen, 1992, pp. 375-376. Translation mine):

While our Chinese people are working selflessly for the socialist industrialization and socialist economic transformation, we are also carrying on the socialist cultural construction. The new socialist culture can never be created in isolation or divorced from historical or world connections. Its growth and development must depend both on carrying forward the most valuable cultural traditions of our own, and on assimilating the cream of world classical and modern progressive literature. From the ancient to the modern, from the East to the West, from Homeric epics to the latest Soviet Union's literary achievements, from India's *Mahabharata* and

¹ The Chinese original word used is *ji hua hua*, literally plan-nization, which sounds awkward but reflected the then mentality of political control.

Ramayana to today's Aragon of France and Foster of America, outstanding works representing the highest achievements of world literature are numerous in number. They are infinitely rich in contents. And all of them are what the Chinese people need today. They must become indispensable spiritual food for our national cultural life. They must become nutrition for cultivating and watering the socialist literature and art that are being created.

It can be seen here that the leading cultural officials of the New China held a somewhat open view and attitude towards translation of things that were regarded as ideologically positive and helpful. They were looking up to foreign things that could serve the new but isolated China. In particular, they favoured Soviet Russian literature. As Mao Dun said in the same speech, for the working people in New China, literature from the more advanced socialist countries was appreciated more as political and ideological textbooks than mere literature. It could not only familiarize the Chinese with the life, struggle, noble internationalism and patriotism in those countries, but also enhance exchange of intellectual, emotional and spiritual experiences between the peoples. On the other hand, Mao Dun went on to say (in Editorial Board, 1984b, p. 3. Translation mine):

We are also deeply concerned with and emotionally attached to the revolutionary and progressive literary works in all the capitalist, colonized and semi-colonized countries. Through these works, we become deeply aware of how the people in those countries are, under reactionary rule, unyieldingly and persistently struggling for their own liberation and a better life of tomorrow against imperialist aggression and slavery. Their miserable and painful life is what we experienced yesterday, and can evoke our profound sympathy. Meanwhile their current struggle for independence and freedom is part of the peace-defending and anti-aggression struggle of the people all over the world. It is right in this struggle that our Chinese people are related by flesh and blood to all the peoples in the world.

This policy of translation seemed to be opening a channel for inflow of foreign literature. However, under the political mentality of control, plan and unification, just like other areas of cultural development, translation as individual, independent and spontaneous creative activity was to be institutionalized under official planning and

adjustment. In the same speech, which was to be the government policy, Mao Dun said (in Chen, 1992, p. 377. Translation mine):

Our country has entered the period of socialist construction and socialist transformation. All the economic and cultural causes (projects) have been gradually placed on the track of *zu zhi hua* (literally organization-ization) and *ji hua hua* (literally plan-nization). The unplanned, chaotic situation of literature translation work must no longer be allowed to exist. Literary translation must be, under the leadership of the Party and the Government, uniformly planned, organized and carried out in proper order by the controlling government bodies and institutions concerned.

Thus tensions arose between the awareness of cultural needs that could hardly be 'planned' or 'organized' in actuality and official recognition, justification and regulation of what were legitimate needs that should be satisfied. Moreover, within the whole social and cultural system designed on the Communist political principles and agendas, 'cultural needs' were to be created and propagandized in a planned and controlled manner. Translation was therefore a tool to both create and satisfy those needs. Inevitably, as part of political manipulation, translation helped in building a Communist political 'theology' with little possibility of continuing its more secular missions of intercultural dialogue for a new cultural identity. The positive and open attitude and ambitions reflected in the first two quotes of Mao Dun's speech were superseded and rendered meaningless by the cultural policies in the last quote.

With translation so oriented and institutionalized, it was confined to a political discursive context. Organization and planning of translation were based on political standards. Things to be introduced into China were selected according to whether they were conducive to the socialist economic and ideological construction. As a result, textual renditions were almost reduced to translating Marxist classics and Soviet Union.

In 1952, the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP established the Translating Section of Stalin's Works. Some well-experienced translators were thus assigned to be professional translators of Stalin. In 1953, the Bureau for Compiling and Translating Works by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin under the direct supervision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was founded (see

Chen, 1992, p. 477). These official organizations, with some of the best translators the New China had, systematically translated Marxist classics into Chinese, constantly providing standardized socialist and communist vocabulary and grammar for the nation to learn, study, memorize and practice.

Publishing houses all over the country, exclusively state-owned, began to organize other kinds of translations in science, technology, education, literature, humanities, etc. Works included in their plans were mostly from the Soviet Union. In literature, for instance, poets and novelists such as Gorky, Fadeev, Mayakovsky, Ostrovsky, A. N. Tolstoy and Esenin became household names among the literate. A generation of Chinese grew up with their works. Many Chinese might not know who Confucius, Lao Zi, Mencius, Li Po, Tu Fu or Cao Xueqin were, but they definitely knew those Soviet Union writers along with the heroic, revolutionary figures and images they had created.

Due to ideological and geopolitical factors, the West, now generally called Western imperialists and reactionaries, was minimally represented. But it was still there, present at both realistic and symbolic levels in the life of the New China. Realistically in translation, the West was the old West - the Homeric, Shakespearean, Dickensian and Balzacian West that had been ideologically purified of any 'impurities' including Dumas, Oscar Wilde, Allan Poe and Baudelaire, who had opened the Chinese eyes to the emotional world of the West forty years before. Measured with the proletarian revolutionary ruler of socialist realism translated from the Soviet Union, only a few Euro-American revolutionary, progressive writers were up to the standard of introduction. As a result, the living image of the remote West in the ordinary Chinese mind was Dickens' world of *Oliver Twist* and Balzac's society of mutual suspicion, cheating, deception, and scheming against one another.

In a semiotic sense, however, the West was serving as a dark, invisible but ever-present background against which the New China was defending and defining itself. In other words, the West was textually omnipresent in between the lines of China's daily publications, broadcasts and political meetings. It was translated in an indirect way through the perfectly planned and controlled media, which concentrated on domestic and international class struggle. Whatever hardship China faced was always easily related to the colonizing West; whatever industrial or economic achievement China made was

always described as a victory of the proletariat over the Western decadent imperialistic and bourgeois hegemony. The image of the West was presented at once as a threat, which could silence any Other voice, and a stimulus which pushed the New China to advance into the Communist paradise.

In the final analysis, the ideological unification was accomplished precisely through indirect translation of the West that had more to do with what the West stood for than what it actually was. Instead of being a subversive force intellectually democratizing the New China, this highly politicized translation helped push China to a place where there was little opportunity for intercultural engagement in its true sense with the living, mainstream West. This unification was made possible by Mao 's series of new revolutions against any elements of the Chinese society judged to be impure or counterrevolutionary¹. It encouraged Mao to stand up against USA during the Korean and later Vietnam wars, and against the Soviet Union (from 1956 onward) for its political revisionist line.

Textually, the politically oriented translation in the early years of the New China actually flourished in its own way, especially in translating Euro-American classics and the 19th century realism. As Mao Dun said (in Editorial Board, 1984b, p. 3. Translation mine):

Due to the great victory of the Chinese people's revolution, under the sunshine of Marxism and Leninism and the wise leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, our country has made outstanding achievements in all the aspects, political, economic and cultural. The cause of literature translation is rapidly developing with the cause of literary creation. According to an incomplete statistic by the Press and

¹ Based upon Mao's interpretation of the New China's situation in relation to its own traditions and to the outside world, a long list of ideological and political campaigns were carried out, including (see Zhu, Guo & Li ed., 1992):

- (1) The Land Reform (1950)
- (2) Criticism of the movie *The Story of Wu Shun* (1951)
- (3) Intellectuals' Ideological Reform Movement (1951-1952)
- (4) Anti-Three Evils and Anti-Five Evils Movements (1951-1952)
- (5) Promoting Dialectic Materialism over Idealism Movement beginning with criticizing Hu Shi (1954-1955)
- (6) Suppressing the "Anti-revolutionary Group Headed by Hu Feng" (1952-1955)
- (7) "Let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend" Movement (1965-1957)
- (8) "Anti-Rightist Movement" (1957-1958)
- (9) "Anti-Ma Yinchu's Reactionary Essay on Population" (1958-1960).

Publications Bureau of the Central Government, from October 1949 to the end of 1953, the number of literary translations (including Children's literature) published across China totaled as many as 2151 (books/volumes). This is unparalleled in Chinese history... In the past, an excellent literary translation would have an impression of only one or two thousand, maximally three to five thousand copies. But now in general, within one year any literary translation reaches a total impression of several hundred thousand, and even over one million copies. In particular, Soviet Union's literary works are most popular among the readers.

What Mao Dun said here, although with a typical political touch, painted an exciting picture of the Chinese thirst for foreign literature. From the official point of view, the influx of foreign literature was to consolidate political and ideological unification. From ordinary readers' viewpoint, however, reading is more a personalized and individualized experience that is beyond political or ideological control. Love of and access to foreign literature in the 50s might explain why the rebellious seeds of democracy, freedom, equality and fraternity transplanted earlier by the May 4th translation did never die in Chinese readers. Even during the Great Cultural Revolution when almost all foreign literature was confiscated or burned, Chinese readers risked their political futures and even their lives in rescuing, preserving and digesting foreign literature.

As one of the gravest cultural disasters in Chinese history, the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) was an anti-culture, and certainly anti-translation, movement. With its slogan of eliminating the Four Olds (old ideas, old culture, old customs and old habits), it violently eradicated whatever little Confucian tradition that had survived the May 4th Movement. Now that China was completely disconnected from its history and isolated from the outside world, the cultural vocabulary and grammar had been unified into, or rather reduced to, Mao's militant language of class struggle¹. Such a socio-political climate left little space for translation, except for conventional Marxist theories, a few Soviet revolutionary writers, and a handful of Euro-American writers like Jack London². In general, foreign translations were banned as decadent bourgeois poisonous weeds.

¹ Chairman Mao once said he took no end of pleasure in fighting against heaven, against earth and against human beings. This saying of his was popularly quoted and practiced during the Cultural Revolution.

² This was because according to Lenin's wife Krupskaya, Lenin loved London's "Love of Life" so much that he kept her reading it to him in his remaining days.

3. Translation as Language Unification

a. Linguistic chaos

Although textual translations in an intercultural sense were under tight control, they constitute an important cultural text of the New China, particularly in terms of the changing language. An inept analogy might be made here as a historical context in which the New China had to rise where the Old China fell. The linguistic situation Mao and his comrades faced somewhat resembled, in a more metaphorical than literal sense, that of Shihuangdi (reigned B.C. 246- B.C. 210), who united China for the first time from the Warring States. To achieve true unification, one of the first things this first emperor had to do was to unify the writing system out of the different writing systems that were existing. This he achieved through heavy-handed means, including burning books and burying alive dissenting Confucian scholars.

Without doubt, the vernacular was to be uniformly used as a unifying tool in the New China. However, the language left behind by Hu Shi, Chiang Kai-shek and colonial powers was a destroyed, hybrid, mixed and immature one. Classical Chinese was abolished, but it had to stay to help express ideas that the underdeveloped vernacular could not. Moreover, as the language of long-standing Chinese history and culture, it had to stay if the Chinese wanted to have any sense or knowledge of history at all. The complicated writing forms of characters had been considered to be a burden, and in the 20s and 30s a number of schemes of character simplification had been proposed, but had not been put into effect because of constant wars. To facilitate learners of Chinese whose written forms have nothing to do with their sounds, different schemes of phoneticization or romanization had been designed and used, including those by Ricci, Trigault, and later Wade-Giles as well as by a number of Chinese scholars (see Chen, 1999). However, none of them was satisfactory in actual use. During the May 4th Movement, frustration with Classical Chinese led some radical scholars to suggest that Chinese should be altogether replaced by English or Esperanto (*ibid.*).

The vernacular was in a chaotic situation. It was not a pure, standardized, all-inclusive language as opposed to Classical Chinese. In oral speech, hundreds of dialects, sometimes sounding like Chinese and Greek to one another, were found. Story has it that

before the founding of the New China, disputes arose as to which dialect (Beijing, Shanghai, Cantonese, etc.) should be established as the national standard speech, just as there was talk about which city should be the new capital. Because of the long-lasting influence of Mandarin, phonetically, the vernacular was based upon the Northern Dialect. In terms of written Chinese, however, the vernacular remained a mixture of Classical Chinese, various dialects and loans. How to unify these elements into a commonly accepted and effective modern written Chinese remained a question partly for translation to answer, particularly in regard to loan vocabulary and grammar.

For instance, due to the colonial history, as Wang said, "more than half of the expressions in common use in present-day Modern Written Chinese are loan words from foreign languages" (in Chen, 1999, p. 86). From previous discussions, it can be seen how Western concepts were ambiguously and paradoxically established. Even transliterations were in no better situation. Historically foreign words and expressions first entered Chinese daily life mainly from coastal areas such as Guangzhou, Hongkong, Shanghai and Fujian, whose phonetic systems are far from the Northern Dialect. In translations and transliterations, loans became phonetically and even culturally localized and dialecticized. Thus the Cantonese transliterated *fashion*, *insurance* and *ball* into 花顺 (*hua shun*), 燕梳 (*yan shu*) and 波 (*bo*). The Shanghainese transliterated *butter*, *pass*, *steam* and *cement* into 白塔油 (*bai ta you*), 派司 (*pai si*), 水汀 (*shui ting*) and 水门汀 (*shui men ting*). Some phenomena in transliteration were unaccountable. For example, the name Holmes (in Conan Doyle's detective stories) was transliterated into 福尔摩斯 (*fu er mo si*), where the consonant "h" in Mandarin gives way to "f," as in the Cantonese dialect. Some scholars suggested that the Japanese had used 福尔摩斯 for Holmes, and the Chinese simply adopted it (see Guo, 1992, pp. 30-31).

In literary translation, the same foreign names had been phonetically rendered into different words/characters. For example, in four different versions translated by four different translators, the character Peggotty in Dickens' *David Copperfield* was transliterated into 璧各德 (*bi ge de*), 攀古堆 (*pan gu dui*), 辟果提 (*pi guo ti*) and 坡勾提 (*po gou ti*). And the title of the novel was rendered respectively into 块肉余生述 (literarily *a lonely survivor's account*, Lin Shu tr.), 大卫·高柏菲尔自述 (literally

personal account of da wei gao bo fei er, Xu Tianhong tr.), 大卫·科波菲尔 (*da wei ke bo fei er*, Dong Qiusi tr.), and 大卫·考坡菲 (*da wei kao po fei*, Zhang Guruo tr.). Here it can be seen that except 大卫(David) as a transliteration standardized in the Chinese version of the Bible, other names and proper nouns seemed to be following no common rules.

Such confusions created obstacles for intercultural understandings. In fact, starting at least from John Fryer, efforts had been constantly made to standardize loan words. From 1908 to 1911, Yan Fu had served as director of the Office of Loan Words Standardization. It was not until after China had been finally reunited into one social and political system that standardization became a possibility. As early as May, 1950, headed by Guo Moruo, the Working Committee on Unification of Academic Terminologies was organized under the Culture and Education Commission of the Central Government (see Chen, 1992). Insofar as foreign personal and geographical names are concerned, a series of dictionaries compiled by the Xinhua News Agency was published from 1950s to 1970s. The New China's tight control over press and media made it possible for loan words to be uniformly standardized in practice. But work done in this period was largely limited to sorting and straightening out what had already been in use. Most of the Euro-American new vocabulary born after WWII in all walks of life and all fields of studies remained unknown to Chinese.

A serious challenge for textual translators was how to create a new written Chinese out of the tensions between the Classical and the vernacular, between un-naturalized loan words and natural demands for easy comprehensibility, and between Chinese grammar and grammatical and syntactic Europeanization. How to properly handle these relationships was even a concern to top leaders of the New China. For instance, Mao, who used to be celebrated as a master of the vernacular and is known for his philosophy of 洋为中用(making foreign things serve China), expressed his views on different occasions. On August 24, 1956, Mao said, for the sake of accuracy he preferred literal/hard translation of theories as Lu Xun advocated. He went on to say "We should familiarize ourselves with foreign things and read foreign books. But this does not mean the Chinese should follow foreigners in a wholesale manner... It does not mean the Chinese should write things like translations" (in Chen, 1992, p. 383. Translation mine).

But Mao's language policy is better reflected in what he said later (ibid. p. 384. Translation mine):

It is also acceptable to be neither donkey nor horse. The mule is something that stands in between. When the donkey and the horse are combined, their faces change... China's face - political, economic or cultural - should not remain old. It should change, but Chinese characteristics should be preserved. Foreign things should be absorbed on the basis of what is Chinese. The two should be... organically integrated.

Here Mao seems to be suggesting a third space for the New China. But first of all, what was Chinese was already questionable. In this case, where was the starting-point from which China could march towards that sharing and shared space? Second, how to integrate the two into an organic whole was the real issue, but Mao did not give any answer. Third, when Mao gave this talk to a group of Chinese artists, his political system and cultural policies were not offering any room for free, democratic or creative discussions. The deeper issue here is: should discussions of this nature be allowed, they would inevitably challenge the Communist language of political control, which was the first and last taboo of the New China.

In the keynote speech cited earlier, Mao Dun proposed some principles for Chinese translators to follow. He said (in Chen, 1992, p. 379. Translation mine):

A good translator, on the one hand, reads foreign languages, and on the other hand, thinks and imagines with his own native tongue. Only in this way can he extricate himself from the restraints of grammatical and lexical particularities of the original, so that the language of his translations is purely native and at the same time faithfully conveys the contents and styles of the original.

Here Mao Dun was advocating a middle ground, where the source and target languages are organically combined while each retains its own identity. Mao Dun believed this was not only possible but necessary. He went on to say (ibid. p. 380. Translation mine):

Some people think our Chinese vocabulary is poor, inadequate in actual translation... This is not necessarily true. Language comes out of life. Life changes and develops, and new words keep emerging accordingly. Like writers, translators should also look for appropriate words from life or abstract new words out of it.

This is part of creativity of the art of translation. Of course, this does not mean we should not adopt new words or expressions from foreign works. But... this adoption should be based upon the basic vocabulary and basic grammar of our own. It is harmful to uncritically take in what is foreign, or to fabricate new vocabulary and expressions in our native tongue.

It is interesting to note here that both Chairman Mao and his cultural officials were envisioning an internationalized culture of language while maintaining the Chinese linguistic characteristics. But given the then social, political and cultural situations, how would that be possible? The possibility, or rather impossibility, of developing a more interculturally mediated language of translation out of the chaotic vernacular might be best seen in the most exemplary, accomplished and respected translator, Fu Lei.

b. Fu Lei

Fu Lei (1908-1966) constitutes a special case for translation studies in the New China. His life and work reflected different dimensions of Chinese translation of the West in the new era. He demonstrated the extent of what could be achieved through vernacular translation under the Communist regime in terms of language, social influence and intercultural engagement. He represented and is still representing the hope of modern Chinese translation towards an intercultural realm foreseen by Mao Zedong and Mao Dun.

As a returned student from France and Switzerland, from 1929 onward, Fu devoted himself to translating French literature. His translations of Balzac, R. Rolland and Voltaire, being household readings for half a century in China, have set up high standards not only for Chinese translation but also for Chinese literary creation in the vernacular. Fu's translations include, among others (see Lin et al. ed., 1988, p. 222) Balzac:

Albert Savarus (1946)

Le Pere Goriot (1950)

La Cousine Bette (1951-54)

Ursule Mirouet (1955)

Le Cure de Tours (1963)

Eugenie Grandet (1948)

Le Cousin Pons (1952)

Le Colonel Chabert (1954)

La Vielle Fille (1960)

Grandeur et Decadence de Cesar Birotteau (1978)

Romain Rolland:

Jean Christophe (1952-53) *Biography of Beethoven* (1942)

Prosper Meremee:

Carmen (1953)

Voltaire:

Candide (1954)

Each of these books has been among best sellers since it was published. In fact, Fu's translations, along with his acclaimed letters to his family members, have been regarded as highest achievements of Chinese literature in the vernacular. However, the translator who almost staged Balzac's Human Comedy in the politically and socially more dramatic society of the New China faced no less challenges than Yan Fu, Lin Shu or May 4th translators did. What perplexed Yan and Lin had been Western ideas and social customs that could hardly find equivalents in Classical Chinese. However they had enjoyed the advantage of literary grace of that old but highly developed and perfected written language. The May 4th translators, as language revolutionaries, could pride themselves in how much they had destroyed the old rather than how much they had rebuilt the new literary language. For Fu Lei, working in a context in which the vernacular was the only language to be used, he had to improve the new literary language of translation, including vocabulary, grammar and literary style.

In a letter to his friend in 1951, Fu complained that the norm-less and style-less vernacular had been just adopted from folk speech, and that no particular local dialect could be taken as the backbone of the vernacular. What was being used therefore was a non-South-non-North, but both-South-and-North language of hybridity. Any inherent characteristics and local flavour of those dialects had to be discarded. What was left was some outlines and skeletons that could hardly express the subtle feelings and emotions in the original. Consequently the original vividness, elegance and thought-provocative-ness could not be achieved in translation. The life and soul of a dialect, said Fu, dwell in its colloquial components, which, if employed in translation, would change foreigners into local Chinese, if not, the translation would lose the local flavour of the original. As a

result, a translator had to use the so-called *putonghua* (common speech, i.e. the vernacular), which, according to Fu (in Editorial Board, 1984b, p. 83. Translation mine):

... is an extremely artificial speech. In other words, it is a speech based upon the Northern Dialect that is devoid of any of its colloquial-ness. What literary value does such a speech have? Unfortunately this is the language we are using in writing. I believe the problem with the style of translation lies mainly in the fact that our language is a "pseudo" one.

In the same letter, Fu cited some examples to show the impossibility of satisfactory translation in the vernacular. He wrote (ibid. p. 82. Translation mine):

To me, what is most difficult is translating the simplest, clearest and shortest sentences. For example, *Elle est charmante* - She is charming - is understandable to any one who has learned French for one or two months. However, it is simply beyond my reach to translate it into such a Chinese sentence as to retain the tone, mood, sentiment and atmosphere of the original. Since this kind of sentences are closely related to the contexts, failing to convey their subtleties would lose the spirit of the original. Consequently, a cup of new *longjing* (Dragon Well tea), fresh and intellectually provocative, becomes a cup of tasteless water.

Fu then went on to discuss difficulties with translating long and winding sentences that have to be split into shorter ones, and a host of other syntactic and grammatical issues that are still challenging Chinese translators today.

Here Fu might be going too far in his assertion of the lifelessness of the written vernacular. But it does bring up a legitimate question of the fuller implications of language revolution the May 4th revolutionaries advocated. For instance, when the unifying Classical Chinese was abolished, how might be established, out of the numerous existing dialects, a common speech that could express different living and lived experiences of different people in different parts of China speaking different dialects? It is interesting to note here that few creative writers of Fu's time ever bothered themselves with the lack or inadequacy in the vernacular. It was in translation of the West that this lack or inadequacy was strongly felt.

Although Fu was translating the older West, cultural gaps were still there for him to cross. On several occasions, Fu pointed out that the Chinese mentality is far from

Western mentalities. Western languages are analytic and prosaic while Chinese is synthetic and poetic. Very specifically, as he remarked in 1957, since literature is about the life of a whole people, it inevitably involves all aspects of human life, including politics, economy, philosophy, science, history, painting, sculpture, architecture, music as well as astronomy, geography, medicine, sorcery and astrology. As social conditions, customs and even utensils used in daily life are different, a translator can hardly make readers understand even if he himself understands what is being translated. For instance, the kind of fine, elaborate and detailed descriptions with which Balzac portrays any of his protagonist's house is indeed confusing unless the translator draws a sketch of it beforehand (see Editorial Board, 1984b, pp. 88-89).

Tensions between the ideal of a translator and what he or she can actually achieve within the target language are well expressed in Fu's preface to his re-translation of *Le Pere Goriot*. In this much-quoted piece, Fu said (ibid. p. 80. Translation mine):

As far as the effect/result is concerned, translation should resemble copying of a painting: what is sought after is spiritual rather than formal identicalness. In actual practice, translation is more difficult than copying. Copying shares with the original painting the same materials (colour, canvas, paper or silk) and the same rules and methods (colouring, anatomy and perspective). A translation, on the other hand, is vastly different from the original in script and (grammar) rules. Any language has its own characteristics, its own inimitable advantages, its own irremediable defects as well as its own inviolable precepts. Even between closely related languages such as English and French or English and German, there are many cases where mutual translation is impossible. Between Chinese and Western languages, the gaps are certainly far greater...

It can be seen here that Fu approached translation from a traditional and experiential point of view, regarding verbal and nonverbal, textual and cultural differences as something fixed and definite rather than dynamic. Yet he advanced Chinese translation to a higher level of inquiry - the possibility, or impossibility, of intercultural mediation. From lexical, syntactical, grammatical, to cultural and intercultural levels, from the relationship between the Classical and the vernacular Chinese, to the relationship between the common speech and local dialects, Fu illustrated various dimensions and

implications of translation in the New China. He represented the depth of intellectual exploration of Chinese translation as an unbroken process to maturity, and the height of textual advancement.

Outside of Fu's somewhat gloomy understanding of translation was a bright world of acceptance of his textual renditions. People from all parts of China loved his faithful, expressive and elegant translations in the vernacular, which seemed to contradict with his own pessimistic views of the common speech. Indeed, the norm-less vernacular, as Fu said, was still in the process of defining itself, and Fu's masterful translations pointed to the hope of the growing vernacular as a new language, therefore a new identity, being rebuilt on the cultural ruins. Through Fu, the Chinese became well informed of the true face of Western capitalism in the 19th century France. With Fu, many Chinese youth developed genuine love for literature and translation.

The life of the translator of the Human Comedy turned out to be a personal as well as national tragedy. In 1966 when Fu buried himself in his ambitious intercultural efforts, the Great Cultural Revolution began. The same translation achievements now turned Fu into one of the first 'objects of the proletarian dictatorship.' Fu was politically persecuted, physically abused, and publicly humiliated. On September 3, 1966, Fu, along with his wife, a talented musician, hanged themselves in their apartment in Shanghai, leaving behind nothing but a list of small debts they owed, hand-written in his elegant and refined calligraphy. But his legacy was and still is there. Story has it that in the 60s and 70s, in order to learn literature and translation, some young Chinese risked their lives literally hand-copying, word by word and sentence by sentence, Fu's translations in between the lines of Balzac and Romain Rolland's original works. The 'poisonous weeds' Fu transplanted in the heart of the new culture were to grow into an intercultural harvest.

4. *Cankao xiaoxi*: A Special Form of Engagement

One suggestive phenomenon characterizing translation under Mao's leadership is the publication of *Cankao xiaoxi* (literally Reference Information), which systematically exposed Chinese communists as well as ordinary people to Western ideological 'poisonous weeds.' As a unique textual translation of the West, it points to the complexity of New China's translation practice. *Cankao xiaoxi* (still in publication today)

is a newspaper dedicated solely to translations of what is happening outside China and on how the rest of the world views China. It relies mainly on Western mainstream media for various sources of information, mostly political but not all. Started publication on November 7, 1931, the paper had been exclusively circulated and read among higher levels of communist leaders. In November 1956, upon Mao's request, the Central Committee of the CCP decided to increase the number of copies from two thousand to 3-4 hundred thousand to be circulated among a much wider audience.

The purpose of this popular newspaper, as Mao summarized, was to inform, in a timely manner, party members and revolutionary comrades of the physical situations and ideological viewpoints of China's enemies, as well as different ideas held by China's friends. On January 27, 1957, Chairman Mao said to national and provincial leaders (in Wei, 2000, online. Translation mine):

Preventing people from being exposed to falsehood, evils or hostilities, to idealism or metaphysics... such a policy is dangerous... Without knowledge of idealism or metaphysics, without any experience in fighting against such negative sides, (our) materialism and dialectics will remain unconsolidated. The shortcomings in some of our party members and party intellectuals lie precisely in too little knowledge of those negative sides... This newspaper will even publish reactionary speeches and writings against us. It is as good as Communists publishing for imperialists. Why should we do so? The purpose is to put those poisonous weeds, those non- and anti-Marxist ideas in front of our comrades, masses of people and liberals, so that they can be tempered and steeled. We should not practice the policy of (information) blockade, which is dangerous. By publishing the newspaper, we are pursuing a different line from the Soviet Union. Publication of *Cankao xiaoxi* and other negative texts is to 'give smallpox vaccination' in order to strengthen the political immunocompetence in our cadres and masses.

On another occasion on March 17 of the same year, Mao said (ibid. Translation mine) of extending circulation of the newspaper:

Some say this will create chaos and confusion. No, it will not. If we don't do so, we would be shutting our eyes and ears in a closed room. Some comrades, concerned that it will be like pouring oil to the flames of reactionary forces, have suggested we

run an editorial before each piece of international news. No, comrades! We will not do that. What we want is exactly to let people think and differentiate for themselves... Are we not promoting smallpox vaccination right now? What is vaccinia? It is a virus, a germ. Once a little of it is injected in the human body, the two will fight against each other... and immunity is acquired. It is dangerous for one not to be sick at all. Once he is sick, he will not be able to stand it since he has never fought against any bacteria.

As Mao expected, *Cankao xiaoxi* became "a unique newspaper under the sun" (ibid.). By 1964, it had reached 440,000 copies in circulation. Although it was officially restricted to cadres and Party members, ordinary people could have access to it anywhere. In June 1971, in order to make the American journalist Edgar Snow's serial reports on China available to all, the newspaper increased its circulation to more than six million copies (see Wei, 2000, online). For many Chinese, reading *Cankao xiaoxi* was one of the few forms of intellectual entertainment to survive the harsh realities of, particularly, the Cultural Revolution.

As a result, on the one hand, in terms of culture in its usual sense, China was isolated and closed. On the other hand, the Chinese were kept politically and socially updated in a fairly objective and open manner of what was going on in the rest of the world. How to interpret this ironic phenomenon remains a unique case that invites special investigations and studies. It is apparent that the newspaper of translation was a deliberately manipulated form of ideological control, and that it was highly selective in its choice of texts. But what is more important here is how first of all translation in a postcolonial world becomes a way of life, and how the same text of Western media can be used to serve opposite purposes. Even in such extreme and radical situations as the Cultural Revolution in China, the highly politicized life had to rely on translation to sustain itself. In fact, it was by contrasting itself with the West through this small window of translations that the Communist power defined, justified and strengthened itself.

Secondly, from a textual point of view, no matter how manipulative a certain political power can be, when it comes to translation, it is always an intercultural engagement. Specifically in the case of *Cankao xiaoxi*, things were directly translated from foreign media, which means the Chinese translators had to keep creating equivalents to Western

Cold War concepts and ideas. Through daily translations, this influential newspaper brought the outside world to the Chinese for understanding and interpretation - no matter how politically oriented it was. It created and standardized a great portion of modern Chinese vocabulary, which urgently needed to be developed to address new realities. In a sense, Euro-American vocabulary and grammar themselves are not political. What is political is how they are interpreted by particular people from particular positions.

It deserves mention here that, unlike the government-controlled media in China which is usually the conduit for CCP's domestic and international policies, Western media tends to be generally critical of its own governments. Without a shared discursive basis of politico-economic, moral or cultural values between China and the West, this criticalness, also with a 'political curriculum' hidden behind, created a 'win-win' situation for *Cankao xiaoxi*. Those critical and negative reports and comments on the West itself could be taken as proof of the greatness, glories and righteousness of the CCP. Those critical and negative, often inevitably de-historicized and de-contextualized reports and comments on China could be interpreted as evidences of Western evil, hostile attitudes against China. In either case, the translations helped Mao to push forward his political agendas that claimed millions of lives from late 1950s to 1970s.

Within the discursive context of this thesis, what is most fascinating is the way in which the politics-centred culture of the New China interacted with the economy-as-politics-centred culture of the West. With an absence of textual translations of China - also a way of translation, the West created a myth of the Communists as the evil Other, which politically enabled the West to concentrate on transnational economic integration and technological development to secure its identity as a democratic and free world. Through translating various texts of the West as the evil Other, China managed to develop a strong, unified and highly centralized political power that almost transcended the bleak realities of economic poverty and technological backwardness. To a certain extent, it helped the Chinese to ideologically de-colonize themselves - to successfully regain their sense of pride, integrity and equality to their former colonizers. However, like Confucianism before the May 4th Movement, Mao's form of political idealism at the cost of the Chinese livelihood and material development was doomed to fail. It was to be defeated by a new form of colonialism - globalization in its Western sense, a religiously,

politically and culturally heavy-loaded text China has been intensively and dramatically translating at an even higher rate than the May 4th translation.

X. Contemporary Translation as a Chinese Form of Globalization

1. Background

In September 1976 Mao died, leaving behind China's modernization largely as a hope to be still dreamed. By then many other founding fathers of the New China had "gone to see Marx," a phrase Mao had used to refer to a Communist's death. The unique, hardly identifiable or definable legacy of Mao's Cultural Revolution was passed on to the second generation of Communist leaders, who had, for the most part, suffered from the Revolution. Instead of building a new national identity, the Cultural Revolution had basically destroyed China in political, economic, social, intellectual, educational and moral terms. It had driven the nation to an existential condition where culture was meaningless within the politically militant language of 'the continuing revolution under the proletarian dictatorship.'

It should be noted here that for all the wrongs the Cultural Revolution had done to Chinese tradition, Mao himself had not been a close-minded leader, as discussed earlier. Apart from regaining Chinese national integrity, pride and self-respect, he had established fairly integrated national systems of heavy- and light-industry, agriculture and economy. In terms of science and technology, under his leadership, China had become a nuclear power (first atomic bomb on October 16, 1964, and first H-bomb on June 17, 1967), and had successfully launched the first recoverable satellite on November 26, 1975. Internationally, China had broken what was commonly referred to as the Western imperialistic blockade in economy, science, technology, etc., had regained in 1971 its legitimate seat in the United Nations, and established diplomatic relationships with leading Western countries.

In terms of culture, however, Mao left behind a world of linguistic poverty and disorientation. As a poet and political essayist (Mao himself was well versed in both Classical Chinese and the vernacular), his practice of personality cult did not allow his people to think or speak with him. Instead, he was thinking and speaking for the whole nation. This was achieved, first and foremost, through abolishing during the Cultural Revolution the national education system. Elementary and secondary schools were carrying out Mao's 'open-door education,' by which is meant students were for the most

part to do physical labour in factories or out in the fields rather than study in the classroom. Higher education institutions were basically shut down. According to Zhu et al. (1992, p. 810), in ten years, over sixteen million urban graduates from primary and middle schools were sent to the countryside to be re-educated by peasants.

Secondly in those ten years, what the Chinese could read was mostly Mao's 'Little Red Book' containing decontextualized excerpts from the four volumes of Mao's selected works. What they could see and watch were the "Eight Revolutionary Model Plays"¹ of "lofty, noble and perfect" revolutionary heroes without family ties or human love, as well as a few equally revolutionary movies from North Korea, Albania and Yugoslavia. Thirdly, nearly every day, people had to attend what was called "Mental/Ideological Struggle Meetings," at which each and every one had to conduct self-criticism in the light of Mao's teachings.

All those processes, called "brainwashing" in the West, did work, in a way. Gradually the Chinese could conceive or think of their individual and collective life only in revolutionary terms. Ironically, most daily used vocabulary, including terms like *class struggle*, *proletarian*, *bourgeois*, *petit bourgeois*, *political criterion*, was translated or borrowed from the West or Soviet Union. Like Classical Chinese, this whole generation of vernacularized and naturalized Chinese language or speech became devoid of worldly, earthly, or human concerns. Culturally, the Chinese seemed to have been moved to a linguistic 'outer space' that was cut off from either the traditional Confucian or the contemporary living Western discourses of human life.

It was only within such linguistic poverty and disorientation that the new generation of leaders headed by Deng Xiaoping, who had been stripped of any political power three times by Mao and persecuted by the "Gang of Four," could re-conceive and re-design China's future in a realistically interrelated world. As a first step of Deng's ambitious plan, a massive political movement, under the slogan of "Practice is the sole criterion of truth," was launched toward the end of 1970s. Just as Mao's mass movements had been carried out under the banner of liberation, freedom, class struggle, truth, etc.,

¹ These were revolutionary operas clothed in the forms of the traditional Beijing Opera and ballet opera under the supervision of Mao's wife Jiang Qing. They were made into movies and played everywhere in the country. They include: *Hong deng ji* (The Red Lantern), *Sha jia bang*, *Qixi baihutuan* (Raid on the White Tiger Regiment), *Zhi qu weihushan* (Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy), *Hai gang* (On the Docks), *Long jiang song*, *Hongse niangzijun* (Red Detachment of Women) and *Baimaonu* (The White-Haired Girl).

this movement was pushed in the name of emancipation from Mao's political dogmas. Culturally, it drew China from Maoist revolutionary utopia back to the realistic world of human life. Politically, it led to the negation of the Cultural Revolution. In the beginning of 1980s, China was united to the consensus of "Reformation and Opening."

How to reform and open China's door was a historical responsibility placed on the shoulders of Chinese translators. But the Cultural Revolution left behind a broken infrastructure. First of all, there was a shortage of qualified translators as a result of the foreign language education policies practiced in the past three decades. For example, from 1949 to 1956, Russian was the dominating foreign language taught in seven colleges and institutes specializing in Russian. It was taught also in 17 universities that had Russian faculties or departments as well as in a large number of normal colleges and universities. In secondary and post-secondary education, Russian was a compulsory course. In comparison, up until the end of 1956, English was taught only in 23, French in 5 and German in 4 universities with corresponding specialties (see Fu, 1988, pp. 68-69). Although an imbalance was present due to China's relationship with the outside world, on the whole foreign language education contributed to the growth of the New China.

From 1966 to 1976, foreign language education became one of the focal targets of the Cultural Revolution. The popular slogan was "Without learning ABC, (one can) still be a good revolutionary." As Fu wrote (ibid. p. 84. Translation mine):

Ignorant-ism and radical nationalism were assiduously propagated and boosted... The big sticks of "worshipping things foreign and fawning on foreigners" and "maintaining illicit relations with foreign countries" were vigorously waved to readily come down on anyone. Anything that had the character *wai* (foreign) was said to be reactionary. Anything foreign was absolutely forbidden. Numerous foreign classics were sealed up, and no modern or contemporary foreign literature was permitted (to come into China). As for foreign newspapers, magazines, radio broadcast, movies in the original - all these were forbidden zones which nobody dared to approach. Those older or middle-aged teachers who had returned to China from abroad before liberation or had been sent to study overseas by the government after liberation were distrusted as "special agents" or "spies," and were all placed on file for investigation and prosecution. Those teachers and students who showed high

academic performances were labeled as "only expert but not red," or "revisionist seedlings." Large numbers of teachers and students were sent to the remote countryside "to be re-educated by the peasants."

Ironically, it was during this time that China diplomatically established relationships with many countries: 5 including Canada, Italy and Chile in 1970; 15 including Austria, Belgium, Iran and Peru in 1971; 16 including Japan, United Kingdom, West Germany, New Zealand, Australia and Mexico in 1972. In February 1972, President Nixon visited China and signed the Shanghai Joint Communiqué (see Fu, 1988). Up to this point, politically and diplomatically China had rejoined the international community. In order to meet the needs of the new international ties, a number of foreign language colleges and faculties began to restore foreign language courses from 1971. However, the domestic political climate forced, for example, English education to use anything but living English as teaching materials. Since anything written by foreigners was categorized as 'feudal, bourgeois and revisionist,' to protect students from 'being poisoned,' only English translations of political writings by Mao or about Mao Zedong thought were adopted as texts. Consequently, the very first thing a Chinese student learned was "Long live Chairman Mao" and "Long live the Communist Party of China." Intellectually, China was even further removed from the West.

2. Translation in the New Era

a. Rebuilding on the ruins

True intercultural engagement did not come until Deng's reform and opening (officially called the New Era), which was headed by education. Elementary, secondary and post-secondary education, completely destroyed by Mao, was systematically restored. In the field of translation, the ban on foreign works was lifted. What had been translated over a decade before was massively reprinted, including translations by Yan Fu and Lin Shu. But the demand for knowledge and information of the more contemporary West was high. At that time, better qualified translators who had survived the Revolution were mostly those who had been translating Marxist-Leninist classics into Chinese or Mao's works into foreign languages. Some of them had been and still were professional translators of either the politically oriented *Cankao xiaoxi* or literature from the United

Nations. Although many of these translators were already old and diseased, they played a crucial role in revitalizing Chinese translation in various ways.

For instance, since 1953 Jiang Chunfang (1912-1987) had been one of the lead translators of the *Complete Works of Marx and Engels*, *Complete Works of Lenin* and *Complete Works of Stalin*. He had also been actively engaged in translating into foreign languages *Selected Works of Mao Zedong* and important political documents of the Chinese Communist Party (see Chen, 1992, p. 452). From the end of 1970s, Jiang devoted himself to organizing and promoting translation. Due to his efforts, on June 23, 1982, the Translators' Association of China was formally established in Beijing. The small but influential journal *Fanyi tongxun* (Translation Newsletter/Bulletin), formally *UN Literatures Translation Bulletin*, became the Association's journal. In its introductory note, the improved leading journal stated its purpose as follows (*Fanyi tong xun*, 1980. Translation mine):

conduct theoretical research of translatology, exchange translation experience, transmit knowledge of translation, advance foreign language education, introduce old and new translators, report both domestic and international intellectual trends in the translation world and promote the cause of translation.

Indeed, the journal, later renamed *Chinese Translators Journal*, lived up to its mission. It helped bring up a new generation of translators, who were working diligently to 'make up for the youth lost,' a saying most popular among middle-aged and young people since late 1970s. Things were developing so fast that in 1983, as president of the Association, Jiang was confident to claim (in Wang ed., 1989, p. 4. Translation mine):

Today the world of Chinese translation is different from what it was in the periods of the late Qing-early Republic, the May 4th Movement, the Anti-Japanese War and Civil War, the beginning years of the New China, or the Cultural Revolution. Our translators have greatly advanced beyond those periods in foreign languages, Chinese, political ideology and artistic qualifications.

This confidence, however, was greatly challenged in actual textual translation. For a largely pre-modern or modernizing nation that had been out of touch with the post-industrial, postmodern and postcolonial Western cultures, great linguistic, intellectual and cultural gaps were there for Chinese translators to cross. Not only Western older

words familiar to Chinese had taken on new meanings, but the new meanings and new vocabulary had been contextualized in the new way of life and new intellectual paradigms that were alien to Chinese. For instance, at the beginning of 1980s, the well accomplished translator Dong Leshan (1924-) wrote a series of papers illustrating the maze of intercultural (mis)understandings in translation. As translator and proofreader of such contemporary books as *The Glory and the Dream* (by W. Manchester, tr. in 1978) *Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (tr. in 1979), Dong and his colleagues had faced a world of untranslatabilities. In particular, Manchester's unconventional, kaleidoscopic verbal scanning of American life since the end of WWII had put the Chinese translators in a situation where they were often lost in social, political and cultural references and anecdotes in the original works.

However, Chinese translators and educators, along with all the other intellectually 'emancipated' Chinese, were working hard for the century-old dream of Four Modernizations (agriculture, industry, national defense and science and technology). In the field of education, English (Russian, French or Japanese in some parts of China) became a compulsory course from elementary schools through to graduate programs. Foreign language departments, faculties and colleges were mushrooming up across the country. English textbooks were soon replaced by *English 900*, *English for Today* (from USA), *Essential English* and *New Concept English* (from the UK) especially in higher education institutions. To facilitate the enormous demand for foreign language (predominantly English) teaching and learning, scores of journals specializing in foreign studies (language, literature, translation, culture, etc.) (re)started publication. Meanwhile, native English speakers from Europe, North America and Australia were employed at China's education and research institutions. And a new wave of Chinese students and scholars going to the West was building.

Soon newly revised and updated dictionaries and reference books appeared. For instance, the *English-Chinese Dictionary of Knowledge of the American Society* (1984), edited by Dong, was helpful for many Chinese translators of the West now dominated by USA. Although it was difficult to find equivalents for new concepts and ideas from the West since WWII, it did not seem to hinder Chinese translation. Just as Chinese had borrowed Japanese translations of the West at the turn of the 20th century, mainland

Chinese could now turn to Hong Kong, Taiwan and overseas Chinese-speaking communities all over the world for help and inspiration in creating equivalents. New theories and techniques of Chinese translology by Chinese scholars from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Europe and North America were introduced to the mainland China.

For instance, beginning from 1980, volumes of works by Qian Gechuan (1903-1990) hit bookstores across the country. Born in Hunan, Qian went to Japan and England as a student in 1920s. When he returned to China in the 30s, he served as editor of *The New China* and translated works by Sinclair, Tolstoy and Hardy into Chinese. In 1950, he became Dean of the Faculty of Literature, University of Taiwan, and started to teach translation. In 1964, Qian went to Singapore, where he taught translation at several universities. Upon retirement, he moved to the United States (see Chen, 1992; Lin et al. ed. 1988). In Qian is seen how Chinese translation and translology in the vernacular had kept growing outside of the mainland from 1949 to the end of 1970s. Qian's multi-volumed *Techniques of Translation*, *Basic Knowledge of Translation* and *On Translation*, were now driving translation studies to a new era in the mainland.

b. Political and social consequences

In a short period of time, Western works since WWII in all fields of studies and academic disciplines were introduced to the intellectually hungry and thirsty nation. In the area of translation studies, Western theories of translation, including Structural, Philological, Sociolinguistic, Semantic and Hermeneutic schools, began to be imported. Eugene Nida, Newmark and Steiner were among the best received theorists in China. In literature, for example, those unheard-of schools and individual writers became known to the Chinese, including Existentialism, Theatre of the Absurd, Nouveau roman, Angry Young Men, Beat Generation, Black Humour, Realismomagico, Arthur Miller, Hemingway and so on so forth. Even anti-Communist works such as *Animal Farm* and *1984* were introduced, translated and studied.

With the rapid development in electrical and electronic industries and communications technology imported from the West, Chinese educators and students soon had easy access to audio and visual equipment for English teaching and learning. With popularization of new educational technologies came Western cultural products,

especially popular culture. Euro-American newspapers, magazines, movies, cassettes and video tapes stormed into the country. As a result, Chinese translation entered a new epoch in which the West was and is being translated simultaneously in various ways and forms, including audio, visual, electronic, digital, verbal, nonverbal, textual and non-textual.

Consequently, a new image of the West - rich, free, vigorous, creative, democratic, scientifically and technologically advanced - started to be formed, imagined and idealized. This powerful image was not only creating a sense of anger and indignation, of suppression, oppression and exploitation, and of being cheated, deceived and misguided, it was also politically, socially and intellectually subversive. It represented a century-long dream of freedom, equality and democracy that had been oppressively manipulated, a 'reality' that was out there in the West but beyond China's reach. A haunting and hurting sense of national inferiority that had been miraculously healed by Maoist version of the same dream was being retranslated back to life again.

As a society, China was lost in its moral, psychological and spiritual disorientation. At a superficial level, traditional Confucianism had been, for nearly a century, ideologically revolutionized to a point where few Chinese in the New China would ever know who Confucius was if Mao had not launched a confusing Anti-Confucius movement in 1973. At a deeper level, Confucianism was still there, embedded in the deeper structure of the Chinese language, or, in other words, the Chinese way of thinking. This is clearly seen in the fact that that way of language/thinking was, for instance, still standing in the way of translating the West. Mao's version of half-translated and half-manipulated Communism had proved to be a disastrous failure. However, the kind of idealism in Maoist interpretation of Communism in many ways resembled, ironically, the Confucian cultural vision, and was still appealing to the Chinese heart/mind. Furthermore, the bitter memory of the colonial history and fear of Western capitalism and imperialism were still working both in China's collective unconscious and in China's official propaganda. With Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, Communism, Marxism, etc. so destroyed and relativized, a general crisis in faith, belief or identity was emerging along with its biproduct of cynicism.

With more and more Western spiritual and material products translated into China, the political legitimacy of the new generation of Communist leadership began to be challenged. The pragmatic leader Deng Xiaoping was fully aware of the political and ideological threats from China's ongoing massive translation. As early as March 1979, before his reform and opening were implemented, Deng laid down his political ground rule of the Four Fundamental Principles: adherence to the socialist road, people's democratic dictatorship, Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, and the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Deng was carrying on his policies under his famous slogan *Mozhe shitou gehe* (literally cross the river steadily by feeling the stepping stones in the water). In fact, he was wire-walking between various currents and over dark, invisible but violent torrents. For instance, Deng had to face numerous conflicts and contradictions between the current system of one-party leadership and the dissenting demand of multi-party democracy; between the socialist public/state ownership and the strong request of capitalist private ownership; between the state planned economy and the market economy; between tight ideological control regarded as necessary and the need of intellectual freedom for reform and opening; between the gripping on political power and loosening of economic development, etc.

Caught in between all these tensions, different social, intellectual and political forces began to surface. While underground democratic movements aiming at changing the one-party system were going on, some young people started to openly express their rebellious feelings by wearing long hair and hippish clothes, dancing disco, and trying freer sex and chemicals. They imitated any Western way of life they could read, hear or see to find their own identities in a rapidly changing society they could hardly make sense of. Social crimes such as theft, robbery, prostitution, rape and drugs that had been successfully eliminated during Mao's leadership reappeared. Just as what had happened to the May 4th Movement, the new generation of translators, writers, scholars and academics were re-translating their own experiences of the West and interpretations of various Western texts into their own writings. The more thoughtful intellectuals re-introduced the May 4th theme of intellectual enlightenment through China-West comparative studies.¹

¹ The above historical accounts come from many different sources, including, for instance, *Major events in the People's*

Toward mid-80s, from the economic basis to the ideological superstructure, social discontent came to a point of explosion. With the deepening of reform towards market economy, the gap between the poor and the rich was widening at an unprecedented rate. Large numbers of state-owned factories were declining and closing with their workers laid off; the *nouveaux riches* were gladly fishing in the troubled waters of disjunction between planned economy and market economy; officials with political power were colluding with those who had economic power in appropriating and privatizing what belonged theoretically to the public. Political and economic corruption was everywhere to be found. All this was interpreted by some intellectuals and political dissidents as the innate, incurable cancer in the Communist rule. Students and workers staged demonstrations in 1985 and 1986 for political reform, which were soon suppressed in the names of "Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization" and "Anti-Spiritual Pollution" movements. But what was suppressed was still there, growing in both the economic basis and the ideological superstructure. It was impossible for Deng to strike a balance between all those conflicting forces to bring the minimum social justice for social stability.

Meanwhile, just as the Eight-Power Allied Forces had triumphantly marched into the militarily defenseless Capital of Beijing eighty years before, Western capital was now marching into the economically defenseless China, especially in coastal areas. Both literally and figuratively, China did not know how to translate the internationalized vocabulary and grammar of transnational capital into its body of national economy and people's livelihood. The fairly integrated systems of national industry and economy established under Mao were rapidly collapsing in front of the neo-colonial economic powers. To show the rate, range and depth of Western economic penetration and expansion into China, it would suffice to quote one sentence from *He shang* (1988), the explosive TV political documentary mentioned earlier:

One day, the director of a large state-owned automobile manufacturing factory was standing at the Tower of Tian'anmen. He looked down below at the passing vehicles. When he counted to one hundred, he found 97 of the vehicles were of foreign produce.

This rapid and massive translation of Western capital and technology was deepening the Chinese social, political, economic as well as cultural crisis. Finally, in 1989, less than ten years since Deng's reform and opening, Chinese translation of the West culminated in the tragic Tian'anmen Square Incident widely known in the West.

3. Translation in a Global Era

a. Western vision of globalization vs. Chinese dream of rejuvenation

The Tian'anmen tragedy may be taken as a sign of complex international and intercultural tensions and threats within translation practices of a global era. In terms of culture, it may be regarded as not only a tragedy for China but more importantly for the contemporary world that is characterized by translation both in its narrower and in its broader sense. While in the West, the Incident has been understood as representing the suppressive and oppressive nature of the Communist rule, within the discursive context of this thesis, it serves more as a warning to the 'global village' that is interpreting everything from an economic or political perspective.

For one thing, both Deng and the students were tragic victims of their different interpretations of China's same reality in relation to the outside world. As a great patriotic leader, Deng had been fighting to secure a place for the once colonized nation in the postcolonial jungle of nations. Fully aware of international political, economic, military and cultural threats his opening policy would bring to China, Deng tried to navigate the international waters of uncertainty to a new identity for China. For instance, when he decided to draw foreign investments into China, he was facing harsh criticisms from within and outside of his Party. But Deng carried on his opening policy firmly and resolutely, believing it was the only way for China to survive in the new global order. On the other hand, the students were risking their future and even their lives for the same China whose hope, they felt, was lying in Western-style democracy. In fact, what the students were hunger-striking for was an official recognition that theirs was a patriotic movement rather than a political and social upheaval as had been so defined and labeled.

The question is what was the West to which Deng was determined to open his China? Certainly, it was not the world Mao had understood it to be and ideologically fought against, for decades. It was a world now politically headed by the Reagan-

Thatcher alliance, whose means of global arms race and economic competition was achieving its Cold War end of overthrowing the "Evil Empire" of the Soviet Union. The fall of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 90s was then interpreted as a proclamation of the self-evident universal truth of economic fundamentalism in ideological, political and intellectual terms. This vision of economic determinism, a renewed Western dream of universality, came to be called *globalization*, a Western term that is hardly translatable into Chinese. In a sense, China was and is now opened to a new version of a Western dream that is about five hundred years old (see Smith, 2000, p. 1).

This 'old wine' in the 'new bottle' of globalization has not been very 'tasty' to the Chinese tongue. Historically, it has certainly not been 'nutritious' to the Chinese body. In fact, from what has been studied so far, the trajectory of globalization as a Euro-American imperial vision along with its instruments of theology, universal reasoning, science-technology, theory of evolution, etc. can be clearly traced in China's history of translation. Matteo Ricci and his converts were undoubtedly trying to translate the re-envisioned world of Catholicism into China. In engaging themselves in science-technology translation, the Missionaries and Chinese converts in the 18th century were continuing with that universal dream with a strong touch of Enlightenment reasoning, ironically inspired by the Jesuits' translation of China. Wei Yuan and his generation of Opium War translators were translating as a way to outwit the Western vision of global colonization. In the late 19th century, Yan Fu, Lin Shu and other translators were trying to transplant the Western evolutionary vision of humanity in China. The May 4th translators were attempting a revolutionary translation through a one-turn negation of Chinese tradition. Mao carried that dream of translation further through his series of organized political movements.

In all these processes is found the conflict between the Chinese dream of a new identity through *globalization* and the deeper, defining structure of the current *globalization* as a Euro-American Imperial dream. The Chinese dream of a new identity naturally implies the Chinese interpretation of what human life, in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world, is, can and should be like. However, the colonial experience of translation, as described so far, has put China in a situation where

no 'language' seems available for the Chinese to express their vision of globalization in a way that is understandable to the West.

Unlike Chinese experience of Buddhist translation, recent centuries of translation has pushed the Chinese to think of the world in Western terms of theology, science-technology, evolution, and Communism as the highest level of evolution, etc. As discussed earlier, driven by urgent needs for national survival before different forms of Western colonial threats, the Chinese had no time to translate various Western texts in a way that could transform Chinese understanding of human life without losing their identity. Consequently, cultural translation became a form of anti-cultural practice. With traditional Confucianism radically decentralized, fragmented and abandoned, there was no solid basis upon which to mediate or assimilate foreign cultures. In their massive translation of the West, the Chinese have been losing their own cultural power of speech. For nearly two hundred years, from a global point of view, the lived and living experiences of nearly a quarter of human beings have been marginalized. Meanwhile, as one of the oldest human civilizations, this profound and resourceful cultural tradition has been silenced and dumbbed.

b. Need for dialogue

Within China, there have been concerns about re-establishing the Chinese cultural identity in the context of global integration. In fact, since the beginning of Deng's reform, some leading philosophers and scholars from China, including Liang Suming (? - 1988), Fei Xiaotong and Ji Xianlin (1911-)¹, have been calling for China-West intercultural dialogue. Their main idea is that in the 21st century, China can contribute to the world in terms of culture by resorting to Confucianism which holds a key to a more humane and harmonious world. For instance, in his article "Cultural Reflections on Economic Globalization and China's Triple Jump," Fei briefly outlined the history of Western globalization in relation to China. In his view:

Chinese culture enjoys a long history. Many thinkers throughout the ages have left us extremely valuable intellectual wealth and resources. Traditional Chinese culture

¹ Liang is one of the leading modern Chinese philosophers who wrote the influential *East-West Cultures and Their Philosophies* (1922). Fei is the most important modern Chinese anthropologist who wrote *Earthbound China* (1947). Ji, a major translator of ancient Indian writings, is one of the most outstanding modern Chinese intellectuals in

is intellectually characterized by its pursuit of balance and harmony, emphasis on the relationship between Self and Others, and advocacy of *tian ren he yi* (the theory that humankind is an integral part of nature)... To the Chinese, *tian ren he yi* is an ideal realm, whose social norm is *he* (harmoniousness, gentleness, peacefulness, etc.). This idea of *he* is the basic starting-point of the inner structure of the Chinese society and of all the Chinese social relations. In living together with other nations and nationalities, the theory of *he er bu tong* (harmony/peace within differences/diversities) developed, which is very different from Western concepts of nations... The ancient idea of *he er bu tong* is still full of vitality, and can serve as a standard and goal for modern social development. 'He' should be preserved while differences acknowledged. This is an inevitable road for the global pluralistic cultures. Otherwise, conflicts will arise. If *tong* (sameness/identicalness) is to be achieved at the cost of *he*, it may lead to an extreme state of conflicts which will result only in destruction. Therefore *he er bu tong* should be a fundamental condition for human co-existence (*Guangming Daily*, November 7, 2000. Translation mine).

What Fei said here is a good footnote to, for example, Huntington's pessimistic theory of clash of civilizations, which typically lacks the spirit of *he* in its analysis of and prescriptions for the current global order. Indeed, the central theme of traditional Chinese culture, *he*, which supported and sustained China as a nation for thousands of years, can be regarded as one of many possible cultural contributions on the part of China to the present world of intercultural discord. Technically, *he* is similar to the North American idea of multiculturalism; philosophically, it is paradigmatically based upon the traditional Chinese understanding of Self, Other and Nature that is different. On the one hand, it is being socially destroyed or suppressed through particularly economic institutionalization of Western-style competition. On the other hand, it is alive in China's collective unconscious that occasionally rebels against the system of market economy. Although *he* is hardly translatable into modern Chinese, not to mention English, it might be a good starting point for global intercultural deliberations for a better future of human co-survival.

In fact, as China is economically developing at an unprecedented rate towards Westernization, voices of cultural revisit and return have been ringing at least among a small, elite circle. They represent part of Chinese efforts in re-establishing a new identity, striking a balance between tradition and Western-style modernization, and seeking cultural harmony out of civilizational differences.

However, such voices can hardly move from the periphery to the centre of Chinese life, which is revolving round the axis of economic development. Internationally China has been opened to a new West of global market economy regulated and controlled by transnational capital represented by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. As a major driving force of globalization, these 'world' organizations seem to be more interested in establishing a West-centred global system of economic competition through eroding individual, local, and national identities than in global dialogues for what economy means. Internally, under heavy pressure of global economic competition, China has fully succumbed to the Western notion of economy as a master key to human issues.

Although the process of globalization has successfully drawn China into its web of capitalism, political and ideological fights still characterize China-West relations, which are overshadowing intercultural concerns. Within this global market logic, the Chinese Communist government finds itself facing multi-layered challenges. To legitimize its rule, the government has to keep the economy developing at a faster speed. The greater the speed however, the deeper China becomes trapped in a system that is in contradiction with Communist moral and political principles. Free economic development tends to reduce a national government to a conduit for the free flow of international corporate capital, whereas the success of the Communist government lies in its tight grip on political power. Consequently, human rights, democracy, freedom, etc. - the sticks with which the West has been striking the Chinese government - have become, by an interesting twist and turn, Chinese official and legitimate sticks to strike back against the West.

The legitimacy comes partly from the inability on the part of the West to answer a long list of questions. These questions include, for example, the global colonial history, Euro-American postcolonial agendas, and the current system of global economy that has

been largely based upon the oppression and exploitation of the South by the North. Such questions have offered sufficient moral ground for economic development at the cost of other human concerns. In this case, when the Chinese government insists that the right to survival is the first and foremost human right, how should the West respond in order to 'improve' China's human rights? If *globalization* means destruction of basic human values including personal, familial, social and national sense of order, peace, security and harmony, whom should and could ordinary Chinese turn to for necessary protection?

It is within these international and intercultural tensions that contemporary Chinese translation has been dramatically unfolding. In a sense, for the past few hundred years China engaged itself in translating various versions of Western self-image as universal truth. Now it is piously translating the huge 'theological treatise' - in Greider's words (1997, p. 35) - of Western free market theory represented by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and now the documents of the World Trade Organization. Both literally and figuratively, China is turning this new world religion of the market into its systems of economy, education, culture and even politics. For instance, in order to fit in with the global track of economy, China has been *guan*, *ting*, *bing*, *zhuan* and *mai* (shutting down, merging, transferring and selling) state-owned factories and enterprises. Consequently, while the country is being changed into a manufacturing base of cheap goods for the global market, millions and millions of workers have been laid off to a 'free' society without a network of minimum social insurance/security.

c. Market-oriented translation

Controlled by the "hidden curriculum" of the market, current Chinese textual translation has become largely dependent upon the confusing Western theories of management, marketing, information technology and popular culture. For instance, in the later half of the 1980s, Western, especially American, bestsellers of cheap thrillers, detective stories, Gothic, quasi-pornography and romance gained a lion's share in the translating market. For a time, writers like Irvin Wallace, Jackie Collins and Ken Follet (see Fan, 1999) and novels such as *Hollywood Wives*, *If Tomorrow Comes* and *The Second Lady* filled China's bookstores. From mid-80s to mid-90s, an international flow process of original text providers-translators-publishers-distributors was well organized.

Once a number one bestseller was published in the United States, it would reach a group of contract translators in China in no time. It was then rapidly turned into Chinese sometimes even without being coherent, when, for example, the names of the protagonists or plots were mistranslated as the translators had no time to compare notes. Within two or three weeks the translation was widely available across the country.

In 1992, China joined the Bern Copyright Convention. As a result, translation of contemporary Western works has decreased in number. Still books on information technology, management and marketing are so popular that Chinese publishers are encouraged to buy copyrights from the original publishers. For instance, books on the stock market and the WTO or by such billionaires as Bill Gates have been bestsellers. Meanwhile, Western popular figures in the fields of politics, sports and entertainment have been selling well. To a certain extent, the profit-oriented book market has been cultivating readers who desire and crave Western popular culture, and the huge number of popular readers is creating and giving life to the money-centred book market.

Euro-American efforts to protect their copyrights in China have created a space for (re)translating Western classics. In the field of literature, for example, (re)translations of classics ranging from Greek, Roman, Middle Ages and Renaissance writers to modernists can be found in China's bookstores. Postmodern, postcolonial and other contemporary classics that are still under copyright protection are imported more in the form of Chinese reviews, treatises and commentaries than through translation. In fact, since the Tian'anmen Incident, Euro-American "post" scholarships and globalization theories have been hot topics among the more elite circle of academics.

In the field of literature, the rate of textual translation and publication is still growing. According to Li (*Guangming Daily*, Dec. 13, 2001), from 1980 to 1986, on average, 657 translations of foreign literary works were published annually. In 1988, the number grew to over one thousand. This rate slowed down for a while when China joined the international copyright convention. In recent years, however, every year more than one thousand foreign literary works have been translated and published.

With advanced communications technologies including the Internet, and the efforts of large numbers of West-based Chinese journalists, students and scholars, new forms of electronic, optical and digital translation have largely replaced the more

traditional ways of textual translation. In fact, what is happening globally is translated into Chinese almost in real time. In particular, popular access to the Internet has created a kind of information democracy, which enables the Chinese to be more open in view and better informed of the West. Although the Chinese government tries to build a 'fire wall' blocking this subversive flow of information, massive flow of Western capital investments, technologies and methods of management is eroding the government's authority and power. It is rendering the 'fire wall' more a symbol than a real defense.

This ongoing process of globalization is fundamentally changing China as a nation, a culture and a civilization. No one can be sure, however, what this change means to China in relation to the globalizing world. In terms of culture, at one end, the ongoing translation seems to be rendering contemporary China increasingly superficial, shallow, secularized, vulgarized, consumer-oriented and technology-dependent. At the other end, a new discourse of resistance against Western version of globalization, largely inspired by contemporary Western critics, is emerging. Ironically, it is popular among the new generation of 'elite' scholars growing up with Western ideas, who are indulged in playing Western intellectual games of postmodernism, deconstruction, postcolonialism and globalization. Since their scholarship is based more on a disjunction than on an awareness of deeper, historical and realistic interrelationship between China and the West, it is hardly accessible to ordinary Chinese, whose lives become increasingly out of control in an economically globalizing context.

In brief, many forces are working at the heart of current translation as different forms of Chinese acceptance of, identification with and resistance against globalization. In the tension of these forces the future of China is being worked out. One-fifth of the world's population will have strong impact on a globalizing world. How, then, are some of the tensions being played out in the current life of especially the younger generation of Chinese? How can their living experiences inform the study of translation as an indispensable part of the way of contemporary life in an increasingly integrated world?

4. Reading Three Texts of Contemporary Translation

Any attempt to draw a clear, detailed picture of the contemporary multi-faced, multifaceted and multi-layered translation of the West would be futile. However, a

reading of three texts may help us gain some insight into translation as a form of cultural dialogue and interaction in this global era.

a. Text One: China Can Say No

(a) The book and the event

As mentioned at the beginning of the thesis, 1996 was an anti-West year in China represented by furious waves of voices of "No" from Chinese youth. This is ironic, since seven years before, at the height of the 1989 students' movement, a big Statue of Liberty symbolizing the West had been put up at the centre of the Tian'anmen Square - the heart of China. It 'lit' the way for the Movement to move to its tragic end, followed by a period of social, political and intellectual silence. Eight years later, as China became increasingly involved in the globalization process of Western design, things turned upside down. The same West which, with its same universal values of freedom, democracy and human rights, had been trying to help ordinary Chinese under a 'suppressive and oppressive' government, was now resented as a hegemonic monster.

The anti-West sentiments were sparked by *China Can Say No*, a bestseller by five young people who had never been to the West but believed they represented the 'silent majority' of the Chinese. The book, which includes many translated excerpts and chapters by contemporary Western politicians and journalists, is not a history, or (auto)biography, or personal reflection, or political commentary. Neither is it a 'nationalistic declaration.' Yet it has all the elements above, a mixture of young people's understanding, interpretation and translation of China's reality in relation to the West, particularly the United States and Japan.

The first three sections of the first chapter are entitled: How I Became Affected with Pro-American Complex, Re-examination: Why the Pestilence of Pro-American Psychology Spread, and We Can Easily Become Slaves, and Having Become Slaves We Take Delight in It. The book opens with the following remarks (Song et al. 1996, p. 2. Translation mine):

I was born in 1964. I learned to be concerned with the outside world at the end of 70s, a time of intellectual emancipation. In the 80s, I attended a university in Shanghai. At that time, there was a strong atmosphere of discussion, and people

were ready to identify themselves with any values. It is hard to imagine any Chinese youth with liberal ideas like myself would not develop deep and strong love for America. This deep-rooted love was genuine and true. It might not express itself in extremely crazy, passionate forms. Rather, in a profound, persistent and even tender way, it controlled the standards with which we understood reality, and exerted influences upon our pursuits. I remember in the summer of 1987, a like-minded roommate of mine from Shandong (Province)...watched an American movie on an old, black-and-white TV... From today's point of view, the movie is indeed superficial, vulgar, hypocritical and even maliciously deceptive. But at that time, under the gloomy circumstances, what excitement and pleasure even an old American movie brought us! I remember the roommate, beaming with delight, said: "If we want to find our root, it is in America - what sense of warmth and affection it brings to watch an American movie!"

That sense grew with time in the author, whose trust and confidence in America deepened with the incidents in Cambodia and Afghanistan. He applauded the United States for boycotting the Olympic Games in Moscow; he was overjoyed when China and Romania decided to participate in the Olympic Games in Los Angeles. He said (ibid. p. 5. Translation mine):

All that touching and feeling (of America) naturally came to be the rock upon which I whole-heartedly felt and experienced America during my university years. Twenty-or-so-year-old professors, handsome president(s), fervent elections, superb movies, from Hemingway to Fitzgerald... the impact of the Super Power was immeasurable. Each and every part of our daily life - mostly spiritual, on second thought - was closely related to America... In those days when we were forcing ourselves into the body of America, there was no way for us to turn it over in our mind... Without doubt, the values of the majority of the students were decided by American values (this is still clearly true of today, for example, people's views about the Gulf War). American joy or sorrow was the joy or sorrow of humankind. The prototypal tragedy of the *Challenger* drove us into a state of muzzy pain.

They cried American cries, laughed American laughs, and cheered American cheers. They worshipped the charismatic Ronald Reagan, to the extent that they wished,

Reagan, as 'God of Freedom,' could lead them. The image of America was so powerful that "all the Chinese values were being reevaluated and re-examined: from democratic politics to the higher education system, from market-oriented economy to ideas of love and marriage... Only America, America and still America, could provide surprisingly delightful perspectives for us liberal students" (ibid. p. 6. Translation mine). In brief, America was the highland in their heart/mind, deeper than love, larger than life, and truer than home.

From the next section on, however, like a betrayed lover filled with the fury of revenge, the authors employ a radical, militant and often irrational language that could have come into being only in a tradition that has experienced the May 4th and Cultural Revolution. Their tones and discursive attitudes easily remind us of Yang Guangxian who launched various attacks on missionaries at the court centuries ago. In a fragmented, incoherent and sometimes decontextualized manner, they cite as many examples and incidents as they could find from domestic and international reports and commentaries about China-West encounters and skirmishes in recent years. In their interpretation, the West, headed by the United States, was carrying on a hegemonic policy of containment against China in diplomatic, military, economic and cultural terms. From the issues of Taiwan, Tibet, WTO, China's bidding to host the 2000 Olympic Games, human rights including the one-child policy, to the American cultural and economic invasion through trade, Hollywood and so-called free but in fact politically manipulated media, the West was well organized as an Anti-China Club. The only way for China was to say "No" to and "be prepared for war" against the West.

(b) An interpretation

Much can be read out of this book of raw facts, and rawer interpretations of those facts, along with the phenomenon of its popularity as well as strong criticisms from academics. Insofar as my thesis is concerned, the following points stand out as relevant.

First of all, it is interesting to see how contemporary translation seems to be still trapped in the same utilitarian mentality as that of the May 4th Movement, without a critical understanding of what translation means to either translators or the translated. As seen in the confessions of the author(s), translation of the post-War West in the late 70s

and early 80s, again, created a Western Utopia for the Post-Mao China. This new image of the West was politically necessary to pull the Chinese down to earth from Mao's utopia, and to further inspire Chinese to shake off shackles of Mao's radical revolutionary dogmas. However, just as what happened during the May 4th, the political necessity of using the utopian West to intellectually liberate the Chinese mind in order to find China lost in Mao's revolution went to the opposite of its intention: the revival of the spirit of wholesale Westernization. A new generation of Chinese became, as seen in the book, intellectually, emotionally and psychologically enslaved, caged in their fancies and fantasies of a West that was not really there, although the authors claimed they knew much more about American history and culture than most American students (see p. 20).

Consequently, instead of being a form of intercultural dialogue with the West from the Chinese footing, for a better life of co-existence, this translation was creating a new sense of 'lack' that could, again, never be filled. In psychoanalytic terms (ironically Freudianism was a buzzword in China in mid-80s), the object of the lack - the objectified West - did not possess what the subject - the Chinese youth - fancied it had. The fantasized West could not give Chinese youth what they dreamed of, particularly the kind of ultimate human concerns of the meaning of life and existence within a broken, colonized and revolutionized tradition. Even if it could give satisfaction, for instance, with its theory of free market economy as the ultimate expression of human values, its offering would go precisely against their broken vision of human life, like the remains of their destroyed Confucianism.

This might explain why Chinese students in the 80s, including the authors, were craving for modern Western philosophies. For a time, Positivism, Pragmatism, Logical Positivism, Neo-Thomism, Existentialism, the Frankfurt School, Neo-Marxism, Structuralism and various 'post' philosophies were sweepingly translated into Chinese. But none of these Western theories could provide the kind of philosophical, moral, intellectual or emotional support Chinese youth 'lacked.' On the contrary, the philosophical tradition Chinese youth so idealized was, and is, suffering from its own, and much older, sense of lack, which, as discussed earlier, brought the West to China four hundred years ago.

Unlike the West-inspired Chinese sense of lack which tends to express itself in the destructive manner of radical, massive and violent political and social revolutions, the Western sense of lack manifests itself in a more subtle, orderly, theological, scientific, and rationally controlled, thus more destructive, manner. As a 'black hole' in the rationalized, legitimized and institutionalized human desires for power, wealth, control, etc., this lack - whose latest form is economic fundamentalism - is now deeply embedded in the vision of globalization. This lack is drawing the whole world into its ultimately empty vortex of free marketism as the ultimate human value, a condition that is eating away any personal, familial, social or national boundaries. As a result, when contemporary China tries to translate the West to fill its sense of lacking a sustaining cultural identity, it is being translated, outwitted and overpowered by a greater lack. It is within this context of globalization that one can make some sense out of the many frustrations, defeats, and failures suffered by China in its engagement with the West, as listed in *China Can Say No*.

It is also interesting to note that while self-sustained Confucianism gave way to the modern sense of lack, the Derridean 'traces' of decentralized and fragmented Sinocentrism are still there working in the new era. Some scholars, such as Liu, Lei and others (in Xiao ed., 1997), have offered some insights into the political and cultural history of Mao's China. According to Lei (ibid. p. 53-54. Translation mine):

This Sinocentric cultural nationalism took on the form of 'China being the centre of the world revolution' in the 1960s and 1970s. Within this discourse, the 'proletarian revolution' was the only way for humankind to be 'saved' and 'liberated.' Therefore, those who held the leadership of the proletarian revolution would control and lead the fate/destiny of humankind. At a superficial level, this discourse was full of such big, universal terms as 'proletarian revolution,' 'the whole humankind,' and 'the world.' At a deeper level, however, they were modern versions of the Celestial Empire Mentality and Sinocentrism. At that time, it was theoretically believed that since the end of the 19th century, the leadership of the proletarian revolution/centre of the world revolution had been constantly moving towards the East from Marx in the Western Europe, to Lenin in Russia and finally to Mao Zedong/China. Thus

China shouldered the historical mission of the Saviour to save humankind from 'imperialism,' 'old and new colonialism' and 'revisionism.'

Lei went on to say that as the Chinese became more informed of a truer West, that Maoist belief was undermined. In the 90s, however, with China economically better developed, the Sinocentric consciousness woke up again. Thus Lei and others rejected the anti-West movement launched by *China Can Say No* as a new 'Cultural Boxers' Movement,' a resurgence of the condemned Celestial Empire mentality. Ironically, this resurgence in Chinese youth, according to Lei, comes from the wholesale acceptance of Western deconstructionism, postmodernism and postcolonialism on the part of some Chinese youth living and studying in North America. In Lei's view (ibid. pp. 48-49. Translation mine), based upon the "post" theories popular in American academies, the 'no-sayers' think what China is facing is the possibility of a neo-cultural colonization. They believe modern mainstream Chinese culture has never been able to get rid of the curse of colonial discourse under Western hegemonic control. Their idea is that

... since China's reform and opening, the dominant discourse in China has become increasingly closer to "international standards and norms," which include "a host of capitalist ideas" such as market economy, freedom, democracy, pluralism, independence of writers and 'humankind is the measure of all.' (They believe) for a long time, China has lost its courage to fundamentally challenge or reject Western power discourses. For instance, in negotiating with the West on issues of human rights, market economy, intellectual property, etc. China has been in a disadvantageous position mainly because it can not present a mode of narrative that is completely free from Western hegemonic discourses. Therefore, (they think) it has become urgent to establish a 'discourse of resistance' so as to ensure and maintain our own cultural subjectivity... in order to gain victory in future international conflicts.

Thus, within Lei's analytic framework, the "No" sayers become blind worshippers of, rather than staunch fighters against, the West. Instead of being a patriotic act, their irrational rejection of the West was almost traitorous, which would inevitably lead China away to a dead-end from the course of modernization. In Lei's opinion, it is not time yet for China to say 'No.' Rather, China should concentrate on taking in whatever is

beneficial and useful from the West. Histories in Russia and Japan have proved that learning from "the other" will strengthen instead of leading to the loss of the Self.

Lei's comments on the "No" saying movement point to, among other things, the complexity and contradiction at the heart of translation in a global era. Indeed, in their quest through translation for certainty - for identity and meaning in life from the "Other" of the West, the Chinese "No" sayers acquired a Western 'post' perspective in intellectual terms. But when this perspective was employed to interpret their own existential conditions in an uncertain world, they found there was no way to conduct any dialogue with the tradition that had brought up the 'post' insights. As a result, translation leads to resistance and rejection of what is translated. Something is dangerously missing.

However, Lei's interpretation of this part of contemporary Chinese translation of the West is somewhat problematic. First, his criticism itself is textually contextualized within the Western "post" discourses he is attacking. His deconstruction of the discourse of resistance of the no-sayers is achieved precisely through the 'post' skills he had learned. Secondly, if 'learning from the Other' is a reciprocal rather than one-way communication, what can China contribute to a world that is interconnected and interdependent? The no-sayers do have a right to voice their concerns about their perceived gloomy future that is largely conditioned in China's interaction with the West. Thirdly, how can this one-way communication be a "healthy, peaceful and open" attitude towards world peace and human progress as he advocates? Fourthly, if this voice of "No" is to be violently suppressed, will it bounce back some day as a more destructive force? Last but not least, Lei's argument seems to imply that as an economically backward country, China is not in a position to talk about its life from a global perspective, and that the future of China lies precisely in silently translating the more advanced West for its good. The question is: what does "future" mean in a globalizing world or is there a future at all if the long tradition of Chinese translation develops the way it has been, given the fact that a vicious cycle of wholesale acceptance and wholesale resistance is clearly found in that history?

The point here is that Lei seems to be focusing on the destructive side of deconstructionism without paying enough attention to the fact that 'post' scholarship rose radically but constructively against a tradition that used to be non-dialogical. For all the misreadings, misinterpretations and misunderstandings resulting in the militant voice

against the West, the Chinese "No" sayers were facing a West that was non-negotiable with its firm belief in the internationalization of Western-style economy as universal politics. The text of the 'no-saying' movement points to the urgent need for dialogue, which requires protection of certain conditions that need to be urgently identified.

The "no-saying" movement died away toward the end of 1997, leaving China greater freedom to translate Euro-American values. What is happening to the post-"no-saying" China?

b. Text Two: The Shanghai Babe

(a) The book and the event

As seen in the previous chapters, the deeper form of Chinese translation of the West has involved an active Chinese embracing and internalization of Western values through literary creation, political and social revolutionary movements. To see how Chinese life is being translated, another text can be read.

Since 1999, there have been quiet talks and heated arguments within China and Chinese communities around the world about a semi-autobiographic novel entitled *Shanghai Babe*. Written in the first person by the much-advertised 'beauty writer' Wei Hui, a young woman in her mid-twenties who claimed to write with her body, the novel has been a tremendous market success since its publication. Set in China's most cosmopolitan city of Shanghai that is leading China's way to 'globalization,' it is described as a 'protogenic' representation of the life of urban youth in contemporary China. The reason for choosing this text is not to see how China is translating, but rather how China is being translated almost beyond recognition in terms of spiritual, physical and material life.

The novel is composed of thirty-two chapters. Each chapter begins with one or several quotes exclusively from a wide range of Euro-American poets, novelists, artists, philosophers, etc. They include, among others, Henry Miller, Marguerite Duras, H. Lawrence, Dylan Thomas, the Beatles, Sylvia Plath, Elizabeth Tyler, F. O'Connor, Alan Ginsberg, Madonna, Bob Dylan, Nietzsche, Milan Kundera, Jack Kerouac, Virginia Wolfe, Lady Teresa, Freud and Descarte. Throughout the chapters, a reader can find almost all Chinese transliterations of Western famous-brand commercial products. The

novel forms a half-Chinese and half-Western linguistic world of Euro-American popular culture, from the way of daily greetings and names of daily clothing and utensils to daily consumption of music, movies, TV and magazines. It is a world of most avant-garde fashions: cafes, bars, salons, expensive clothes and drinks, French perfumes, taxis, luxurious hotels, homosexuality, bisexuality, drugs, exotic lovers and deaths. It is a world of consumerism, where there is no boundary between classical and popular or between highbrow and lowbrow - everything becomes the object of consumption. The protagonist lives practically in a colonized/globalized land of the West in Shanghai, which mostly serves as an invisible stage for the erotic drama of struggle between the feminine Chinese soul and masculine Western body.

The novel opens with the following paragraph (translation mine):

My name is Ni Ke (the same as Chinese transliteration of Nicole - translator). My friends call me CoCo (The exactly 90-year-old French female celebrity, CoCo Chanel, is my idol, second only to Henry Miller). Every morning when I open my eyes, the first thing that comes to my mind is to do something remarkable, something that can attract public attention. I fancy that one day I can be like magnificent fireworks cracking up into the sky above this city. It has come to be my ideal of life, a reason for me to feel life is still worth living.

As a student in the Chinese Department at a prestigious university in Shanghai, the 'I' was determined to be a novelist, whose carefully chosen key words of literary aspiration include "ill omen, conspiracy, ulcer, dagger, eros, poison, insanity, moonlight." After graduation, she worked as a journalist for a magazine, and published a collection of stories whose only success was inspiring a number of male readers to send her letters with porno pictures. Now the 25-year-old 'I' has resigned and become a waitress wearing mini-skirts at a cafe named Ludi (the Chinese transliteration of the heroine in Goethe's *Sorrow of Young Werther*). There, she meets a young, sentimental (Chinese) man of few words by the name of Tian Tian. His mother is running a Chinese restaurant in a small town in Spain, where his father died of 'myocardial infarction.' But his grandmother believes her son has been murdered by the woman - his mother - who is now living with a Spanish native.

Soon Ni Ke and Tian Tian live together. Her good-looking but fragile boyfriend turns out to be sexually impotent. Although he can not satisfy her physical needs, he draws her into a world of melancholy and decadence that includes sleeping, reading in bed, smoking, contemplating spirit and flesh, watching VCDs, playing video games and taking drugs. The qualities of quietness, weakness, helplessness, powerlessness, and sentimentality in her boyfriend seem to hold the key to her soul. She loves him deeply. Meanwhile, against his will, however, she plunges herself into a masculine world of pleasures with her foreign lover, Mark, a married businessman from Germany. As a 'pure Aryan German,' Mark represents everything she could fantasize. In her eyes, Mark is ...neatly dressed, smells fragrant. Standing under a streetlight, he appears as if just coming off a movie, as if just floating from the Pacific Ocean. My exotic lover, he has a pair of beautiful, wickedly blue eyes, incomparably perky buttocks, and that big member of his - shockingly big. Every time I date him, I think I am willing to die for him, to die under his body...(Wei Hui, 1999, online. Translation mine).

She and Mark try every crazy form of erotic pleasure that could be squeezed out of each other. They make love in the Lady's Room, out in the park - in situations that could be found - in her words - in Western blue movies. They even flirt with each other in front of Mark's wife Eva. As their promiscuity intensifies, her drug-addicted boyfriend is dying. While (she knows) Tian Tian is breathing his last,

I stayed in Mark's apartment. We lay naked in bed listening to Chinese music, watching VCDs or playing chess. When we felt hungry, we cooked Italian spaghetti or Chinese dumplings in the kitchen. We slept very little... When the mixture of semen, saliva and sweat filled every pore of our bodies, we took our swimsuits, swimming glasses and VIP cards and went swimming at the Grand Capital. Back in bed, we tested - with the kind of strength that only a devil could have - the fullest extent to which the sexual energy between us could reach. We found it was a completely crazy, extremely evil strength. If God said this was dust, we were ready to return to dust; if God said this was doomsday, we were already there. That giant thing of his (Mark's), as if made of rubber, was always in a state of erection, never collapsing, never admitting defeat, until my private parts bled. I thought the cells in some part of my womb fell...(ibid. Translation mine).

Indeed, the Shanghai Babe's way of intercourse with the object of her fantasy is doomed. Although Mark manages to find excuses to extend his stay in Shanghai, business has to take him back to Europe. By the end of the last chapter entitled "Who Am I," with Mark flying home to his cheated wife, the Shanghai Babe loses and is lost between the two worlds she claims to love but can not hold together.

(b) An interpretation

Again, out of this text much can be read of the manner in and extent to which the West is being translated into China, at both realistic and symbolic levels, as well as personal, social, cultural and intercultural levels. For its 'unhealthy and pornographic elements,' the book was for a short time officially banned, but for that very reason became all the more popular and accessible. Responses from readers widely differ. Some, such as Meng, F. L., Wu (2000, online) praise the book as the latest Chinese women's declaration of liberation. Since it is the most influential and controversial piece of contemporary literature, it will be, they believe, written into the history of Chinese literature. They regard the author Wei Hui, who describes herself as being heavily influenced by Eileen Chang and M. Duras (1914-96, French author of *The Lover*), as being true to herself in her literary originality and daring rebellion against commonly accepted moral codes of conduct.

More readers, however, violently attack both the author and the book from linguistic, literary, moral and cultural perspectives. While they agree the novel is between reality and imagination, they can not emotionally accept the 'truth' of life in Shanghai as presented and the 'immoral,' 'treacherous,' and 'colonized' way of imagination on the part of the author. In a short comment entitled "Shanghai Babe and the Neo-Colonial Epoch," Wei writes in a sarcastic, poignant, abusive and almost obscene tone (2000, online. Translation mine):

In an age full of desires and beliefs, and in an environment brimming with French perfumes, Wei Hui, such a delicate young woman, actively takes off her CK underwear. She willingly submits herself to the American chest which is as hairy as American economy is prosperous, and to the 'organ' which is as firm as the US

dollar. She opens her own small container to feel the pounding of US-made *jian chuan li pao* (strong warships and weapons, a special term used by the reformists in the end of the 19th century - translator) together with the physical and psychological climax the pounding brings. She gives off one or two petit-bourgeois moans and groans, fantasizing the pleasant sensation of herself being taken, invaded, humiliated and sadistically tyrannized... The glory of Shanghai's history is its being colonized... The difference is this time it is not geographically colonized, but rather physiologically and, at a deeper level, psychologically possessed and taken... This is an age of mutual colonization, only that it takes place on our land.

Wei's comments may well represent a group of Chinese youth's response to the social, psychological, emotional and intellectual transformation and changes of Shanghai. In this kind of responses are clearly seen the memory of the colonial history, awareness of the postcolonial reality, and concern with the future of China as a cultural entity.

From the present thesis' point of view, what is most relevant here is the postcolonial existential conditions of the Shanghai Babe together with its attitudes towards the changing reality. First and foremost, the 'I' lives in a world of translations, both literally and metaphorically. The daily vocabulary of her material life is mostly transliterated or translated from Western languages. Her passionate love with Mark is a crazy mixture of linguistic, physical and emotional translations - one would wonder how the two communicate with each other when one can hardly speak the language of the other. Her spiritual life - if she has one in its usual sense - is composed of a mass of translated names of Western classical and popular writers and artists along with their works in Chinese translation. In a way, the book itself is a superficial, sometimes awkward and weird synthesization of various Chinese translations. Throughout the novel, a reader inevitably gets a sense that the 'I' actually lives in a world of literary imagination and literary methods borrowed from the West.

Indeed, with Western capital storming into China, the physical environment is changing. For instance, as the pride of China's modernization, Shanghai is as cosmopolitan as any other Western city with its skyscrapers, busy traffic, international fashions, McDonalds's and Kentucky Fried Chicken, air pollution, etc. This 'globalized' environment of commercialization provides the Babe with the possibility of free choice,

including her career, sexual partners and hobbies that a more traditional young woman would not dare to imagine. It creates in her an imaginary that anything fashionable in the world - which seems to be right there in Shanghai - can be bought, sold and consumed, although it is not clear how she could financially access those exotic luxuries she enjoys. Constant efforts in satisfying the 'lack' in her, ironically, endow her with a sense of standing at the forefront of global consumer culture. While she consumes such new fashions as Ikea furniture, *Titanic* and Madonna, she also consumes such fashionable names as, or at its best, dismembered and decontextualized, Milan Kundera, Nietzsche and Freud.

It is right here, however, that the Babe's world falls apart. On the one hand, she is emotionally and even intellectually attached to the weak, vulnerable and dying world of her boyfriend. With his broken family ties, Tian Tian may symbolize, to a certain degree, her root of being. Living with him does give her a sense of home - although that home is financially supported by his mother in Europe. Even at her wildest moments with Mark, something in her seems to draw her back to Tian Tian. On the other hand, she could not resist the temptation of the other world of strength, power, luxury, exoticism and superiority symbolized by Mark. Although the two worlds exist simultaneously and side by side under the same sky of the globalized and globalizing Shanghai, they are not meaningfully related and are even mutually repelling at a deeper level. As a result, she constantly lives in a state of being torn apart between her soul and her flesh. There is no way for her to integrate the two worlds into a livable life.

Such a life in between the two worlds is shallow. Indeed, textually, the language of the novel is superficial, unable to convey the deeper experiences of a complicated life with its lack of literary, aesthetic or cultural depth most valued in the Chinese literary tradition. In its so-called avant-garde feeling and perception of reality with tastes and perspectives borrowed largely from Western popular culture, the novel is sometimes careless in diction, and from time to time lacks readable grammatical and syntactic structures. Meanwhile, the author's experience of the West is certainly skin-deep. For instance, although Mark seems to have powerfully penetrated into the very existence of the protagonist, he serves more as a pale symbol of beastly physical strength, without a perceptible soul or cultural values. Furthermore, those blurring quotes and sayings from

Western texts, which might have been intended to show off the author's Western knowledge and learning, look more like Western cosmetics clumsily put on her face.

On October 6, 2001, at the China Institute in New York, a lecture was held in honour of Wei Hui together with an autographing sales ceremony of the English translation of the *Shanghai Babe*. It was an embarrassing and emotionally charged occasion. Participants from Chinese communities around the world burst into an oral fight over the writer and the book. The author Wei Hui briefly talked about her writing experiences. In the end she commented that many young people in today's Shanghai were living like her, and that her novel truthfully reflected the ideas, ideologies and way of life of her generation. It was followed by an un-arranged and unexpected period of questioning from the audience. A participant, who had spotted in the novel "over a hundred mistakes in matters of principle" in terms of common sense and Chinese-Western cultures, rose to challenge the author. His questioning included the following (see Wu, 2001, online. Translation mine):

Line 4 of p. 80, you wrote: "Living scenes as Manet depicted in his famous *Lunch on a Meadow*, which is permeated with the sentiments of the middle class in the Middle Ages, are what I have been curious about." May I ask, Miss Wei Hui, when is the Middle Ages? And in the Middle Ages, was there such a thing as 'middle class'? When did the 'middle class' emerge?

On p. 81 (you wrote): "Then (were) motels in Germany, small abandoned churches in Vienna, and 15th-century colosseum (for gladiators) in Rome." May I ask, when is the 15th century? How should they build such a place in the 15th century?

...

Although a few participants from Taiwan, Hong Kong and North America rose in defense of the author, Wei Hui's superficial, disconnected and erroneous knowledge and information about Western and Chinese cultures put her in an indefensible situation. In fact, nicknamed by some as a *jīnu zuojia* (prostitute writer), Wei Hui was accused of shamelessly bringing shame onto the Chinese. Some critics pointed out that her more-than-explicit descriptions of sex were no more than a shortcut to the market of fame. The most popular writer thus became speechless and dumb. More importantly, perhaps, Wei Hui and her work may represent the kind of existential conditions of superficiality,

ignorance and forgetfulness in a global era of that group of Chinese youth who take delight in such a way of life.

The scene is indeed ironically suggestive. The China Institute in New York, where the drama was staged, was established by Hu Shi and Dewey in 1926 for China-US intercultural engagement. As the initiator of the Literary Revolution through translation, Hu Shi might have never expected that his Revolution for the rebirth of Chinese literary identity should have brought modern Chinese literature to where it is. This situation, a product of radical political, social and intellectual revolutions, is well illustrated by a contemporary Chinese poet Yang Lian, who has been exiled to the United Kingdom. In an almost untranslatable way, Yang makes the following comments (2001, online. Translation mine):

The innate predicament of contemporary Chinese poetry is the predicament of Chinese culture. It is rooted in a breakup at all levels between the past and the present. The wounds are recorded in the form of cheers and hails in our history textbooks. The most hasty 'victories' of the 20th century Chinese, driven by realistic blows but at the same time fawning on promises of the future with a belief that they could transplant out of thin air a tradition belonging to others, found no better expression than their loss of cultural tradition. Being radical equals being blind. A blueprint could be indeed easily drawn, but there was no shortcut for the painful transformation of modernity. In a short period of time, an invisible process of sifting was completed: a host of values concerning social evolution replaced the cycle of dynasties while enabling primitive evils to emit themselves all the more bold and straight. A utopian paradise built with the logic of science, when it suddenly collapsed, revealed its unparalleled ruins of humanity.

Yang then goes on to offer the following picture of Chinese language and literature (ibid. Translation mine):

Violence in language has been all the more radical: 'Classical Chinese' along with its 赋(*fu*), 骈(*pian*), 绝(*jue*), 律(*lu*)¹ (and of course the eight-legged essay!) - all the formalistic pursuits of the Chinese language - were equated with the original

¹ They refer to classical Chinese literary forms and styles. *Fu* means descriptive prose interspersed with verse; *pian* rhythmical prose characterized by parallelism and orativeness; *jue* a poem of four lines, each containing five or seven characters, with a strict tonal pattern and rhyme scheme; *lu* a poem of eight lines following the rules of *jue*.

sins of feudalism and sweepingly replaced by the vulgar and anti-formal *baihua* (vernacular). The cultural nihilist movement unprecedented in world history paved, in terms of attitude, the way for the Cultural Revolution... In a sense, our writings are like plants grown in a vacuum container: first there is no language apart from the *baihua* and a huge heap of unfamiliar, dull and dry words coming from translation. Second, there is no tradition, except for a misconception about 'the past.' In fact, even if there is any heritage, we have lost our ability to inherit it. Third, there is no poetry, by which I mean the sense of history and sense of form contained in the standards of evaluation. The past in the Classical Poetry is as distant and remote to us as the West in translations.

What Yang says here may well serve as a summary of literary translation in China, and China in translation, in the 20th century, certainly providing a historical footnote to *Shanghai Babe*. The world of the Babe seems to be situated at a point of no return, a point of superficiality, disorientation and loss - a point of disjunction between China's past and present and between China and the West. The superficial world of the Babe seems to mirror deep and profound linguistic and cultural challenges of China's meeting and interfacing with the West in this new age of globalization.

c. Text Three: Interviews

(a) Rationale

The two texts of *China Can Say No* and the *Shanghai Babe* can be described as two extremes, which, more destructive than constructive, historically characterize Chinese translation of the West. They seem to offer little hope of intercultural understanding or mediation which translation theoretically stands for.

Precisely because of the extremities of the two texts, they may not represent the living, multi-dimensional truth of contemporary Chinese translation. What, then, is actually happening among particularly the younger generation of Chinese who are silently learning, practicing and living out a life of translations? What do they think of the cultural future of China in a world being re-constructed with the Western language of globalization? Out of their life experiences, what can be read about the meaning and studies of translation in a global era?

With these and other concerns in mind, I hoped to have a third text that would be helpful to our understanding of current translation. But where to look for such a text was a challenge. After much thought, it became clear to me that this text might be best found in China's educational world, which is living in translation both in the narrower and in the broader sense of the word. For instance, currently in China (see Yang, 2001, online), well over 100 million elementary and secondary school students, more than 7.2 million undergraduates and 140,000 graduate students are learning English. In curricular and pedagogical terms, English learning in China mostly takes the form of understanding and translation. It would be meaningful to see how some of the aspects of translation as discussed in the present thesis are developing and are understood among this vast group of Chinese. Meanwhile, I came to the conclusion that Shanghai, a city that best represents the depth and width of current translation against the background of globalization, would be an ideal place for interviewing. Therefore I contacted some friends at a national key education university there. They arranged for me to meet a group of their graduate students and teachers with different academic backgrounds from different parts of China.

Yet, I was still facing the question of how to build a text in a way that some kind of fair and manageable picture of and some insights into the current situation of Chinese translation could be gained. Because of the interpretive nature of the present thesis, I thought a living, flowing and changing text of translation without a technically prescribed context would provide an opportunity to see what this 'un-contextualized' text could reveal. Furthermore, I believed instead of strictly following the usual practices of quantitative or qualitative research with prescribed questions, questionnaires or other forms of data collection, it would be more practical to conduct interviews with those students and teachers in a conversational manner. In other words, topics and questions of interviews should emerge out of the conversations themselves. The conversations would develop depending on two-way interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee, whose roles should be equal and interchangeable. The conversations should be able to speak for themselves about questions under study.

In October 2000, I went to the 'International Conference on Curriculum Theory' held at the East-China Normal University in Shanghai. Following the pre-arranged plan,

I stayed there for ten days and interviewed eight graduate students and one associate professor specializing in different areas of education mostly without a translation background. Part of the interviews was conducted on campus at the East-China Normal University, from which the lead writers of *China Can Say No* graduated. Part of the conversations took place in a hotel close to the University - according to F. L. (2000, online) the story of the *Shanghai Babe* happened mostly in that area, where the protagonist lived with Tian Tian until his death.

I had sent out to each interviewee a Letter of Invitation (see Appendix II) and a Consent Form (see Appendix III). The two documents had been prepared strictly according to the Procedures for Observing Ethical Guidelines, and officially approved by the Faculties of Education and Extension Research Ethics Board, University of Alberta. Each of the nine interviewees, eight females and one male aged between 25 and 35, had signed the Consent Form before the interviews began.

Although the interviews and conversations proceeded with my video camera and audio-recorder on, care was taken to ensure an easy, natural and spontaneous flow of the dialogues. On the one hand, I deliberately refrained myself from looking at the questions I had prepared so that the other party/parties might feel it was a free conversation on Chinese translation in relation to Chinese perception of the West. On the other hand, I managed to focus on the interviewees' own experiences in reading, practicing, understanding and interpreting translation. And all the interviews and conversations began with questions related to *China Can Say No* with some mention of the *Shanghai Babe*. Translating from Chinese into English and then repeated reading of the transcripts made me realize that, although each dialogue went in its different way due to the interviewee(s)'s background and style of conversation, all the conversations share the following six aspects of concern in common:

- a. About *China Can Say No*
- b. Interviewees' experiences with translation
- c. Current state of Chinese translation and its relationship with politics and the market economy
- d. Translation and acceptance

- e. Relationships between translation and globalization and between translation and the Chinese cultural identity
- f. The image of the West

Here is a brief summary report on those major topics covered. Each topic includes a summary, followed by some quotable quotes from the interviewees, whose last rather than whole names are used. There are two interviewees with *Han* as their family name. They will appear as Han 1 and Han 2.

(b) Topic One: About *China Can Say No*

Summary:

A. Six interviewees said they had not read it; three had flipped through it but did not read carefully. B. All commented that the book had been very popular in the late 90s. All of them had read or heard about it from Chinese media, their students, peers or friends.

Quotes:

Zhang: (General opinions about the book) are very mixed and conflicting. Some people were very proud of the book, and felt it enabled them to stand up with their heads high. Others thought it reflected the nationalistic, Celestial Empire mentality long inherent in the Chinese character, and represented the resistant and anti-foreign attitude.

Zheng: I think it gave vent to and reflected an (anti-West) sentiment. Sometimes the authors lost their reason and were somewhat irrational. But I love that kind of feeling. I have been brought up and educated under a very orthodox climate, and there is a sense of rebellion in me. Therefore, I enjoy anything rebellious that agrees with my sentiment and mentality. I like to be shocked.

Jia: I did not read it carefully. But I think Chinese people should have that spirit of patriotism. I tend to agree with its ideas.

(c) Topic Two: Experiences with translation

Summary:

A. All of them had read lots of translations ranging from literature to educational theory. B. All of them had done some translations, but only two had published in this field. C. All commented that reading and doing translations had become more and more

practical and utilitarian, mostly depending on whether they were related to their field of studies and research. D. Five mentioned that they were doing translations they did not really understand or were interested in, but as part of their assignments from their supervisors who wanted to use them. E. All confessed they had been greatly influenced by translations they had read.

Quotes:

Yang: I have read nearly all the translations of classical writers in education from Rousseau through Dewey to Tyler... The translations I read in my secondary school years have influenced me most. At that time, there was no sense of specialty. I read lots of foreign literature. For example, at that time I read the novel *How the Steel Was Tempered* by the former Soviet Union writer (Ostrovsky). Its influence has been lasting. The image of Paul is noble. He is vigorous and persistent. He has given me great encouragement ever since.

Zheng: Yes, I have (done some translations), but basically not out of my own choice. I have been told to translate some materials, just for others to understand, a kind of very primitive translation. I do hope to have an opportunity to translate something. For example, if I'm very interested in a certain Western work, and if I am allowed to go deep into the original, to think from the original writer's perspective, I would be so happy to translate it after solid preparations and thinking, and to present it (my translation) to my compatriots. I hope I could experience such a process of re-creation. This process of re-creation is a dialogue and communication between the original writer and the translator from a shared level or angle/perspective, an exchange that is carried out with the surface of words conveying the depth/bottom of cultures. Not long ago I read a book by a Western author on the issue of exchange. According to the author, exchange is a kind of activity taking place within a certain group or community. If you can not become a member of the group, you are not really involved in the activity even though you may be communicating using a language...

(My translations are) basically in the area of education, just short chapters rather than any whole books. I regret to have been unable to translate anything in its whole context. It is always the case that someone came to me with some pages in English, telling me to translate them into Chinese because s/he has to use them.

(Some of my friends and classmates) enjoy reading translations, but they read with a strong utilitarian purpose. Instead of reading for cultural appreciation, they read for the sake of homework assignments because they are asked by their teachers to read, and because it is much easier to read Chinese translations instead of the originals. So far as I myself am concerned, I prefer reading the originals, as I find a single wording in the original is enough to reflect the quality of the author...

Zhang: I am interested in translations, but so far as I'm concerned, I do not pay much attention to translation per se as a field of study. I have read many books of translation and I watch lots of dubbed movies, videotapes, VCDs and so on. My reading of translated works is mostly limited to humanities, such as philosophy, literature, education as well as sociology... On the whole, works introduced or translated from the West have had great impact upon me, my thoughts and even my world outlook... I went to university in the 1980s. At that time in China, the so-called "Reading Fever/Craze" was at its peak. So I followed the trends and tides. At first, I did not really understand what I was reading. I just read whatever was most popular. I read Nietzsche when Nietzsche was in fashion; I read Schopenhauer when the Schopenhauer Fever was high. Many translated books in the field of education were also all the rage, including Rousseau's *Emile*. At that time, in general, like other young people, I simply went with the trend. Later, however, with more works translated and introduced into China, I became more selective, choosing to read what I was truly interested in. What influenced me most was *Interpretation of Dreams*. I learned to look at the world from a psychoanalytic point of view. Not just this book, of course. In brief, works in psychoanalysis, for instance, Erickson's theory of self-development, were particularly appealing to me

... Not long ago Jung was a buzzword. Lacan has not gained popularity yet, mainly because no Chinese translation is available so far. But there are some people who are studying Lacan. I have read quotes from him in a number of writings, including papers on pedagogy. Lacanian texts are much quoted in postmodern pedagogy, especially in discussions about the relationship between the individual and the self.

I quite accept psychoanalytic ideas. However, I don't think psychoanalysis is a science. I believe it is an ideology (thinking). It is a kind of original and creative thinking

with lots of assumptions and hypotheses, which can be used to understand and interpret human behaviours and psychological states, including one's own. So sometimes I would analyze myself from this perspective.

Its (Freudian) method may not be applicable (in the Chinese context), but its hypotheses and assumptions are very powerful. Terms such as subconscious and stages of personality development, original and creative, are applicable not only to the middle class, but also to the ordinary people - although cases may differ. If a conjunction or conformity can be found, the Freudian methods can also be employed. But people do differ from one another... (Contemporary Western Neo-Marxist philosophies) do not have as much influence upon me as Existentialism, although I quite appreciate their critiques and criticism of the Western society. My knowledge of Neo-Marxism is very superficial. Psychoanalysis finds far more echoes in me. (I have read) Sartre's own literary writings, including *The Flies* and *Nausea*. I have also read *Waiting for Godot*, and also Camus.

(I have done some translations), but the choice has not been out of my own interest in literature or my inner desire. I do translation (in the field of curriculum) for the sake of my profession.

(d) Topic Three: Current state of Chinese translation and its relationships with politics and the market economy

Summary:

Opinions vary and differ among the interviewees. Five commented that the general situation of translation was positive with more and better translations available. Three held a rather negative view on the current state, believing the choice of original materials to be translated was controlled by the market and quality of translations was declining. One had an extremely negative impression of the market of translation, thinking it was dominated by the introduction of third-rate or garbage culture of the West.

As to the relationships between translation and politics, all were of the opinion that translation was still conditioned by the political climate. However, six commented that

the official ideological control had been loosened, particularly in areas of pure scholarship.

On the relationship between translation and market economy, all the nine interviewees believed a close relationship existed between them. Part of the consequences was that Western popular culture came to dominate the market of translation. Two interviewees commented that in many cases, translations of classical writings had become some kind of cultural luxury or cultural consumer item. Many publishers were producing luxury or royal editions at high prices for those richer people to purchase as gifts to their friends, which would end up sitting on book shelves as decorations.

Quotes:

Zhang: First of all, it should be said that contemporary Chinese translation (of the West) is extensive and comprehensive. Various Western schools and representative works have been translated and introduced into China. And the rate of import is fast. Newly emerged Western theories, books and literature are immediately available in translation in China. Another characteristic is that (Western) serious writings prevail over popular works, which have their presence but do not represent the mainstream. Lastly, Chinese translation affects Chinese scholarship in a profound way.

Wang: I think translation is definitely related to politics. It seems to me there is a Bureau of Press and Publications that exercises censorship. But official grip and control have been greatly eased. For example, there are several new editions of the same Western work. This means previous translations are being re-examined, since they are permeated with too many ideological elements and too much revolutionary vocabulary... Now with intellectual shackles being shaken off, more works of more kinds and areas of studies, from fiction to philosophy, which we were not exposed to during our undergraduate years, have become available. You can practically find latest editions of any (Western) philosophers and educators... But control is certainly still there. In the field of scholarship, it is relaxed.

Wei: I haven't given any thought about this issue (the relationship between translation and economy). But I do believe that with the rapid economic development in China, translation as a cultural cause will become more and more prosperous, because

much more can be invested in translation... Translations are cultural needs of the people. They are not dependent on economic development. When economy grows, people need translations. When it slows down, people still need translations... The relationship between translation and politics is a sensitive issue. Political control over translations is certainly there. This is not unique to China. It is the same in other countries.

Zhang: On the whole, politically and ideologically, translation enjoys fair freedom. The Bureau of Press and Publications does not exercise too much control over what is translated and published - except writings by (religious) cults and heresies. In the academic circle, even very radical, anti-Communist works, such as Polk's Project of Social Reform, have several versions of translation published. Economically speaking, although Chinese publishers have to contact original publishers and buy copyrights, yet books are being sold at increasingly much higher prices. Many people are ready to buy translated books. There are profits for publishers to gain.

Zhang: The immediate and direct relationship (between translation and economy) lies in the fact that a great number of books in the field of economy and economics have been translated, including business management and textbooks for different curricular subjects. Many books have been used as textbooks (either in the original or in translation) in China's post-secondary institutions. This means Western economic theories and practices are playing a major role in educating Chinese youth, and in training Chinese business professionals. This will influence a generation in their style of business management, the way future business will be operated, etc. Another influence is the infiltration of Western life-style, which will gradually infiltrate into the consciousness of the Chinese. At present, people may be subconsciously accepting Western way of life. Later on, people will imagine their way of life according to the Western model and imitate it. By and by, the Chinese economic mode, fashion of investment and way of consumption will be changed. (Of course, such influences come not only from translation. They are also closely related to China's institutional reform.) Nowadays, lots of young people tend to consume through acquiring loan, which has never been a Chinese tradition. In fact, the Chinese tradition rejects it. However, more and more young people consume in that fashion. It is changing Chinese economic mode.

Zheng: I think it (Chinese translation) is in a state of impetuosity. This is a time of

impetuosity, which is leaving its mark on contemporary translation in China. This state of impetuosity will perhaps continue to last for several more years or decades. Translation in China is a kind of snack-like instant-food culture. Translators, publishers and readers are all the same - with a clearly pragmatic and utilitarian purpose in mind...

Contemporary Chinese translation is very much linked with and tied to the market economy. What's more, there's a very horrible phenomenon: the market is piled with third-rate and x-rated American novels, Western garbage culture. Some unknown translators have translated lots of such stuff, and reprocessed them with their own imagination. Such stuff has been pouring into the Chinese society, creating extremely bad influences upon the young people.

(e) Topic Four: Contemporary Chinese translation and its acceptance

Summary:

Questions concerning reader response were raised not as a special topic but more as a natural extension of the contexts. Answers to these questions are therefore varied, contextualized and individualized rather than in a general sense.

Quotes:

Han 1: In my age and as a married person, my life is settled and I'm emotionally and intellectually stabilized. I like (translated) literature that is true, good and beautiful...

Many Chinese enjoy movies and novels such as *Gone with the Wind* and *Red and Black*. Many people have been attracted to the novel *Gone with the Wind* from watching the movie... I think it is a true representation of that period of American history.

Zheng: During my M. A. years, I was rather fond of reading John Dewey. Personally I regard Dewey as the most creative and innovative scholar in American history. His language, being not so overcautious, reflects the mind full of sensibility and sensitivity. His *Democracy and Education* has been translated into Chinese. I have read parts of the translation. On the whole I feel it is well translated. But I'm a person of sensibility, always looking for sensibilities and passion behind the words. Although I think the translation is good, I feel something - some sensibility - has been lost. These days, I have been reading a book in English on postmodern education by Professor Doll of the Louisiana State University. I have been deeply affected. Do you know how I read

his book? Alone by myself in my student dorm, with American folk music on but played very low, I make myself a cup of coffee. I turn on the desk lamp. With a pen in hand, I open his book, quietly coming into the language. To me, Professor Doll seems more like a philosopher. In between the lines, I can sense the beating of a noble heart...I'm a sensitive person, very subjective rather than objective, and I tend to bring some kind of sentiment into whatever I do. I believe in idealism, and I dare say that with the development of humanities and social (including natural) sciences, things that have life are those that are personal and individualistic.

Zhang: There are many people in China! The tastes of the vast readership are actually stratified. In general, if you think a book is valuable and should be translated and introduced to the compatriots, then you are likely to have many potential readers who have the same taste (as yours). This is why some extremely difficult books of philosophy are selling very well. Many people can see their value. It is not very common that a (translated) book of little value is very popular.

... Books like Sherlock Holmes do attract wide readership. But nothing is wrong with that. Indeed there are some "bad" books, but not many. Most buyers of literature translations are well educated. Poorly or under-educated people do not buy translated books, not even (semi-)pornography. (They would prefer to buy Chinese pornography since their brains hurt merely at the sight of the weird titles of Western pornographic works.) My observation is that, on the whole, literature translations are of good quality. Even those popular works may have a position in Western literary histories.

...It depends on specific groups of readers. More people tend to buy classical works. Even those who do not enjoy classical writings would buy classics. There are some people who would like to pose as lovers of culture with their shelves full of classics. Actually many people do read modernist and postmodern writings, which have been selling well in China... There are many reasons. First, vast numbers of Chinese are curious about the West; secondly some people find modernist and postmodern works closer to their existential conditions, and more reflective of how they think and feel. For instance, many college and university students enjoy reading *Catcher in the Rye* and *On the Road*. Although those works were written in the 1960s, they seem to reflect contemporary Chinese young people's longing for freedom, or desire for new order and

strong discontent with the existing order.

As far as I myself am concerned, I think modernist and postmodern literature is more concerned with individuals and individuality, which is different from classical literature. Classical literature cares more about social and interpersonal relationships, whereas modernism and postmodernism start from and end in the inner experiences. Most works I read are inner experience-oriented.

Zheng: During my spare time, I read *The Unbearable Lightness of Being* by Milan Kundera, and works by D. H. Lawrence. I also read some American works. I was more attracted by the environments. Now when I look back, I think Lawrence's works are well translated, or maybe because I can not make any comparison since I do not have the original.

(f) Topic Five: Relationships between translation and globalization, and between translation and the Chinese cultural identity

Summary:

All the nine interviewees believed translation would play a most important role in globalization, and that the process of globalization would exercise great influences upon Chinese culture. However each and every one of them believed China would keep her own national identity.

Quotes:

Yu: Globalization is a trend, which nobody can stop or turn around. When the world has come to the present situation through centuries of mutual translation, people in the world are facing more or less the same issues and problems... Nowadays Chinese people may be focusing their attention on the same things as foreigners do, including environmental protection. When we are facing the same problems, we share more similarities in our ways of thinking. Under such circumstances, it is very difficult for the Chinese to go against the trend, to think we are Chinese and nobody else, or to behave absolutely in Chinese ways. China should take an active attitude towards the trend. Of course, globalization is not just about economy. It is also about culture, and about human vision and ideal - no matter what social system, social class, or ethnicity there are, we are becoming more uniform globally. Certainly, in this process, we should keep our own

characteristics. Since our skin colours are different, we have to keep our own individuality. I'm black, you are white, s/he is yellow - since our inborn origins are different, there is something unique to us all.

Jia: I am definitely against racial discrimination. However, I believe different peoples are like flowers, which have different types/categories/families... In this world, being tall, or short, or fat or thin is quite normal. Taller people wear longer clothes; shorter ones wear shorter clothes. Since I was born of my own type/family, I should choose my own way of life.

Wei: With more Western works translated into China, cultural plurality will certainly follow... In literature, for instance, some works are avant-garde; some are very conventional. As time goes on, they will form a basis upon which people will develop their own likes and dislikes. There is a natural process working here. We should let it go natural.

Han 2: I think in the earlier period, Chinese translation concentrated more on the highbrow areas of science, technology and social theories... The process of globalization with translation has made translation increasingly identify itself with plebification. More and more popular works have come into Chinese view. It is a trend for translation to come from highbrow down to plebification. It certainly has impact upon our culture. But the Chinese nation enjoys a long-lasting cultural tradition. We will preserve our national characteristics... For instance, in the 80s, Euro-American culture was very popular mainly through translated works. Now, China is turning to Japanese and Korean cultures for reference and inspiration.

Zheng: I'd like to mention what Mr. Lin Yutang said. He once pointed out that in some sense the Chinese culture has a strong absorptive power. But it can hardly be changed or transformed. What is meant here is that on the one hand the inside of the core (of the Chinese culture) can hardly be broken. On the other hand, the outside of the culture is ready to absorb anything new. You will find that young Chinese, including me myself, are ready to accept Western snacks, clothes and Hollywood blockbusters. But you will also find that in their actual daily life and in their subconscious are well kept the Chinese traditional concepts of patriarchal order (let the king be a king, the minister a minister, the father a father and the son a son). Take the so-called "new-new-humankind"

(a term coined by and for the group of youth represented by the author of *Shanghai Babe*). Although they behave in a manner that appears to be quite Westernized, yet in the deeper structure, they are using this manner to fight against their subconscious. It is not genuine Westernization. This Westernization is superficial. It arose from rebelling against old conventions. Therefore, on the one hand, we need to take into account Western influences. On the other hand, we need to consider the special property of the Chinese culture.

...I would like to use a simple analogy here to show one characteristic of the Chinese people. It may not be so appropriate. The analogy was made by a friend of mine who majors in philosophy. Have you heard of the difference between the Chinese crabs and the Japanese crabs? No? The difference is: when a Chinese crab wants to climb out of a bottle/container, another (other) Chinese crab(s) would grasp its feet to keep it inside. Therefore everybody stays inside. What about the Japanese crabs? When one Japanese crab climbs out of the bottle/container, other crabs would follow, and all the crabs will move out of it. This may demonstrate the difference between the Chinese character and the Japanese character. It signifies something very deep. Everybody may have his or her own interpretation of it.

Zhang: I should say it (China's entry into WTO) is an economic issue. But soon cultural issues will arise. China may not have any cultural intentions in joining the WTO, nor does it consider to be culturally identified with the West. But once accepted into the WTO, Chinese culture will inevitably suffer further shocks.

...I think wholesale Westernization is impossible. The Chinese national identity is deep-rooted and stubborn. For instance, currently traditional feudal ideologies and moralities are still everywhere to be found. Those distinctly Chinese features are commonly present in the social and interpersonal relationships in Chinese communities. Joining the WTO can hardly erode those characteristics. However, there will be some influences.

...I suppose as the world gets more and more integrated, things should be different for different people. Some people may become institutionized, reduced to a screw, a tool for the mighty machine of globalization. Others may find globalization actually provides lots of possibilities. Accelerated international exchange and communication is enriching

and good for everyone. It enables you to take an all-round view of things. Therefore, everything depends on the particular relationship between the local environment and globalization one finds him/herself in and how s/he deals with the relationship.

... Yes, the current reform is inevitably a strange mixture, embracing both modernist and postmodern ideas. Since postmodern ideas have infiltrated into the reform, there will be no escape from or evasion of the question of multiculturalism. I dare not predict what the solutions will be. However, I believe China will absorb what it regards as harmless.

... Currently in China, in all the aspects learning or scholarship is heavily influenced by the West, including the norms for writing academic papers and methods of research. Many people study Western ideas and introduce them into China. In fact, Western way of thinking is not the only way of thinking. For example, Chinese people are born poor at analyzing, but good at reaching high order of wisdom through intuitive means. But if you write an academic paper in the latter way, you can not get it published.

They (the two methods) are conflictual. Of course you can say they are mutually complementary. Sometimes there are true barriers for Chinese to express their ideas in Western terms. This forces many people full of constructiveness, creativity and originality to expend their wisdom on various nitty-gritty details, so that their wisdom can not be brought to full, active play... Eastern people can achieve wisdom through intuition, and highly intelligent Western people can also achieve wisdom through analysis. If a highly intelligent Chinese is forced to do analysis, s/he may not be able to achieve that height of wisdom which s/he could have since s/he is too exhausted... The point in question is: currently Chinese scholarship is completely controlled and ruled by so-called Western norms. Chinese thinking has been largely fettered by Western methodology, particularly for women, who are especially good at intuitive thought.

...I think part of our language in daily life remains unchanged...Of course there is a postcolonial dilemma. Consequently, on the one hand, Chinese are going all out to learn from and try to catch up with the West. On the other hand, everybody laments that there is no "great master" in the present China. We are expending too much time and energy to learn Western systems of language and expressing ourselves in Western linguistic systems.

Of course, it is difficult to resist the trend of using pure Western methods of analysis.

I think no Chinese can learn to be Kant or Hegel. But it does not mean that the Chinese knowledge and understanding of the world is less or not as profound. Therefore we need not talk about balance. What is important is to allow different people to think differently for themselves. Chinese people should be allowed to think in their own ways. This may be just a dream... The point is scholarly achievements should not be confined to things written by following Western methods and norms.

(g) Topic Six: The image of the West

Summary:

This question was posed to four of the interviewees. None of them had ever had any first-hand knowledge or experience of the West. But they did have their own images of the West in mind, which evoked different psychological responses.

Quotes:

Yang: It (the image of the West) has been acquired from the media and from reading translations. It includes North America, Western Europe, Japan and also Korea. They have been presented to us Chinese as highly developed and enjoying high standards of life. Of course, they have their own dark sides, but on the whole, they look very advanced. The image, in my mind, is not clear. It is very vague.

Zhang: For the ordinary Chinese, that image (of the West) would be *yangfang* (foreign-style gorgeous houses), beautiful gardens, cars, parties, diligence and so on. In my mind, Western life-style has developed out of its specific and particular historical factors. It has resulted from a predatory history. That predatoriness has made it possible for (Western) people to live a relatively rich life. However it also creates tremendous problems, including psychological pressure, cold interpersonal relationships due to money, sense of estrangement, alienation, and such potential crises as natural environment. As I understand it, after rounds of predating and plundering, not many natural resources on this earth are left. If we do not go and seize them, we will be sifted out of history. In the past, China as a whole was not developed in its productive power, yet we enjoyed stable social order. Now the Western predatory mode of production forces us to follow suit. But not many people realize what will happen afterwards. It would take (resources of) scores of earths for the majority of the people in this world to live the kind

of life Westerners are living. The question is that kind of life is not a genuinely happy life. Therefore we need to calm down and think it over: given the global social context (conditions), how to find a happy way of life that is in accordance with human felicity?

...I would like very much to go and visit the West. First, I'm full of curiosities. This may explain why I read so many different kinds of books. I would like to acquire some first-hand knowledge of the West and realistically experience foreign cultures. Secondly, I have been deeply influenced by the West. A traditional Chinese would choose to live one way of life from cradle to grave. Although I grew up against this cultural background, I believe the most important thing is experience and to experience. I hope to experience different ways of life as part of me.

(My understanding of the West comes) mainly from two sources. One is my observation and experience of my daily life - we are undergoing the process of globalization, and we have sensed the presence of some of its defects, drawbacks and evils. The other is my reading of others.

Zheng: To me, Europe is a pastoral culture; America is a kind of cauldron of feelings and sentiments. China is a pond of seemingly undisturbed water. I feel like a fish swimming at its bottom, always ready to jump out of it... I'm simply looking for something. I'm not quite sure what it is - maybe a kind of emotional and intellectual freedom, maybe a beautiful landscape, or maybe a feeling of home. I never believe as a yellow-skinned, black-haired Chinese I have to be inevitably confined to this culture. I think I am an international creature. I am looking for that sense of home. That sense of home is not expressed in terms of either national boundary or racial background. I don't know when or where I can find it - that ultimate, almost religious concern... I want to jump out of the pond because I am always and everywhere seeking that kind of ultimate concern of home, which I have not found in this pond...

Yu: First and foremost, (China-West intercultural dialogue in this postcolonial age) needs mutual understanding and tolerance. Although the Chinese are trapped in a disfranchised state of culture due to China's level of economic development, as a Chinese, I long for communication and understanding (with the West) - that longing is needed for any possible dialogue to take place. Riding in a bus or on any other occasions, I like to chat with common people. I find that the cultural inferiority complex in them expresses

itself in a mentality of resistance, which is more or less found in *China Can Say No*. It is when you realize you are in a disadvantageous position that you behave in a heroic manner. In this case, that heroic sense is the other side of the inferiority complex. As for myself, I hope whether in studies or in day-to-day life, I can always maintain a peaceful state of mind, a state that is needed for everyone to pursue a happy life.

(h) Reflections on Interviews

Again, based on the discursive nature of the interviews, no conclusion of any kind is here attempted. Instead, a few points could be elaborated that are most relevant to the present study, particularly the tensions that can be felt from between the lines of the interviews. From what has been quoted above, very selectively due to the limited space, it can be seen that the interviews form a kaleidoscopic text of how the West is being understood, interpreted, translated, read, accepted, criticized and fantasized. It can also be seen how China is now living in an age of translation that is reshaping China.

First of all, unlike what is happening in the educational world in North America where actual translation of others along with foreign languages learning is more a symbolic and theoretical than a realistic act, translation in China is a day-to-day reality. For instance, all the nine interviewees have had almost or over twenty years of English learning experiences. Although only three of them once specialized in English, all of them have had some experiences in textual translation. As learned or confirmed in the interviews, English competence is the vital key to any personal, social, professional or academic success. Starting from elementary school on, a student has to do well in English in order to get enrolled in a key junior high and high school. High marks in English will then provide access to the extremely competitive post-secondary education. Without a good score in English, it is theoretically impossible for anyone to be accepted in any graduate programs. In many cases, English is the only and the hottest "war-zone" for academic success. In terms of professional promotion, from junior to senior positions, at each level, one has to pass a national, provincial or ministerial English exam, which is mostly in the form of written translation. Interestingly, a person can be exempted from this test only if s/he has published a formal book of translation. Consequently, English -

the universal language of globalization - seems to be playing the role of the long-abolished *keju* (Imperial Examinations) system.

Secondly, it is seen that all the interviewees have read extensive Western works, from profession-related, to non-professional, from intellectually challenging to popular. The works they have read, in one way or another, have much impact upon their emotional and intellectual growth while enhancing their knowledge and understanding of the West. But this is paradoxical. On the one hand, the translations they have read do provide a textual West for them to learn, interpret and develop their own different images of the West. On the other hand, their readings have been largely conditioned within the linguistic, textual and cultural tensions described in earlier chapters in this thesis, especially in political and economic terms. Furthermore, although one of the interviewees seems to hold a critical view of the West, and another highly values her Taoist tradition, most of the interviewees seem to have been taught to read the West, or have learned from the translations to read the West in relation to themselves. They do not seem to have their own particular Chinese point of view from which to talk about translation.

Thirdly, the interviews show that in the educational world in China, extensive translation of Western academic paradigms has rendered translation itself into a major force to sustain those paradigms. Consequently translation has become suppressive and oppressive, hindering free development of personality and creativity on the part of the students. For example, all the nine interviewees indicate their translation practice together with reading translations is not out of their own interest or will. Instead, it is derived from the needs of their homework assignments and thesis writing. Furthermore, the interviewees complain that translation is often something imposed by their supervisors, who are under heavy pressure of 'publishing or perishing,' an academic system imported from the West. By asking each student to translate part(s) of a certain work, professors can then assemble them together for publication as their own academic achievements (translations of theories and/or classics count as scholarly achievements in China). Those professors can take whatever information that is useful for their own writings. With more "academic achievements" of this kind, professors are in a more advantageous position to get research grants. With more research grants, they can

sponsor more of such translations. For actual translators, they have to translate for "translation's sake."

As a result, great quantities of translation have been done by translators without being qualified in either Chinese or English, and without any serious studies or training in translation as an academic discipline. The quality of translations is, therefore, indeed questionable. For instance, before and after our first interview on campus, a number of students came up to me with photocopied paragraphs or chapters in English which they were translating. They had various kinds of problems understanding the original ranging from the meaning of a certain word, grammar structures, to cultural and historical references. From the questions they asked me, I could sense they lacked basic English language qualification, background or disciplinary knowledge of the theme/topic being translated, as well as an understanding of the contexts in which the meaning of a certain word could be determined.

Furthermore, interviews with the three students who major in English and have studied translation and translatology reveal that, in terms of curriculum and pedagogy, translation has fallen victim in the larger technical-rational paradigm transplanted into China's education beginning from the colonial years. Few, if any, aspects of translation discussed in this thesis, have been touched upon in the translation courses they have taken. In general, translation as an art and independent field of learning is understood in terms of techniques and methods. Teaching translation is mostly concerned with how to technically deal with a certain original sentence or text as a body that can be skillfully dismembered into structural components and reassembled into grammatically understandable Chinese. It has been reduced to grammar and structural analysis and treatment. The human life living in the specific words, phrases, rhetorical devices and so on in the original has given way to linguistic codes called information and knowledge.

Fourthly, the interviews show that translation is largely conditioned within China's politico-economic context. Although explicit political intervention and control seem to have been loosened, they are still there. With a long history of political experiences, translation is politically conscious. There is a strong politico-censorship mechanism in translators and publishers when they decide what to or not to translate. As China becomes increasingly involved in the process of globalization, the political iron

face has strategically given way to one full of commercial smiles of the market-centred economy. In a sense, in current China, politics and economy are one and the same. Although political control is still the end, and economic development is the means, the means and the end can not be separated in front of global economic integration.

With translation being what is officially called part of economic construction, it is subject to market control. To some extent, just as current Chinese economy is sometimes called *paomo jingji* (bubble economy), current translation can also be called 'bubble translation.' This has different implications. First, since translations as cultural goods sell well, translators and publishers go all out to create, develop and exploit the market. They have made such drastic adjustments and changes as described above in choice of materials and novel designs favouring what is marketable. This market-driven translation pays least respect to the integrity of what is being translated. So long as a certain topic/theme or an author sells, it goes to the market in the shortest possible time.

Meanwhile other trends have emerged. For instance, many foreign works have reached their Chinese readers not as translations. Instead, they appear as *bianyi* (a combination of translating and editing), *bianxie* (a combination of translating and writing), *jiyei* (condensed translation) and *yishu* (summary or narrative translation). Although such practices are fairly common in the history of translation, they have formed a unique landscape in current translation. As Li (*Guangming Daily*, Dec. 13, 2001) pointed out, these four kinds of treatment offer enough space for market-oriented translating to escape charges against its quality (faithfulness, expressiveness and elegance) as well as its copyright violation. For example, if accused of making wrong translations, it can defend itself by claiming it is creatively editing; if accused of fabricating, it can escape the charge by claiming it is derived from the original sources. Consequently, just as fake products have taken a lion's share in the market, such fake translations are everywhere to be found. Those market-minded along with those linguistically and culturally unqualified translators are pushing Chinese translation to the opposite of what it means - translating only to create confusion. Therefore, one of the interviewees is justified in criticizing current translation market as importing and selling Western garbage culture.

Fifthly, under such a climate of translation, the West that is being translated is hardly the West that can culturally inform or enrich China in relation to the West. It is interesting to find that the interviewees know almost all the (Chinese equivalents of) new terms created in the postmodern, postcolonial and globalizing West. They readily and often casually use Western terms like 'globalization' and 'identity.' However, those religiously, philosophically and culturally loaded terms are used in such a way that they do not seem to bear any historical-intercultural weight. Most interviewees sound as if globalization was something natural and self-evident, something that had grown out of China's history. They do not show interest in discussing its connotations or its implications in relation to China's own version of global vision. Most of them take globalization as merely an improved state of international exchange, communication and trade. Largely unaware of social, political, economic and cultural agendas behind globalization in its Western practice, they tend to take a rather romantic view of what has been happening in recent years. To them, at its worst, globalization might mean China's inevitable competition against the West in terms of the market.

With globalization so understood, with the unprecedented rate of economic growth that is building up Chinese national pride, most of the interviewees seem to be confident about their own personal identities. Although all of them admit that globalization would bring Western values that would culturally challenge China, they all believe, beyond any doubt, that China would keep her cultural identity. What that identity means, none of them is able to identify, although they refer very often to the remaining Confucian tradition, which is, as Yang commented, as distant and remote as the West in Chinese translations. Consequently, few of them seem to be concerned about what would happen when one day China realizes that the Western version of globalization runs exactly against the sense of identity they are now taking for granted.

It is right here that the danger of such a way of translation in a global era lies. This massive, hasty, superficial, utilitarian, market-oriented, one-way translation of the Other does not involve meeting of the heart/mind with the Other. Culturally, it brings things exotic for pleasure and enjoyment. Intellectually, it serves as the easiest way to acquire fragmented, de-contextualized and disintegrated information as knowledge. Politically it serves the purpose of keeping the economy growing as the only way to keep

social peace and stability. Academically, it introduces Western 'advanced' science, technology and theories for China's own good. To a great extent, China is trying to translate her own ideal - the Celestial Empire imaginary reflected in *China Can Say No* - into reality by translating the Western imaginary of globalization.

The danger is that, without a deeper level of intercultural dialogue, such a way of translation might be leading China to repeat its repeated failures in its centuries of translation of the West. Historically, from 17th to early 19th centuries, it failed in bringing China into the Catholic umbrella of world vision through religious and science-technology translation. In mid-19th century, it failed in its attempt to 'learn from the barbarians in order to control them.' In the late Qing Dynasty, it failed in combining the Chinese body with Western function. In early 20th century, it failed to 'enlighten' the Chinese with Western philosophical, social, economic and political theories and literature. The May 4th translation failed to create a new cultural China out of the ruins of its revolution. Translation under Mao's leadership failed to modernize China as was expected. Current translation of globalization, as seen in this thesis, holds little promise of bringing China and the West realistically to the table of deliberations about a shared future. In the worst case, it may result in the opposite of what translation stands for, that is, Huntington's clash of civilizations.

Last but not least, conversations with the interviewees and observation of what is happening in China seem to suggest a pre-mature end of translation in its conventional sense. This has to be understood at several levels. On the Chinese side, for instance, no matter whether they are qualified or not in the usual meaning of the word, all the nine interviewees are translators. Translation is part of their daily life as a student and teacher. It is no longer something culturally or intellectually monopolized by a group of social elite. The traditional kingdom of translation has been decentralized and disintegrated. In this sense, millions and millions of Chinese students, teachers, intellectuals as well as ordinary people living in an age of translation are translators.

With the development of science and technology, the more traditional form of textual translation is giving way to new practices of translation through audio, visual and virtual means. More importantly, perhaps, as more and more Chinese are learning to use the global language of English, translation is losing its original meaning. For instance, in

an article about distinguished Chinese translators 'being laid off,' Fu (*Wenhui Daily*, Dec. 5, 2001) said that a few years ago, the group of distinguished translators who brought the *Hotel* and *Roots* to the huge, always waiting audience, translated over one hundred Western movies and TV series each year. From last year to the present, however, they have rendered less than twenty into Chinese. Although part of the reason is that they regard translating those soap operas and gangster films that have been most popular in China as a waste of their life, the deeper reason is that the younger generation, better qualified in English, prefers to watch the originals.

While such a situation indicates new phenomena leading to an end of translation, it does not change the function of translation as intercultural mediation. In fact, it calls for greater attention to translation and translatology. For instance, as Fu (*ibid.*) wrote, the total number of translated movies and TV series has not decreased. The problem is that as the entertainment industry is trying to reduce its production costs, it is happy to use cheaper labour with whatever little grounding in English. Consequently, those translations of commercialized movies and TV series are full of serious and ridiculous errors and mistakes. They possess little intercultural value, which the producers of such consumer products have no intention of offering in the first place.

Thus the 'end of translation' resulting from the global market economy is a call for the rebirth of the genuine spirit of translation as a dialogue for a better future of humanity. Translation in its historical sense has far from accomplished its role. It is the market economy that is altering the nature of translation, as it may be altering all the other human values. Before the world comes to a point where one global language is truly understood, shared and spoken by all human beings, serious translation is needed to cross various linguistic, religious, social, historical and all the other gaps as at least identified in this thesis. As the above three texts show, such gaps can not be bridged merely by the all-pervasive market. Here are some final issues I intend to examine: What do the various aspects of centuries of Chinese translation of the West as examined so far tell us about the identity of translation? What lessons can be drawn from the Chinese experiences both for Chinese and for the West in this age of globalization? What could be done to protect the integrity of translation as a way to protect the integrity of human beings sharing one world that has come a long way?

Of course, to adequately answer such big questions is beyond the author's reach. To raise such questions and find some clues from the Chinese translation experiences, however, might be urgently needed at this beginning of the new millennium that is being overshadowed by the global resistance against WTO and global war on terrorism, a human condition partly resulting from global mutual translation. To some extent, such questions might be some of the core issues lying as a new, global 'hidden curriculum' at the heart of curriculum studies that is being increasingly internationalized.

XI. A Hermeneutics of Translation in a Global Era

The present study has been trying to hermeneutically reconstruct Chinese experiences of translating the West. It attempts to put Chinese translation in a framework of various tensions between the source and the target languages, between a specific word and the historical and cultural contexts in which it is treated, between the individual (text or translator) and the collective, and between the periphery and the centre. It is in these tensions between the micro and the macro, between Self and Other, and between China and the West that the "effective-historical consciousness" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 305) of the hermeneutic imagination lives. It is in these tensions that the hermeneutic circle within the Chinese experience is best seen.

The circle as seen in the text of Chinese translation of the West has been more a vicious one than virtuous, and current Chinese translation practices are still and even more deeply entangled in this condition. In the contemporary process of translating, China has been losing its identity, in terms of language, culture and tradition. This loss is driving China to take on more radical forms of translation in order to find itself. In a broader sense, the vicious circle might be seen as characterizing the personal, ethnic, religious and national aspects of translation on a global scale. It is defining the relationships between China and the West, between the North and the South, and between Christian and other civilizations. The visible and invisible wars of global resistance against globalization and wars against terrorism are merely icebergs rising out of the dark ocean of different human desires, dreams and visions that are barely negotiable between languages.

In the following pages, I will attempt to deepen the hermeneutic of Chinese translation by looking more closely at the various cycles of Chinese experience, and then summarizing some aspects of translation and translatology that may not be unique to the Chinese experience. As Gadamer (1975) says, "All interpretation is highlighting" (p. 362), and "Translation, like all interpretation, is a highlighting" (p. 348). The issues to be highlighted here include the identity, process, subject and object of translation, with a

view to articulating what might be called a recovered "original face" (Smith, 1999, p. 21) of translation in an intercultural sense.

1. Translation as a Hermeneutic Act

Translation is always a hermeneutic act, an act of interpretation in the service of understanding. In *Truth and Method*, Gadamer (1975, pp. 345-351) devotes the section "Language as the Medium of Hermeneutical Experience" to interpreting the process of translation and the role of the translator. In fact, it is from the extreme cases of translator and translation that Gadamer establishes his ontological shift to a hermeneutics guided by language. In a sense, hermeneutics and translation are inseparable from each other, even though translation is not hermeneutics. While hermeneutics is concerned with the nature and art of understanding as well as with preserving the necessary conditions for sound interpretation, translation is always subject to the given linguistic, historical, individual, political, social and cultural conditions that form the inevitable boundaries around meaning.

Such boundaries are difficult to cross in translation. In the first place, due to the ambiguous and porous nature of language, a text can be interpreted in different ways within its culture of origin. Although "texts are 'permanently fixed expressions of life'" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 349), they can find their expressions only through the interpretation of the reader. This process of interpretation means the texts are already removed from their original ideal in the Platonic sense. In translation, they have to be expressed in another language through the interpretation of the translator, and are thus twice or thrice removed from their very originality. Consequently, as Gadamer (ibid. p. 346) says "in fact, any translation seems impossible."

However, as is generally believed, no text has any meaning unless it is understood and recreated in the reader. This justifies translation as an extreme case of understanding. The extremity lies in the fact that a translation, as seen in Chinese experience, involves at least the following:

- (1) The original text, or the word of the other, which presupposes a highly developed culture out of which the text has grown. It is linguistically and culturally conditioned in the source language as cultural codes that can be understood only within that

- cultural system as a whole, and for that very reason it poses challenges to the identity of the target language and culture;
- (2) The choice of original texts to be translated, which is conditioned by the visions, values, political climate, needs, aspirations, taboos and so on so forth in the target culture. It also involves the essential question of for whom and by whom an original text is translated. In a way, in that very choice dwells the cultural dream of the translator and the audience in the target culture.
 - (3) The translator or interpreter of the original text, who is emotionally and intellectually limited, and is also 'linguistically and culturally conditioned' in his/her (in)ability to understand the original and translate it into the target language. As a lonely 'exile' lost in the cultural incommensurables, a translator may be a hermeneutically constructive bridge bringing the two cultures into meaningful intellectual engagement. However, the translator can easily become a 'betrayal' to both cultures in interpreting, appropriating and manipulating the original text;
 - (4) The target language, or the Word of the Self, which puts limits on the extent to which an original text can be translated, while at the same time facing an identity crisis because of the face of the translated Word of the Other;
 - (5) The translated text. On the one hand, it is usually regarded as secondary to and derivative of the original. On the other hand, it can be, as seen in the Chinese experience, a political, economic, revolutionary and academic Bible, whose interpretation is held in the hands of those who claim authority over it;
 - (6) The condition of interpretation, acceptance and practice of the translated text in the target culture, which has its own, independent and legitimate tradition as a historical product. This 'product' is constructed through the desires, dreams, world outlooks, etc. that define who the people are in relation to the cultural Other. Positively, the translated text can enrich, enlighten and inspire the target culture. Negatively, it can cause resistance leading to mutual destruction;
 - (7) The globalized and globalizing system of capitalism or market economy within which translation is now rendered not as a way of understanding but as a form of commodity;

- (8) The development of science and technology that keeps changing the means, methods and conveyances of translation;
- (9) The subversive seeds contained in current global translation practices which destroy translation as is commonly understood, particularly at a time when English is becoming the dominant global language.

Thus from the original to the translated text, translation involves a complicated process that reflects the complexity of the existential conditions of both the source and the target cultures. It reflects the limitations as well as possibilities of the target language along with its culture. It reflects the interpretive conditions under which the translator and the translated understand their own realities in relation to each other. It reflects cultural aspirations and the will of both the source and target cultures. Most importantly, perhaps, it reflects the conditions under which interaction takes place between the two cultures. Therefore, to translate is in a way to interpret and understand one's own existential conditions through the other. To understand translation is to understand the intertextualized and interculturalized nature of human condition.

Each step in the process of translation is full of tensions, which can divert translation to purposes other than hermeneutic concerns. This is clearly seen in the broader text of Chinese experience in which translation has been repeatedly thwarted from any course of cross/inter-cultural understanding. A general review might reveal the gap between what translation has been and what it might be.

In the first place, as discussed in the second chapter, the pictographic and ideographic system of classical Chinese language as systemized encoding of the highly sophisticated ancient culture defies easy translation or transformation. It is linguistically the other of the alphabetic system of language. The ideographic *character* developed out of the Chinese cultural vision does not have a shared basis for mediation with the *Word* growing out of a logocentric tradition. At a symbolic level, to translate the *character* into the *word* or the other way round may mean to tear apart the integrated structure of the other system in order to get a particular brick of equivalence or affinity buried at the depth of shared humanity.

On the other hand, as John Fryer said, the Chinese language is basically the same as any other language, changing and renewing itself gradually with time. This innate

quality of porosity and permeability in Chinese made it possible for China to translate Buddhism. As discussed earlier, Buddhism enjoys close cultural, philosophical and intellectual affinities with Confucianism and Taoism, so Buddhist translation was a natural and spontaneous intercultural act of understanding. It helped China to grow in terms of language, literature, philosophy and religious beliefs.

However, Chinese translation of the West seems to speak more about the negative side of translation. Conditioned within the Western logocentric discourses, it started with the Jesuits' efforts to convert the Chinese into the Catholic grand vision of a universal Christendom. It was not, at the very outset, an effort to bring the two independent entities of the *character* and the *word* into a space of dialogue. Rather, it was the West imposing its word on the Chinese character. As discussed earlier, the various translations of Western texts into Chinese by the missionaries, especially as far as the choice of materials and ways of translation were concerned, said more about the West itself than any true interest in Chinese experience. On the Chinese side, the convert-translators represented by Xu Guangqi were confined to their own Celestial Empire mentality. It is difficult to tell the degrees to which their translation work assimilated them to Christianity or sinicized their Christianity. Although the converts were highly praised by the Jesuits for their loyalty to the Catholic faith, almost no writings by the converts have been found to show their understanding of Christianity or what it meant and how they felt, as Chinese, to be Christians.

From the various historical documents cited in earlier chapters, it can be seen that the converts, instead of being converted, used Christian knowledge imparted by the Jesuits as a weapon to strike against China's intelligentsia who were blindly indulging in useless philosophical disputes. The translators intended to advance, in Xu's words, the universal learning of the Celestial Empire to catch up with and surpass the West. Consequently, for example, while irrationally idealizing the Christian West, Xu used translation as a way to fulfill his own heavenly dream of the Middle Kingdom, whose identity Xu had sensed was being challenged. Torn by the gulf between the *character* and the *word*, the converts were lost, unable to establish intercultural meanings in their translation. In this loss were found the roots of using translation as a weapon against

what was being translated, which resulted in the Chinese occidentalist attitude and love-hate complex that characterized Chinese translation in the centuries to come.

Such attitudes of translation on the part of both the missionaries and the converts predetermined the failure of translation as an enriching and reciprocal form of mutual understanding. On the one hand, for more than two centuries, Western missionaries heroically braved all kinds of hardships to go to China and admirably engaged themselves in translation. Their textual translations covered a wide range of Western learning. On the other hand, Chinese knowledge and understanding of the West was minimal, if any, as can be seen in Chinese naivete at the time of the Opium War. Meanwhile, the continuing efforts of Western translators of China - missionaries, sinologists, diplomats, business, adventurers and travelers - all these could never reach the deep inner heart of China. Instead, it was the Western language of primitive violence, rather than the more civilized way of translation, that broke open China's closed door.

After the Opium War, Chinese translation explicitly assumed an occidentalist approach, translating the 'barbarian' West in order to control it, as clearly stated by Lin Zexu, Wei Yuan and Feng Guifen. Such an approach, with its utilitarian purposes in view and Western-style dichotomic methods, certainly went against any view of translation as intercultural dialogue. At a superficial level, the Yangwu Movement translators could not find a way to bring the 'Chinese body' and 'Western function' together. At a deeper level, it was the deep-seated, defensive and xenophobic occidentalism that prevented them from establishing a meaningful relationship with what they were translating. Within that mentality, the West was dichotomized into a good West of science and technology and an evil West of moral, political and spiritual degradation and decadence.

The underlying occidentalist philosophy of the Yangwu, and in fact all the other movements that followed, was to translate the good part of the West to strengthen the Chinese body while blocking the evil from entering so as to maintain the Chinese soul. However, any translation is a cultural act - translation of even just one word necessarily involves understanding the linguistic and cultural context as a whole. For instance, as analyzed earlier, in the Jesuits' translation of Western mathematics were found huge linguistic and cultural differences in the treatment of the simple verb to *be*. So David Geoffrey Smith has pointed out (Smith, 2000, p. IV):

...there is no such thing as pure technology, technology that can be lifted up from anywhere and put down anywhere and simply used at one's own will. This is because particular forms of technology emerge always from particular forms of human reasoning, and those forms of reasoning always arise from particular human concerns in a particular time and place. Contemporary Western technology *is* the West, not just its biproduct, and therefore to import the technology is in fact to import the culture.

This is true to Chinese historical experience. The Yangwu translation movement was doomed to fail, leaving behind a lasting struggle between wholesale Westernization and its negation.

A ray of hope for averting the negative trend of translation flashed toward the late 19th century, when the Euro-American colonists finally found one way that turned out to be positive. This was through attracting Chinese students to study in the West. Although with a colonial agenda in mind, they helped the Chinese to understand the West by entering the heart of the West. This historical event broke through the borders and boundaries in Chinese translation, which could no longer shut itself in the closed Celestial Empire mentality. The great translator Yan Fu could be regarded as the first to bring a hermeneutic perspective into Chinese translation. Yan exemplifies the hope of establishing a true reciprocal intercultural relationship between China and the West.

While returned and overseas students opened translation onto the heart of the West, the colonial-minded, non-dialogical West was still triumphantly indulging in its global colonial dream. What happened at the turn of the century, particularly the Sino-Japanese War and the Boxers' Movement, destroyed the emerging hope of positive intellectual engagement. In face of the fact that Chinese national survival was at stake, Chinese translation was drawn back to its old heavenly mentality.

At the beginning of the 20th century, China tried every possible means to understand her fate and destiny in relation to the West through translating the various, conflicting faces of the West. It learned to understand itself from translated values, particularly the Enlightenment principles of equality, freedom, democracy and science as well as newer theories of evolution, anthropology, economics, politics, sociology and psychoanalysis. Without delving further into the question of how those values had been

developed and contextualized within specific Western historical experiences, the Chinese youths whole-heartedly embraced those values. They radically rejected the Confucian tradition as "anti-evolution" and "anti-humanity." They imported a host of non- or half-mediated, half- appropriated and half-manipulated modern Western vocabulary in a utilitarian and revolutionary fashion. They hastily revolutionized Classical Chinese - the medium of Chinese culture - through translating Western literature as a model for the new, vernacular literature. In a short period of time, not only was the last feudal imperial dynasty overthrown, but Chinese cultural identity was basically destroyed. China chose to discard its defining *Character* for the *Word* it could hardly translate.

Meanwhile, politically and socially, various Western political theories along with their social and economic values were translated and practiced, including constitutional monarchism, democratic republicanism, socialism and communism. Backed by different colonial powers with their own particular colonial objectives in view, for over half a century, different factions in China's political arena were fighting against one another to prove the 'truths' of translated Western doctrines. China became an 'experimental site,' testing and justifying the originality and validity of Western political visions. Translation served as a tool for those social engineering projects which attempted to establish constitutional monarchy, parliamentary, cabinet, presidential, republic and people's republic systems. Each of these attempts claimed thousands and even millions of lives. What happened to the world of Chinese translation before and after the May 4th Movement clearly demonstrates the political quality of translation.

Translation as a vehicle of political and intellectual power naturally also extended to the New China in the postcolonial period. Politically, such a practice on the one hand enabled Mao's China to heal the wounds of her colonial experience, and rebuild national pride in the face of the West. On the other hand, it pushed China to a dead-end political struggle guided by a utopian dream. Culturally, it put some finishing touches to the destruction of China as a Confucian nation. The gravest consequence is that the ensuing cultural disorientation emptied Chinese translation of intercultural constructivity. Chinese translation failed to help the vernacular to grow as a cultural expression of the new Chinese nation. It failed to help China speak to the West in an understandable language. The more it selectively and manipulatively translated the political West, as in

the case of *Cankao xiaoxi*, the farther away it led China from the very West with whom the Chinese were attempting to realistically share a future dependent on mutual dialogue.

Consequently, when re-opened to the West toward the beginning of 1980s, the culturally unprepared China had little, if any, understanding of what the West was. It should be noted here that when the Communists headed by Deng practiced the open-door policy, China had its own objective of national rejuvenation through the Four Modernizations. It was a dream growing out of the disjunctions between the present and a radically rejected past, and between China's Middle Kingdom Complex and the Euro-American imaginary of globalization. Although colonial memory has kept China politically sensitive to Western domination and hegemony, the Chinese dream and the Western dream are now dependent on each other for survival in an age of interconnection. China needs the West (science, technology, economic theory and capital) to realize her West-inspired dream of survival through modernization. The West needs China (as a last political Other to be conquered) to give life to its global imaginary.

As a result, Chinese translation has been lost in textual, non-textual, literal and metaphorical senses. It is lost in its linguistic inability to bridge the cultural division between a largely pre-modern and a postmodern culture. It is lost in its inability to serve at once two non-dialogical masters: the politically oriented and the market-economy-minded. It is lost between its own academic and disciplinary role as a form of intercultural hermeneutics that transcends borders and boundaries, and its historically imposed obligations to utilitarian purposes. Caught in between all these contradictions, Chinese translation has been more destructive than constructive. As described above, in mid- and late 80s, with Western values as sticks striking the Communist leadership, translation in the New Era led to the Tian'anmen tragedy. Less than ten years later, it went to the other extreme, leading to the anti-West, no-saying movement.

Currently, Chinese translation is still disoriented under the pressure of a Western global, economy-as-theology imaginary backed by scientific, technological, military and economic power. As China translates with a utilitarian and occidentalist attitude, it is not moving to a third, hermeneutical space. Instead, it is being translated by what it is translating. The world of *Shanghai Babe* and of the student teachers interviewed is a clear sign of what translation in a global era dominated by Western values means. With

translation now commercialized, commodified and economized, the end of translation may have been masked.

Here, I am not in any way unmindful of the tremendous positive achievements translation has contributed to the Chinese language and culture in relation to the West. After all, textually translation is inevitably an act of negotiation, mediation, compromise and reconciliation. Neither is the author suggesting a fundamentalist view of the very original face of translation - 'the flower above all flowers,' which can hardly be identified at least from Chinese historical experiences. What I am concerned with is how translation might be better understood, from Chinese experience, in a way that can protect the integrity of translation. If this is a global era, it is also an age of translation.

2. Dimensions of Translation: Dream and Exile

What has been discussed so far points to the fact that translation has many dimensions. Chinese translation wears the faces of empire, fantasy, desire, amnesia, political and intellectual power games, subversion, resistance, hope for a third space, etc. And a translator can be a cultural mediator, 'match-maker,' betrayer, manipulator, appropriator, fighter, builder as well as destroyer. While there is no way to define 'definitely' what translation under this study means, all the aforementioned dimensions seem to revolve round two central themes, resonating throughout this present work: translation as a form of dreaming and translator as an exile.

a. Translation as a form of dreaming

First of all, translation might be best understood to be a form of dreaming. Such an analogy may lead to another interpretive maze of what a dream is. There is a proverb in Chinese: a person dreams at night what s/he thinks about during the day. The *Applied Dictionary of Chinese Characters* (Editor, 1985, p. 461) gives five definitions to *meng* (dream), two of which are place and family names. The *Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary* (1992, pp. 430-431) offers 18 definitions. Of course, there is Freud's psychoanalytic interpretations of dream. However, here *dream* is understood simply in its common sense summarized in the Oxford Dictionary (1985, p. 233): fantasy;

ideal or aspiration; beautiful or ideal person or thing; series of pictures or events in mind of sleeping person.

The analogy may help make sense of the various confusing, conflicting and contradictory phenomena in Chinese translation. Dreaming often involves desire for the Other of what a person feels s/he is not or does not have, a fantasy of what one may possess. Or it could involve fear of the unknown Other, aspiration for what one thinks could come true, a sense of lack which has to be overcome by any means, etc. It is an unconscious expression of what has been consciously suppressed. It is also a form of fulfillment of what one desires, fantasizes about, lacks, aspires to and idealizes. While dreams can be a series of pictures and events of beautiful, ideal people or things, they can also take the form of nightmares.

In terms of textual achievements, Chinese translation has remained a dream. The Jesuits translated out of their sense of lack, and for their dream of a universal Christianity. The converts, on the other hand, translated out of and for their own dream of the universal Celestial Empire, learning by fantasizing a perfect Christian world that had not been there before. In reality, as discussed earlier, neither the missionaries nor the converts successfully crossed the linguistic and cultural boundaries to a genuine understanding of what it was they were translating. Their translations, hardly equivalent to the originals, ended up at best in creating an image of the Other among a small part of Chinese, and at worst in evoking strong resentment and hostility of the West in people like Yang Guangxian.

The Yangwu translation was driven by an ideal of combining the good part of the West (science and technology) with the soul of the Middle Kingdom. The May 4th Movement was guided by a vision of modernity, which led to a cultural nightmare. Translation under Mao's leadership was based on an imagining of what the West was and a dream of what China was not. In actuality, all these translation movements as anti-colonization, self-colonization and de-colonization practice were driven by a desire and sense of lack created by their Western counterparts. China seemed to have never entered the truth - if there was any - of the West through translation.

What is important is that by understanding translation (both the act of translating and what is translated) as a dream, one might acquire a more open and hermeneutic view

of this human experience. No matter whether translation represents what one aspires to, lacks, fantasizes about or idealizes as what life can and should be, or what is suppressed under the existing hierarchical and patriarchal structure of the ego and superego, it is always an act of exploring human possibilities. The original text, the translator/interpreter, the translated text, and the reader are both participants in, while at the same time, interpreters of the dream. As well, every party engaged in this intercultural activity operates within his/her/its own limitations and prejudices.

Translation then can be seen as both an agent and a space for cultural deliberation, from which all the parties concerned move from their own positions to a shared understanding. In this case, none of the parties involved can claim to hold complete truth in hand. Instead, truth in translation becomes a dynamic intercultural form of mediation, negotiation and dialogue. Without translation, an original text has no identity for the others - it is nothing but a series of dead symbols unless brought to life through translation. The translator in turn finds his or her new identity as a living possibility from between the inevitable linguistic and cultural divides. The translated text will remain dead unless it is read and interpreted by the reader, who comes to a new horizon of life which would have never emerged without the translation. In a sense, translating, being translated and being (re)interpreted are all limited forms of self-projection, which are subject to constant hermeneutic correction and rectification.

b. Translation as exile in a third space

The issue of "the Self and the Other" as a common problem facing humankind in the age of globalization itself arises from mutual acts of translation. Maybe through such an understanding, the problem of Self and Other can be de-mystified, de-constructed and de-problematized. In this third space of translation, as it might be called, where none of the parties can claim the full truth of translation, the West, as chief translator of global modernity and now globalization, may see how it has translated the Other through its orientalist view and attitude. It may also now have an opportunity to see how it is interpreted and translated by the non-West. In particular, it may come to realize how much it has hurt and destroyed the Other. Meanwhile, the non-West can reflect on its own occidentalist view and attitude in translating the West. It can come to see how its

passive/aggressive way of translating the West has done harm to itself, and thus has harmed the conditions under which a sound translation is possible. In this way, what is dreamed by all the parties can become a more fully shared truth.

As discussed in previous chapters, a translator has had many names, including tongue man, match-maker, betrayer and mediator. In the discursive context of this study, a translator may be best understood to be a person in exile. This is because to translate means to stand *in between* different texts. It means a translator has to go deep into his or her own culture linguistically expressed, and through ambiguities of language into the target culture. Then the translator has to come out of both cultures through a kind of meditation¹ in order to achieve a translated form of understanding.

In the Chinese experience, starting from the period of Buddhist translation, true translators have been true exiles. For example, the great translator of Buddhism, Xuanzang, had exiled himself in order to gain access to the authentic Scriptures, spending seventeen years travelling around the homeland of Buddhism, India. He had piously purified himself of any worldly desires or attachments before he took up the work of Buddhist translation. Deeply aware of what translation involved, he set high standards for translators and translations. To protect the integrity of the original and translated texts, for instance, he divided his Yichang (institute of Buddhist translation) into eleven steps or departments (see Chen, 1992, pp. 43-44):

- (1) *yizhu*, the chief translator, who mastered both Chinese and Sanskrit as well as Buddhism, and could find solutions to questions and problems as they arose;
- (2) *zhengyi*, assistant to the chief translator, who examined both the original and translated text. Should any misinterpretation or mistranslation occur, he would discuss with the chief translator;
- (3) *zhengwen*, who looked to see if there was any error in the translation while the chief translator read aloud the Sanskrit original;
- (4) *duyu*, transliterating Sanskrit words into Chinese;
- (5) *bishou*, translating into Chinese the recorded Chinese transliterations according to the original sentence and syntactic structures;

¹ Meditation as a form of translation may be a good topic for study. Here please refer to "On Discursivity and Neurosis: Conditions of Possibility for (West) Discourse with Others" and "Journeying: A Meditation on Leaving Home and Coming Home" (Smith, 1999) for what it involves and means to meditate.

- (6) *zuiwen*, working on the translation done by the *bishou*, making appropriate adjustments according to the Chinese way of speech and writing;
- (7) *canyi*, checking the original text, and using the translated text to counter-check the original;
- (8) *kanding*, shortening long and winding sentences in the translated text;
- (9) *renwen*, refining and polishing the translated text from a rhetorical point of view;
- (10) *fanbai*, repeatedly chanting and reading aloud the translated text until it sounded orally natural;
- (11) *jianhu dashi*, imperial appointee reading the translated texts.

All these processes, which form a sharp contrast to how translation is now irresponsibly carried on within the market mentality, enabled Buddhist translations to be faithful to the original, expressive in Chinese and easily acceptable to the reader. Such highly mediated translations truly enlightened and enriched China in terms of language, literature, religion, philosophy, culture and politics, as discussed earlier. They are truly fruits of exiles.

In secular translation, Yan Fu is also exemplary of what being a translator might truly mean. As a 'product' of the anti-colonial Yangwu Movement, Yan was sent by the late Qing government to Britain to learn military science. But he transcended his imperial mission, and became the first to open Chinese eyes to the non-military aspects of the West. Highly versed in Chinese cultural tradition, he went deep into the spirit of Western culture, gained sharp insights into its downside in the light of its Chinese counterpart, and came out of it with a critical perspective of the modernity that was spreading worldwide. For several years after returning from England, Yan exiled himself, stayed away from worldly concerns, and was buried in his studies of Chinese and Western classics. Standing in between the two cultures, Yan contributed to his time the kind of intercultural understanding and mediation that only a genuinely bi-cultured soul could achieve.

The place of exile, lost in the disjuncture between the source and target cultures, is not a fun place for linguistic play, as postmodernists might suggest. Rather, it is a lonely, bitter, soul-searching journey into the meaning of existence within cultural otherness. Only by exiling oneself to a third space can a translator come to terms with

two radically different texts as permanent expressions of life. It was here that Yan Fu engaged himself in translation in a hermeneutic way without even knowing the word hermeneutics. He would not let go of one equivalent without thoroughly investigating the historical contexts in which the original word and the Chinese equivalent appeared. The fact that he sometimes spent a month deciding on a Chinese equivalent suggests the depth of the irreconcilability and un-nameability of the third space. However, it was right here that Yan was enlightened and awakened. He became the first Chinese to establish true, deep intertextual and intercultural relationships between China and the West through translation.

The space of exile is not a space for fame, wealth or any other kind of worldly gain that might serve as a means to overcome one's sense of lack or insecurity. Instead, it is a position from which a translator approaches intercultural truth while shaking off the burden of worldly concerns. Indeed, because the awakened translator has many seemingly contradictory faces, he or she tends to lose favour of either the source or the target culture. For instance, Yan was full of contradictions.

As the first to introduce the theory of evolution, Yan was an evolutionist. However, in his writings and commentaries is also found the strong traditional Chinese idea of cyclicity. Meanwhile, he was at the same time a strong believer in the nineteenth century Spencerian philosophy of agnosticism. Therefore, although his translations of the theory of evolution inspired Chinese progressive-historicists to radically revolutionize and remold China according to their fixed dream of the higher order of evolution, Yan himself remained critical of the idea. This was particularly true of his views of the May 4th Movement (Zhang, 1998).

Although in his earlier stage, Yan was one of the first to advocate the superiority of Western civilization, he was also one of the first to point out and criticize the downside of that civilization. As Zhang (*ibid.* Translation mine) wrote:

He (Yan) thought modern Western civilization was far from "perfectly developed" ... He even believed it "was going farther and farther away from what it could be accomplishing." ... Yan Fu was always highly cautious about the negative effects of modernity. In his later years, he put the blame on the theory of evolution. (Yan wrote): "Since the rise of the theory of evolution, all the races all over the

world have regarded it as their highest heavenly duty to exploit and develop. Therefore, those (peoples) who have accumulated great material wealth and military power in the last two or three hundred years are killing off other peoples for their own material gains." It should be pointed out that it was before WWI that Yan had come to this understanding of the serious problems with modernity through his first-hand observation and experience of the British life at the height of Victorian period. This is evidence of Yan's constant intellectual independence and autonomy...

Also, as Zhang commented, Yan was one of the first to realize that China had been dragged into global modernity, and that what was happening in China was not an isolated incident unique to China. As Yan said: "The great change is unprecedented not only for China... Its immensity along with its alienness is actually spreading to all the continents in the world" (in Zhang, 1998. Translation mine). In the face of this global trend, Yan encouraged his compatriots to adapt to the changes through reform, as described earlier. However, as an empiricist and sceptic, he did not believe human history was a linear progression to a foreseeable and fixed end. He did not believe China was incapable of doing anything about the downside of modernity. He resorted to Confucianism and Taoism for insights while fighting against the May 4th Movement which seemed to be radically destroying the present for an unknown future.

As a result, in the West, Yan has been regarded as an advocate of wholesale Westernization (see Zhang, *ibid.*). Because of his translations, he has been criticized as a 'conservative' and 'reactionary' in China. Along with other moderate and critical translators such as Hu Shi, Yan was politically 'swept onto the rubbish heap of history,' to use a saying popular during the Cultural Revolution. However, as Zhang suggested, Yan was also a universalist in an intercultural sense. He was constantly trying to break barriers and boundaries between cultures. Through his hermeneutic efforts, he was constantly trying to bring Chinese and Western cultures into a reciprocal relationship. On the one hand, for a long time, Yan has been misunderstood, misrepresented and wronged partly due to the way in which translation has been understood and practiced. On the other hand, as China is becoming more disoriented under modernization and globalization, Yan is being rediscovered and recovered from the 'rubbish heap of history' to give intellectual guidance. A true exile as translator would not forever be lost.

3. Implications for Curriculum Studies

Such an understanding of translation and translator as briefly illustrated above has strong curricular implications not only for China but perhaps also for the postcolonial and globalizing world. It introduces the issue of translation as a form of curriculum inquiry. Without doubt, this topic, which involves both the internationalization and reconceptualization of curriculum, is too huge to be addressed in any detail here. What I intend to do in this section is to sketch briefly some implications for curriculum studies at two, inter-related levels: 1) to understand curriculum as translation, and 2) to understand translation as curriculum.

As far as curriculum as translation is concerned, the West and non-West are now living in an intellectual world of intertextuality as a result of translation, a world of 'translations of translations of translations' (Paz, in Shulte & Biguenet, 1992). In his reflections on curriculum understanding, Pinar (2000, p. 398) notes that "... curriculum inquiry is not a knowledge-producing process. Necessarily a field so conceived must take from others; it is a field of translation and application." As I have said elsewhere, the very Chinese equivalent for 'curriculum,' 课程(*kecheng*), is a loan word from Japanese. It is a Chinese word the Japanese created when they were translating Euro-American writings during the Meiji Restoration of the nineteenth century. But the two characters, 课(*ke*) and 程(*cheng*), like thousands of other Chinese characters, were imported to Japan from China a thousand years before. Similarly, the English word *curriculum* is not of Anglo-Saxon origin. It is a loan word from Latin. In a sense, the etymologies of "curriculum" in all the national languages in the world may form a 'grand narrative' of how curriculum has come to be what it is today (Guo, 2001).

On the one hand, centuries of mutual translation have already internationalized curriculum, in one way or another. On the other hand, curriculum as a field of design, development, instruction and evaluation remains largely national and, in some cases, nationalistic, as Chinese experience of translation shows. This condition requires a kind of reconceptualization of curriculum that can address the question of what curriculum means in a global era.

Efforts have been made in recent years to problematize and internationalize curriculum through international comparisons, global education and peace education (see Pinar et al., 1995; Pinar ed., 2000). Since 1999, the *JCT: Journal of Curriculum Theorizing* has dedicated a section to international curriculum discourses. In his introduction to this new section, D. G. Smith (1999) describes a number of aspects of global phenomena that are challenging curriculum studies. In particular, Smith is here calling on curriculum theorists to move beyond "post" scholarship to acquire a kind of Intercivilizational Dialogue.

However, "to understand curriculum internationally is too large and too complex an undertaking" (Pinar, 1995, p. 792). Take my own experience. Before coming to North America, as deputy director of the Department, I had been, for over two years, responsible for a systematic curricular engineering project as part of the ongoing national higher education reform. Its aim was to move away from the old to a totally new paradigm so as to create a new curricular framework that would be more compatible with China's new socialist market economy. Within China's political and educational discourses, that was tantamount to curriculum reconceptualization (in Western wording) under the pressure of global competitiveness.

As I reflected on the project (JCT, 15:1, p. 69), for China this was a time of anxiety, frustration and despair. What does it mean to reform curriculum? What is involved in creating a new curriculum in a semi-postcolonial and semi-modern culture that is a mixture of Confucian pedagogical remains, Daoist ideas about the way of human life, Marxist notions of social equality and justice and ex-Soviet Union's rigid statist policies? How is it possible to address the general political, socio-psychological reality of fierce competition through education when there is limited access to the most desired positions in the existing system of social structure?

As I look back now on that experience, which was part of the reason why I came to North America, I realize that the Chinese curricular reform project, as I witnessed it, was doomed to fail. The reform effort was conditioned by a hidden curriculum combination of two forces: Communist political control and global competition. It was based on the logic of preparation for political and economic wars against the West under the Communist leadership. It was part of the continuing occidentalism and nationalistic

way of translating the West, whose 'truth' had never been achieved through translation, as this study has shown. It was really a re-translation of curriculum as a political, bureaucratic and anti-colonial text. Inevitably, it could not jump out of an entrapment within the Western technical-rational paradigm it had borrowed from the West.

Curriculum inquiry is now inexorably opened to international, intercultural and intercivilizational mediation. What insights, then, could be drawn from the present study, in terms of curriculum as translation?

First of all, we may have to return to what Paz (1971, p. 152) said: "When we learn to speak, we are learning to translate; the child who asks his mother the meaning of a word is really asking her to translate the unfamiliar term into the simple words he already knows." In this sense, all curriculum work involves translating something unknown into something we feel we know. From this perspective, while curriculum work in China has often lost its own sight because of its different translations of the West for different purposes, the Euro-American history of curriculum since the 19th century is also one of translating the Rest vs. the West.

There is a fundamental difference between Western imperial, logocentric translation of the Rest and Chinese defensive translation of the West as a means of survival. Still when empire starts to translate back, as postcolonial studies says it does, the West is also 'lost' - lost between the 'real' and the 'gaze,' in Lacanian terms. When one tries to achieve the 'real' as Self by objectifying everything else, what is thought to be objectified begins to gaze back, and the Self as real slips away. The Euro-American epistemological revolution in the form of Post scholarships seems to point to this loss.

Thus, within the discourse of this study, translators in both China and the West can be described as lost in translating each other. At this historical moment, it might be time for translators to self-exile to a third space where sounder translation can be achieved on a more shared basis. In that space, curriculum inquiry will be a form of intercultural mediation, negotiation and dialogue. Since no party can claim to hold the full truth in hand, translation as curriculum becomes truth finding 'together.' All parties engaged in curriculum inquiry will come to see how one has hurt the other through logocentric or sinocentric (or Afrocentric, see Pinar ed., 1995, p. 795) ways of translating the other. One may hope that a new, more constructive form of curriculum inquiry -

curriculum as intercultural and intercivilizational mediation and reconciliation for international peace and harmony - could emerge.

How can this understanding of curriculum as translation be translated and applied in any specific instance? Again take Chinese experience of translation as an example. Modern Chinese curriculum as systems of knowledge, school subjects, educationally, culturally, politically and socially institutionalized practices, has involved different versions of Chinese translation of the West in particular historical periods. It started with missionary schools, and was dominated by the American technical-rational paradigm (see Guo, 2001). This paradigm was pushed to the extreme during 1950s when China was incorporating the Soviet Union system of education. Since 1980s, curriculum in China has become increasingly Westernized, with textbooks, forms of exams and methods of evaluation being directly imported from the West (see Wu & Wang, 2001, online). Not only English, but even the course of Chinese language instruction itself is following the model of Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL). Everything is now fragmented, departmentalized, technicalized and informationized. The technical-rational paradigm under the hidden curriculum of capitalism (now globalization), coupled with the 'hidden curriculum' of political control, has put Chinese curriculum in a highly contradictory situation.

Nearly all Chinese students are learning by way of translating the global language of English. And all the students majoring in English have to take a compulsory course in translation. The national standard textbook of English-Chinese translation (edited by Zhang et al., 1987) begins by devoting one and a half pages to the importance of translation, which says as much that translation is important to the great course of modernization. It contains two pages surveying the Chinese history of translation, which is so brief that in fact only a very limited view of history can be found. The main part deals with general methods and techniques of translation, which is so technical that no meaningful language, as the full expression of human life, is present. Consequently, in this course, little is learned or taught in a way that can represent the wider implications of Chinese translation I have tried to identify.

Here, we can move beyond a curriculum of translation as a bureaucratic text by reconceptualizing translation as curriculum. From the text of Chinese translation of the West, many new dimensions can be introduced to translation as a course.

First of all, a critical perspective on Chinese translation of the West in terms of curricular contents and pedagogy. This perspective can inform learners not only about Western orientalist translation of China (missionary translation, for instance) but also, and more importantly, Chinese occidental translation of the West. It may help towards developing a new understanding of translation that transcends national and nationalistic views to achieve more international, intercultural and intertextual insights. It may advance Chinese translation from the sinocentric and anti-West mentality and attitude to a more open and constructive space of cultural reconciliation with the West.

Secondly, the political and ideological dimensions of translation illustrated in this thesis can help students and teachers understand more clearly the negative side of translation when it is used as a radical, violent and destructive force. This may help young Chinese draw some lessons from more than a century of radical revolutions and rebellions, to achieve better insights into cultural re-construction as a first step towards any possible intercultural reconciliation.

Thirdly, the ambiguous, slippery, porous and permeable nature of language as textually analyzed in this thesis may lead learners of translation to this awareness: on the one hand, no translation or translator can claim authority over what is translated, since translation is, in the final analysis, guided by dreaming. On the other hand, language can not be restrained by any particular time and space. Linguistic and cultural divides as seen between Chinese and English in this thesis point to the openness, rather than closed-ness, of Chinese language and culture.

Fourthly, insofar as identity (personal, local and national) is a linguistic construct, this awareness of language may help learners understand that identity of the Self vs. Other is constantly in translation. It is the extent to which one's own language can not translate others that prompts a sense of who one is. The age of globalization as an age of translation requires each and every one of us learn and learn to translate languages of others, who then mirror our own limits and possibilities.

Last but not least, the various roles of a translator as seen in this thesis point to the normative and ethical position a translator has to take. A translator as a bearer of his or her own culture and an interpreter of other cultures can not be neutral. S/He has to take positions in his or her translation. To be a truly responsible translator, it seems that a person needs to enter a kind of spiritual exile, a third space in between the source and target languages and cultures. Hermeneutically, a translator comes in contact with what is to be translated inevitably with his or her own linguistic and cultural limitations and prejudices. But the true contribution of a translator lies in how much he or she respects the integrity of the original text through soul-searching efforts in that intercultural ground called the third space. If *living* can be described as *translating* in a global era, every one is a translator. A responsible translator is one who starts, from his or her limitations and prejudices, to build international and intercultural understanding, peace and harmony through exile.

If curriculum is the *course* of humanity, understanding translation and translation education is a course along which to explore where we - different peoples of the world - have come from, where we are, and where we should and can go, in an age of globalization.

4. Epilogue

From China to Canada, from Lethbridge to Edmonton, from the time when the present study first flashed in my mind to this point when the thesis is coming to an open ending, a lot has happened to my personal life of living both in between and across languages and cultures. For hours and hours over the past four years, I have been looking into the computer screen, trying to translate myself out of the disjuncture between my past in China and my present in the West. I have been dreaming about some meaning in a life of uncertainties, incommensurabilities and a vague hope of a livable identity. Now, the blank screen seems to be gazing back at me.

What has become of me? On the positive side, from a visiting scholar to a student, my life changed dramatically from being an onlooker to more or less an insider of the society I have been physically living in. The Old Man River, whose access was denied to me by the roaring wind and rattle snakes, gave way to the North Saskatchewan River, a

free space for physical and intellectual exploration. As a student in a supportive, caring and academically stimulating learning environment, I enjoyed taking courses in curriculum theory, pedagogy, educational philosophy, research approaches, globalization, etc. Meanwhile I have been able to focus my particular attention upon the relationship between language education and culture, and intercultural implications within the larger context of globalization. A relationship between my past and present seems to have been naturally, spontaneously and reflectively translated out of the day-to-day life in the new culture.

At the same time, I have participated in a number of research projects. In particular, the Culture and Teaching Project has offered me a window to what education in an immigration culture means. Perhaps the future of the globalizing world is being shaped by the multicultural approach to education in North America. This approach might be enriched by some insights into how and to what extent the Word of the dominant culture - the Hidden Curriculum - can be translated by marginal and marginalized cultures. To a certain extent, as discussed earlier, the logocentric Word means nothing unless its truth could be hermeneutically established through mediation with other, heterogeneous linguistic systems. In that process, the Word will find its new life as a sharable, shared, and therefore translatable vision of humanity.

As a coordinator of the Intercultural Dialogue Project working with both international as well as Canadian students, I had the opportunity to see how difficult the Canadian way of academic and daily life can be as translated by foreign students. As Chinese translator and pilot-project coordinator of a worldwide Olympic Education project, I have been led into the complexities of an intercultural curriculum experiment. As conductor of an informal seminar called "Chinese Culture through Chinese Characters" with a group of professors and graduate students, I could sense the hope of how the alien Chinese Character might be interculturally mediated and translated into the Word. My experiences as a Graduate Representative to the Department Council, and later President of the Michener Park Community Association have helped me understand complexities of living within cultural diversities.

Also, I had the honour to serve as a section editor for *JCT: Journal of Curriculum Theorizing* (International Curriculum Discourses), which offered me opportunities to

form a picture of internationalization of curriculum in North America. I have been involved in a China ESL project of textbook development and teacher training. My work in this project has been a profoundly challenging experience of intercultural mediation between two radically different curricular and pedagogical systems of English education. It may have deeper inter-educational and intercultural significance than I have so far realized. Together with writing papers on English education in China, I kept translating David Geoffrey Smith's book *Globalization and Postmodern Pedagogy*. Published in 2000 by the Education Science Press in Beijing, the book received an unexpectedly warm response from Chinese readers, who are trying to understand their educational reality in an age of globalization.

All these and other experiences have been related to linguistic and cultural translation. They tell me I am living in a globalizing world being rapidly conceptualized through translation. Wherever I go or whatever I do, I am translating, literally and figuratively, which points to the essential condition of living and being. Hamlet's question seems to have been recast: "to translate or not to translate, that is the question." Clearly for me, to be is to translate.

On the other hand, although I have come to accept and live with this reality, knowing that there is no escape from it, to be a translator means to be always on a road in exile. For instance, although my wife and daughter have joined me and we have settled to a normal life here in Canada, I can not be sure if I could call it a home. Although I seldom dream of going back to China now, knowing that I could never return to where I thought I was, still deep inside I can feel the gap between dream and reality. For instance, to find my new identity as an educator, I succeeded in translating Smith's book into Chinese. However, textually, many linguistic and cultural divides are still there. I could not find or invent a Chinese equivalent to the key word "identity." Instead, I had to use the general word *shenfen* with a long footnote. Maybe it is symbolic of *identity*, whose untranslatable meaning is there as a footnote in translation. However, like Western words in Yan Fu's translations, its true equivalent may one day be developed and move from the margin to the centre in the text of Chinese translations of the West.

From the discursive context of the present thesis, an absolute Chinese equivalent of "identity" may remain a dream. If it was to be radically invented, it might mean a

disastrous nightmare, as in May 4th translation. Here, I find comfort in a Taoist saying: "The great sound is soundless, and the great form is formless." True translation may be non-translation, although translation is about identity.

In fact, according to Qian (Editorial Board, 1984b, p. 267), the Chinese word 译 (*yi*, translate) is etymologically derived from the archaic word 囿, which is pronounced after 譌 as *e*, composed of 口 (*kou*, mouth) and 化 (*hua*, transformation), and literally refers to a bird used by bird-hunters to induce other birds of the same feather. It means "to transmit languages of barbarians, birds and animals." It acts as a 媒 (*mei*, medium or match-maker) to 诱 (*you*, lure) birds and animals as well as human beings into knowledge and understanding of one another. In the process of transmission, it inevitably falls into 讹 (*e*, error or mistake). However, it ultimately leads to mutual 化 (*hua*), transformation. In fact, said Qian, in ancient Chinese, 譌, 讹, 囿 and 化 are one and the same word/character. 译 (translate or translation), 诱 (lure or temptation), 媒 (medium or act as a match-maker), 囿 (bait or cajole), 讹 (err or error) and 化 (transform or transformation) are different aspects and dimensions of translation.

The highest form of translation is therefore transformation, which means a translation would not read like a translation, and a translator would not be what he or she is understood to be today. Given the linguistic and cultural chasms between Chinese and English discussed throughout the thesis, that height of translation seems to be impossible to achieve. However, translation is essentially a bait luring the reader into learning to speak and read the language of the original, as Qian commented. In this sense, it might lead to non-translation. But before the world might be globalized to a point where no language barrier exists, translation will continue to be an erring and stumbling language of humanity, as the creators of the Chinese characters foresaw thousands of years ago.

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Appendix 1: Letter of Invitation

LETTER OF INVITATION

Yangsheng Guo
Department of Secondary Education
University of Alberta
Edmonton, AB, Canada
T6G 2G5
Phone: 780-492-0749 (W)
780-431-1518 (H)
Fax: 780-492-9402
Email: yguo@ualberta.ca

August 28, 2000

Dear _____,

My name is Yangsheng Guo, currently a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada.

I am in the process of doing my Ph.D. thesis titled "Chinese Translation of the West: A History for a Global Era." The thesis is about how the ongoing massive Chinese translation of the West is changing, as it has been, the Chinese identity in its relation with the rest of the world in this age of globalization. The aim and purpose is to understand the nature, process and patterns governing China-West cultural exchange from the perspective of translation. In particular, the question translation as curriculum practice will be addressed.

Part of this thesis involves research and investigation into the current situation of teaching, understanding, interpreting, reading and practicing translating Western, especially English texts, on both textual and cultural levels. I would like very much to have the honour and pleasure to work with you to find out about the following things: How is translation being conducted, accepted, interpreted and internalized in China? How is translation being taught and learned in terms of curriculum and pedagogy? Is there a sense of cultural identity and historic consciousness in current translation education and practice? What do English learners translate out of their learning, reading and doing translation? In short, what does contemporary Chinese translation of the West tell us of the future relationship between China and the West, in educational terms?

Specifically, I would like to request your involvement in the following ways:

1. Allow me to interview you for about one hour. The interview will be audio- and video-recorded.
2. Participate in two focus group meetings with myself, seven other students and one

professor. The meetings will be audio recorded.

While some findings of this project may be included in my ongoing Ph.D. thesis, complete confidentiality and anonymity will be guaranteed in accordance with University of Alberta Ethics Review Committee. Personal information will be kept strictly confidential and your identities anonymous unless otherwise agreed to be disclosed by any participant in a letter of consent. Please refer to the Consent Form for more information about ethical concerns.

You are warmly and respectfully invited to this project. Your contribution will be vital not only to my research but also to the understanding of the way of China's engagement with the West, which profoundly affects the uncertain future of globalization.

I look forward to your participation. Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely yours,

Yangsheng Guo
Ph.D. Candidate

Appendix II: Consent Form

CONSENT FORM

I, _____, have read the letter of invitation by Yangsheng Guo dated August 28, 2000, requesting my participation in the project Chinese Translation of the West.

I agree to participate with the understanding that:

- 1. I may withdraw from the research aspect of the course at any time without penalty;
- 2. I may request that all or some of the data collected be omitted at my request;
- 3. My name will not be used, at my request, in any reports/presentations/discussion of this research;
- 4. Research findings will not be shown to anyone outside of the group of participants and Guo's Ph.D. examining committee without permission being granted;
- 5. The data I contribute will be subject to the same procedures and constraints as outlined in the letter.

Signature

Date

University of Alberta Library



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